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This book treats the history of the English criminal trial jury from its 
origins to the eve of the Victorian reforms in the criminal law. It consists 
of eight free-standing essays on important aspects of that history and a 
conclusion. Each chapter addresses the phenomenon that has come to be 
known as "jury nullification," the exercise of jury discretion in favor of 
a defendant whom the jury nonetheless believes to have committed the 
act with which he is charged. Historically, some instances of nullification 
reflect the jury's view that the act in question is not unlawful, while in 
other cases the jury does not quarrel with the law but believes that the 
prescribed sanction is too severe. Order is imposed on the book not by 
time but by a unity of concern. This approach trades the continuity of a 
comprehensive narrative for a more detailed treatment of issues and 
events of particular significance. 
With one exception, these essays are not concerned with establishing 
the fact of nullification. No one who has studied the history of criminal 
law doubts that on occasion this practice occurs. (Indeed, the practice is 
a central topic in many of the important studies of the social history of 
crime that have appeared in recent years.) What interests me most is not 
the persistence of nullification but its imp_act through time on the 
substantive law, on the administration of the law, and on the ways in 
which Englishmen-officials, jurists, and laymen-thought about both the 
jury and the law. It is on these aspects that I focus, and it is that focus that 
makes the book (at least in the author's mind) a general social and 
intellectual history of an important element of English criminal law. 
In writing this book I have been aided by scholarship on the history of 
criminal law, and at times I draw heavily on such work. Some of my most 
important intellectual debts are to those with whom I disagree. This will 
be clear at a number of points where I state how my own view of the 
criminal law-of its administration and place in English culture-differs 
from that of those who have gone before. I hope that the reader will be 
stimulated by these disagreements and will find my citations to the recent 
scholarship that relates to each chapter useful. More generally, I am 
aware that the story I am telling cannot be told fully without a great deal 
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more attention to many matters that, given the particular focus of each 
chapter, I barely touch. If this book provides a framework within which 
broader discussion of the subjects I treat can be placed, or if it stimulates 
scholars interested in those subjects to test the plausibility of the 
framework I advance, it will have served its purpose. 
The separate chapters in this volume represent different styles of 
historical writing. The problem I examine is best approached through the 
study of official and lay commentary on the jury specifically, and on the 
criminal law in general. That literature is, of course, very sparse before 
the sixteenth century. Thus, early chapters draw upon medieval trial 
records, in the traditional mode of legal history, whereas the later 
chapters depend on texts of a kind familiar to readers of political and 
intellectual history. Moreover, parts of both early and late chapters are 
best described as historical sociology of the kind that characterizes much 
recent writing on the history of crime. By and large, I have not sought to 
minimize these differences in approach and tone. 
Some readers may find the transitions both in subject matter and 
approach more than a little jarring. We are used to such differences 
between books, not between chapters in one book by a single author. My 
own view is that the analysis of most historical problems requires a 
variety of approaches and that historians may fail to exploit their subjects 
fully if they insist on a single approach or a satisfyingly consistent voice. 
This is particularly true with regard to legal history; for the development 
of legal doctrines and institutions is in part a matter of internal logic, in 
part a matter of the relationship between institutions and society, and in 
part a matter of pervasive cultural attitudes. But there is, I concede, 
another, more personal point. Simply put, I enjoy trying my hand at 
different kinds of historical scholarship. The justification I have given 
stands, but it is a fair criticism that, where there may be conflict between 
my readers' sensibilities and my own, I have consistently erred on the 
side of self-indulgence. 
The essentially hybrid nature of this book is revealed in yet another 
way. I have tried to present a unified (if tentative and partial) account of 
the history of the criminal trial jury that will profit specialists and lay 
readers alike. The former will find some of the bridge material un-
necessary; the latter will not wish to pursue some specific subjects quite 
so far as the text and copious footnotes pursue them. It is hoped that 
readers will make the use of this book that their personal interests dictate 
without feeling it necessary to focus on material presented for the 
convenience of other readers. 
A final note: The history of the criminal law, long (and I sometimes 
think, mercifully) neglected, now boasts nearly as many scholars as there 
ever have been justices of the peace. Even criminals undetected in their 
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own day, long since dead and resting peacefully, are hunted down, 
classified, quantified, and correlated-treated less respectfully, all in all, 
than those caught, convicted, hanged, and dissected. In the next several 
years, scores of articles and upward of a dozen books will be published 
dealing with the English criminal law before 1850. The present study 
makes reference to many recent and forthcoming works, but it attempts 
no definitive listing of the literature in this rapidly changing field. Instead, 
I have been guided throughout by an effort to make use of, and to cite, 
those very recent works that bear most importantly on the episodes in the 
history of the criminal trial jury that I treat in greatest detail. 
II 
Most of the chapters in this volume are self-contained and can be read on 
their own. To aid the reader whose interests are selective I have tried to 
place each essay within the context of the unfolding story that the book 
relates. This necessarily entails some repetition for those who read the 
story straight through. 
A brief summary of contents may serve to guide those whose concerns 
lie in a specific period or aspect of legal history, or whose curiosity about 
the jury, though more general, falls short of an obsession. Chapter 1 is an 
introduction to the institutional setting of the medieval criminal trial jury. 
Resting almost exclusively on secondary writings, it offers an interpreta-
tion of how changing institutional arrangements paved the way for the 
jury to play an active, albeit de facto, discretionary role. Jury discretion 
was most common in cases of sudden, unplanned homicides and in thefts 
that did not involve physical violence or housebreaking. In these cases, 
which had been settled by "composition" in pre-Angevin times, juries 
frequently manipulated the fact-finding process to prevent the imposition 
of capital punishment. They thus blunted the impact of the Angevin 
reforms, accommodating those reforms to long-held social concepts of 
liability and just deserts. Chapter 2 further explores this subject through 
an extensive empirical analysis of jury behavior in homicide cases. The 
law of homicide is the focus partly because of the relative richness of the 
extant evidence and partly because in homicide cases, unlike theft, jury 
discretion reflected opposition not merely to the level of sanction but also 
to the rules of the substantive law itself. Although homicides decreased 
over the centuries covered in this study, in the medieval period they were 
common and made up a very large percentage of the court agenda. As I 
shall show, the jury's role in homicide cases shaped the way people 
thought about what the jury was supposed to do. The influence of the 
jury's role in homicide long outlived the period of frequent homicide 
prosecutions and was felt in other areas of the law. 
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The impact of jury behavior on the evolution of the substantive law in 
the medieval period is the subject of Chapter 3. This important aspect of 
the relationship between law and society is one to which historians have 
seldom attended and one which readers not trained in law understandably 
find very difficult. I have tried to minimize the difficulties while giving the 
history of homicide doctrine its due. My hypothesis is that the relation-
ship between law and society was one of constant interaction: the 
evolution of jury discretion reflected the influence of legal institutions and 
ideas that were themselves at least in part the by-product of jury-based 
discretion. Moreover, one of the few indices of the societal reaction to 
jury behavior in the medieval period is the approach that officials who 
were aware of that behavior took in the elaboration and application of the 
law. Although the central subject matter of Chapters 2 and 3 is the law of 
homicide, I have drawn inferences from developments in that sphere to 
elucidate similar developments in theft, the other common felony where 
jury discretion was frequent. I also discuss the relationship between the 
particular kind of jury behavior that I am describing in Part I and the 
administration of the medieval criminal law generally. Jury nullification of 
the law of sanctions, I suggest, was accommodated by authorities who did 
not foresee the long-run implications of their acquiescence in this rela-
tively benign form of jury-based intervention. 
Chapter 4 deals with changes both in procedure and in substantive law 
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These changes involved 
the decline of the self-informing jury, the rise of the prosecution, and the 
development, for the first time in English history, of effective means for 
controlling the criminal trial jury. The question I am concerned with is 
how these developments affected the role and impact of jury-based 
discretion. The chapter argues that authorities used their new powers 
selectively and, having to some extent tamed the jury, continued to 
acquiesce in a substantial amount of jury discretion which the bench saw 
as harmless. The result was that while authorities provoked a reaction to 
their attempts at jury control in some kinds of cases, for the most part 
they further sanctified the ancient tradition of jury "law-finding." This 
argument requires me to establish the relationships among many early 
modern developments in the administration of the criminal law. Thus, 
Chapter 4, like Chapter l, may be read as an interpretive overview and 
introduction to the two chapters that follow it. 
Those chapters (5 and 6) deal with the emergence and maturation of the 
claim that the jury has the right to "find law." These matters require an 
understanding of how seventeenth-century writers viewed both the his-
tory of the jury and the place of the criminal trial jury in the English 
constitution. Chapter 5 focuses on Interregnum (mainly Leveller) ideas 
concerning law-finding. I discuss those ideas against the background of 
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the 1649 and 1653 trials of John Lilburne, and in the light of the tracts that 
those trials provoked. Although some pamphleteers argued against the 
legitimacy of the judiciary and for comprehensive jury law-finding, by the 
mid-1650s the dominant pro-jury position accepted the judiciary as the 
ordinary interpreters of the law. The jury's law-finding role was to nullify 
judicial instructions in those (presumably rare) cases where the instruc-
tions, in the eyes of the jury, clashed with the "true" English common 
law. Chapter 6 deals with Restoration thought regarding the right of the 
jury to be free from judicial coercion. The centerpiece of the chapter's 
lengthy narrative is Chief Justice Vaughan's famous opinion in Bushel's 
Case (1670-71), in which Vaughan held such coercion to be unlawful. I 
attempt to establish the relationship between the law-finding tradition and 
Vaughan's opinion. To put it simply, Vaughan steered clear of that 
tradition, but his opinion was subsequently glossed and appropriated by 
late-Restoration proponents of the law-finding jury. These two chapters 
introduce a major focus of the second half of the book, the ideological 
relationship between the jury's "merciful" role in routine felonies, where 
the community's quarrel was rather more with the capital sanction than 
with the definition of crimes, and the jury's more dramatic nullifying role 
in some political cases, where elements in the community viewed the law 
itself as an aspect of governmental tyranny. 
The last part of this book carries the story down to the early nineteenth 
century. Chapter 7 begins with another overview, a brief discussion of 
changes in the administration of the criminal law in the century following 
the Glorious Revolution. There is now a substantial literature dealing with 
the criminal trial and the administration of the criminal law in the 
eighteenth century, and my own work ought to be read in conjunction 
with that literature. The emphasis in Chapter 7 is on the way in which 
some contemporaries viewed the role of the jury in routine felonies. As is 
well known, many English jurists and lay writers who were influenced by 
the Continental movement for law reform became critics of jury-based 
mitigation. Yet, if I am correct, these critics, reflecting certain distinc-
tively English ideas about the criminal law, lent some support to jury-
based mitigation even as they argued for a criminal justice system in 
which such jury behavior would be unnecessary. 
In Chapter 8, the last of the essay chapters, I address the political and 
legal struggle in the eighteenth century surrounding the law of seditious 
libel. The celebrated criminal libel trials of this period became the 
occasion for a wide-ranging debate over the jury's right to find law as well 
as fact. Passions ran high, and both official and lay commentators were 
involved. I pay particular attention to the impact on this debate of the jury 
nullification in more routine cases that authorities countenanced with 
relative equanimity. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
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manner in which the centuries-long tradition of jury nullification influ-
enced the development of what might be called the constitutional role of 
the criminal trial jury. I attempt to bring together two problems that are 
too often kept separate in historical scholarship: the daily administration 
of the law in routine cases, and the more episodic, and epiphenomenal, 
"political" trials that generated far-reaching claims about the rights of 
Englishmen. 
Chapter 9 concludes this history with a brief commentary on the 
relationship between the role of the jury and the partial reform of the law 
of sanctions in mid-nineteenth-century England. I link this commentary to 
my concluding discussion and summary of the main themes of this book 
on the relationship between social attitudes, legal institutions, and legal 
doctrine. Here, as at earlier points, I assess the influence of the history of 
the jury on contemporary views regarding criminal justice and discuss the 
unity implicit in the centuries-long dialectic that I have traced. 
III 
Jury nullification, the concept that lies at the heart of the various essays 
in this book, may take on a variety of meanings or shades of meaning. In 
some of its senses, the jury's war with the law and the judges who 
represent the law is a strong conflict, and in other senses it is much less 
so. Although I try to keep the different meanings clear as I write, I believe 
the reader will find that a general discussion of the term is a helpful 
prelude to the substantive chapters. 
Jury nullification in its strongest sense occurs when the jury recognizes 
that a defendant's act is proscribed by the law but acquits because it does 
not believe the act should be proscribed. The behavior, in other words, is 
not criminal in the eyes of the jury, and the jury is willing to assert its view 
in the face of what it is told by the judge. An intermediate form of 
nullification reflects the jury's view that although the act proved is 
properly classified as criminal, it is within a class of acts that do not 
deserve the punishment prescribed for them. Such nullification serves to 
protect defendants from punishments that are regarded as excessive. A 
relatively weak form of nullification reflects the jury's view that although 
the act proved is criminal and falls in a class of acts that may well deserve 
the prescribed punishment, such punishment is inappropriate in the case 
at hand. When nullification is in this way ad hoc, a defendant, because of 
personal characteristics or the particular features of the case at hand, will 
escape the generally fair sanctions that a concededly just law prescribes. 
Nullification begins in the medieval period with jury mitigation in 
routine felonies. It appears that the jury was in part disagreeing with 
substantive legal rules and in part merely mitigating the sanction provided 
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by law. Because of the available data, I pay most attention to the subset 
of legally nonpardonable homicides that juries characterized as pardon-
able self defense. The cases in which jurors so characterized killings, and 
thereby preserved defendants from death, fall primarily into the inter-
mediate category of systemic nullification of the law of sanctions but also, 
no doubt, contain instances of the other two types. It appears that the 
typical situation was one in which death was thought too severe a penalty 
for a wrongful, but victim-provoked, killing. In other cases of victim 
provocation the act was probably viewed as blameless in the first 
instance, and in still other cases there was an ad hoc quality since the 
defendant apparently benefited from his good reputation. Nullification in 
the case of theft, the other common capital felony, appears almost always 
to be systemic rejection of the capital sanction or an ad hoc merciful 
acquittal. The jurors had no quarrel with the laws protecting property, but 
they apparently believed that some kinds of theft should not be punished 
capitally and that specific defendants or those thieving in certain, special 
circumstances did not deserve to die. While the data permit us to identify 
such law-evading leniency, they do not always allow us to be certain of 
the jurors' motives. It is also probably the case that in some instances in 
which the jury appears to have been conforming, despite their sentiments, 
to the law, they were in fact engaging in ad hoc harshness. Thus, the 
refusal to return a life-sparing verdict for the kind of crime that usually 
elicited one may reflect disapproval of the defendant rather than the 
fortuitous assembly of twelve men who approved of the law or who, while 
disapproving, believed they should defer to it. 
Later chapters of the book analyze jury nullification in political cases, 
and so engage true, or "strong" nullification. The state's problem is not 
that the jury disbelieves the proof offered in support of an indictment; 
rather, it is that the jury does not believe that the behavior the indictment 
alleges should be a crime. One major theme of these later chapters is the 
interrelationship between, on the one hand, systemic and ad hoc nullifica-
tion of capital sanctions (merciful acquittals) in common-run felonies and, 
on the other, strong nullification (repudiation of the law) in political 
offenses. 
The judicial perspective on the jury's behavior is significant, because 
our characterization of the jury's behavior must be made in the light of the 
bench's stance toward the law. Strong nullification, as I am using the 
term, assumes that the judge adheres to the legal rule and believes the jury 
ought to adhere to it. Thus the strongest form of jury nullification 
represents a repudiation of the rules set forth by the bench, and it is not 
surprising that it led to official attempts to restrain or redefine the role of 
the jury. This contrasts with the systemic or ad hoc nullification in 
common felonies, which frequently met with the acquiescence or en-
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couragement of the bench. Indeed, where judges encouraged or acqui-
esced in merciful verdicts, we might wonder whether there was nullifica-
tion at all. From one perspective, we might say that the bench was, in 
effect, suspending the law, or interpreting the law in such a way that the 
jury's action was consistent with it. Where the bench disagreed with the 
jury, it might have viewed what was for the jury an ad hoc nullification as 
an instance of systemic nullification, or it might have appreciated the ad 
hoc nature of the verdict but believed it inappropriate in the given case. 
In either instance, the jury's leniency might be regarded as a serious 
abuse of the jury's de facto power. Political conflict has never been 
essential to judicial criticism of what juries do. 
It must also be noted that juries nullified the law in many instances not 
out of mercy but out of fear of the defendant's friends or relatives, or for 
political favor, or even, perhaps, for monetary gain. The bench could not 
always be certain whether the jury's motives were mercenary or merciful, 
and such doubts must have influenced their response to life-sparing 
verdicts. Although this book concerns the phenomenon of "conscien-
tious" verdicts, it will be necessary to keep in mind that some verdicts 
were corrupt and that the bench had to guard against them. 
Verdicts that reflect systemic and ad hoc mercy have, once we take 
account of the bench's perspective, two histories: as quasi-legitimate 
responses permitted by the bench and as illegitimate, law-flouting re-
sponses. As we shall see, some lay writers extrapolated from judicial 
acquiescence in cases involving quasi-legitimate "nullification" to a right 
of juries to nullify even when the bench objected. The bench, on the other 
hand, sometimes viewed what were in fact ad hoc nullifications of the 
weakest form as true repudiations of substantive legal standards. The 
several strands of nullificatory behavior that I have tried to separate in 
theory were in practice intimately intertwined, and, as we shall see, were 
often confounded by those in the thick of the debates concerning the 
jury's role. 
Note.-Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from antiquarian English sources have 
been modernized throughout this volume. Titles of antiquarian English sources have been 
left in their original form. Original foreign language quotations have been extended; 
punctuation and capitalization remain as in the original. All unpublished archival material 
not otherwise identified in the footnotes is from the Public Record Office, London, England. 
Part I Origins 
1 The Criminal Trial Jury: Origins and Early Development-
an Interpretive Ove!"view 
From about 1220, trial by jury has been the primary means for determin-
ing guilt or innocence in prosecutions for felony. Trial by jury, as is well 
known, replaced trial by ordeal after the Church in 1215 proscribed 
clerical participation in that "barbaric" practice. 1 Although regular use of 
the jury represented a significant transformation in the administration of 
the criminal law, juries had from time to time been employed in this 
particular setting for at least a generation. The historian has more reason 
to ask why it took so long for trial by jury to become the general rule than 
why it ultimately replaced the ordeal, for by the third decade of the 
thirteenth century juries were in common use in a variety of other closely 
related settings. Trial by something other than a jury had become virtually 
an anomaly. 
It may be that as long as the ordeal was thought to reflect God's will it 
was thought necessary to invoke its powers before putting to death an 
alleged felon. Men might on oath make determinations that affected the 
disposal of property or the payment of fines, but God alone could mandate 
the taking of a human life. And even if belief in the divine nature of proof 
by ordeal had begun to wane long before the decree of 1215 brought its 
use to an abrupt end, tradition may have sustained its use in the late 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries-tradition and the lack of a divinely 
endowed alternative. Even after 1215, recourse to the verdict of men 
sworn to say the truth could not be had without the suspect's consent.2 
The decision to employ a trial jury in criminal cases appears to have 
been an act of administrative expediency. The justices in eyre in 1218 had 
raised the issue of an appropriate substitute for the ordeal; they were 
ordered (in the absence of a formal trial mechanism) to imprison or to 
banish those accused by a jury of presentment of having committed a serious 
1. Lateran IV (1215) c. 18, in J. Alberigo et al., eds., Conciliorum oecumenicorum 
decreta (3rd ed., Bologna, 1972), p. 220. See e.g. R. C. van Caenegem, "La Preuve dans le 
droit du moyen age occidental: rapport de synthese," La Preuve, Receuils de la Societe Jean 
Bodin, vol. 17 (Brussels, 1965), pp. 715-18; John Baldwin, "The Intellectual Preparation for 
the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals," Speculum, vol. 36 (1961), p. 613. 
2. See generally P.R .. Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law," in Morris S. Arnold et al., eds., On the Laws and Customs of England (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 1981), pp. 90-126. 
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offense.3 It seems more than a little odd that the question had not been 
settled before the justices reached the provinces. The solution seems only 
slightly less so. It is likely that the order to imprison or banish confirmed 
an existing plan and that the decision to punish mere suspects hardly 
imposed upon the presenters a new responsibility. Having named all 
those suspected of having committed a felony, the presenters probably 
indicated which suspects they considered guilty. This may not have been 
a departure from earlier practice: it does not seem plausible that before 
1215 all whom the presenters had named had gone forward to the ordeal. 
The presenters had probably always determined who the "true" suspects 
were; the ordeal may well have been managed to confirm the presenters' 
determinations. From the 1218 procedure to the trial jury was, according 
to this theory, a relatively short step: a number of the original presenters, 
afforced perhaps by others, were sworn to give a verdict on those whom 
they and the other presenters had named as suspects. It was not so much 
that the trial jury was adopted as that the ordeal was dispensed with. 4 
The resort to a trial jury in criminal cases was the final stage of a 
century-long evolution in the administration of the criminal law. Because 
that evolution involved the steady increase of royal control over the 
criminal process, it might seem paradoxical that this almost final stage 
placed the defendant in the hands of the local community. But, as we shall 
see, this was a natural development, one that at once expanded and 
defined the limits of royal power. It was a development that allowed the 
new form of criminal process to work. The interpretive overview 
presented here can hardly do justice to the complex legal and social 
origins of the criminal trial jury, a subject that has only recently received 
the attention it deserves. I shall piece together a story that, in its details, 
is both partial and tentative. Subsequent chapters shed further light, at 
least by way of inference, on the question of early jury behavior. The 
present discussion is intended to introduce an institution, its early 
institutional setting, and the problems involved in assessing its behavior 
and influence in the resolution of felony cases. 
I 
The roots of a royal system of criminal justice run deep into the English 
past. Long before the Conquest, perhaps even from the outset of the 
3. F.W. Maitland, ed., Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester, 1221 (London, 
1884), pp. xxxviii-xxxix; T. F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th 
ed., Boston, 1956), p. 119. 
4. See generally Roger D. Groot, "The Jury of Presentment before 1215," American 
Journal ofLegal History, vol. 26 (1982), pp. 1-24. I shall at several points draw upon Groot's 
important conclusions. See also Catherine Hamilton Kappauf, "The Early Development of 
the Petty Jury in England: 1194-1221," doctoral dissertation (University of Illinois, 1973), 
passim. For Kappauf's discussion of the procedure followed in 1218 see pp. 169-74. 
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Anglo-Saxon period, some offenses were prosecuted on behalf of the 
Crown, and those persons found to have perpetrated the most heinous of 
them were at the Crown's mercy. Unless the king chose to commute their 
sentence, they were executed at the king's hand. 5 These offenses-pleas 
of the Crown-may be contrasted to all other pleas, which were pros-
ecuted by the aggrieved or his kin, though typically in a public court, and 
which usually led to composition or monetary compensation by the 
convicted wrongdoer. 6 At the core of the theory of royal pleas lay those 
enormities perpetrated against the Crown that amounted to treason. From 
very early the king also exercised sole jurisdiction over the most heinous 
offenses, such as murder-that is, homicide by stealth, in circumstances 
where the offender not only took his victim offguard but also concealed 
his identity from third parties. 7 During the several centuries between the 
reigns of Alfred (871-99) and Henry II (1154-89), the list of royal pleas 
gradually lengthened so that the number of "private" criminal prosecu-
tions leading to composition between private parties was steadily re-
duced. 8 Nonetheless, until the twelfth century most prosecutions re-
mained private; simple homicide and larceny, the two most common 
offenses, were still both privately prosecuted and emendable. 
The expansion of the scope of royal pleas left its mark on even those 
offenses over which the Crown did not take sole jurisdiction. Offenders 
were required to pay a fine to the king in addition to the composition they 
rendered to the injured party.9 Yet there were limits at this stage to the 
practical effects ofthe growth of the theory of Crown law. Even where the 
king took sole jurisdiction, prosecution was commenced privately, either 
in the traditional Anglo-Saxon manner, wherein proof was achieved by 
compurgation or by ordeal, or through the Norman institution of the 
appeal, which led to trial by battle .10 Because punishment in Crown pleas 
5. Naomi D. Hurnard, The King's Pardon for Homicide before A.D. 1307 (Oxford, 1969), 
pp. 1-3. On Crown pleas generally see Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 
The History of English Law, 2 vols. (2nd ed., reissued with an introduction by S. F. C. 
Milsom, Cambridge, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 453-56; Frederick Pollock, "The King's Peace in the 
Middle Ages," Harvard Law Review, vol. 13 (1900), pp. 177 et seq., reprinted in Select 
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 3 vols. (Boston, 1907-9), vol. 2 (1908), pp. 403 et 
seq. 
6. See e.g. Dorothy Whitelock, The Beginnings of English Society (2nd ed., Middlesex, 
1965), pp. 137-46. 
7. Thomas A. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Mediaeval 
England," Speculum, vol. 47 (1972), pp. 686, 689; Thomas A. Green, "The Jury and the 
English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600," Michigan Law Review, vol. 74 (1976), p. 416. 
8. See generally Pollock, "The King's Peace in the Middle Ages." 
9. On this fine, the wite, see e.g. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:458-60. 
10. On early modes of trial see James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on 
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was at the hands of the Crown, society may have viewed prosecution and 
trial in such cases as in the name of the Crown. Procedure, however, with 
its heavy dependence upon private initiative, remained largely the same 
as before. 
The Crown's interest in prosecutions for crime was represented by the 
sheriff and the hundred official, who presided, respectively, in the courts 
of the county and of the hundred, a division of the county or "shire," 
where trials were traditionally held. 11 Central justices at times joined or 
replaced these county-based officials, although how often they had come 
to do so by the early decades of the twelfth century remains unknown.l2 
Yet even the sporadic appearance of royal justices must have reinforced 
the increasingly royal aspect of the administration of the criminal law and 
eroded the once firm distinction between Crown pleas and private 
prosecutions. Possibly a significant percentage of simple homicides and 
larcenies led to execution rather than composition as early as the reign of 
Henry I (1100-1135). Even so, the reforms effected in the later twelfth 
century by Henry II were hardly less dramatic than historians have 
commonly assumed them to be. 13 
The Angevin reforms, whether they amounted to the creation of new 
procedures or the regularizing of preexisting ones, were embodied in the 
famous Assize of Clarendon of 1166. 14 The Assize is a complex document 
registering the Crown's concern not only with felony but also with the 
Evidence at the Common Law (New York, 1969), ch. 1; Whitelock, Beginnings of English 
Society, pp. 137-46. 
II. W. A. Morris, The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300 (Manchester, 1927), esp. ch. 7. 
See also Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal," p. 93; A. Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval 
England (London, 1973), pp. 18, 28-29. 
12. See H. G. Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England from 
the Conquest to Magna Carta (Edinburgh, 1963), ch. 9. 
13. Hurnard (King's Pardon For Homicide, pp. 8--9) suggests that many felonies had 
become unemendable as early as the reign of Henry I (1100--35). The king's peace was 
extended to cover slayings that occurred at specified places or on certain occasions. Thus, 
in Hurnard' s view, the reforms effected by Henry II (1154--89) represented a coalescence of 
earlier, piecemeal extensions of the king's peace. On the impact of Henry II's legal reforms 
see generally Julius Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanor (1937; reprinted, Philadelphia, 1976), 
pp. 423-40; Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, 173-215; Doris M. 
Stenton, English Justice between the Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 1066-1215 
(London, 1965), pp. 65-82; Naomi D. Hurnard, "The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of 
Clarendon," English Historical Review, vol. 56 (1941), pp. 374 et seq.; Harding, Law Courts 
of Medieval England, pp. 49-57; W. L. Warren, Henry II (London, 1973), pp. 317--61. 
14. Assize of Clarendon, in C. Stephenson and F. Marcham, trans. and eds., Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York, 1937), pp. 76-80. The Assize of Northampton 
(1176) developed the program set in motion by the earlier assize, increasing the range of 
felonies to be prosecuted. The presentment procedure was not altered. For the Assize of 
Northampton, see ibid., pp. 80-83, esp. c. 1. 
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political, religious, and social matters that interfered with effective 
policing of the realm. 15 Henry II's government was moving decisively to 
assert its jurisdiction over trial and execution for all felony at the expense 
of existing, competing jurisdictions16 and to ensure that local officials 
were actively associated with the royal program of law enforcement. The 
key to the new program was the procedure of presentment, or lay 
accusation made on oath in the presence of royal officials. The presenters 
were bound by their oath to report all those suspected of the commission 
of felony; all those thus accused were ipso facto within the Crown's 
jurisdiction. No interference with the prosecution of the accused would 
be brooked, whether that interference stemmed from lawfully held 
liberties or the exercise by the Church of legitimate privileges. 
According to the terms of the Assize, twelve lawful men of each 
hundred were to be chosen to take the oath. No doubt these were to be 
men of substantial stature, men whose word would not be doubted and 
whose role in the process would strengthen the royal position. Although 
their accusations were supposed to be made before the royal justices, it 
appears that more often than not they testified before the sheriff in county 
court. The presentments and the process those presentments set in 
motion were monitored, mostly after the fact, by royal justices, whose 
regular circuits commenced as a result of the Assize. 17 The sheriff or 
justices ordered the accused persons to be taken and held for trial; those 
already in hand were tried immediately. Trial was typically by the ordeal 
of cold water. In this second stage of the transformation of criminal 
process the procedure of accusation was radically altered; the method of 
proof, however, remained unchanged. 18 
15. Ibid., c. 7 (pp. 77-78): mandates construction of gaols; c. 8 (p. 78): requires holders 
of liberties to participate in presentment procedure; c. 9 (p. 78): states that no one may 
forbid the sheriff to enter land for view of frankpledge; c. 15 (p. 78): forbids giving lodging 
to strangers; c. 20 (p. 79): requires religious orders to examine reputation of prospective 
entrants. 
16. The royal program was not so comprehensive as this suggests. For an excellent 
account of competing jurisdictions that lasted in some cases down to the fifteenth century 
see J. B. Post, "Local Jurisdictions and Judgment of Death in Later Medieval England," 
Criminal Justice History, vol. 4 (1983), pp. 1-22. 
17. See Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 198-202. The 
authors conjecture that the presentment jurors were to make their oath before local justices 
and sheriffs; they state that royal justices were deployed to "oversee the activities of the 
sheriffs and local justices" (p. 200). The account I give in the text should be taken as a model 
for succeeding accusations and visitations; the procedure under the Assize of Clarendon 
may have been almost entirely local. For discussion of the mechanics oflate-twelfth-century 
presentment, see Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 77 et seq. Kappauf 
concludes that presentments were often made in written form as well as recited orally. 
18. Assize of Clarendon, c. 2 (p. 77). I use "proof' in the technical sense; in fact, the 
accusation process seems to have included a weighing of evidence that must be considered 
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The new, public procedure of accusation was mandated by the Assize, 
but it is by no means clear exactly what the presenting juries were 
supposed to do-or did. The Assize bound the lawful men to present all 
persons who had been accused of having committed theft, homicide, or 
another serious offense. 19 The words seem very inclusive; there is little in 
them to suggest that the presenting jury was supposed to employ a 
significant degree of discretion. Nonetheless, we have good reasons for 
inferring that they did employ some discretion. At the very least, the 
presenting jury was to determine which persons had been "accused" or 
were "publicly known" to be felons. If the presenters were indeed 
required to pass along the names of all those who had been accused, no 
matter how casually, we cannot imagine that all those named were 
supposed in fact to undergo the ordeal. The most recent scholarship 
argues that the presenters were not merely conduits for private accusa-
tions but that they also played an adjudicatory or a screening role. 
Presentment by the twelve lawful men leading to the ordeal involved a 
broader-based accusation, one that carried greater force-a greater 
presumption of truthfulness-than the bare accusation of an aggrieved 
party. 20 
Not everyone named by the hundredmen on oath could "make his law" 
by oath and ordeal. Not only those who had been caught red-handed or 
had confessed but also those of very low reputation were to be treated 
summarily. 2 I It appears even on the face of the Assize, therefore, that the 
presenting jury was in some cases to make a finding of its own regarding 
the character of the accused. There is one other point worth making. 
Although we have very little evidence regarding the manner in which the 
ordeal itself was administered, there are reasons for supposing it was not 
part of the method of proof. See below, nn. 20, 26, 35, and accompanying text. The ordeal 
of cold water involved submerging the suspect in water to determine whether God accepted 
him (in which case the suspect sank) or rejected him (in which case the suspect bobbed to 
the surface). The other common ordeal, reserved typically for freemen, involved carrying a 
bar of hot iron for a certain distance. If after several days one's hands were still deeply 
scarred, one was adjudged guilty. 
19. Ibid., c. l (p. 77): the "lawful men" were put on oath "to tell the truth, whether in 
their hundred or in their vill there is any man accused or publicly known as a robber or 
murderer or thief." 
20. See Groot, "Jury of Presentment." Groot argues convincingly (pp. 5 et seq.) that the 
presenters were first to name all who were suspected but then to specify whom they truly 
suspected; only the latter were forced to undergo the ordeal. Groot's evidence does not 
allow the conclusion that the presentment jury's true suspicion always amounted to the kind 
of certainty later trial juries were expectea to have before they convicted, or, for that matter, 
to the certainty the presenters would have insisted upon if their unfavorable "verdicts" 
were final ones. In this sense, the presenting jury was not a trial jury but was closer to our 
grand jury. I use the phrase "screening role" to signal this. 
21. Assize of Clarendon, cc. 12-13 (p. 78). 
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imposed upon everyone who was, in theory, liable to undergo it. 
Moreover, many who were subjected to the ordeal must have experienced 
only a very mitigated version of it. It is, then, reasonable to suppose that 
the presenting juries were instrumental in the sorting out of the accused. 
So long as the method of proof remained brutal and blunt, the process of 
accusation was probably sensitive and subtle. 22 
The Assize and subsequent commissions to justices to hear and 
determine hundred-jury presentments constituted a significant advance 
where the Crown took control over the law of felony. All homicide and all 
theft were subject to presentment by the hundredmen. Private accusa-
tions leading to private composition, in the Anglo-Saxon manner, had 
come virtually to an end. Only the appeal remained, and, as we shall see, 
even this private suit was about to be turned into a means of generating 
accusations for presenting juries to consider. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Henry II's reforms, by 
substantially widening the reach of monarchical power, created new 
tensions in the criminal process. Private parties were stripped of their 
traditional remedy; royal jurisdiction and royal remedies dominated. The 
injured or his kin sometimes attempted settlement out of court, using the 
threat of appeal or public accusation leading to presentment for lever-
age.23 The Crown, seeking to vindicate its jurisdiction, imposed fines 
upon defaulting appellors and upon presenting juries that concealed 
felonies, thereby limiting their discretionary role. 24 Although in some 
cases the king or his justices allowed concords between the defendant and 
the aggrieved,2s most convicted defendants now faced mutilation or death 
rather than payment of monetary compensation. Inevitably, the present-
ing jury was being employed to undermine the interests of private parties 
in obtaining compensation for themselves. Perhaps more significantly~ the 
22. See generally Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal," pp. 93-94 and passim. I am treating very 
briskly a complex subject that has recently received excellent scholarly attention. Groot 
("Jury of Presentment") and Hyams have revolutionized scholarship on accusation and 
proof before the Lateran Council of 1215. See also Peter Brown, "Society and the 
Supernatural: A Medieval Change," Daedalus, vol. 104 (1975), pp. 133-51. For an 
interesting discussion of the implications of some of the new anthropological and historical 
scholarship on the ordeal see Lawrence Rosen, "Intentionality and the Concept of the 
Person," in The Theory of Criminal Justice, NOMOS, vol. 27 (1984). 
23. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 8-12. 
24. Ibid., pp. 10, 24-25. Hurnard is concerned mainly with royal efforts to prevent 
concealment of felony by those seeking extrajudicial settlement. See also Pollock and 
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:648. 
25. Ibid., p. 22. See also Roger Groot, "The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions before 
1215," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 27 (1983), pp. 132--40, for an extensive 
discussion of judicially allowed concords where appellors retracted their appeals in return 
for reparations by the appellees. 
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hundred jurors were constrained to set in motion a procedure that led to 
the mutilation or execution of many who, under the traditional system of 
dispute settlement, had been allowed a chance to make peace, to restore 
harmony through payment of fines. 
We are not in a position to say how the presenting jury functioned in 
these straits. Our best guess is that the hundredmen made presentments-
thus avoiding being fined for concealment of pleas-and then exercised 
discretionary power in the subsequent task of stating whom they truly 
suspected. If suspects of particularly bad reputation were not allowed to 
exculpate themselves entirely by making their law, it seems likely that the 
same discretion might be exercised to spare persons of particularly good 
reputation the pain and ignominy that accompanied the ordeal. 26 
The Angevin transformation of the criminal law was largely a jurisdic-
tional revolution. By harnessing the prestige and knowledge of the most 
respected members of local communities, the Crown was able to assert its 
sole jurisdiction over virtually all those suspected of felony. Surely the 
Crown's first priority was to shore up the enforcement of law against 
those over whom the Crown already had sole power of punishment-
traitors, murderers, and robbers-but who escaped all punishment unless 
a private accusation were made and sustained through the traditional 
Anglo-Saxon trial procedure. Prudence may have suggested that the 
Crown hear presentments of all felons; otherwise, injured parties seeking 
compensation might pass off the most heinous offenses as lesser felonies 
that were still emendable.27 The extension of mutilation or (as soon came 
to be the general sanction) capital punishment to lesser felonies was a 
clear result of Angevin policy; it was probably not its raison d'etre. Why 
lesser punishments for simple homicide and larceny were not established 
is difficult to explain unless we assume that the Crown either believed 
such offenses merited execution or, realizing the nature of the presenting 
and ordeal practice, expected such offenders would not in fact be 
subjected to capital punishment. As we shall see, the little evidence that 
sheds light on this problem is ambiguous. Probably we shall never know 
why all felony was made capital or how much discretion the Crown 
26. Groot does not discuss the problem of presentment jury "discretion," or the refusal, 
on grounds of mercy, to send to the ordeal persons whom the presenters truly suspected. 
The evidence he has adduced-and no one has yet dug deeper-does not make clear 
whether presenters exercised such discretion. My account encourages the speculation that 
presenters played such a role; any excess in this regard should be blamed on me, not on 
Groot. 
27. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 23-27. Hurnard thus explains the 
requirement for reporting all homicides and the need for a royal pardon even in excusable 
homicides. It seems likely that the logic of her argument extends also to cases of theft. 
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intended for the presenting jury. zs 
The half century that followed the Assize of Clarendon was the 
foundation period of the English common law. Henry II put the ancient 
practice of sworn lay testimony to work in a variety of contexts. In 
private law the grand and petty assize juries came to dominate;29 on the 
criminal side, the jury of presentment was in frequent use. All of these 
juries, save for the presenting jury, rendered verdicts on the question of 
guilt or innocence, or on some other dispositive question of fact. In theory 
the purpose of the presenting jury was solely to name persons who were 
suspected of having committed a felony. In practice, it then stated 
whether it believed there was a credible basis for the suspicion. The 
suspects it exonerated went free; those it truly suspected were held to 
undergo the ordeal. By and large, dispositive verdicts leading to the 
severe sanctions of the criminal law were left to the ordeal and to God. 
There was, nevertheless, sufficient leeway for other embryonic forms 
of the criminal trial jury to make their way into the workings of the law 
around the year 1200. The difficulties and dangers that beset the highly 
formal Norman institution of private accusation by the victim of a felony 
or by the victim's close kin-the accusation and process known as the 
appeal-proved fruitful in this regard. Persons who had been appealed 
and imprisoned could secure an inquest into the merits of the appeal 
before being subjected to the forms of physical proof available in such 
actions-combat or ordeal.30 These early jury trials usually involved 
soliciting a verdict from the presenters who had presented the appeal (in 
effect, noted the existence of the private accusation) or from an inquest 
composed of similar persons. 31 In theory, the jurors usually were to 
respond to the question whether the appeal had been made out of' 'hatred 
and malice" (de odio et atia),32 but, in fact, from early on the jurors 
28. I shall return to this matter of the "original assumptions" in Chapters 2, 3, and 9. 
29. See Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 357-62; S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations 
of the Common Law (2nd ed., Toronto, 1981), pp. 130-43; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval 
England, pp. 58-63; see also Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 69-71, 
132-35. 
30. See Roger Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 113-41. Because 
Groot's recent article appeared as the present work was going to press, I have only partially 
incorporated his findings. Groot's work is central: it lays bare the workings of proceedings 
set in motion by appeals and relates those workings to the interests (often financial 
reparations rather than "punishment" of the accused) of the private parties involved. Taken 
together, Groot's articles on presentments and appeals constitute the foundation for the 
prehistory of the criminal trial jury. 
31. Groot (ibid., p. 126) points out that appeals in the central courts at Westminster could 
result in referral of an inquest to a local jury. At the eyre, the jury that presented the appeal 
was immediately available. 
32. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, Appendix I, pp. 339-74. 
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looked to the more general question of the appellee's guilt or innocence.33 
It is not always easy to tell whether such inquests undertook full-scale 
resolutions of guilt or innocence or, instead, rendered 3. more modest 
assessment of the credibility of the private accusation (the screening 
process undertaken by presenting juries in public prosecutions). If merely 
the latter, we should not be surprised, for the appellee who received an 
unfavorable verdict had still to be tried by a form of physical proof.34 
Recent research suggests, however, that many early inquests pursuant to 
appeals were indeed comprehensive determinations.35 If presentment-
process jury determinations were limited in nature-and even that re-
mains unclear-at least many appeals inquest determinations were not.36 
There is some evidence that suggests defendants incarcerated pursuant 
to a hundred-jury presentment also availed themselves of writs ordering 
special inquisitions. In such cases the need for screening private accusa-
tions likely was not involved; that step had already been undertaken by 
the presenting jury. It is probable that defendants claiming to have slain 
through accident or self-defense were among those who secured the writs. 
Like many who had been appealed, they were not asserting noninvolve-
ment or that they had been accused out of malice. They were claiming, 
rather, that they had not acted feloniously. Ultimately, they would seek 
and obtain a royal pardon; pending the eyre, they would establish their 
bona fides and secure bail. Others, too, obtained the writ, either to secure 
33. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 118-24. See also Hurnard, 
King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 340. 
34. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," p. 125. See also Hurnard, King's 
Pardon for Homicide, p. 343. 
35. Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 127-28. The use of the word 
"guilty" (as opposed to "suspected") is probably significant. In this regard, see Groot's 
remarks, pp. 129-30. He rightly points out that the same persons served sometimes as 
presenters of presentments, sometimes as presenters of appeals, and sometimes as inquest 
jurors in appeals. In practice, presenters may have done much the same thing in their 
screening and their inquest roles, whatever the difference may have been in theory between 
the two roles. 
36. Groot's approach complements the earlier research on the appeal of J. M. Kaye, 
trans. and ed., Placito Carone (London, 1966), pp. xxiv-xxviii. Kaye argues that the appeal 
remained in use throughout the thirteenth century and that judges were not opposed to it as 
a means of accusation. Rather, the bench sought to avoid delays involved both in the 
appellee's various defenses to the appeal and in trial by battle. Thus the bench induced 
appellees to make a general denial and to opt for trial by jury. The groundwork for this 
approach to the use of the appeal had, evidently, been well established in the pre-trial-jury 
period. Kaye is probably correct in the view that Holdsworth overstated judicial opposition 
to the appeal. See William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 17 vols. (London, 
1903-72), vol. 2 (3rd ed., London, 1923), pp. 256-57, 360 et seq. For a recent study of the 
use of the appeal in medieval and early modern England see Daniel R. Ernst, "The 
Moribund Appeal of Death: Compensating Survivors and Controlling Jurors in Early 
Modern England," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 28 (1984), pp. 164-85. 
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bail pending trial or to avoid trial by ordeal altogether. Typically, these 
last persons paid a substantial sum for the privilege of what amounted to 
jury trial at the eyreY 
By 1215, when the use of the ordeal in England came suddenly to an 
end, there was ample precedent for putting substantial laymen on oath to 
say whether or not a suspect was guilty of felony. The prototype trial 
juries were very similar to their descendants, although the student of the 
history of jury discretion must recognize that the unfavorable verdicts of 
the pre-1215 prototypes were rarely final and thus may not have been 
rendered by jurors who went through the same psychological process as 
the later true trialjurors. 38 The institution of the trial jury had developed 
largely, though not entirely, as a remedy for the defects of the appeal that 
the evolving procedure of presentment threw into relief. It may in some 
few cases have been employed as a true alternative to the ordeal. But that 
step, which was momentous if not unprecedented, was not commonly 
taken until the ordeal was formally abolished.39 
II 
It is well known that the institutions of presenting jury and trial jury 
were from the outset closely related. It would be too much to say, 
however, that, as of 1220, they were usually identical in composition. 
That was sometimes the case, but more often the presenters made up one 
part of the trial jury, which might be a larger body. This was a time for 
experiment, and it appears that the Crown was anxious that the trial jury 
carry real authority. 40 The trial jury undertook one facet of the parent 
institution's earlier role. Before 1215, that "screening" aspect of the 
37. See e.g. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 345; Kappauf, "Early Develop-
ment of the Petty Jury," pp. 143, 164, 165.lt is possible that had these suspects been "found 
guilty" by the inquests they procured they would have had to go to the ordeal. 
38. A suspect who was purged by the ordeal might be required to abjure the realm. Groot, 
"Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 118, 140. How this prospect affected jury 
behavior we cannot say. The risk that the "suspected" person would not be purged and 
would be put to death would probably have sufficed to induce presenting juries to render 
merciful verdicts in at least some cases, if anything would have made them do so. See 
Kappauf, however, who reports that most suspects were purged by the ordeal ("Early 
Development of the Petty Jury," p. 167). 
39. See Hurnard's comments (King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 345-46) on Magna Carta, 
c. 36, which stipulated that "the writ of inquisition concerning life and limbs ... shall be 
issued gratis and shall not be denied" (Stephenson and Marcham, trans. and eds., Sources 
of English Constitutional History, pp. 120-21). Hurnard contends that this clause referred 
not only to the writ de odio but to writs for inquisitions in cases begun by indictment. The 
framers of Magna Carta, Hurnard suggests, were anxious to create the right to jury trial in 
place of the ordeal for all who preferred it. 
40. Kappauf, "Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 188-96. 
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presenting jury's role had been nearly incidental and never well-defined. 
It had been, I have suggested, largely a by-product of the traditional 
method of proof, the ordeal. The ordeal may have been seen as a ritual 
that confirmed the judgment of the lawful men of the hundred; in a certain 
sense, it may have been "rational" precisely because it was implemented 
in accordance with the presenters' own belief about a defendant's guilt. 
The ultimate verdict was seen to be God's; He demonstrated the 
innocence or guilt of the accused who, presumed guilty by men, was made 
to endure the ultimate test. 41 When the ritual was dispensed with, the two 
functions of the jury were separated and, thus, more clearly defined. The 
presenting jury proper now named all those for whom there was a soundly 
based accusation. If the defendant consented to a verdict by the '' coun-
try," untempered by God's confirming judgment, he put himself upon the 
judgment of his countrymen, who were sworn to give a truly dispositive 
verdict on the basis of what they had learned about the suspect's guilt. 
The trial jury's role in part corresponded to the earlier screening 
function and possibly in practice to the discretionary role of the present-
ing jury-but only in part. For one thing, it must have made some 
difference to the hundredmen that the ordeal stood between their verdict 
and the defendant's fate. The trial jury was, in contrast, formally charged 
with finding the guilt or innocence of the accused. Moreover, the trial 
jurors gave their verdict in open court, not only upon their prior 
knowledge but also upon their viewing of the confrontation between the 
accused and the bench. Thus, the history of the trial jury can only be 
understood in terms of the history of the trial. Since we shall return to 
specific aspects ofthe medieval trial in Chapters 2 and 3, a brief overview 
of its history will suffice. 
The judicial eyres of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were 
undertaken in a given county at six- or seven-year intervals. 42 They were 
administrative as well as purely legal undertakings. The king' s justices in 
eyre were empowered not only to hear civil and criminal pleas but also to 
scrutinize coroners' rolls and other official records for notations of fines 
owed to the Crown. It is well known that these visitations inspired a 
41. This remains unclear. Much depends upon what the presenters actually did, or were 
thought to have done. The more the screening process involved a full assessment of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, the more the ordeal may have been accepted as mere 
confirmation. 
42. On the judicial eyres see e.g. Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 1-9; C. A. F. 
Meekings and David Crook, eds., The 1235 Surrey Eyre (Guildford, 1979), pp. 4-26, and 
Appendix I: A Bibliography of the Common Pleas Eyre; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval 
England, pp. 63-80, 86-88; Milsom, Historical Foundations, pp. 27-31. 
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mixture of awe, fear, and hatred.43 The judicial business of the eyre was 
routine and tedious. This must have been especially true on the criminal 
side, for the justices apparently heard an interminable series of present-
ments involving defendants who had not been taken or who had been 
bailed but did not appear at the eyre. The records contain many more 
judicial orders that suspects be taken than judgments upon verdicts of 
trialjuries. Process in all of these cases was carefully noted; communities, 
frankpledges, and officials were amerced, the fines being inscribed on the 
eyre rolls by the busy clerks. The tedium was relieved from time to time 
by the trial of a suspect who had appeared and put himself, for good or ill, 
upon the country. 44 
Most of those persons who were tried at the eyre were brought forward 
after they had been named by the presenting jury and were asked how 
they pleaded. Virtually all pleaded not guilty and put themselves on the 
country. A few refused to plead, exercising a right that was by the later 
decades of the thirteenth century a bare fiction. They were subjected to 
the infamous peine forte et dure, wherein weights were laid upon them 
until they pleaded or expired; the recalcitrant perished, but, not having 
been convicted, they avoided forfeiture. 45 To go on the country meant, at 
first, to be tried by a body of persons that included some or all of the 
hundredmen who had comprised the jury of presentment. 46 From the 
outset, however, there were exceptions to this, and over the course of the 
century the two juries became increasingly distinct. Some defendants 
requested an entirely different jury, or challenged at least some of those 
trial jurors who had been part of the presenting jury, but it appears that 
defendants could not yet demand such a jury as a matter of right. 47 The 
43. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:202; Kappauf, "Early Development 
of the Petty Jury," p. 58. 
44. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:201, 2:644 et seq.; Harding, Law 
Courts of Medieval England, pp. 63-68; Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 16-23. 
45. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 126; Harding, Law Courts of Medieval England, p. 67. 
See also Groot, "Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions," pp. 137-41. Groot has found 
pre-trial-jury-period cases in which the bench ordered inquests (leading potentially to trial 
by ordeal) where neither presentment nor continued appeal was forthcoming. This, he 
conjectures, suggests ancient roots of later royal attitudes about subjecting defendants to 
trial on the Crown's own order. 
46. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:648-49; Harding, Law Courts of 
Medieval England, p. 67; Plucknett, Concise History, p. 120; Kappauf, "Early Develop-
ment of the Petty Jury," pp. 188-96. 
47. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 127. For an interesting case involving a knight who 
successfully challenged prospective trial jurors who had served on the jury of presentment 
that accused him (of rape) see Henry Summerson, "Plea Roll and YearBook: The Yorkshire 
Eyre of 1293-94" (paper presented at the Fifth British Legal History Conference, Bristol, 
July, 1981). I am grateful to Dr. Summerson for allowing me to see his important study based 
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real break between presenting and trial juries came in the last decades of 
the century, however, and accompanied the expansion of the system of 
gaol delivery. 
We know very little about what transpired after the jury was sworn, 
whether at the eyre or at gaol delivery. The defendant stood at the bar, in 
the sight of both judge and jury; he stood alone, unaccompanied by 
counsel or friend. The sheriff or other official repeated the charges, then 
fell back, leaving the defendant to face the bench. No witness could come 
forward either for or against him, the self-informed jurors were the 
witnesses for good or ill.4s Two voices only were to be heard: the justice 
questioned, the defendant answered. Presumably the defendant was 
asked what he had to say for himself and in most cases replied he had not 
committed the act with which he had been charged. We do not know how 
often he supplied an alibi. 49 Occasionally, a defendant who had pleaded 
not guilty to a charge of homicide admitted he had slain the deceased but 
claimed to have done so accidentally or in self-defense.so In such a case 
the bench had some leeway to test the defendant's story, at least with 
respect to its internal consistency, and even to attempt to trick the 
defendant into an assertion that fell short of what the law required for 
pardonable homicide. 51 In most cases, however, the exchange between 
the bench and the defendant must have been brief and productive of little 
hard evidence beyond that which the jury had in hand at the moment they 
were sworn to serve. 
It is commonplace that the medieval jury was "self-informing." But 
just how jurors came to be informed remains largely a matter of 
conjecture. The problem is less intractable with regard to the early period. 
So long as trial jurors were drawn, at least in large number, from the 
upon his comparison of a plea roll with the yearbook version of several cases on the plea 
roll. See below, n. 58. 
48. This may be an exaggeration of the situation at the eyre. Witnesses as well as others 
were attached to appear at the eyre, either as witnesses or as potential suspects. It is not 
clear that they gave information at the trial itself rather than before the trial to presentment 
and trial juries. When the suspect did not appear they may have given evidence that was 
instrumental to his being exacted and outlawed. 
49. See Kaye, ed., Placita Carone, pp. 1-31. This mid-thirteenth-century pleading manual 
provides the best extant descriptions of medieval trials. It must be used with care, however, 
for it was compiled with the purposes of instruction in mind. It is not always clear whether 
a particular procedure or colloquy was included because it was typical or because it was 
unusual. Most of the "cases" involve appeals (this was above all a form book for pleaders); 
the accusations and denials are therefore highly formal. In one case which has the ring of the 
commonplace, the defendant, indicted for theft of farm animals, claimed he had purchased 
the animals at a certain fair on a certain day (ibid., p. 18). 
50. See below, Chapter 2. 
51. See below, Chapter 3, text at nn. 3-7. 
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presenting jury, the appropriate question to ask is how the presenters 
learned the facts of individual cases. The answer, at least in general, is not 
difficult to imagine. The presenters were established figures in the 
hundred. Although they were not likely to have firsthand knowledge of 
slayings and thefts, they were well positioned to make inquiries. They 
soon learned of complaints made to local officials, who were bound to 
keep track of the raising of the hue and cry. sz In the case of homicide, the 
coroner's inquest provided a context for the gathering of testimony, little 
of which was taken down by the coroner or his clerk but much of which 
must have come to the attention of the village elites. 53 
Formal presentments were made in hundred and county courts in the 
years between judicial visitations. The rumors and suspicions that circu-
lated in the wake of a felony became the governing perceptions of the 
truth of the matter; the early stages of criminal procedure gave shape to 
the facts of individual cases. By the time of the eyre, much had been 
sorted out, though many cases must have remained tentative for lack of 
solid evidence. The eyre and the imminence of trial must have given focus 
to those cases where the suspect was likely to be present. The defendant's 
reputation, his bearing since the time of the felony in question, the 
response of those into whose midst he would be returned if acquitted-
these and other considerations must have been central to the men who 
would present and try him. This is not to say that these matters were 
unknown before the coming of the justices. In many cases, this complex 
process of community judgment had been completed long before the eyre, 
and its results were well enough known that they conditioned the 
willingness or unwillingness of those suspects who were not under secure 
guard to come forward after presentment to be tried.54 
So far as we can tell, juries rendered their verdicts in simple and 
conclusory terms, stating that the defendant was guilty or not guilty, or 
that, in some cases of homicide, he had slain the deceased but had done 
so accidentally or in self-defense.ss In these last cases, the jury repeated 
52. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:578-79; R. F. Hunnisett, The 
Medieval Coroner, (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 55-58; Alan Harding, "The Origins and Early 
History of the Keeper of the Peace," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 
vol. 10 (1960), p. 90; Barbara A. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities, 
1300-1348 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 33-35. 
53. See Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner, esp. chs. 2 and 6. See also below, Chapter 
2. 
54. See F. W. Maitland eta!., eds., Eyre of Kent. 6 and 7 Edward II, 3 vols. (London, 
1909-14), vol. 1, p. xlii. 
55. The extant trial rolls record the jury's verdict: est culpabilis; non est culpabilis, 
except in cases of excusable homicide, for which see below, Chapter 2. Placita Carone is no 
more helpful. It is possible that juries said a great deal more, especially at the eyre where, 
18 Origins 
the story the defendant had told, perhaps embellishing it to meet the rules 
oflaw. The fact that the jury had in many cases decided upon its verdict 
even before it was sworn does not mean that it was not in many others 
influenced by the defendant's statements and bearing in court or by the 
tone or substance of the questions that the justices asked. The trial often 
may have constituted an important part of the process by which the jury 
informed itself or confirmed its earlier impressions.56 
The jury may have retired to discuss their verdict among themselves; 
the evidence on this point is far from clear. In some instances, juries were 
unable to reach unanimous agreement and reported a divided verdict to 
the court. In the early decades of recourse to trial jury verdicts, the bench 
did not always require unanimity. Later on, when unanimity became the 
rule, the justices pushed juries to reach agreement, as was already the 
practice in civil cases, and even applied some degree of coercion to help 
the process along.57 Only rarely, it seems, did the bench question ajury's 
verdict. In cases of pardonable homicide they sometimes did so, but only 
because jury verdicts in such cases were not entirely conclusory and left 
the bench some measure of freedom to test the jurors' report. ss In the 
great majority of cases, the verdict was conclusory and conclusive. Only 
the defendant's demeanor provided the bench with grounds for doubting 
an acquittal in a particular case, though the steady flow of not guilty 
verdicts doubtless made the bench suspicious of acquittals in general. The 
pretrial and trial procedure left the jury in almost total control of the 
outcome of cases. The bench might doubt the veracity of a defendant's 
story or of the jury's verdict, but lacking an independent source of 
evidence, the bench was not in a position to challenge either one 
effectively. 59 
if they found the defendant not guilty, they often said whom they did suspect. See Kappauf, 
"Early Development of the Petty Jury," pp. 196-201. 
56. This is largely conjecture. It is borne out, however, by sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and 
eighteenth-century trial procedure and writings on the criminal trial, and there is no reason 
to believe that jury practice had changed in this respect. See below, Chapters 4 and 7. 
57. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 129. 
58. See below, Chapter 2. See also Summerson, "Plea Roll and Year Book." Dr. 
Summerson demonstrates that judges frequently put questions to juries. His study does not 
suggest that judges frequently questioned juries on their verdicts; what is most striking about 
the evidence he has uncovered-it seems to me-is that judicial questioning (and even 
badgering) of juries on specific aspects of given cases did not seem to prevent those juries 
from returning an acquittal. 
59. In the two chapters that follow, I shall develop this theme in some detail. I have 
perhaps overstated the point here. It is possible that witnesses attached to appear at the eyre 
in the thirteenth century made representations before the justices; victims of theft, 
especially those who had been robbed by persons they could subsequently recognize, may 
have played a role. It would appear, however, that such testimony was taken into account 
by presentment juries. The justices might choose to weigh all indictments heavily, but from 
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The jury's power to determine the defendant's fate was virtually 
absolute. Those acquitted were with only rare exceptions released sine 
die; a few of them were released upon pledges of an official or other 
person of importance for their good behavior.60 The guilty were hanged 
almost immediately. There was no time for appeal or pardon. In a very 
few cases the bench refused to accept a verdict, but those cases involved 
special verdicts of self-defense where the original verdict left some 
doubts. It does not appear that a second trial jury ever reversed the 
verdict given by the trial jury it superseded.6t 
Although jurors might be held liable to punishment for what amounted 
to pe:Ijury-giving false verdicts under oath-that liability extended in 
criminal cases only to outright corruption. Jurors proven to have been 
bribed or who admitted they had lied might be fined or imprisoned. The 
more general liability to attaint, and to the extreme form of punishment it 
involved, was never extended to the criminal trial jury. 62 The closest the 
bench came to application of the dreaded process of attaint was the 
impaneling of a second jury to test the first jury's special verdict of 
self-defense, and there is no evidence to suggest that the first jury would 
have been punished had its verdict been repudiated. 
The trial jury's immunity to punishment for an honest but mistaken 
verdict has never been easy to explain. It may be that the divine aspect of 
the ordeal, which at first delayed the adoption of the trial jury, attached to 
the latter institution when it replaced the ordeal after 1215. The verdict of 
the criminal trial jury, unlike that of the civil trial jury, was thus not open 
to challenge, for its judgment reflected a will greater than that of humans, 
a will to which all humans were bound. But this traditional explanation 
seems entirely too mechanistic. It is more plausible that the immunity of 
the criminal trial jury was owing to the presumption of lawfulness 
accorded its members in the institution's early years, when presenters 
made up a large percentage of many, perhaps most, juries. Nothing short 
the records it does not appear that they were in a position to determine which indictments 
were particularly well grounded. So many indictments were ultimately repudiated by juries 
on which at least some of the indictors sat, that the justices must have been stymied in their 
efforts to get at the truth. At gaol delivery (see below, text at n. 79) their job was doubly 
difficult. 
60. See e.g. C. A. F. Meekings, "Introduction" to Meekings and Crook, eds., The 1235 
Surrey Eyre, p. 126. 
61. See below, Chapter 3 text at nn. 3-7 and passim. 
62. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 132; Milsom, Historical Foundations, p. 411. On 
attaint see Thayer, Preliminary Treatise, pp. 137 et seq. The matter of fining jurors in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is discussed at length below, Chapters 4, text at nn. 
149-58, and 6, passim. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commentary on attaint in 
criminal cases is discussed below, Chapters 6, text at nn. 138-46, and 8, nn. 95-96 and 
accompanying text. 
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of proof of gross abuse of office sufficed to refute the word of the 
substantial hundredmen who served as presenters. Moreover, that the 
defendant's life was at stake must have counted for something. The power 
of the jury may have reflected more than its institutional setting and role: 
it may have reflected a social understanding about the appropriate 
circumstances under which a person's life might be surrendered to the 
Crown. On this view, jury discretion was from the outset a given of the 
administration of the criminal law. Abuse of discretion involved con-
scious subversion of the trial process, the rendering of a verdict in bad 
faith. A verdict rendered according to conscience and reflecting the jury's 
conception of just deserts was divine in the sense that it was beyond 
judicial reproach.63 
HI 
The adoption of the trial jury as a regular means of proof effected the 
first major transition in the post-Angevin administration of the criminal 
law-a natural, though profound, step. Less dramatic but perhaps not less 
important was the second transition, one that occurred over several 
decades: the decline of the eyre and the recourse to regular commissions 
of gaol delivery. 64 There were frequent gaol deliveries in the mid- and 
late-thirteenth century; by the early fourteenth century, deliveries were 
held at least twice yearly .65 The eyre was infrequently held by that time.66 
63. Maitland's classic explanation of the finality of the criminal trial jury's verdict 
stressed the fact that the defendant "had put himself upon the oath of the jurors; a 
professedly unanimous verdict would satisfy the justices; it was the test that the prisoner 
had chosen. On the whole, trial by jury must have been in the main a trial by general 
repute." Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:655. Milsom gives a similar 
explanation: "Because a jury was the defendant's own proof, chosen by himself, attaint was 
in principle not available in criminal cases. This process, by which a verdict could be 
challenged before a larger jury, was appropriate to such procedures as the petty assizes, 
where the defendant had no choice either in the question or the means by which it was to be 
answered." Historical Foundations, p. 411. 
64. For discussion of the transition from eyre to gaol delivery and other, related 
proceedings (and of the relevant literature on the subject) see Bernard McLane, "The Royal 
Courts and the Problem of Disorder in Lincolnshire, 1290-1341," doctoral dissertation 
(University of Rochester, 1979), ch. I. 
65. SeeR. B. Pugh, Imprisonment in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1968), chs. 12 and 
13. See also M. Gollancz, "The System of Gaol Delivery," M.A. dissertation (University 
of London, 1936); M. Taylor, "The Justices of Assize," in J. F. Willard and William A. 
Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1940-50), 
vol. 3, pp. 219-47. 
66. See Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner. pp. 114-15; Richard W. Kaeuper, "Law and Order 
in Fourteenth-Century England; The Evidence of Special Commissions of Oyer and 
Terminer," Speculum, vol. 54 (1979), p. 738. 
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The decline of that cumbersome and unpopular administrative and 
judicial institution was also signaled by the Crown's increasing use of 
special commissions of trailbaston and of oyer and terminer to hear 
presentments and to try those taken pursuant to them. 67 These special 
commissions had broader authority than did justices of gaol delivery, 
whose jurisdiction extended only to persons already gaoled upon an 
indictment for felony.6s 
Our own interest lies mainly with felony trials at gaol delivery. But we 
shall have to keep in mind the contemporaneous proceedings, in the main 
for trespasses,69 before justices upon commission of oyer and terminer, 
and we must remember that the transition from eyre to gaol delivery 
involved a major readjustment in the Crown's administration of criminal 
justice.7° This readjustment, which reflected new and sometimes contra-
dictory attitudes, involved changes-though perhaps unintended ones-
in the institution of the trial jury in felony cases. The commissions to 
justices to deliver England's gaols ordered the justices to make certain 
that jurors from each hundred in the counties they were to visit would be 
present at the proceedings.71 The justices in turn notified the sheriffs of 
those counties, and the sheriffs sent appropriate orders to the hundred 
bailiffs .72 Typically, a hundred was represented by a panel of eighteen 
persons from whom the twelve triers would be chosen for each felony 
committed in the hundred.73 Those who were tried had been presented 
earlier in the county court; because they were not re-presented before the 
justices of gaol delivery, the attendance of the presenters was not 
required. There was nothing to prevent a bailiff from returning persons 
67. SeeR. B. Pugh, "Some Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," Proceedings of the 
British Academy, vol. 59 (1973), pp. 83-84; Alan Harding, "Early Trailbaston Proceedings 
from the Lincoln Roll of 1305," in R. F. Hunnisett and J. B. Post, eds., Medieval Legal 
Records edited in memory of C. A. F. Meekings (London, 1978), pp. 130-38. 
68. See generally Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 734-84. 
69. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 11-12, 24. 
70. Ibid., ch. I. The increase in actions for trespass contributed to the need for frequent 
local sessions; the strain thus placed on the central justices contributed to the use as judges 
(for oyer and terminer; not for gaol delivery, where felony was the principal business) of 
local magnates and gentry and to the development of the offices of keeper of the peace and, 
by the 1330s, of justice of the peace. By then, if not long before, the easy availability of such 
actions drew cases away from the gaol delivery and other sessions that heard felonies. 
Especially important was the prosecution of much relatively minor theft that might have 
been prosecuted as felony, as mere, indictable trespass, or indeed as private suits of trespass 
for money damages. On the origins of trespass see Alan Harding, The Roll of the Shropshire 
Eyre of 1256 (London, 1981), pp. xxxii-lviii, and sources cited therein. 
71. Thomas A. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," doctoral disserta-
tion (Harvard University, 1970), p. 167. 
72. Idem. 
73. See e.g. C 260/4, no. 19 (1288); C 260/6, no. 7 (1292); C 260/16, no. 12 (1306). 
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who had served in the county court on the presenting jury. 74 In some 
instances there must have been substantial overlap between the original 
presenters and those sent to the county town for proceedings before 
justices of gaol delivery. But more often than not these frequent proceed-
ings saw men of lesser status, men less able to avoid the onerous service 
of the trial juror. The separation of the juries was not, however, merely 
the result of the transition from eyre to delivery. During the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries it had come to be thought that the 
defendant ought to be tried mainly by persons who had not presented him. 
Thus administrative development and nascent concepts of due process 
worked together to produce the virtual separation of the two juries long 
before 1352, when statute allowed challenge of a prospective juror on 
grounds he had served as an indictor.75 
The decline in the status of trial jurors was not dramatic in the early 
decades of the fourteenth century. But gradually thereafter its impact was 
felt as exemptions from service reduced the base of substantial jurors. 
This apparent "democratizing" of the trial jury may have weakened the 
institution, as its members were now more often susceptible to pressure 
from powerful friends or foes of defendants. 76 Legislative attention to jury 
malpractices grew more intense, and in the fifteenth century there were 
attempts to set property qualifications for jury service.77 By then, the 
resistance to serving was great enough to doom any meaningful reform. 
This is not to suggest that, at least in the fourteenth century, the system 
of gaol delivery was unworkable. In fact, it represented in some respects 
a great improvement over the eyre in the administration of criminal law 
with regard to felonies. The system's most significant virtue was the 
frequency of judicial visitations. Suspects who had been taken were tried 
within a matter of weeks or months, not years; bail was less important and 
less universally resorted to. In homicide, special commissions were very 
rarely held after the late thirteenth century, for the denial of bail worked 
far less hardship.7s 
The conviction rate at gaol deliveries was roughly what it had been for 
homicide at the eyre, and double what it had been for theft. Juries 
condemned about 15 percent of homicide suspects and nearly one third of 
those indicted for theft. 79 One might have expected higher rates of 
74. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 92-93. 
75. Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5. c. 3. See Plucknett, Concise History, p. 127. 
76. See e.g. J. H. Bellamy, Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages 
(London, 1973), p. 149. 
77. See below, Chapter 4, n. 25 and accompanying text. 
78. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," p. 148. 
79. Given found that 17.4 percent of those charged with homicide alone at eyres in the 
thirteenth century were "executed." This may include cases actually tried at gaol delivery 
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conviction at gaol delivery than at the eyre: relatively few suspects 
appeared at the eyre, and many of those who did had reason to be 
confident that they would be exonerated. At gaol deliveries, all those who 
were being held pending trial had to come forward to face the bench and 
a trial jury. Far fewer suspects had been bailed; certainly those held for 
the most heinous offenses and possibly those who were most suspect had 
not. If the conviction rates are surprisingly low by the standards of the 
eyre, they are even more strikingly low by modern standards. The 
reasons for this are complex and require further consideration of the 
administration of criminal justice in the period that began with the decline 
of the general eyre. 
The maturation of gaol delivery belongs to the period of late medieval 
criminal administration about which we know least. The attention of 
modern scholars has fallen mostly on the mid-thirteenth-century eyres 
and on the fourteenth-century system of gaol delivery. It is conventional 
to treat the late thirteenth century as the beginning of a long period of 
social decline and disruption and to treat the transition from eyre to 
delivery as in part a symptom of that decline and in part an attempt to 
remedy the disruption. 80 All ages think themselves the victims of increas-
ing criminal activity. In some, people are especially articulate about their 
perceptions, and we must not uncritically equate oft-stated fears with 
realities. 81 The attention which Edward I's legislation pays to the problem 
of crime may say more about such fears82 and about the impulse to 
legislate than about relative rates of criminal activity. Edward's legisla-
tion and the creation of new procedures to deal with crime may have 
represented (amateurish) attempts to deal with longstanding problems for 
which the eyre was too irregular and too cumbersome. 83 
but reported and recorded at a subsequent eyre; it does not include many tried by special 
commissions and found to have slain in self-defense. James B. Given, Society and Homicide 
in Thirteenth Century England (Stanford, 1977), p. 133. Hanawalt gives 12.4 percent as the 
conviction rate for homicide at early fourteenth-century gaol deliveries and about 30 percent 
as the conviction rate for theft. Crime and Conflict, p. 59. Pugh examined the Newgate 
(London and Middlesex) gaol delivery rolls for the decade 1281-90; he found a condemna-
tion rate of 21 percent for homicide (where no other charge was involved) and 31 percent for 
all forms of theft (excluding only cases where an additional charge of homicide, forgery, or 
prison breach accompanied the charge, or charges, of theft). "Reflections of a Medieval 
Criminologist," pp. 6-7. 
80. On the literature regarding the "crisis in order and justice" in this period see 
Kaeuper, "Law and Order," p. 735, n. 4, and works cited therein. 
81. See Kaeuper's excellent treatment of this problem at ibid., pp. 735 et seq. See also 
McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 60, 115. McLane concludes that 
there was an increase. 
82. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 84. See Statute of Winchester, 
preamble (Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. I; Statutes of the Realm, 1:96). 
83. See T. F. T. Plucknett, Edward I and Criminal Law (Cambridge, 1960), ch. 4. 
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The late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries saw the use of special 
commissions of trailbaston and oyer and terminer, increased reliance on 
keepers of the peace, and an attempt to tighten the bail system.s4 By the 
middle of the fourteenth century the keepers had attained the status of 
justices, adding the capacity to try misdemeanants and (sometimes) felons 
to their traditional power to hear presentments.85 The quarter sessions of 
the justices of the peace soon absorbed most of the criminal business that 
had earlier been handled by the less flexible commissions of trailbaston 
and oyer and terminer. Local law enforcement capacities had been greatly 
enhanced during the period of transition from eyre to quarter sessions and 
regular delivery of gaols. 86 Frequent gaol deliveries, therefore, were only 
one aspect of a major overhaul of the system of criminal administration. 
Conviction rates at gaol delivery must be read in the light of these 
reforms: the results must have been disappointing. 
The statistics must also be read in light of the disasters that beset 
England in the fourteenth century. Famine, plague, and war brought on 
social dislocation, hurrying the disintegration of older forms of social 
structure and increasing the numbers of dispossessed.S7 The Crown 
sought to establish means to deal with these problems and with the 
criminal activity they brought in their wake, but it may have intensified 
them through, among other things, the granting of pardons ''of grace'' to 
those who would serve in foreign wars.ss Pardons of grace, which 
absolved the most hardened criminals of all their felonies by making them 
immune to prosecution,s9 were issued in large numbers in the 1290s and 
84. Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 735 et seq; Alan Harding, "The Origin and Early 
History of the Keeper of the Peace," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 
no. 10 (1950), pp. 85-109. 
85. Bertha Haven Putnam, Proceedings before the Justices of the Peace in the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London, 1938), pp. xix-xxxii; "The Transformation of the 
Keepers of the Peace into the Justices of the Peace, 1327-80," Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 4th ser., no. 12 (1929), pp. 19-48; "Shire Officials: Keepers of the Peace 
and Justices of the Peace," in Willard eta!., eds., English Government at Work, 3: 182-217; 
Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 167-69. 
86. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 37-43, for discussion 
of the reforms effected and the problems they brought in their wake. See also Post, "Local 
Jurisdictions and Judgment of Death," pp. 12-15, for the impact of royal commissions of the 
peace on residual private jurisdiction over felony. 
87. See below, Chapter 3, text at nn. 8-10. 
88. Pardons of grace are to be distinguished from pardons of course. All pardons were 
emanations of the royal prerogative. Those pardons that came to be granted automatically, 
for slaying in self-defense, through accident or through insanity, as though the defendant had 
done no wrong, were pardons "of course." All other pardons were granted by "grace" of 
the king, who-usually for a price-"mercifully" absolved a person of a wrongdoing, or at 
least insured the person against prosecution. 
89. See e.g. Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 311-23; H. J. Hewitt, The 
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throughout the fourteenth century. Assumptions of contemporaries about 
the destructive impact of this policy are reflected in parliamentary 
petitions and statutes seeking to limit the royal pardoning power. Periodi-
cally the Crown consented to limit the sale of pardons but then soon 
breached its promise; not until the last decade of the fourteenth century 
was even a mildly effective brake placed on the flow of pardons of grace. 90 
How, then, does one begin to account for the vast number of acquittals 
even of those accused and held for commission of felony? And what 
pressures were brought to bear upon the juries that were forced to 
respond in individual cases to the question of capital liability? These are 
among the questions that the following chapters explore. By way of 
conclusion to this introductory essay we may suggest the direction that 
our explorations will take. 
Some, perhaps many, of those tried at gaol delivery were not guilty of 
the acts with which they had been charged. The system of presentment, 
including the supporting scheme of amercements for failure to name a 
suspect, produced some false accusations. This had been true from the 
beginning of the presentment process. 91 It is possible that the replacement 
of the ordeal by the jury actually increased the amount of false charging, 
for the latter institution provided a more trustworthy and less painful 
means of exoneration. By the fifteenth century, the modern indictment 
·process was emerging out of the older system of presentment.92 This 
process, wherein officials investigated complaints and put the evidence 
they had gathered before the grand jury, must have placed a check on 
unsubstantiated accusations, but for most of the medieval period the 
margin of error at the presentment stage was very great.93 In addition, 
many of those accused were guilty in fact but not proven to be so. Jurors 
Organization of War under Edward Ill, 1338-62 (Manchester, 1966), pp. 173-75; Hanawalt, 
Crime and Conflict, pp. 235-37. Hanawalt cautions that the gaol delivery rolls do not 
provide clear evidence that the pardoning policy resulted in a dramatic increase in crime. 
90. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 12-30 and accompanying text. 
91. Not all "false" accusations resulted from bad faith. Perhaps the better phrase is 
"wrong accusations." Presentment, we have seen, was deemed an improvement upon the 
appeal, which produced a substantial amount of truly false ("malicious") prosecution. 
92. See below, Chapter 4, text preceding n. 19. For the thirteenth-century origins of 
indictment by bill see Alan Harding, "The Origins of the Crime of Conspiracy," Trans-
actions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., vol. 33 (1983), pp. 94-95. 
93. The crime of "conspiracy" in its original meaning: an agreement falsely to indict of 
crime, was statutorily defined in 1300. Statutes of the Realm, vol. I, p. 139. See also Pugh, 
"Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 97. For a recent important account of 
conspiracy see Harding, "Origins of the Crime of Conspiracy." Harding marshals the 
evidence for a near-crisis in the administration of the criminal law owing to the practice of 
false accusation (pp. 97-99). It remains unclear how much such false accusation was 
responsible for trials at gaol delivery of persons held for homicide or theft (as opposed to 
trials at eyres or before justices of trailbaston for assaults and like offenses). 
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were sworn to state the truth, not to confirm susp1c1ons. They were 
supposed to acquit those against whom a firm case had not been made, 
and probably they generally did.94 
At the other extreme were cases where the jury believed the defendant 
to be guilty but acquitted him nonetheless out of fear of retribution or out 
of partisanship. This latter category included the simple favor shown to 
friends and neighbors as well as the more serious instances where the jury 
had been bribed to save the guilty suspect's life. Authorities believed that 
coercion and bribery were common and that the truly corrupt verdicts 
that resulted forestalled attempts to bring very grave offenders to justice. 
Concern with this kind of corruption lay behind parliamentary attempts to 
secure more qualified jurors and might have been reflected in the 
increasing investigative activity of the justices of the peace.95 
There were, of course, many other defendants who were guilty under 
the strict rules of the law whom juries refused to convict. These were 
persons whose acts, whether theft, homicide, or rape, were not consid-
ered sufficiently serious to merit capital punishment. The jury was 
reacting to the reputation of the accused,96 the nature of his offense, and-
perhaps most important-the punishment he would incur. Thefts of a 
relatively trivial amount perpetrated by persons in dire straits, slayings 
born of sudden anger by persons long of good standing, these were 
offenses for which the law prescribed death but for which the community 
frequently refused to convict. Juries in these cases simply nullified the law 
of felony. 97 
The jury's power to render verdicts against the evidence was perhaps 
the most distinctive aspect of medieval criminal law. Whether such 
verdicts resulted from mercy, fear, or outright corruption, they evidenced 
the trial jury's domination of the system of justice. In part, the jury's 
power flowed from its institutional setting. From its inception, and 
perhaps until Tudor times, the jury was the source of practically all of the 
94. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 97-98. Jurors were sworn 
to tell the truth "to the best of their knowledge. If, however, they did not know it or 
possessed imperfect knowledge they could not then support the prosecution, for they must 
not reach their verdict on the basis of mere 'thoughts."' See also Thayer, Preliminary 
Treatise, pp. 100-101, n. 2. 
95. See Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, pp. 149-50. On statutes setting qualifications 
for jurors see below, Chapter 4, n. 25. On investigation by justices of the peace see below, 
Chapter 4, text at nn. 15-21. 
96. Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 98: "When acquitting [jurors] 
often said no more than that a suspect's character was good. He who had the reputation of 
Fide lit as must have had a flying start toward liberation." The role played by reputation is 
difficult to assess. Jurors might have been using it as evidence and inferring innocence from 
good reputation or taking it into account in extending mercy to one they believed guilty. 
97. See below, Chapter 2. 
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evidence put before the court. Typically, jury verdicts were conclusions 
based on assessment of facts gathered before the defendant went on trial. 
Although juries were probably influenced by the defendant's bearing in 
court, their reactions to that drama must have been played back against 
what they had already learned about him and the circumstances of the act 
with which he had been charged. 
In part, too, the jury's power reflected deep-seated assumptions about 
justice, assumptions which-as may increasingly have become the case-
authorities shared with those they ruled. The verdict was a verdict "of the 
country,'' made by persons on oath before God to tell the truth according 
to their consciences. It was an inscrutable verdict, though it is by no 
means clear to us why that was so. We may try to understand the various 
aspects of the inscrutability of verdicts: they were, it was thought, 
divinely inspired; if the defendant so chose, the matter of life and death 
was for his countrymen to determine. Nevertheless, the trial jury's power 
also reflected incapacities of central government that could not be 
confronted openly and that may have induced authorities to conceive of 
jury verdicts as presumptively legitimate. Only clear corruption was open 
to correction; the notion of truth according to conscience was sufficiently 
broad to cover misreadings of evidence and verdicts rendered knowingly 
against the evidence but inspired by mercy. 
The problem of merciful or otherwise principled nullification-the 
subject of this study-is extremely complex. In the medieval period, for 
one thing, specific instances of nullification were largely hidden from 
view. Such verdicts were usually indistinguishable, from the perspective 
of the bench, from acquittals based on the belief that the defendant had 
not been involved. Moreover, if the justices did in a given case suspect 
nullification, they might have thought it of the unprincipled sort, the 
product of bribery, extortion, or abject fear. Those were more serious and 
perhaps more common problems. Simple merciful nullification, especially 
in close cases, was often sheltered from view and frequently protected by 
the jury's duty to acquit where the evidence was uncertain. It was also a 
relatively trivial matter, given the perception of a substantial increase in 
truly serious crimes. Nullification, in this particular sense, was probably 
an unintended by-product of the medieval system of criminal justice. But 
its importance should not for that reason be underestimated. Although it 
was a relatively insignificant form of jury lawlessness, it involved serious 
long-term implications for the relationship between rulers and ruled. In 
the ensuing chapters we shall search out the evidence for jury nullification 
of the rules of capital felony, and we shall attempt to assess the judicial 
reaction to this kind of jury behavior. We shall, in short, inventory a lost 
part of the legacy of the medieval criminal trial jury that the modern world 
inherited and took over for its own. 
2 Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability and 
Jury Nullification of the 
Law in the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Centuries 
We move in this chapter from an overview of the institutional setting of 
the criminal trial jury to consideration of one very important aspect of the 
jury's social role: the jury as law finder. I shall show that the medieval 
criminal trial jury imposed upon the courts the community's-or the 
communities'-concepts of liability for felony. In doing so, the jury 
exercised a de facto power, since its legal role was to find and declare fact 
and to leave to the bench judgment according to law. This extended role 
is one of the two main themes of this book. The second theme-the effect 
of such jury behavior on the development of the law and on the way 
official and lay Englishmen viewed the jury-is introduced in Chapter 3. 
Early juries obviously nullified at least to some degree the reach of the 
capital laws. It would be more extraordinary, and possibly more interest-
ing, had they not done so. But it is not easy to show juries playing this role 
in specific cases. Moreover, it is not obvious that this aspect of jury 
behavior mattered very much; from the perspective of the bench, other 
aspects of jury behavior must have mattered a great deal more. 
The great majority of defendants in felony trials were acquitted. Many 
of these acquittals were deserved, for the system of presentment often 
resulted in prosecutions of the truly innocent, and the means for gathering 
evidence were so rudimentary that in many instances a case simply could 
not be made. Many acquittals were, on the other hand, undeserved, 
arising not from defects in pretrial procedures but from corruption of the 
trial process itself. Juries were sometimes bribed and often fear-stricken; 
moreover, they might lie out of dishonest partisanship that did not rise to 
the level of conscientious nullification. These problems plagued the 
bench, and the fact that the judges were at pains to discover whether an 
acquittal was of the former, deserved kind, or of the latter, undeserved 
kind, only worsened their predicament. Because the jury produced the 
evidence, it prevented the bench from seeing exactly what was occurring 
in individual cases. The bench, and officialdom in general, lashed out 
blindly against the major forms of corruption-the bribing and intimida-
tion of jurors-which it knew played a role in a substantial number of 
cases that ended in acquittal. 
Somewhere in between the deserved and undeserved acquittals lay the 
presumably large number of acquittals based on jury repudiation of the 
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death sanction. These jury responses were only partly visible to the 
bench. Many of them were indistinguishable from the other, more or less 
serious, forms of jury behavior. To speak of them as isolable even in 
theory is, of course, to engage in oversimplification, for in any given case 
feelings of simple mercy might have been mixed either with doubts about 
the evidence or with a purely partisan attitude, or even with fear of 
retaliation by the defendant's kin or associates. 
What follows in this chapter is a tentative exploration of one relatively 
hidden phenomenon that characterized trial by jury: jury assessment of 
the nature of the defendant's act. Given the nature of the extant evidence, 
the greatest amount of attention shall be paid to jury behavior in 
homicide. I mean to accomplish several things: to demonstrate that in 
homicide cases juries systematically imposed upon the courts a distinc-
tion the formal legal rules did not draw; to establish the presumption that 
juries played a similar nullifying role in other kinds of cases, especially in 
theft, the other main felony reflected on the trial rolls; to make possible 
the drawing of inferences regarding the kinds of nullification in which 
juries engaged in felonies other than homicide, again mainly in theft; and 
to suggest that the Angevin revolution in procedure and sanctions had less 
impact on the actual resolution of cases than is sometimes supposed, and 
thereby to raise questions (to be addressed in Chapter 3) regarding the 
reasons for using the jury in the way it was used. 1 
I 
The early history of English criminal law lies hidden within the laconic 
formulas of the rolls and law books. The rules of the law, as expounded 
by the judges, have been the subject of many studies; but their practical 
application in the courts, where the jury of the community was the final 
and unbridled arbiter, largely remains a mystery. Only now are we 
coming to know something about the social mores regarding crime and 
criminals. 2 
1. See below, Chapter 3, section IV. 
2. Among the recent works that address these latter concerns are Given, Society and 
Homicide; Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict; McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of 
Disorder"; Carl I. Hammer, "Patterns of Homicide in Fourteenth-Century Oxford," Past 
and Present, vol. 78 (1978), pp. l-23. Given's book represents the most detailed analysis to 
date of the ''sociology'' of homicide. Its strengths lie in its data on perpetrators and victims, 
their geographical and social background, and their relationship to each other. Given may 
overstate the degree to which violence was accepted (see p. 213) rather than the capital 
sanction repudiated. His sources did not give him much room to investigate the behavior of 
juries regarding their assessment of the defendant's act. Probably juries reacted to both act 
and person, their view of one influencing their view of the other. Given's book, as well as 
the other works cited in this note, should be read alongside this chapter. 
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The following study attempts to demonstrate that from late Anglo-
Saxon times to the end of the Middle Ages there existed a widespread 
societal distinction between "murder," i.e., homicide perpetrated 
through stealth, and "simple" homicide, roughly what a later legal age 
termed "manslaughter." This distinction, which was imposed upon the 
courts through the instrument of the trial jury, was fundamentally at odds 
with the letter of the law. It is therefore necessary to state briefly what the 
rules of law were. 
In the early twelfth century, the Crown took exclusive jurisdiction over 
all homicides and defined them as (l) culpable and thereby capital, (2) 
excusable and thereby pardonable, (3) justifiable and thereby deserving of 
acquittaP The last class at first incorporated the slaying of manifest 
felons (e.g., "hand-having thieves") and outlaws who resisted capture. 
By the middle of the fourteenth century it came to include the killing of 
housebreakers and robbers caught in the act, though it was not until the 
sixteenth century that a statute turned this policy into firm law. 4 Pardon-
able homicides were those committed by the insane, those committed in 
self-defense, and those committed unintentionally. The rules of self-
defense were rigorous throughout the entire medieval period. The slayer 
had to have made every possible attempt to escape his attacker, must 
have reached a point beyond which he could not retreat, and must have 
retaliated out ofliterally vital necessity.s All other intentional homicides, 
those deliberate but of a sudden, as well as those planned and stealthily 
perpetrated, fell into the large category of culpable homicide. According 
to the rules of the law, there were to be no distinctions made among them. 
This classification remained intact until the late sixteenth century, when 
the judicial distinction between murder and manslaughter finally 
emerged. 6 Originally, of those meriting pardons for excusable homicide, 
only persons who had tried to flee suffered forfeiture of goods; after 1343, 
all pardonable slayers were supposed to lose their goods.? 
We have seen that the king migl)t as a special favor grant a pardon to a 
felonious slayer, usually for a considerable fee, or as a reward for service 
abroad in the royal army. These pardons "of grace" (de gratia) were 
emanations of the royal prerogative. Pardons for self-defense, accident, 
and insanity were, by the late thirteenth century, pardons "of course" 
(de cursu): all who deserved them according to the rules of the law were 
3. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 1 et seq. 
4. 24 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1532). 
5. See below, text at n. 22. 
6. J. M. Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," Law Quarterly 
Review, vol. lxxxiii (July and Oct., 1967), pp. 365-95, 569-601. 
7. For discussion of the rule of automatic forfeiture see below, Chapter 3, n. 105. 
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to receive them.s After 1294, due mainly to the needs of military 
recruitment, pardons of grace issued in far greater numbers than ever 
before to perpetrators of felonious slayings of all sorts. 
Because of the evidence on which this chapter is based, it has seemed 
best to proceed in reverse chronological order, to move backward from 
late-fourteenth-century evidence to a consideration of the rules of crimi-
nal liability in the Anglo-Saxon period. Subsection 1 examines jury 
behavior in the decades immediately following 1390 when some coroners 
and justices of the peace distinguished in their indictments between 
"murder" and simple homicide. Although both types of homicide re-
mained felonious, juries appear to have been loath to convict for the 
latter, while they frequently condemned perpetrators of the former. 
Before 1390, terms of indictment in all felonious homicides were uniform 
and no such correlation can be made. Subsection 2, therefore, utilizes 
another source of evidence: a correlation of fourteenth-century coroners' 
indictments with their corresponding verdicts for self-defense. It will be 
shown that many of those who received pardons for self-defense had in 
fact committed a felonious, simple homicide. The area of pardonable 
homicide, it appears, served as a possible way out in cases where the 
community did not believe the defendant deserved to be hanged. 
Because coroners' rolls are very sparse in the period before 1300, there 
exists no trustworthy method of proving that the societal attitudes traced 
here precede the fourteenth century. In fact, an important study of 
pardonable homicide in the thirteenth century argues that jurors were 
fairly scrupulous in giving evidence and that their determinations did not 
vary substantially from at least the spirit of the law.9 Nevertheless, in 
subsection 3 I shall contend that there is reason to believe verdicts were 
fabricated before the fourteenth century. Moreover, I shall argue that the 
early history of criminal liability, especially for the period just preceding 
the imposition of royal jurisdiction in all homicides, suggests that from 
their very inception the official rules ran counter to and never really 
became a part of social practice. This argument, admittedly speculative, 
takes the following form. During the Anglo-Saxon period only those who 
committed homicide through secrecy or stealth-murder-had to pay for 
their act with their life. The new, twelfth-century practice subjected to the 
death penalty not only "murderers" but the large class of open slayers 
formerly allowed to compensate for their act by payment of the wergeld. 
The community resisted this harsh extension of capital punishment and 
subsequently found means-acquittals and verdicts of self-defense-to 
impose upon the courts their long-held notions of justice, a process that 
8. See below, Chapter 3, n. 29 and accompanying text. 
9. Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 267-68. 
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becomes visible to us only in the fourteenth century. Thus the societal 
distinction between murder and simple homicide had its source deep in 
the English past. The introduction of novel and strict official rules of 
liability did away with the traditional means of dispute settlement in 
simple homicide, but it did not erase traditional social attitudes about 
liability. Nor did the imposition of a new scheme of criminal administra-
tion prevent society from acting, within the context of that scheme, in 
accordance with its traditional attitudes. 
Finally, in subsection 4, I shall elaborate upon the nature of the 
medieval societal concept of "murder" and the place of that concept 
within the process of dispute settlement. 
Throughout the medieval period for which written records are extant, 
the great majority of defendants who stood trial for homicide were 
acquitted. While today many are acquitted, one must take into account 
the fact that most suspects do not now stand trial; the vast majority of 
them plead guilty. In the Middle Ages few pleaded guilty to any felony 
since the penalty was invariably capital. 10 
Many defendants doubtless deserved acquittal, for many charges were 
poorly supported. The coroner's report might reflect the testimony of 
only a few neighbors and might present only the most serious charges that 
circulated in the wake of a homicide.n Although coroners were required 
to list all those present at a homicide, they often failed to do so. In many. 
cases they recorded the details of a slaying, yet maintained that no one 
had been present except the slain man, who had died immediately, and 
the slayer, who had thereupon fled. 12 What, or who, then, was the source 
of those details? There had probably been witnesses who were not 
anxious to become involved, who did not wish to risk coming under 
suspicion themselves. To come forward later was to risk a fine for not 
10. Convictions were particularly rare at the eyre, for few would appear who had neither 
a pardon nor assurance of acquittal by the country. At gaol delivery, where nearly all the 
defendants had been arrested against their will, the record of conviction was not much 
better. The roll of Thomas Ingelby and his associates, e.g., compiled at deliveries of 
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, and 
Warwickshire, 40--45 Edward III, contains the trials of 160 individuals accused of homicide 
(twenty-four were cited as accessories or receivers). Only fifteen were found guilty; 
seventy-four were acquitted, fifty-nine were given special verdicts of self-defense. The 
remainder came with pardons or were released for other reasons. Of the principals who 
denied the charges against them 80 percent were acquitted outright. JUST 3/142, mm.3 ff. 
11. Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner, p. 24. 
12. E.g. R. R. Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Coroners' Rolls of the City of London, A.D. 
1300-1378, (London, 1913), Roll B, no. 36; Roll D, no. 5. 
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having raised the hue. 13 On the other hand, what they had seen must soon 
have become the common knowledge of the countryside, and, allowing 
for the usual exaggerations or alterations of the true story, may have 
appeared in the coroner's enrollment as a fairly accurate account of the 
event. But it is difficult to separate the accurate descriptions from the 
cases of mere guesswork. The trial jurors probably took a more reason-
able view, rejecting unsubstantiated testimony .14 
Though malicious prosecution and honestly moved but mistaken indict-
ments may account in part for the high rate of acquittals, other factors 
must also have been at work. It is contended here that, for the most part, 
those few who were condemned had especially offended against the 
standards of the community. By discriminating between them and the 
many who committed homicides of a less serious nature, the jurors were 
creating a de facto classification roughly similar to the later legal distinc-
tion between murder and manslaughter. 
The clearest evidence of juries discriminating on the basis of the nature 
of the slaying dates from the end of the fourteenth century and the first 
decades of the fifteenth. In 1390 century-long protests against the royal 
pardoning policy culminated in a statute that restricted the king's power 
to grant pardons of grace to those who had committed murder.ts "Mur-
der," as a term of art, referred to the most heinous forms of homicide, 
those perpetrated through stealth, at night, or by ambush. The statute 
appears to have been directed especially at murderous assaults committed 
by professional highwaymen and burglars for monetary gain. The king 
agreed not to use his pardon powers casually; moreover, no pardon for 
murder would be valid unless it made specific mention of "murder." 
Significantly, culpable homicide continued to include both murder and 
simple homicide. Both were capital; no judicial distinction was made 
between them. The term "murder" was employed, where relevant, solely 
for the purpose of administering the Statute of 1390, i.e., for regulating the 
granting of pardons of grace to felonious slayers. Though the statute's 
effectiveness was short-lived, for several decades "murder" found its 
way into some homicide indictments. 
Analysis of several trial rolls that include indictments by coroners and 
justices of the peace who, despite the courts' failure to apply the 1390 
13. Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner, pp. 10, 25. 
14. See Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 361 et seq. for an analysis of 
inquisitions, held on a writ de odio et atia, to ascertain the veracity of appeals and 
indictments. 
15. The background to the statute of 1390 is given in Kaye, "Early History," Part I. My 
interpretation of the statute itself differs from that of Kaye, who argued that it limited 
pardons in all types of felonious homicides. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," 
pp. 462-69. 
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statute, bothered to discriminate between murder and simple homicide, 
reveals that juries acquitted the great majority of nonmurderers and sent 
murderers to the gallows about 50 percent of the time. 16 A gaol delivery 
roll covering the first eight years of the reign of Henry VI demonstrates 
the point quite clearly. 17 The roll was compiled for James Strangways and 
his fellows, who visited the gaols of Lincoln, Nottingham, Northampton, 
Warwick, and Leicester. A total of 114 defendants came before them to 
answer indictments for homicide in seventy-seven different cases. Of 
these, excluding those excused for faulty indictments and those for whom 
the jury returned special verdicts, eighty-four persons were acquitted and 
twenty were condemned to death. The latter group, with one exception, 
had been indicted for murder. Acquittals, on the other hand, were 
registered for thirty-seven indicted for simple homicide and for forty-
seven held for murder. Taking only principals into account, eighteen of 
the nineteen hanged had been charged with murder, and of the forty-five 
acquitted only seventeen were murder suspects. Thus, while an indict-
ment for simple homicide practically assured the principal defendant of 
exculpation (one of twenty-nine was hanged), an allegation of murder put 
his chances at about fifty-fifty (eighteen of thirty-five were hanged). 18 
Similarly, John Cokayn's roll, compiled over the years of Henry V's 
reign from deliveries of the gaols in Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, and 
Warwickshire, records fifteen convictions based on murder indictments 
and only four based on simple homicide, despite the fact that there are 
substantially more simple homicides on the roll. 19 The enrollments for 
Leicester gaol, based on several deliveries during the reign of Henry IV, 
show only four convictions, all based on murder allegations. Of the 
thirteen acquittals, seven of the original indictments were for murder, six 
for simple homicide.zo John Martyn's roll for the far western circuit 
(1424-30) presents ten simple homicides, nine of which ended in acquittal, 
and five murders, four of which led to convictions.21 
16. I have chosen those rolls, or sections of rolls, that contain a substantial number of 
indictments for homicide and where it seems clear that coroners and justices of the peace 
inserted, when relevant, murdravit or its statutory equivalent: insidiavit. On many other 
rolls, of course, where no distinction was made, indictments not including these terms of art 
often ended in convictions. 
17. JUST 3/203. 
18. Two of the seventeen had been indicted for murder by one inquest and for simple 
homicide by the other: coroners' indictments often differed from those of the justices of the 
peace. 
19. JUST 3/195. 
20. JUST 3/188. 
21. JUST 3/205. The "simple homicide" resulting in conviction was the slaying of a man 
by his wife, an act the community frequently construed as murder. 
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Despite the lack of evidence on the point, we might speculate that the 
judges sometimes urged juries to convict in cases brought on murder 
indictments. But it is not safe to conclude that the judges encouraged 
juries to acquit those indicted for simple homicide. Only the grounds of 
self-defense justified the deliberate slaying of a person who was neither a 
convicted nor a manifest felon, and the test for self-defense remained 
quite rigorous. As late as 1454 Prisot, J., stated the test for merely 
threatening to kill in self defense: 
... if a man assaults you in order to beat you it is not lawful for you 
to say you will kill him and to menace his life and limb: but if the case 
is such that he has you at such advantage that it may be understood that 
he is going to kill you as if you seek to flee and he is swifter than you 
and pursues you so that you are unable to escape; or if you are on the 
ground under him; or if he chases you to a wall or hedge or dike, so that 
you cannot escape, then it is lawful for you to say that if he won't 
desist, you want to slay him to save your own life, and thus you may 
menace him for such special cause.22 
2 
Our demonstration that juries acted upon their own extralegal notion of 
culpable homicide based on the distinction between serious and simple 
homicide is limited thus far to the post-1390 period. It is likely that juries 
made this distinction earlier, but it is not easy to prove. Before 1390 gaol 
delivery enrollments, in recording the indictment made before the coroner 
or justice of the peace, almost invariably used only the unenlightening 
phrase felonice interfecit ("feloniously slew"). Thus it is impossible to 
show from them that juries distinguished between types of felonious 
homicides. If we work backward from the trial roll to the indictment as it 
appeared on the original coroner's roll, two nearly insuperable problems 
are presented: the greater part of the original inquests are no longer 
extant; those that do survive generally contain only the operative phrase, 
felonice interfecit, with few details from which the nature of the act can 
be deduced. One of the few coroners' rolls that does supply such details 
22. Year Books, 1422-1461 (Henry VI) (London, 1556-74), 33 Hen. 6, Easter, pl. 10: 
" ... quar si un home vous assaute de vou batre n 'e loial pour vous a dire que vous voiles 
luy tuer, et de luy menasser de vie et de membre: mes si !'cas soit tiel, q'il ad vous a tiel 
advantage que par entendment il voilloit vous tuer come si voiles fuir, et il est plus courrant 
que vous estes, et alia apres vous, issint que ne vous poies luy escaper; ou autrement que 
vous estes desouh luy a!' terre; ou s'il ad enchace vous a un mure ou un hedge ou dike, issint 
que vous ne poies luy escape, donq's est loial pour vous adire que s'il ne veut departir de 
vous, q'vous en salvatio de vostre vie luy voiles tuer, et issint vous poies luy menasser pour 
tiel special cause." 
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is the roll of Edmund de Ovyng.23 It is also the longest (sixty-nine 
membranes) of the extant coroners' rolls. Of the twenty-five cases on 
Ovyng's roll that present homicides identifiable on the trial rolls, only two 
ended in convictions.24 Both show the characteristics of murder, but in 
one the defendant confessed and turned approver. 25 This sort of piece-
meal evidence, drawn from isolated cases on many different rolls over a 
century or more, does not afford convincing proof. 
The only feasible approach to our problem is to compare the coroner's 
indictment with the trial enrollment in cases ending in a verdict of 
self-defense. As we have seen, the law of self-defense was very strict. The 
slayer had to have acted as a last resort, which meant, in effect, that the 
jury had to detail the defendant's attempts to escape his assailant. 
Verdicts of self-defense appear on the trial rolls as a series of formulas 
that put the defendant's actions in the best possible light. The slain man 
was usually said to have provoked the fight and dealt the first blow; the 
defendant then had attempted to escape, only to find himself cornered or 
thrown down and held to the ground; gravely wounded, the defendant as 
a last resort drew a weapon and saved his life in the only way possible. 
Often, it was specified that the defendant had retaliated with a single 
blow.26 Some of these details doubtless represented embellishments of the 
truth; some even went beyond the rigorous requirements of the law. It 
would have been sufficient, for purposes of eligibility for royal pardon, to 
allege that the defendant had retreated as far as possible and had struck 
23. JUST 2/18 (Cambridgeshire, 14-39 Edw. III). 
24. Nine ended in acquittals, eleven in findings of self-defense, one defendant came 
forward with a pardon, one died in gaol, and one was remanded to gaol pending further 
proceedings. 
25. JUST 2/18, m.21/4 (1349): " ... noctanter felonice interfecit R. B. et M. uxorem eius 
. . . " The gaol delivery roll (JUST 3/134, m.38/5) used the form, "felonice et sediciose 
interfecit ... noctanter." In the second case, testimony was recorded at the coroner's 
inquest [JUST 2/18, m.5d/4 (1346)] that " ... post horam cubitus [A] surexit extra cubitum 
suum . .. insultumfecit eidem W . ... W. surexit a tecto suo" and raised the hue, at which 
point the defendant stabbed him to death. The accused turned approver [i.e., confessed and 
then appealed others in hope of obtaining their convictions and, in return, of gaining pardon 
for his own offense. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 16-17; F. C. 
Hamil, "The King's Approver," Speculum, vol. 11, p. 238; Jens Roehrkasten, "The King's 
Approver in the Fourteenth Century" (paper delivered at the British Legal History 
Conference, Norwich, July, 1983)]. For the gaol delivery enrollment, see JUST 3/134, 
m.34/4 (1346). Although little can be made of such rare cases, they deserve some comment. 
They are the only cases that led to conviction. Both have elements of "murder." The first 
was secretly done, at night; the second was an attack on a man in his own bed. Though the 
defendant confessed, it is unlikely he would have done so had the jury not been about to 
declare him guilty. This is precisely what we would expect to find if a more extensive 
comparison were possible. 
26. E.g. JUST 3/142, m.6d/2 (1367); JUST 3/142, m.10d/2 (1371). 
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back as a last resort; had he not yet been wounded or had he needed to 
retaliate with multiple blows, he would still have been eligible. 
It thus becomes critical to determine just how much the jury embel-
lished the defendant's true case. If juries used the category of pardonable 
homicide to exculpate manslaughterers, they would have fabricated 
stories of retreat and last resort where in fact there had been neither. They 
would have cast fights willingly entered by the defendant, possibly ones 
wherein he had struck the first blow, as struggles in which the defendant 
was an unwilling participant. If the juries perpetrated such fabrications, it 
would be visible to us only through a comparison of the trial enrollments 
with the corresponding coroners' enrollments. The coroner's enrollment 
was often far less formulistic and represented a more candid response 
from the jury. It was a record that could be contradicted or embellished 
in court without reprimand to the jury or detriment to the defendant's 
case. 27 
Admittedly, several methodological difficulties arise in employing the 
coroners' rolls. In the first place, the coroner's inquest was held very 
soon after the homicide occurred, and in some cases additional evidence 
must have come to light after the inquest had been held. Moreover, the 
coroners' enrollments nearly always name only one suspect and set forth 
only one set of facts as to the circumstances of the homicide. The process 
by which these unanimous inquest verdicts were reached is unknown. 
They probably represented the belief of the majority of the jurors. Many 
inquest votes may have been dose, and their outcome may have resulted 
from the prestige or power of one or two persons. Many coroners (or their 
clerks) were erratic in the enrollment of details; that only a few facts were 
set down in a given case does not mean that others were not stated at the 
inquest. Finally, some enrollments were malicious indictments. This is 
more likely to have been the case where there had been only one witness, 
or where there had not been a witness but merely a "first finder." The 
witness or finder would have been in a strong position to place the blame 
where he pleased. 
Several steps have been taken in order to mitigate the above problem. 
Coroners' inquest juries often stated that a homicide had been committed 
in self-defense although the evidence they presented did not meet the 
legal requirements for a pardon. These cases are the best source of 
evidence of community attitudes, and I have relied heavily upon them. I 
27. Some coroners' enrollments were highly formulistic, the local inquest apparently 
having already "embellished" a suspect's defense. Although the coroner's enrollment could 
be (implicitly) repudiated, it probably caused the bench in some cases to examine the 
defendant or the trial jury closely. The testimony given at the inquest must have had some 
influence; it was not evidence "of record," however. 
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have excluded from my study coroners' rolls which include very few 
details. It is clear that the clerks compiling these rolls did not bother to 
enroll evidence of self-defense but merely characterized all homicides as 
felonious. Therefore, it is unsafe to assume that any corresponding trial 
verdict of self-defense represented an alteration of the facts. Instead, I 
have relied upon rolls that include a great deal of detail in most cases. This 
allowed the assumption that where the coroner's inquest did produce 
testimony of self-defense it was duly enrolled. 
In order to justify killing in self-defense, it will be recalled, the man 
attacked had to retreat until retreat was no longer possible. At the trial the 
jurors always alleged such a predicament, and though it was sometimes 
true,zs a comparison of the coroners' rolls and the trial rolls reveal that it 
often was not and that a petty jury had so altered the facts as to make 
pardonable what the law considered nonpardonable. Thus from the 
community's point of view, a violent attack could be met by a violent 
response. A man whose life was threatened did not have to seek some 
means of escape; indeed, he need not do so though he was in no danger 
oflosing his life. The court's concern with last resort indicates a concept 
of criminal liability clearly at odds with prevailing social norms. 
A case from a Norfolk coroner's roll indicates the looseness of the 
social concept of self-defense: 
William put his hand to his knife in order to draw it and strike Robert. 
Robert, fearing that William wanted to kill him, in self-defense struck 
William on the head with a hatchet.z9 
Edmund de Ovyng, the Cambridge coroner, was usually very careful to 
report inquest findings in detail.3° He recorded a case of homicide, 
described by the inquest jurors as homicide se defendendo, in which the 
28. For various examples on coroners' rolls of clearly stated last resort see JUST 2/102, 
m.9d/2: "fugit usque ad quoddam angulum domus" (1363); JUST 2/18, m.5/4: "iacuit super 
ipsum" (1345); JUST 2/102, m.lld/2 (1364); JUST 2/67, m.5/3: "quandam ripam ubi voluit 
transisse et non potuit pro profunditate et largitudine dicte aque" (1354); JUST 2/18, 
m.52d/2: "cessidit ad terram . .. A.fuit in propos ito interfecisse . .. B." (1361); JUST 2/18, 
m.61/l: "supersit pre dictum J. in ulnas suas" (1364); JUST 2/23, m.2/2: "non potuit evadere 
propter multitudinem inimicorum suorum" (1373). The fact that the coroner's inquest 
produced such testimony does not mean that the facts were true; they might have been 
altered at this early stage. But in such cases the trial jury was not adducing facts contrary 
to those of the indictment. 
29. JUST 2/102, m.9/2: "Wille/mus misit manum suum ad cultellum suum abtrahendum 
et ad percuciendum dictum Robertum. Idemque Robertus timens quod idem W. voluit 
occidisse eum in defensione vite sue percussit eundem W. in capite super cervicem eiusdem 
cum quadam hachia" (1363). The trial record (Oyer and Terminer) has not been located, but 
the slayer was pardoned for self-defense: Calendar of the Patent Rolls, 1232-1422 (London, 
1906), May 6, 1367, p. 395. Hereafter cited as C.P.R. See also JUST 2/58, m.2/2 (1379). 
30. E.g. JUST 2/18 (14--39 Edw. III); JUST 2/256, mm.1-4 (44-48 Edw. III). 
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assailant had seized the defendant's beard. Walter Clerk and Thomas 
Clerk argued until Thomas, threatening to kill Walter, 
suddenly jumped from the cart and took up an iron fork, intending to 
run at Walter, but Walter immediately grabbed the fork in his own hand 
and threw it from Thomas lest he do further damage with it; for which 
Thomas took Walter by the beard; Walter, because of this, drew his 
knife and in self-defense struck Thomas in the left arm so that he 
died.JI 
Thomas's attack and intentions, rather than the imminence of danger to 
Walter's life, were, apparently, the basis for the community's view that 
Walter had acted in self-defense. In a similar instance, Hugh Harpour, 
chaplain, took John atte Lane, also a chaplain, in his hands and 
threw him down feloniously at his feet and wanted to kill him . . . 
because of this, John, fearing death and getting up, drew his knife and 
stabbed Hugh in the chest.32 
Hugh seems to have been weaponless, so that John was not in imminent 
danger of death. Nevertheless, he was repelling an attack and, thus, 
defending himself. The resistance was excessive, but the community did 
not scruple as to the nature of the retaliation. The trial jury provided an 
elaborate story of self-defense.33 
Jurors at a Leicestershire coroner's inquest in 1365 told a complicated 
story with respect to the death of Richard de Sydenfen.34 Richard Ruskin 
and his son William came to the door of William de Assheby's house in 
Melton and the elder Ruskin brought Assheby outside with sword drawn 
31. JUST 2/18, m.45d/5: "W. C. et T. C .... simul cum una caretta pro garbis querendo 
... et contencio mota inter ipsos T . ... stetit super carettam querandam et minavit ipsum 
Walterum de vita et membra etfestinans descendens de caretta cepit unumfurcumferratum 
et voluit concurasse super dictum W. et incontinenti dictus W. cepit furcum in manu sua et 
illud iactavit ab ipso ne dampnum ulterius cum illo face ret quo facto dictus T. cepit ipsum 
W. per barbam suam quo facto dictus W. traxit cultellum suum et in defensione sua 
percussit predictum T. in brachia sinistro" (1357). The trial enrollment has not been located. 
32. JUST 2/18, m.47d/4: "cepit in manibus suis et iactavit ipsum feloniter humo sub 
pedibus suis et ipsum voluit interfecisse ... quo facto predictus Johannes atte Lane timens 
mortem suam et in resurgendo de pedibus ipsius Hugonis traxit cultellum suum ... et 
percussit predictum Hugonem in pectore" (1358). 
33. The trial enrollment (C 47, Cambridge, 6/87) is partly blind, but the legible parts 
indicate a classic form of self-defense. See also JUST 2/58, m.4/2 (1380), where the accused 
had been thrown to the ground before slaying his assailant. There is no mention of any 
weapon used by the assailant, but the jury maintained the homicide was committed in 
self-defense. No trial enrollment located. In some cases, the self-defender seems to have 
stood his ground and waited for his assailant to reach him despite the fact that there was no 
apparent obstacle to retreat. E.g. JUST 2/18, m.16/3 (1351); trial enrollment at JUST 3/134, 
m.4111. JUST 2/58, m.3d/1 (1379); trial enrollment not located. 
34. JUST 2/53, m.3d/4. 
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by calling him a liar. After a struggle, Assheby chased his enemies to the 
door of their house where the elder Ruskin's servant, Sydenfen, seeing 
that his master was in grave danger, felled Assheby with a blow of a club. 
The latter revived and, drawing a small knife, slew the servant "in 
self-defense." Assheby did not retreat once he had risen to his feet, but 
that was of no consequence. Nor did it matter that he had entered the fray 
of his own choosing. When he killed Sydenfen he was acting in "self-
defense. " 35 
Jurors at the inquest in Aldgate Ward, London, in 1325, described a 
somewhat one-sided fight which grew out of a sudden quarrel: 
John le Marche, "pottere," and Agnes de Wycoumbe after the hour of 
curfew, were quarreling in the High Street opposite the house of John 
... when the said Agnes taking a staff ... out of the hand of John ... 
therewith struck the said John on the back and sides; that thereupon 
came Geoffrey de Caxtone . . . and Andrew de Wynton, "pottere," 
with staves in their hands to assist the said Agnes and struck the said 
John on the head and body, so that he died a week later. 36 
A trial enrollment is extant only in the case of Andrew. 37 The petty jurors 
testified that John met Andrew some distance from the place of the 
slaying and struck him on the head with a staff.38 Andrew fled until he was 
up against a wall and forced to retaliate. 39 There was no mention of other 
principals to the homicide. 
Testimony of a more unusual sort was given by inquest jurors at an 
Aldersgate viewing of a dead man, a certain John de Chiggewell: 
John Pentyn would have hanged himself in his solar, and on that 
account his wife Clemencia raised the cry so that the said John de 
Chiggewell, John atte Adam de Mersshe, Wykham and other neigh-
bors, names unknown, came to her assistance, and that when the said 
John de Chiggewell would have entered the solar before the others, ... 
Pentyn feloniously struck him on the head . . . inflicting a mortal 
wound. 40 
At Pentyn's trial the petty jury alleged that he had argued with his wife 
and, after she had left the house, had locked the door and gone up to his 
35. When Assheby came to trial he already had a pardon. JUST 3/142, m.181l; C.P.R., 
Dec. 6, 1366, p. 345. 
36. London Coroners' Rolls, RollE, no. 35, pp. 162--63. 
37. According to the coroner's roll, Andrew and a certain Robert le Raykere, who had 
"aided and abetted" the felony, were immediately captured; Agnes and Geoffrey fled. 
38. C 260/37, no. 7 (1326). See also JUST 3/43/3, m.21l (1326) for the original trial 
enrollment. 
39. Pardon: C.P.R., Feb. 22, 1327, p. 24. 
40. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll B, no. 42, pp. 65--66. 
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bed in the solar. Clemen cia returned in the evening and finding herself 
locked out raised the hue, at which point Chiggewell arrived, ascended 
the stairs to the solar, and tried to kill Pentyn with a hatchet. Pentyn, 
unable to escape, grabbed an iron window bar and in self-defense gave his 
assailant one blow from which he died fifteen days later. 41 
Finally, a simple homicide led to a special verdict of self-defense in the 
case of John Counte, who, after quarreling with Robert Paunchard in 
Bishopsgate Ward, London, drew a knife and stabbed Paunchard to 
death.42 The trial jury maintained that Paunchard had thrown rocks at 
Counte and driven him to a wall.43 
By the middle of the fourteenth century, a defendant who had slain a 
housebreaker might be acquitted by judgment of the court.44 The same 
applied where he had slain someone who came to rob him. But the courts 
were not consistent in their treatment of such cases, and it appears that at 
least until late into the century acquittal might depend upon clear 
evidence of self-defense.45 In this area, the community was ahead of the 
courts. Trial juries supplied evidence of self-defense where, on the basis 
of coroner's inquest testimony, there had been neither true self-defense 
nor even clear evidence of housebreaking or attempted theft. 
In one instance, where self-defense may in fact have been involved, 
though the jurors at the inquest made no mention of last resort, the 
deceased had entered the close of William Childerle 
at the hour of Prime [about one o'clock, a.m.] without the license of 
William and against the latter's will.46 
William returned home from the fields and met Richard on the stairs of his 
solar where a struggle ensued and the intruder was slain. At the trial, the 
petty jury assured the court that William had fled to a wall near the door 
of the house where he was finally cornered and forced to strike back in 
self defense.47 Thomas Randolph of Braunston, Leicestershire, saw 
someone standing outside his window at night and demanded to know 
who it was.48 Receiving no answer, he took up a club and went outside 
41. C 260/32, no. 15 (1322). Order to bail Pentyn: Calendar of the Close Rolls, 1272-1447 
(London, 1900-1937), April13, 1323, p. 636. Hereafter cited as C.C.R. 
42. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll H, no. 9, pp. 242-43. 
43. C 260/50, no. 61 (1339). It is possible that the jury was influenced by the location of 
the slaying. The fight had taken place in the close of the Earl of Warwick where Robert 
Artoys, by whom Counte was employed as a cook, resided. 
44. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 53-54 and accompanying text. 
45. Ibid., text at n. 55. 
46. JUST 2/18, m.4ld/2: "circa horam prima sine licencia ipsius Willelmi et contra 
voluntate ipsius Willelmi" (1356). 
47. C 260/68, no. 20 (1357); Pardon: C.P.R., May 3, 1357, p. 530. 
48. JUST 2/58, m.l/1 (1379). 
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where the trespasser, John Sherman, attacked him. Standing his ground, 
Thomas dealt Sherman a fatal blow, which the inquest jurors said was 
done in self-defense. 49 Similarly, Henry Priour, attacked by William, son 
of John Paryn, who came one evening to the door of Henry's house, 
retaliated immediately with a club.50 At Priour's trial, the petty jury 
asserted that William attacked Henry "ad domum ipsius Henrici" and 
drove him to a wall where he, Henry, happened to find the club he used; 
he thus had slain in self-defense.st 
In a more extreme case, it was considered self-defense where the 
defendant on his master's property slew a man who had hurled insults at 
him.sz William de Walynford, "brewere," quarreled with Simon de Parys 
in Cheap and the latter followed William home, threatening him as they 
went. The coroner recorded that William forbade Simon to insult him in 
his master's house and then immediately William fetched a knife and 
plunged it into Simon's chest. In the petty jury's account, however, the 
facts were altered to show that Simon had attacked William with a knife 
as they stood in the king's highway. William fled to his master's house, 
where, being cornered by his assailant, he had slain him as a last resort. 53 
One related and extraordinary case, for which coroner's indictment and 
trial enrollment are both extant, shows how the community sanctioned 
the slaying of an adulterer. An aggrieved husband was not permitted to 
take the adulterer's life, 54 but, as in the case of a trespasser upon his land, 
he would have been able to drive him away. Robert Bousserman returned 
home at midday, an inquest jury testified, to find John Doughty having 
sexual intercourse with his wife ("adfornicandum cum illa").ss Bousser-
man forthwith dispatched Doughty with a blow of his hatchet. The petty 
jury altered the facts to make Robert a self-defender who could not escape 
and to emphasize the aspect of trespass: 
John Doughty came at night to the house of Robert in the village of 
Laghscale as Robert and his wife lay asleep in bed in the peace of the 
King, and he entered Robert's house; seeing this, Robert's wife 
secretly arose from her husband and went to John and John went to bed 
with Robert's wife; in the meantime Robert awakened and hearing 
noise in his house and seeing that his wife had left his bed rose and 
49. No trial enrollment has been located for this case. Possibly, the defendant was 
acquitted as a slayer of a thief. 
50. JUST 2/18, m.44d/3 (1354). 
51. JUST 3/139, m.13d/l (1356). Priour was remanded to await a pardon. 
52. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll C, no. 13, p. 80. 
53. JUST 3/43/1, m.2111 (1324). 
54. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:484. Referring to an earlier period, 
the authors suggest that the right to slay the adulterer was already doubtful. 
55. JUST 2/211, m.1dll (1341). 
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sought her in his house and found her with John; immediately John 
attacked Robert with a knife ... and wounded him and stood between 
him and the door of Robert's house continually stabbing and wounding 
him and Robert seeing that his life was in danger and that he could in 
no way flee further, in order to save his life he took up a hatchet and 
gave John one blow in the head.56 
The allegation that the slain man had secretly entered a house at night 
while the master of the house slept was one of the common elements of 
later indictments for "murder. "57 In this case it was unnecessary; the 
jurors needed to do no more than provide the usual allegations of 
homicide se defendendo. Possibly, the elaborations by the trial jury 
indicate an especially strong sense of outrage. 
The community was also ready to excuse homicide that occurred in 
defense of a kinsman though the slayer was not himself in mortal danger. 
The petty jury had to alter the true facts by asserting that the accused 
himself had come under attack and had slain his assailant as a last resort. ss 
This may be seen in a number of cases. A Buckinghamshire coroner, John 
atte Broke, recorded that John Calles, senior, and his son John stood 
talking to William Shepherde when an argument broke out. Shepherde 
struck Calles senior with a staff. 
Seeing this, John Calles junior drew his knife and struck Shepherde in 
the right part of the neck wounding him mortally.59 
Broke concluded his enrollment with the phrase, "and thus he slew him 
feloniously," and indeed the younger Calles had clearly not been at-
tacked. At the trial, however, the petty jury asserted that after Shepherde 
56. JUST 3/78 m.2d/l: "infra nocte predictus Johannes Doughty venit ad domum ipsius 
Roberti in predicta villa de Laghscales prefato R. cum uxore sua in lecto suo in pace Regis 
iacente et sompniente et domum ipsius R. intravit quod percipiens uxor ipsius R. secrete a 
viro suo surexit et ad ipsum J. ivit et predictus J. uxorem ipsius R. ibidem concubiit ... 
medio tempore predict us R. vigilavit et audiens tumultum in domo sua et percipiens uxorem 
suam a lecto suo abe sse surexit et querendo earn in domo sua invenit earn cum predicto J. 
et statim predictus J. in ipsum R. cum quodam cultello vocato [tear in membrane] ibidem 
insultumfecit et ipsum verberavit vulneravit et inter ipsum et hostium eiusdem domus stetit 
semper cum cultello predicto ipsurri percuciendo et vulnerando ipsum ibidem ad 
interficiendum et predictus R. videns periculum mortis sibi iminere et se ulterius nullo modo 
posse diffugere causa mortem suam propriam evitandi sumpsit quoddam polhachet et inde 
percussit predictum J. solo ictu in capite usque cerebrum unde statim obiit." (1342). 
57. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability," p. 692. 
58. Hurnard states the common law rule as restricting self-defense to defense of one's 
own life. She appears to have found no cases where defense solely of one's kin was alleged. 
59. C 260/105, no.l3: " ... hoc videns extraxit cultellum suum ... et perc us sit prefatum 
Willelmum in dextera parte collifaciens ei plagam mortalem et sic ipsumfelonice interfecit" 
(1393). The coroner's indictment is enrolled on the King's Bench transcript of the trial 
proceedings. 
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had begun the quarrel, and had struck Colles senior, Colles junior 
intervened to part them. Shepherde then turned on Collesjunior, who fled 
as far as a wall between two houses where he was forced to slay his 
attacker in self-defense.6o 
According to a London coroner's roll, Simon Chaucer and Robert de 
Uptone quarreled on the street in Cordwainer Street Ward; Simon struck 
Robert, wounding him on the upper lip (there is no mention of a weapon). 
John, Robert's son, who was present and saw the incident, seized a 
"dorbarre" with which he beat Simon on the hands, side, and head, 
killing him.61 The petty jury told an elaborate story that made John eligible 
for a royal pardon: 
A quarrel broke out between Simon and Robert over certain pennies 
which Simon owed the latter. Simon took up a staff and wanted to 
strike Robert, but Robert grasped it firmly in his hands .... Simon 
drew his knife and stabbed Robert in the mouth so that blood flowed. 
John, sitting in a shop [shopa], saw the fight and rising and taking up a 
dorbarre ran to the fight to pacify the two if he could. When Simon saw 
John coming he left Robert and went after John with the knife ... he 
chased John as far as a wall in Aldermannescherche and held him 
tightly against the wall so that John could not escape. 62 
Similarly, Alice, the wife of James Almand, "Pipere," who slew John 
Langetolft in London, was said at her trial to have entered a fray to save 
James, only to end by slaying in self-defense. The petty jury added, 
however, that she slew John in order to save not only her own life but that 
of her husband. 63 The coroner's indictment copied onto the gaol delivery 
60. Idem. Colles junior was released, pending his pardon, in the hands of four men, one 
of whom was his father. 
61. London Coroners' Rolls, Roll F, no. 4, pp. 175-76. 
62. C 260/50, no. 60: " ... contencio oriebatur inter Simonem et Robertum de Uptone 
patrem predicti Johannis pro certis denariis eidem Roberto per prefatum Simonem debitis. 
Ita quod predictus Simon cepit in manu sua quendam baculum ... et inde percussisse voluit 
predictum Robertum quem baculum predictus Robertus in manibus suis itafirmiter tenuit . 
. . . Simon ... extraxit quendam cultellum suum qui vacatur "Bideu" et inde percussit 
predictum Robertum in ore ita quod sanguis inde exivit. Predictus Johannes sedens ibidem 
in quadam shopa et videns dictum patrem suum et prefatum Simonem sic fore in contumelia 
surrexit et cepit quendam Dorebarre in manu sua et cucurrit eis ad contumeliam il/am 
pacificandam si potuisset. Et cum predictus Simon vidit ipsum Johannem sic venientem 
reliquit predictum Robertum et se dedit eidem Johanni cum prefato Bideu in manu sua 
extracto et ipsum inde fugavit ad quandam parietem de Aldermannescherche contra quem 
parietem predict us Simon ipsum Johannem cum manu sua sinistra ita strite tenuit quod ex 
nulla parte evadere potuit" (1340). Despite his immediate capture, John did not appear at 
gaol delivery until 1339, some three years thereafter. John was pardoned in Jan., 1340 
(C.P.R., p. 351). 
63. C 260/72, no. 15. (1361). 
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roll states that she slew John feloniously, no mention being made of 
self-defense. 
A Cambridge jury converted a more serious manslaughter into pardon-
able homicide when it altered the facts of Richard Godmancester's slaying 
at the hands of William Holdy. Edmund de Ovyng's coroner's roll states 
that William came upon his brother Thomas and Richard as they 
quarreled. William drew his knife and stabbed Richard in the back.64 
Ovyng termed the homicide a felony. The trial jury's reworking of the 
facts provided ample evidence of last resort and asserted that 
Godmancester had died of a wound in the stomach, a rather more 
reasonable place for a self-defender to stab his adversary. 65 
In none of the above cases had the defendant acted out of true 
premeditation. Where the defendant had supplied the initial provocation, 
it appears to have been a less than homicidal attack, which then escalated 
with fatal results. Certainly, these slayings were not "murders" in the 
sense that term was used by the late fourteenth century. The defendant 
had not ambushed the deceased or employed other means of stealth. But 
in none of them would the defendant have merited a royal pardon under 
the terms of the law. Had the true story come out in court, as the 
statement ofPrisot indicates, the defendant would have been sentenced to 
death. 66 
One final and difficult question: Are we dealing here with an eXpanded 
notion of self-defense, or with a broader attitude that only murderers 
ought to be hanged? The answer must be that there is evidence of both. 
In many, perhaps most, of the above cases the community surely believed 
the slaying was justified even though the official rules of self-defense had 
not been met. But in others there had been little or no element of 
64. JUST 2/18, m.l5d/3 (1351). 
65. JUST 3/134, m.41/4 (1348). The accused was thrown to the ground and lay "subtus 
quandam parietem . . . insurgendo versus dictum parietem se defendendo percussit 
predictum Willelmum [sic] in ventre." For a case in which self-defense involved striking a 
man in the back see Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery), 1219-1377 
(London, 1916-37), vol. I, pp. 568-69, no. 2126. 
66. This study remains tentative. The great majority of cases for which I located both an 
indictment and a trial enrollment could not be used. In hundreds of cases, indictments for 
felonious homicide led to trial verdicts of self-defense, but it is unclear that the coroner 
bothered to record details of self-defense. In many others where both indictment and verdict 
agreed on self-defense the former was so formulistic as to raise suspicion that fact alteration 
had already taken place. Another possible approach to the problem of demonstrating fact 
alteration is to analyze the formulistic verdicts of self-defense and to infer alteration from the 
frequent use of a limited number of excuses. My approach draws attention to the plausibility 
of such an inference but goes a st~p further by showing that the formulas were not merely 
convenient summaries for what were in fact instances of pardonable homicide. 
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self-defense, and the trial verdict appears to be an entire fiction devised 
for purposes of saving the defendant's neck. 
Perhaps all that can be said is that, given the nature of medieval life, the 
rules of both self-defense and felonious homicide were unrealistically 
strict. If firmly applied, they would have meant the condemnation of 
persons of pride who, when under attack, did not turn tail and flee until 
cornered beyond all hope of further escape. They would also have meant 
the hanging of men who, in sudden anger, struck a blow not in itself 
mortal but which, due to infection or careless treatment, resulted in 
death. These are different cases, occasioning different motives for leni-
ency. Many homicides must have combined elements of both cases. It is, 
however, impossible to determine where society drew the line between 
homicides it viewed as justifiable self-defense and homicides it viewed as 
unjustifiable but still not deserving capital punishment. Nor, for that 
matter, is it possible to determine which slayings in the latter class were 
considered so impetuous as to be akin to accidental homicides. It is likely 
that some simple homicides were recast by trial jurors as misadventures, 
and hence made pardonable, but there are too few such special verdicts 
on the fourteenth-century rolls to make comparison with the coroner's 
enrollment profitable. The subgroups within the area of simple homicide 
must have shaded into one another, and distinctions among them prob-
ably differed over time and locale. Moreover, as I shall suggest in 
subsection 4, many social and psychological factors must have played a 
role in the formation of the community's attitude toward individual 
defendants and its perception of their deeds. 
3 
The foregoing suggests that in the fourteenth century trial jurors were 
not above characterizing as pardonable "simple" homicide, roughly what 
we would call manslaughter. The present section of this study seeks to 
assess whether thirteenth-century trial jurors' verdicts closely repre-
sented the truth. Naomi D. Hurnard concluded her pioneering and 
learned study of royal pardons for homicide with the end of the reign of 
Edward I, but she hinted that jury behavior might have changed in the 
ensuing period. 67 She pointed out that the sudden increase of pardons de 
gratia after 1294 caused a fundamental break with earlier practice. The 
implication of her remarks is that conclusions arrived at on the basis of 
fourteenth-century evidence cannot be carried back into the earlier 
67. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 268: "[T)he jurors were not yet falling back 
on one or other of a set of prefabricated tales which could be borrowed, disguised only with 
minor variants, to substantiate their declaration that slayings had been in self-defense." 
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period. The specific argument here would be that, after 1294, jurors, with 
knowledge of the indiscriminate dispensing of pardons to slayers, altered 
their outlook toward homicide defendants-especially toward those who 
had committed a simple homicide-and found pardonable circumstances 
where there had been none. The jury would have reasoned, in effect, that 
a man who by acting with more dispatch might have made himself 
invulnerable to prosecution should not be hanged unless he was of the 
most disreputable sort. In my view, while the new pardoning policy might 
have increased the jury's willingness to alter the facts in favor of the 
defendant, that policy was not the real source of jury attitudes. Jury 
behavior did not change radically after 1294; from the very outset of the 
common law period, juries were inclined to structure the evidence in such 
a way as to save the life of the manslaughterer. 
In her chapter on trial jury verdicts Hurnard examined the extent to 
which juries fabricated facts in order to ensure that the defendant would 
receive a pardon for excusable homicide. She compared the allegations 
made by jurors at special inquisitions held for the purpose of deciding 
whether bail ought to be granted with those set forth at the actual trial 
before justices in eyre. Her findings support her conclusion that 
on the whole, discrepancies between two or more verdicts were over 
details of location and the sequence of events, the sort of thing on 
which independent witnesses could easily differ. ... The impression 
which these comparisons give is of pretty general agreement on the 
issue of self-defense or accident. 68 
In one case of ''serious discrepancy,'' the eyre jury suppressed the fact 
that the defendant had retaliated against blows of a staff with a relatively 
more lethal weapon, a small ax, alleging instead that he had used a staff 
in self-defense. The inquisition had alleged that the defendant had been 
struck on the head and cornered and that he had employed his ax because 
he could not otherwise have escaped death. 69 The alteration "may have 
been literally vital" to the defendant, as Hurnard argues, but this would 
be true only because of the overly strict rules of self-defense, not because 
the trial jurors were coming to the aid of a person who had not in fact slain 
in self-defense. 
How much weight ought we to accord to the "pretty general agree-
ment" between special inquisitions and trial enrollments? The former 
were indeed less formal than the latter; they were not necessarily final and 
sometimes less attention was paid to the stringent rules of pardonable 
self-defense. But special inquisitions were directed to the issue of 
68. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 265. 
69. Ibid., p. 261. 
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excusable circumstances and were held at the ''request of the accused or 
his friends, who probably had some reason for confidence in their 
outcome. "7o They represented a point in the procedure at which the 
community view of the homicide had become known, and they probably 
were held only when it was fairly clear that community sympathy lay with 
the suspect. This may help to explain why Hurnard was able to find only 
one such commission that determined the defendant had slain feloni-
ously. 71 In fact, the partiality of jurors at special inquisitions sometimes 
resulted in favorable verdicts that trial jurors later overturned.72 
Hurnard's comparison, therefore, is of limited usefulness. Having set 
alongside the trial verdicts a body of evidence overwhelmingly favorable 
to the defendants, i.e., special inquisitions, she concluded that the trial 
verdicts were relatively scrupulous; where they disagreed with the special 
inquisitions, they took a more critical, and probably a more objective, 
view of the circumstances. But Hurnard was unable to establish the 
relationship between a random selection of indictments and the trial ver-
dicts. That relationship can be established, if at all, only by comparing the 
coroners' enrollments with the verdicts given at trial. Hurnard recognized 
the potential value of such a correlation, but rightly concluded that too 
few thirteenth-century coroners' rolls exist to carry it out. 
There exists one important piece of evidence that sheds some light on 
contemporary practice. A thirteenth-century precedent book, Placita 
Corone, describes the case of a man indicted for homicide. The defend-
ant, a certain Thomas, came before the court and told his story as follows: 
And because I refused him [the deceased] the loan of my horse he ran 
at me in my own house with a Welsh knife, horn handled, in his right 
hand and inflicted several wounds on my head, shoulders, feet, and 
elsewhere on my body wherever he could reach. I did not at first return 
his blows; but when I realized that he was set on killing me I started to 
defend myself: that is to say I wounded him in the right arm with a little 
pointed knife which I carried, making no further onslaught and acting 
in this way to save my own life. 73 
One justice put the court's impatience with such formulistic defenses 
quite succinctly: 
Thomas, you have greatly embroidered your tale and coloured your 
defense: for you are telling us only what you think will be to your 
advantage, and suppressing whatever you think may damage you, and 
70. Ibid., p. 110. 
71. Ibid., p. 254. 
72. Ibid., p. 110. 
73. Kaye, trans. and ed., Placita Carone, pp. 19-20. 
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I do not believe you have told the whole truth. 74 
Nevertheless, the defendant stood his ground, putting himself upon the 
country. When the petty jury testified under oath that Thomas's story was 
true, the court could only remand him to await his pardon. 
Thomas's case is perhaps an exaggerated example,75 but it is not very 
different from a great many thirteenth-century enrollments. Moreover, it 
strongly suggests that the justices were aware that coloration in cases of 
self-defense was common but that doubts expressed from the Bench 
would not intimidate juries. Hurnard recognized that formulistic descrip-
tions of self-defense raise ''suspicion that some of these circumstances 
were borrowed from other cases." She admitted: 
It may be judged that too many slayers in self-defense pulled stakes 
from fences and poles from carts, bolted into culs de sac or tried and 
failed to climb walls, were brought up against dykes or rivers, found 
swords unexpectedly but conveniently to hand or made random knife 
thrusts that just happened to hit vital spotsJ6 
Hurnard concluded that victims of assault "naturally reacted in a similar 
manner"; that the "paucity of many of the clerks' Latin vocabulary" led 
them to fall back on the same terminology. Before 1307, she maintained, 
the jurors were not yet falling back on one or other set of prefabricated 
tales which could be borrowed, disguised only with minor variants, to 
substantiate their declaration that slayings had been in self-defense.77 
Perhaps she is correct, but there appears to be little evidence to support 
her view. 78 One must still explain the high number of acquittals on the 
medieval rolls, rather than view pardonable homicides in isolation from 
other elements of the administration of criminal law. This is so because 
74. "Thomas, vous avez mut enbeli vostre parole et vostre defens en.flori: kar vous 
pronunciez quant ke vous quidez ke vous poet valer et conceler ce ke grever vos poet, kar 
je ne quid pas ke vos eiez tote la verite conte" (idem). 
75. See above, Chapter I, n. 49, for cautionary remarks regarding the use of this source. 
76. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 267. 
77. Ibid., p. 268. 
78. In her analysis of the king's role in the pardoning process, Hurnard argues that "in a 
sample of well over 500 cases identified on the plea rolls pardon is very unlikely to have been 
granted to felonious killers in more than twenty percent, and even ten percent may be 
considerably above the mark" (p. 245). This assumes, of course, that the evidence on the 
plea rolls is trustworthy. What the author has proved is that the king did not often grant 
pardons to persons for whom there was not some favorable testimony, not that those who 
in fact slew feloniously were seldom able to obtain pardons. Hurnard also shows that 
presenting juries often used the phrase "mota contencione" to describe "fatal free fights"; 
they did not adduce testimony of pardonable circumstances in all such free fights. This does 
not prove the trial jury would not have done so had the suspect appeared and put his life in 
their hands. 
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the possibility that the acquittals resulted from jurors' failure to tell the 
truth threatens to undermine the notion that jurors were particularly 
scrupulous in cases of excusable homicide. There are, in fact, good 
reasons to believe that fourteenth-century social attitudes were not 
radically different from those of the preceding period. To explore these 
reasons, we must turn from the narrow confines of pardonable homicide 
to the general contours of the early history of liability for homicide. 
We have seen that in the Anglo-Saxon period, and for perhaps a 
century after the Norman Conquest, some homicides were unemendable, 
leading to punishment-usually capital-at the hands of the Crown.79 
These homicides, secret homicides known as "murders," were consid-
ered particularly heinous and, as outrages against society as a whole, 
were exclusively royal pleas. It cannot be determined how closely the 
Anglo-Saxon "murder" corresponded to the "murder" of the late four-
teenth century.so Probably the term always had connoted stealth; the 
slayer acted when his victim was off guard. But it appears that any 
homicide committed in the absence of a witness was presumed to have 
been committed through stealth. It was in secret and, hence, a murder. 81 
Open homicide, on the other hand, remained until the outset of the twelfth 
century an emendable act. 82 The guilty party or his kin paid wer, bot, and 
wite. Failure to pay the wer could result in liability to the feud; after the 
tenth century, only the slayer could be subjected to the vengeance of the 
slain man's kin.s3 Although there is no evidence as to the frequency of 
such feuds, it is likely that settlement in money or in kind was the usual 
result of sudden and open acts of homicide. If the slaying resulted from a 
mutual quarrel and involved fighting on both sides, some elements of 
self-defense probably lay side by side with elements of excessive retali-
ation. Settlements probably took these elements into account, though in 
an impressionistic way. The extension of royal jurisdiction in the twelfth 
century to encompass the entire area of homicide had two revolutionary 
79. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 5-8. 
80. See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:486; Kaye, "Early History," 
Part I, pp. 366 et seq. Kaye argues that "murder" retained its ancient meaning of "secret 
or stealthy killing" during the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, despite the fact that it 
was also used as a synonym for the general term "kill" and a fine for an unexplained 
homicide. It seems clear that the concept was deeply embedded in social attitudes during the 
entire period. Possibly, the social view of "murder" changed, due to the growth of 
professional crime, from certain specific acts, e.g., poisoning, to all planned homicides. 
81. See below, nn. 100, 102-3, and accompanying text. 
82. Hurnard, King's Pardonfor Homicide, p. 8. Hurnard ventures the judgment that "the 
process may have been completed by the end of the reign of Henry I" (1135). But she 
cautions: "The date when this occurs is not known." 
83. II Edmund, I, in A. J. Robertson, trans. and ed., The Laws of the Kings of England 
from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge, 1925), p. 9. 
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effects: many homicides that formerly had not resulted in capital punish-
ment were now made capital under the law; strict and largely unenforce-
able requirements were introduced into a law of self-defense. 
The evidence as to jury attitudes in the fourteenth century may aid in 
understanding social attitudes toward criminal liability in the entire period 
from late Anglo-Saxon times to the end of the Middle Ages. If so, the 
argument would run as follows. Originally, the Anglo-Saxons practiced 
the feud in homicide cases. The kin of the slain took vengeance upon the 
slayer or one of his kin, who were jointly liable for their kinsman's act.84 
Whether the mental element was taken into account is unknown. Secret 
homicide was a matter for the king, but all other homicides were 
emendable; failure to pay the wergild rendered the slayer and his kin 
liable to vendetta, though reduction of the amount of compensation by 
agreement was probably common. By the tenth century, the laws 
restricted liability to vendetta to the actual slayer. They also mandated a 
reduction of wergild compensation where there had been mitigating 
circumstances.ss In such cases, where the slayer had acted in self-defense 
or through accident, the king relinquished the wite. 86 While the kin of the 
slain may have taken a narrow view of such mitigating circumstances, 
society at large took a broader view of the matter, having nothing to gain 
from feud or compensation, and in a day when fights began easily and led 
often to death due to sepsis or other results of poor medical techniques. 
In its eyes, secret homicide or especially malicious attacks justified 
punishment by death. Simple homicides were seen as requiring compen-
sation, with mitigation if the act was unintentional or to some extent 
provoked. When all homicides were drawn within the sphere of royal 
jurisdiction and made, unless excusable, punishable by death, the com-
munity was forced to choose between presentment of the slayer and 
payment of the murdrum, a fine imposed for an unexplained homicide.s7 
Before 1215, persons presented for homicide were forced to undergo the 
ordeal, so that if the community desired to absolve a slayer it had to fail 
to present him in the first place.8s The records do not permit us to observe 
84. Whitelock, Beginnings of English Society, p. 39. 
85. III Edgar, I, 2: "[T]here is to be such remission in the compensation as is justifiable 
before God and supportable in the State." Quoted by Hurnard, King's Pardon for 
Homicide, p. 5; VI Ethelred, 52,1: "[H]e who is an involuntary agent in his misdeeds should 
always be entitled to clemency and to better terms." Idem. 
86. Francis Sayre, "Mens Rea," Harvard Law Review, vol. 45 (1932), p. 982. 
87. Hurnard has traced the use of presentment from the late tenth century to the Assize 
of Clarendon. "The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon," English Historical 
Review, vol. 56 (1941), pp. 374-410. On the murdrum fine see ibid., pp. 385 et seq.; 
Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 195-96. Pollock and 
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:487. 
88. Groot ("Jury of Presentment," passim; above, Chapter I, n. 20 and accompanying 
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the resulting tension between the bonds of friendship and the demands of 
the pocketbook. By the third decade of the thirteenth century, however, 
this tension had been relieved: once the slayer had been presented, it was 
left to the trial jury to state whether he was guilty or not. 89 This provided 
them with an opportunity to acquit or to adduce circumstances of 
pardonable homicide. The compromise that resulted is illustrated in 
Placita Corone, where a defendant who successfully pleaded self-defense 
was asked who put him in prison. He replied: 
Sire, my neighbors: for they were afraid of being involved in the affair 
and suffering loss thereby.9o 
Thus, from the outset of the common law period, trial juries were 
prepared to voice a sense of justice fundamentally at odds with the letter 
of the law. They persisted throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries in using their role as submitters of evidence to condemn many 
murderers and to acquit or render pardonable those whom a later legal age 
would term "manslaughterers." Trial juries remained free to say the 
"truth" as they knew it, to reject the conclusions of both juries of 
presentment and coroners' inquest juries. Of course, in many cases the 
process of fact alteration began before the trialjury gave its verdict: it was 
not uncommon for a coroner's jury to use elaborate formulas to describe 
a case of self-defense.91 The trial jurors, drawn from the hundred where 
the homicide was committed, but not necessarily from the immediate 
vicinage, probably reflected already settled attitudes of the countryside 
toward individual defendants. 92 It remains to suggest, by way of conclu-
sion to this preliminary study, what the significant determinants of these 
societal attitudes were. 
text) has shown that the presenters screened suspects before formally presenting them to 
make their law. They screened out suspects who they believed had not committed the felony 
of which the suspects had been accused by someone in the hundred. Presumably, they were 
obliged to present all whom they suspected of committing homicide; if they failed to present 
those whom they suspected of having committed simple homicide or even true self-defense, 
they were nullifying the law and subject to being amerced. 
89. Doris M. Stenton, ed., Rolls of the Justices in Eyre, being the Rolls of Pleas and 
Assizes for Lincolnshire, 1218-1219, and Worcestershire, 1221, (London, 1934), pp. 
lxviii-lxxi. As Lady Stenton points out, judges had never been partial to the ordeal and had, 
before 1215, tried to persuade defendants to put themselves upon the country. 
90. Kaye, trans. and ed., Placita Carone, p. 19. 
91. E.g. JUST 2/58, m.4/2 (1380). 
92. From the 1280s at least, the sheriff, in preparing for a gaol delivery, ordered the 
hundred bailiffs of his county to supply a panel of sixteen or twenty knights and freeholders 
for use as jurors. See C 260/4 no. 19 (1288); C 260/5 no. 14 (1289). Trial juries at the eyre were 
not always drawn from the hundred of the homicide. Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, p. 52. 
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We have seen that in the Anglo-Saxon period murder meant homicide 
through secrecy or stealth. Originally, murder was secret in the narrow 
sense that the slayer hid his victim's body to conceal the deed,93 but it 
probably was soon used more broadly to refer to any homicide whose 
perpetrator was unknown. It is with this aspect of murder that the 
murdrum fine was associated, for the hundred was amerced in all cases of 
unexplained homicide. 94 It is likely, however, that already in Anglo-
Saxon times murder sometimes implies that the slayer's identity was 
concealed from his victim, so that the latter was taken off guard. 95 Both 
Glanvill96 and Bracton97 refer to murder as homicide wherein the conceal-
ment was relative to third parties, but this may be because by the time 
they wrote the sole function of the allegation of murder was to relieve the 
appellor from the requirement that he claimed to have seen the deed with 
his own eyes. For our purposes, of course, the important question is not 
which acts the official concept of murder encompassed, but which acts 
society considered so heinous that it believed the perpetrator deserved to 
be hanged. The answer to this question for the twelfth century will 
probably never be known. 
By the fourteenth century, society's concept of serious homicide was 
far broader than that corresponding to the original technical meaning of 
murder. Evidence shedding light on the notion of serious homicide is 
sparse and difficult to interpret. The principal sources of such evidence 
are trial enrollments in verdicts of self-defense. In several cases, all dating 
from the first half of the fourteenth century, the jurors included elaborate 
allegations as to the nature of the attack by the deceased upon the 
defendant: 
A. M. was staying at the house of S .... and R., knowing M. was 
staying there, through murder and malice aforethought came to the 
house of S. and sought M. in order to kill him ... R. immediately 
broke the door of the room and entered it and ... ferociously attacked 
98 
93. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:485. 
94. See above, n. 87. 
95. Hurnard assumes too much when she defines murder as "secret and so presumably 
premediated killing." King's Pardon for Homicide, p. I. 
96. G. D. G. Hall, trans. and ed., Glanvill (London, 1965), p. 174. 
97. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:378-79 (fol. 134b). 
98. C 260/15, no. 38 (1305): "M. hospitatus ad domum cuiusdam Sarre F . ... et R. sciens 
predictum M. ibidem hospitatum esse per murdram et maliciam precogitatam venit ad 
domum predicte Sarre et quesivit predictum M. ad ipsum inter.ficiendum ... R. ostium 
eiusdem camere statim fregit et came ram intravit et ... ferociter insultavit ... '' 
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B. M .... about noon of that day maliciously entered and afterward, 
maliciously abusing the said W. and committing hamsoken against him, 
of his malice aforethought, ... attacked him there in the house [and] 
threw him to the ground.99 
C. R. left the aforesaid house and stood outside the door of the house 
of the aforesaid W. beneath the wall of that house lying in wait for A. 
in order to slay him because of an old quarrel between them, A. 
knowing nothing at all about R. 's lying in wait.IOo 
D. W. was in his house and W. B. knew this. W. B. entered the close 
of W. at night and hid there during the night through malice afore-
thought, and maliciously lay in wait for the said W. in order to kill him, 
W. being ignorant of this; and when W. arose at dawn and left his house 
closing the door behind him thinking no evil, W. B. with malice 
aforethought suddenly and feloniously ... 10 1 
E. H. and S. fought together in a mill ... and S. attacked H. with a 
hatchet and wanted to strike him, but they were separated from one 
another by certain bystanders and S. was expelled from the mill .... 
S., nevertheless his furious intention continuing, maliciously devised 
deceitful plans against H., hiding himself outside of the mill. And 
[when] H., believing that the argument between them had been settled, 
left a little later thinking he was leaving safely and in peace ... 102 
F. J. [was] lying hidden in ambush with two strangers in the house of 
H. They saw H. coming along the way and immediately, feloniously 
and in a deliberate assault, they attacked H. from all sides. 103 
99. C 262/111, no. 6 (1318): "M . ... circa horam nonam eius diei maliciose intravit ac 
postmodum maliciose ipsum W. insultando et hamsoken super ipsum faciendo ex malicia 
sua precogitata ... ipsum W. ibidem in domum ad terram prostravit." 
100. C 260/20, no. 26 (1310): "R. exivit domum predictam et stetit extra ostium domus 
predicti W. subtus murum dicte domus insidiando predictum A. ad ipsum interficiendum 
ratione antiqui odii inter eos perhabiti et ipso A. insidiacionem ill am omnino nesciente." 
101. C 47, Bedfordshire, File 4/86 (1314): "W. in domo sua propria extitisset et predictus 
W. B. hoc scivisset. W. B. clausum ipsius W. noctanter intravit et ibidem pernoctavit 
latitando (sic) per maliciam excogitatam et predicto W. maliciose insidiabatur ad ipsum W. 
interficiendum ipso W. hoc omnino ignorante et cum W. in aurora diei surrexisset et domum 
suam exivisset et hostium post se clausisset nulli malum cogitans predictus W. B. malicia 
precogitata in ipsum W. subito felonice prosiliit et cum quodam bacula ipsum insultavit 
" 
102. C 260/15, no. 9 (1304): "H. et S. contenderunt adinvicem infra molendinum ... et 
idem S. cum quadam hachia que vacatur hache a Pyke ipsum H. insultavit et ipsum H. 
percussisse voluit set per quosdam circumstantes seperatifuerunt abinvicem et predictus S. 
a molendino illo fuit expulsus . ... [S]et tamen idem S. animo furioso et perseveranti insidias 
excogitatas adversus ipsum H. maliciose machinabatur abscondendo se extra molendinum 
predictum. Et predictus H. credens contencionem illam inter eos pacificari post pauca exivit 
a molendino illo credens secure et pacifice recessisse ... " 
103. C 260/54, no. 40. (1343): "1. cum duobus hominibus extraneis latitanter insidiando 
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The chief purpose of the testimony in the above cases was to support a 
verdict of self-defense. Housebreaking immediately puts those residing 
within on the defensive. Stealth on the part of the assailant, whose 
presence was until the last moment unknown to the eventual slayer, is 
strong evidence that the latter lacked malice (cases C, D, E). It might be 
argued that the second part of the testimony, the formal allegation of last 
resort (which I have omitted from the above excerpts), was alone 
insufficient in proving that the defendant had not provoked the fight. But 
it should have been enough merely to assert, as most juries did, that A 
attacked B, wounded B, and drove B to the wall. Whatever additional 
strength the above details lent to a special verdict, whether they rep-
resented the truth or were mere fabrications, the jury was describing what 
society took to be the most repugnant form of attack. 
There can be no doubt that the jurors were alleging that the deceased 
had attempted to commit what was considered to be serious homicide-
what we may call the community's concept of murder. Cases A, C, D, E, 
and F involved stealth; housebreaking occurs in A and B; and in all these 
cases there was some measure of planning: malice aforethought was 
specified in A, B, and D, and seems implicit inC and F; in E, though his 
mind was in a fury, the assailant ''devised deceitful plans.'' The difficulty 
lies in discerning whether stealth, housebreaking, or malice aforethought 
were critical to the societal concept of murder or were merely incidental. 
The use of "per murdram" in case A, which was recorded in 1305, is 
extremely rare. 104 Murdrum at this time was used almost exclusively to 
refer to the fine for an unexplained homicide; it almost never describes the 
slayer's act. 105 It would appear, then, that the phrase meant "through 
stealth" in the sense that the slayer acted in such a way as to conceal his 
identity from third parties. But stealth in C, D, E, and F involves the 
intended victims knowing nothing of the presence of their ambusher. 
Murder was no longer conceived, if indeed it ever had been, solely as the 
concealment of the slayer's identity from third parties. 
The only case that does not involve stealth is B. Here the jurors alleged 
that the would-be slayer committed housebreaking, presumably with 
intent to kill, an act which in Anglo-Saxon times had been regarded by the 
law as particularly heinous. 106 It may well be that such acts had always 
been included in the societal view of murder. 
... in domo cuiusdam H. predictum H. transeuntem per viam videbant et statim felonice 
et insultu premeditato ipsum H . ... incircuiter insultaverunt." 
104. Kaye found a "Latinised form of the English 'to murder,' synonymous with 'to 
kill' "in a 1281 eyre roll (JUST 1/147, m.13a). "Early History," Part I, p. 371. 
105. The murdrum fine was effectively abolished in 1340. 14 Edw. 3, stat. l, c. 4. 
106. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:457. 
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The phrase malicia precogitata and its variants, which I have translated 
as "malice aforethought," was used commonly in indictments of homi-
cide throughout the Middle Ages to denote the threshold degree of mens 
rea for felonious homicide: mere deliberateness. 107 As I have demon-
strated elsewhere, 108 the phrase could also be used in the fourteenth 
century to refer to true premeditation. Everything depended upon the 
context. In case A, the assailant came to the defendant's house with 
malice aforethought, not mere deliberateness; "ex malicia sua 
precogitata" in case B seems contextually to represent more than the 
formulistic "mali cia precogitata"; the ambusher in D, who lay in wait 
throughout the night "per maliciam excogitatam," exhibited more than 
mere deliberateness. 109 In case C, the assailant carried an old grudge; like 
the assailants in E and F, he lay in wait for the defendant. Only the 
assailant in E appears to have acted in hot blood. 
Clearly, the jurors were attentive to the mental state of the assailant. It 
might be argued, however, that this resulted from their concern to blame 
the fight on the deceased; or, that planning was merely incidental to most 
acts of stealth and that premeditation was a common, but not an essential, 
aspect of murder. The foregoing evidence from the early decades of the 
fourteenth century is unclear on this point, and, as we shall see, there is 
reason to believe that even by the end of the century premeditation had 
not yet become a necessary element in the societal concept of murder. 
The Statute of 1390 equated murder with ambush and malice afore-
thought.110 Its drafters were undoubtedly concerned mainly with high-
waymen and housebreakers who robbed and slew their victims.lll The 
official term, "murder," operative only in the administration of pardons, 
now clearly embraced homicide perpetrated through stealth with respect 
to the victim. Moreover, true premeditation had come to be conceived 
officially as at least a common incident of murderous intent. But most 
murder indictments contain only the operative phrase "murdravit" or 
"insidiavit" (ambushed), and are thus insufficiently detailed to provide 
insight into the social, as opposed to the official, concept of murder. 
There is nevertheless some indication that the short lived statute cast 
murder in terms too narrow for the community. If murder was, stricto 
sensu, homicide through stealth where the victim was taken off guard, it 
was in its broadest societal use a particularly repugnant homicide. A case 
from the roll of John Fovyll, coroner in Leicester and one of the first to 
107. Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 371 et seq. 
108. Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 462-69. 
109. Later on in the indictment, "malicia precogitata" is used in its formulistic sense. 
110. "Murdre, Mort d' orne occis par agait, assaut, ou malice purpense." Stat. 13 
Richard 2, stat. 2, c. 1. 
111. See below, Chapter 3, nn. 26-30 and accompanying text. 
Concepts of Criminal Liability and Jury Nullification 57 
employ the word "murder" systematically in his indictments, lays to rest 
the notion that the societal concept of a murderous act was dependent 
upon secrecy or stealth. John Howetson came upon two boys, Roger and 
Richard Malynson, working near the road and wanted to strike them 
because of a long-held grudge. Seeing this, a certain Robert Malesherbe 
interceded, saying he would take whatever punishment was coming to the 
boys. Their sister Maud arrived at this point and similarly offered to make 
amends, but Howetson, calling her a whore, tried to strike her with a 
hatchet, pursuing her as she fled to her house. Malesherbe followed, 
imploring Howetson not to strike the woman, at which point Howetson 
turned upon him, swinging the hatchet "with great force." Malesherbe, 
thinking no evil, neither having a knife with him nor seeing any other 
weapon to prevent a blow upon his head, sprang from him and ran into 
Maud's house to get some weapon for defending himself. 
Malesherbe grabbed a stake, but Howetson broke this and then, aided it 
seems by his son and another relative, proceeded to finish the job. While 
the two held Malesherbe down, the other struck him, and when the victim 
could no longer struggle, all dealt mortal blows so that "they slew and 
murdered Robert without any cause." 112 
In another case, admittedly a rare one, there was stealth but not 
premeditation. It was alleged that after a vigorous argument, one of the 
disputants, B, 
turned his back to [A] in the field and A ran to B and suddenly drew the 
dagger of B and feloniously stabbed him twice in the side. . . . The 
jurors say he slew him feloniously and murdered him.II3 
The allegation of murder seems to have turned on the deviousness of the 
act, which was apparently not premeditated but committed in hot blood. 
The word "felonia," rather than "murdrum," was later marginated, 
perhaps indicating that the coroner took a different view of the requisite 
mens rea. 
There is one final point to be made about the late-fourteenth-century 
murder indictments. The slaying of master by servant and of husband by 
112. JUST 2/61, m.12/l (1409): " ... nullum malum cogitans nee super se habens 
cultellum nee aliqua alia arma videns ictum ilium supra caput suum eminere saltavit ab eo 
et cucurrit in domum ipsius Matillidis ad aliqua arma sibi assumenda pro defensione et 
salvacione vite sue ... absque aliqua causa dictum R. M. interfecerunt et murdraverunt." 
See also JUST 2/61, m.92/2 (1406), where the slayer's dog attacked the victim, bringing him 
to the ground, whereupon the slayer "murdered" him. 
113. JUST 2/63, m.3/2 (1400): " ... vertebat dorsum suum ad eundem in campum, 
predictus A. cucurrit ad predictum B., subito extraxit daggarium ipsius B. et felonice 
percussit ... his in latere .... [J]urati dicuntfelonice interfecit et murdravit." 
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wife, two forms of statutory petty treason, 114 had for centuries counted 
among the most reprehensible homicides. Such slayings figured promi-
nently in the indictments for murder, and all too frequently the jurors 
alleged that the victim had been slain while he slept in his bed or taken at 
night by ambush. 115 And, what is more revealing, occasionally it was said 
in such cases that the slayer had attempted to hide the deceased to 
conceal the act. 116 Thus, murder had not entirely lost its most ancient 
meaning, and its stigma, one suspects, could be attached to any homicide 
that society found particularly repugnant. 
The process by which the community determined that a given slayer 
was a murderer was undoubtedly complex and by no means solely a 
function of the act itself. Coroners' juries and trial jurors were swayed in 
many cases by the status and reputations of the combatants and by what 
was known about past relations between them. Such considerations may 
have been critical to the determination that the defendant had acted 
through stealth, that he had caught his victim off guard. Conversely, these 
factors must sometimes have contributed to the conclusion that the 
parties had fought together on equal terms, out of sudden and mutual 
anger. There is, in fact, evidence that in some cases jurors perceived 
simple homicides as "accidental" ones because the parties were known 
to have been "friends. " 117 It may be, too, that an informal, extrajudicial 
system of monetary compensation long outlived the demise of formal 
wergild settlement. 118 If so, the relations between the slayer and his 
victim's kin may have determined the community's perception of the 
homicide or, at least, of the slayer's just deserts. 
We must be careful not to assume too much precision in medieval 
evidence-gathering techniques. The coroners' rolls leave the impression 
one would expect: in many cases the inquest jurors were imprecise, 
confessed lack of knowledge or made little effort to assess blame for a 
114. Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2 (1352). 
115. E.g. JUST 3/180, m.23d/6 (Gloucester, 1393); JUST 3/180, m.31/l (Hereford, 1390); 
JUST 3/203, m.lld/3 (Lincoln, 1429); JUST 2/190, m.4/3 (Warwickshire, ca. 1390); JUST 
2/242, m.5d/6 (Yorkshire, 1388). This last case, recorded by a coroner before the Statute of 
1390, was one of many indictments reflecting the use of "murder" in a commission to 
justices of the peace in 1380. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 3, 84b. For discussion of justice of the 
peace indictments based on the commission of 1380, see Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 
379 et seq. The Statute of 1390, with slight modification, repeated the categories represented 
in the commission. I have based my discussion upon the Statute to avoid confusion, but it 
should be noted that indictments began to employ the term "murder" a decade before the 
Statute. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 461-62. 
116. JUST 2/163, m.l/6 (1389) and m.2/ll (1393). 
117. E.g. JUST 1/1185, m.3; C 145, File 59/46. 
118. Hurnard stated that out of court settlement was commol} during the twelfth century, 
but it is unclear how long this continued. Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 9. 
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fight ending in homicide. Many homicides must have been viewed from a 
distance or not all. To the extent that facts were unknown, poorly 
documented, or in conflict with other testimony, social and psychological 
assessments unrelated to the actual homicide but related instead to the 
parties involved must have been used. 119 It may be true that in the 
fourteenth century trial jurors were more lenient in some cases than they 
had been before the change in the Crown's pardoning policy.12o But it is 
also possible that with the increase in social mobility and the rise of 
professional crime trial jurors were called upon more frequently to pass 
judgment on strangers to the neighborhood and dealt with them more 
harshly. 121 In any case, these would be merely two more examples of 
foreign elements creeping into the verdict process. The essential nature of 
that process had not suddenly changed. Due to the nature of the extant 
evidence, it suddenly becomes visible to us, but the available evidence 
suggests that it had for centuries been integral to the phenomenon of 
dispute settlement. 
II 
Theft, in its various forms, was the most common capital offense 
committed by medieval Englishmen. 122 To judge from presentments on 
the thirteenth-century eyre and fourteenth-century gaol delivery rolls, 
thieving was endemic; and these sources reflect only a fraction of the 
offenses actually committed. In theft, even more dramatically than in 
homicide, the formal legal rules prescribed the death sanction for what 
was commonplace social behavior. It comes as no surprise that most 
defendants were acquitted-typically two-thirds to three-quarters at gaol 
119. For extensive discussion of this and related issues, see the important work of Given, 
McLane, Hanawalt and Hammer, cited above, n. 2. 
120. Pugh ("Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 102-3) suggests that the 
"additional impediments" of the later period may have made some difference but cautions 
against assuming that juries acquitted significantly less in the 1280s. 
121. See Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 54. 
122. Hanawalt (ibid., p. 66) found that in the eight counties she studied (1300-48) larceny 
(38.7 percent), burglary (24.3 percent) and robbery (10.5 percent) accounted for 73.5 percent 
of all felony indictments. These exclude, of course, thefts not reported as well as thefts 
prosecuted as criminal or as civil trespasses. See below, n. 135 and accompanying text. 
Homicide, though less common, accounted for a substantial minority of those felonies 
actually tried. Hanawalt (idem) found 18 percent. Pugh ("Reflections of a Medieval 
Criminologist," pp. 86-87) found 22 percent for London gaol deliveries of the 1280s. 
McLane ("Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder") noted a very high percentage of 
homicide indictments (more than half of all felony indictments) but suggests this does not 
reflect the true rate of occurrence of this felony. 
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deliveries. 123 
Roughly stated, the forms of theft ranged from violent taking from the 
person (robbery) to taking upon a housebreaking, often under cover of 
night (burglary), to a simple taking and carrying off (larceny).t24 Each was 
practiced by all kinds of persons. Nonetheless, robbers frequently were 
or were viewed as outsiders and professionals who operated as highway-
men through ambush. 125 They often physically overpowered, injured, or 
even slew their victims. Compared with robbers, burglars were more 
often "local," less often professional, and they less frequently assaulted 
their victims. They were, however, more likely to be professional or to 
act in consort than larcenists. Larcenists stole goods ofless value than did 
those who committed the more professionally oriented offenses.t26 Nearly 
all theft involved stealth or surprise attack. Burglary was frequently 
nocturnal and its perpetrator had entered, often unseen, the victim's 
private domain. Larceny was the act of the pickpocket or casual 
sneakthief. Ambush characterized much robbery. Although actually 
committed openly, it usually involved actions that gave its perpetrator an 
unfair advantage over his victim. Few thefts were responses to what 
society recognized as provocation on the part of the victim. Some, 
perhaps many, however, were understood as responses to the hardships 
of life. 127 As Hanawalt has demonstrated, the juries' treatment of theft 
suspects in the royal courts involved a complex of factors having to do 
with the nature of the actor and his act, the relationship between 
defendant and victim, and-to put it bluntly-the temper of the times.12s 
Analysis of jury verdicts in cases of felonious theft is doubly compli-
cated by the fact that many thefts were not prosecuted at all and many 
others were prosecuted as other than felonies. Many minor unlawful 
takings were settled informally or privately prosecuted as trespass, even 
though an indictment would have been appropriate. Many other unlawful 
takings of goods worth 12 pence or more (that were thus felonies) were 
presented as mere criminal trespasses. At both the private and the 
123. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 59. See above, Chapter I, n. 79. 
124. See T. F. T. Plucknett, "A Commentary on the Indictments," in Putnam, ed., 
Proceedings before Justices of the Peace, pp. cxxxix-cxlvi. The questions of the carrying-
off requirement in burglary and of the intent requirement in larceny are problematic. See 
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:492-93; Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 
446-47. 
125. See Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 83. 
126. Ibid., p. 75. 
127. Ibid., p. 253. See Pugh, "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 88. Pugh 
observes that most thefts tried at late-thirteenth-century Newgate gaol deliveries involved 
goods of "comparatively small value ... taken for immediate use by ordinary citizens out 
of houses, often because of poverty or instant temptation." 
128. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, pp. 52-54 and chs. 4 and 5. 
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community level, there was a preindictment sorting process that we can 
discern but not always closely examine. 129 
Theft and homicide presented different problems for trial juries and for 
those responsible for the administration of the criminal law. They do as 
well for historians who seek to understand the behavior both of juries and 
administrators. Nearly all homicides were reported, and most of them led 
to indictments. Although many suspects were not taken, virtually all who 
were taken were tried at the felony level. Some significant distortion is 
produced by the fact that the least culpable slayers were the most likely 
to surrender themselves for trial-or to remain where they might easily be 
taken. But while that distortion affected the acquittal and conviction 
rates, it does not conceal from us the attitudes of juries toward the least 
culpable. Quite the opposite: prosecution of homicide at the capital level 
tended to fall disproportionately on the least culpable. In theft such 
prosecution fell on the most serious cases, the ones least likely to be 
handled as lesser offenses. 130 Moreover, there was no category of 
excusable, i.e., pardonable, theft. Juries had either to convict and thus 
condemn (before the expansion of benefit of clergy in the fifteenth 
century), or acquit the defendants whom they tried. In homicide, not only 
was there an intermediate, pardonable category, but juries were required 
to state the facts in cases falling within that category .131 Finally, coroners 
were required to hold inquests in homicide, and their records often were 
far more detailed than the summary indictments recorded by the clerks or 
sheriffs and justices of the peace. 
Thus, conviction and acquittal rates in prosecutions for capital theft tell 
us far less than the historian of social attitudes would like to know. They 
confirm the most obvious fact: juries sent relatively few defendants to the 
gallows. Only about a third of those tried were convicted. More were 
sentenced to die than in homicide,m but that may have been due as much 
to the screening out of "lesser" offenders as to anything else. If we may 
draw any conclusion it is that with regard to capital sanction, theft, while 
typically involving stealth, was treated little differently by society at large 
than was homicide. One ought not make too much of the difference in 
conviction rates at gaol delivery; certainly there is no evidence that 
129. See the important work of McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," 
esp. pp. 84-86, 93-95. McLane has carried analysis of this sorting process further than any 
other student of medieval criminal administration. See also Barbara Hanawalt, ''Community 
Conflict and Social Control," Mediaeval Studies, vol. 28 (1976), pp. 402-3. 
130. McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," p. 85. 
131. Even after 1300 when pardons for homicide in self-defense and through accident 
were granted de cursu, the verdict had to be sent by the presiding judge to Chancery for 
consideration. See below, Chapter 3, text at n. 20. 
132. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p. 59. See above, Chapter 1, n. 79. 
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property was more highly prized than life.m Theft was common social 
behavior, reprehensible but not generally viewed as deserving the ulti-
mate penalty. 
Some evidence confirms the commonsense guess that juries dis-
tinguished between the professional and the amateur thief, between the 
truly premeditated and the opportunistic theft, between the most ag-
gravated and the simplest forms of stealthy behavior. The most serious 
cases were those where the law of theft and the law of homicide 
converged. Excluding treason, conviction rates in capital cases were 
highest in trials on indictments for slaying by ambush by professional 
thieves.l34 We have seen also that the pardon statutes ostensibly relating 
to murder were aimed mainly at thieves (i.e., robbers), not at slayers who 
acted without the motive of pecuniary gain. Once again, there was a 
substantial overlap between the interests of the administrators of the 
criminal law and the attitudes of trial juries. Nonetheless, not all such 
defendants were convicted: frequently fearful juries could be managed by 
them or their powerful patrons. This, presumably, posed a serious 
problem for legal officials and the classes that sought to reduce the 
disorder that plagued the land. We shall return to this issue in the next 
chapter. 
Jury behavior in the less serious forms of theft is difficult to analyze. 
There is little to relate beyond the bare record of massive acquittals, a 
record that, as we shall see, in slightly different form extends down to 
modern times. As in the case of homicide, juries were influenced as much 
by the defendant's reputation and social position as by the act with which 
he had been charged. Indeed, it is likely that in theft, even more than in 
homicide, who the defendant was counted for more than what he had 
done, for even the lesser forms of theft were regarded as very wrongful, 
insidious behavior that might reflect a disposition to engage in more 
serious forms of theft.l35 In homicide, by contrast, many defendants were 
considered to have acted justifiably, in defense of their honor, their 
family, or their friends. We have seen how difficult it is to determine in a 
given case whether the jury approved of the defendant's behavior, merely 
"accepted" it, or disapproved of it but nonetheless thought it did not 
merit the defendant's execution. Whereas some acquittals or self-defense 
verdicts in homicide cases reflected the view that, despite the official 
rules, the defendant had acted "lawfully" (true rule nullification), perhaps 
133. See the remarks of McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," pp. 
109-10. 
134. See Given, Society and Homicide, p. 133: 42.6 percent of those who were accused 
of both robbery and homicide and who appeared for trial were condemned. 
135. See the remarks of C. M. Radding, "Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive 
Structural Approach," American Historical Review, vol. 83 (1978), p. 586. 
Concepts of Criminal Liability and Jury Nullification 63 
virtually all nullification in theft occurred in cases involving socially 
disapproved behavior. Acquittals in theft cases typically represented 
what we may term systemic nullification of the prescribed sanction, the 
phenomenon of the purely ''merciful acquittal.'' 
Because theft was by definition both insidious and wrongful behavior, 
juries were bound to pay close attention to the defendant's social 
standing. The stranger who committed casual theft was perhaps neces-
sarily more vulnerable to conviction than the one who committed simple 
homicide. Local communities with some justice believed they were 
constantly under threat from roving brigands. Moreover, within the 
community, status differences betweenjurors and the defendant probably 
counted for more in theft than in homicide. And this fact must be kept in 
mind also when one assesses the conviction and acquittal rates in the 
more highly stratified urban areas. 
There are, then, few concrete conclusions to be drawn about jury 
nullification in theft. We are left for the most part to draw inferences from 
our study of jury behavior in homicide and to test them against what we 
do know regarding the prevalence of theft and the outcome of trials of 
thieves. 
First, as noted above, the most serious forms of homicide, from the 
perspective of the Crown, legal officials, Parliament, and trial juries, 
involved slayings by professional thieves, mainly highway robbers and 
burglars. It is reasonable to suppose that jurors convicted a substantial 
number of such thieves even when the offenders did not slay their victims 
and that such convictions represent a fair percentage of the total number 
of convictions for theft. Second, jurors probably came down hard on 
strangers and others whose ties to the local community were attenuated 
for one reason or another. The leniency accorded villagers by their 
neighbors may be put down to favoritism, but given what jury behavior in 
homicide suggests, that may be just another way of saying that jurors 
thought the rules too harsh when forced to apply them to persons whom 
they knew well enough to identify with.t36 
I have earlier suggested that social mores reflected in traditional, 
private forms of dispute resolution in homicide influenced the handling of 
cases at common law. A similar hypothesis probably ought to be put 
forward in the case of theft. In pre-Angevin times, many forms of theft 
had been emendable. There is every reason to suppose that in theft the 
revolution in sanctions was as out of step with social attitudes as it was in 
homicide. The nearly blanket rule mandating capital punishment never 
136. Hanawalt's preliminary study of indictment and conviction patterns in Ramsey 
Abbey is of great interest. Crime and Conflict, esp. pp. 53-54. I have drawn heavily upon her 
conclusions regarding the importance of status and residence to the outcome of theft cases. 
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truly took hold within the community, which imposed its own standards 
both outside of and within the formal legal system. The hypothesis is 
strengthened by what we know about the substantial amount of down-
grading of felony to trespass, and what we might expect to result from 
such a potentially arbitrary process. Very likely, many whom the indict-
ment jury left to be tried by authorities for the capital offense were viewed 
by the community at large as perhaps less savory but as no more 
deserving of death than many who were prosecuted merely for trespass. 
Finally, the acquittal rate speaks for itself. It is of course possible that 
most acquittals were the product of bribery, fear, and belief in the 
defendant's innocence. But it is likely that just as many sprang from 
mercy and from deeply ingrained notions of how social harmony was to 
be maintained through composition with, rather than ultimate rejection 
of, the offender. Much thieving was opportunistic and committed against 
one's neighbor. Much of it was committed by the desperate and destitute 
of the local community, 137 and it was these locals who were the most 
likely to be apprehended and made to stand trial. Some of them, no doubt, 
suffered as a result of the community's frustration at not being able to 
bring all of the truly evil persons to justice. Many others of them, 
however, must have been spared simply because they were not among the 
truly evil in the eyes of their neighbors. 
137. Ibid., p. 253. 
3 Judge, Jury, and the Evolution of the Criminal Law 
in Medieval England 
We shall never know a great deal about the official response to the 
law-finding role of the medieval criminal trial jury. Most of what we do 
know we understand by way of inference from records that do not speak 
directly to this problem. Our lack of hard evidence, however, should not 
discourage speculation. In the present essay I shall attempt to put the 
problem of the law-finding jury into perspective. I shall suggest that the 
jury behavior described above influenced the bench in its interpretation 
and development of the substantive law of homicide. I shall also suggest 
the way authorities might have viewed the place of merciful verdicts in 
the less serious felonies as they considered the problems of the adminis-
tration of the criminal law generally. 
The difficulties in determining how the Crown, bench, and other 
officials viewed jury nullification are compounded by the fact that 
nullification was only one pattern of jury behavior that caused concern. 1 
Nor was it likely to have been viewed as the most worrisome. Corruption, 
though not necessarily determinative in a great number of cases, was 
undoubtedly perceived as a greater problem. Jury timidity was less 
serious but perhaps more common, and likely to be present in just those 
cases in which officials were most anxious to secure convictions. Verdicts 
resulting from partisanship that did not involve outright graft were serious 
enough and might have seemed more akin to corrupt verdicts than to 
merciful ones. By comparison, rule or sanction nullification, whether 
systemic or ad hoc, may have been-especially in close cases-relatively 
easy for officials to tolerate. 
Two other factors require our constant attention. Pretrial procedures 
resulted in a substantial amount of overindictment; there could hardly be 
a presumption against individual defendants in most cases. Even where 
indictments were justified, the trial jury might not be able to obtain 
dispositive evidence. Honest acquittals of guilty suspects were probably 
very common. On the other hand, simple rule or sanction nullification, 
when it did occur, was not easily distinguished from corrupt, timid, or 
purely partisan verdicts, and it may not have even captured the bench's 
1. For a related discussion of the points raised in these introductory paragraphs see 
above, Chapter!, text at nn. 87-97. 
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attention. If so, from the perspective of the bench the universe of 
exculpatory verdicts was divided mainly between rightful acquittals of the 
innocent-or those not proven guilty-and corrupt acquittals of true 
offenders. By the same token, however, the bench might have over-
estimated the instances of nullification in close cases. Attention to this 
form of jury behavior might have blinded the bench to much of the 
corruption that plagued the system. The procedures that concealed so 
much from the bench conceal just as much-or more-from us. In 
reconstructing the perspective of the bench, we come to understand how 
little insight the judges were allowed into the actual workings of the 
system they administered. In the end, we cannot be certain whether they 
hesitated to draw any general conclusions, given their actual position of 
ignorance, or whether, without real justification, they drew such conclu-
sions. A fortiori, we cannot know whether the bench thought it was more 
commonly confronting outright jury corruption, or well-intentioned jury 
nullification, or something in between. 
I 
The Crown and royal officials were of course aware of the many 
problems that beset the administration of criminal justice. They sought in 
a variety of ways to combat the bribing and intimidation of juries, which 
were among the most serious of those problems. So far as one can tell, 
however, the official response rarely included either the refusal to enter a 
verdict or the punishment of a particular trial jury. Grand juries could be 
fined for intentional concealment when they failed to present a felony, but 
trial juries were, by and large, immune to penalties for acquittals or 
verdicts of pardonable homicide. 2 Why should this have been so? 
The nature of criminal procedure shielded jurors against judicial 
monitoring of their behavior. In most cases the bench was dependent 
upon the jury and the defendant for information concerning the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. The judges might have suspected some 
mode of corruption, but they could not prove that it existed in individual 
cases. The judges at gaol delivery could invoke the strictest standards of 
the law but could not impose them upon the jury. They could relieve their 
frustration only by getting on to the next case, the next county town. 
Evidence of false testimony lay all about them, but pursuing it would have 
been very time consuming. Testimony at coroners' inquests and before 
sheriffs and justices of the peace could not have been as systematically 
wrong as the verdicts of petty juries made it appear. Yet if questioned, the 
jurors would simply have continued to swear on their oaths that the 
2. See above, Chapter I, text at n. 62. 
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defendant was not guilty. The court could have done little, short of 
undertaking a full-scale investigation of the homicide or theft, and lacking 
a police force or any sophisticated evidence-gathering techniques, even 
that seldom would have made the matter any clearer. 
Ironically, our best evidence of judicial attempts to get at the truth in 
individual cases comes from cases about which the bench possibly cared 
least-cases involving verdicts of self-defense. Here the judges had some 
leeway in testing verdicts, for the jury had to state the evidence that 
justified the special verdict; a simple "not guilty" or "self-defense" 
would not do. There can be little doubt that the bench was aware that in 
many cases involving verdicts of self-defense the strict rules of the law 
had not in fact been met. The numbers of such verdicts were sometimes 
overwhelming; we must infer judicial recognition of realities. 3 Moreover, 
the rolls themselves reveal judicial caution in self-defense cases and even 
attempts to trick defendants or to steer juries into an admission that would 
preclude a judgment of pardonable homicide. 
The trial rolls indicate that the judges sometimes questioned the jurors 
closely, particularly when the jury's original statement left unclear 
whether the defendant had in fact been placed in a position from which he 
could escape only through physical retaliation. In a few such cases the 
jurors responded that the defendant might have turned tail and outrun his 
assailant, an assertion that condemned the defendant.4 But usually jurors 
proved to be made of sterner stuff. In several cases from the early 1290s 
separate juries resisted what appears to have been a concerted effort to 
restrict the availability of pardons de cursu to those who truly deserved 
them under the law. Responding to judicial queries, the juries strength-
ened their original verdicts: the deceased "lay upon [the defendant's] 
stomach and held him tightly to the ground";5 the defendant was "armed, 
but had drawn neither weapon," resorting instead to a broken branch;6 
3. See below, section IV. 
4. See e.g. Le Livre des Assises et Pleas del'Corone en Temps du Roy Edward Le Tiers 
(London, 1670), 43 Edw. 3, pl. 31 (1370). Hereafter cited as Livre des Assises. 
5. C 260/7, no. 46A (1293). In this case, the jurors stated that Gregory le Waleis threw 
Thomas de Gloucester "to the ground, lay upon him, and drew his knife desiring to kill him. 
Thomas, perceiving this, and fearing likewise his own death, drew his knife and struck 
Gregory as the latter lay upon Thomas's stomach." The justices then asked the jury whether 
in fact Thomas might have escaped without killing Gregory, to which the jury responded, 
"No, because Gregory lay upon Thomas's stomach and held him tightly and firmly to the 
ground" ("et ipsum strite et firmiter ad terram tenuit"). Their reply having satisfied the 
court, the defendant was remanded to prison to await his pardon. The pardon is recorded in 
C.P.R., Oct. II, 1293, p. 40. 
6. C 260/6, no. 6 (1292). The jurors were asked whether Gilbert had a sword or a knife 
and, if so, whether he had drawn either. When they replied that Gilbert was so armed, but 
had drawn neither weapon, the court, obviously doubtful as to the lethal nature of Gilbert's 
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the defendant could not have fled because the deceased was faster than he 
was.7 Only in the second case did the bench refuse to accept the verdict 
the jury insisted upon. A secondjury was called, which supported the first 
jury and ensured that the defendant would receive a royal pardon. 
Although the rolls do not reveal it, it is possible that judges frequently 
badgered juries into returning verdicts of guilty. As Henry Summerson 
has demonstrated, we may not accept the trial rolls as evidence of all that 
transpired at the triaLS If my depiction of jury behavior in self-defense 
cases is accurate, then the rolls are patently deceiving guides to the real 
world of the medieval courtroom. There are, however, strong reasons for 
doubting that judges successfully steered juries toward capital verdicts. 
Relatively few defendants, as we have seen, received such verdicts, and 
too many verdicts of self-defense were registered for us to imagine a 
coercive bench. We must either assume that the bench was in sympathy 
with the jury in close cases or that it was powerless to halt a practice it 
opposed. The latter possibility cannot be rejected out of hand: clearly the 
bench opposed all forms of outright corruption, but the continuing 
protests against such practices suggest that they persisted despite official 
resistance. 
The apparent weakness of the bench and of royal officials should come 
as no surprise. The institutional or procedural bars to establishment of 
jury corruption or nonadherence to legal rules in given cases-the very 
fact of a self-informing jury-reflected the limits to royal administration. 
attack, asked the jurors once again whether Robert could have escaped without slaying 
Gilbert. The jurors reiterated their opinion that he could not have done so. This failed to 
satisfy the court, however, and only after a second jury had been impaneled and had 
supported the verdict of the original jury was the defendant awarded a special verdict. The 
enrollment indicates in a later hand that Gilbert was pardoned. 
7. C 260/6, no. 16 (1292). The petty jury stated that Alan de !a More killed John Tyrel in 
self-defense after a great chase. The two had argued until John ran home to fetch a sword. 
"Alan, seeing John approaching, and desiring to evade John's malicious intent, kept himself 
underneath the horse his father, Robert, was riding. Robert did all in his power to prevent 
John from striking Alan, but John chased Alan into a certain corner" where, as a last resort, 
Alan retaliated with a mortal blow. The court asked whether Alan could have fled before 
John returned from his house armed. The jury replied that the defendant could not have fled 
because John was faster than he ("Johannes erat celorior predicto Alana"). Compare C 
260/23, no. 23 (1332), where the jurors testified that the defendant fled as fast as he could 
("velociori curru quo potuit"), but his assailants were even fleeter and caught up with him 
("velociores demum ipsum ... attinxerunt"). 
8. Summerson, "Plea Roll and Year Book." Summerson has shown that judges ques-
tioned juries at the eyre but that the plea rolls record jury statements as though made sua 
spome and not in response to such questions. It does not appear, however, that the bench 
overturned acquittals; it is possible, however, that judicial attitudes led some juries to 
convict where otherwise they might not have done so. Whether the bench questioned jurors 
at gaol delivery (as opposed to the eyre) remains unclear. See above, Chapter 1, n. 58. 
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In the area of criminal law, the Crown was dependent upon the coop-
eration of society at large, and continued to be so, though in ever 
lessening degrees, until modern times. About the best officialdom could 
hope for was to convert its pervasive weakness into a moderate strength 
by associating itself with the popular impulses that the jury represented. 
This it did, though we cannot be sure it did so with any degree of 
self-consciousness. But it was, in any case, only one of several policies 
the Crown pursued. We must sort out the contradictory aspects of the 
royal administration of the criminal law before we can speculate as to why 
the Crown accepted not only the jury but prevailingjury practices as well. 
II 
Medieval legislation reveals the preoccupation of England's rulers with 
serious crime. Homicide and theft were but parts of a larger problem of 
disorder that attended changes in late medieval society. The periodic 
demobilization of military forces unleashed unmanageable numbers of 
potential brigands. Plague and famine created dislocations that taxed the 
restraining tendencies of medieval social organization. Town life and 
wealth spawned antipathies for which there was no solvent, and assaults 
against both were not easily checked. It is difficult to overestimate the 
rudeness of conditions, the commonness of petty warfare, and the 
insecurity oflife. As time went on conditions worsened, and the elaborate 
legislative schemes to halt violence became increasingly utopian and 
fruitless. 
There remained of course a world of difference between rural settle-
ments and the populous areas along the most frequented highways. But 
even peaceful rural villages were subject to occasional pillage by roving 
gangs and the henchmen of local political magnates. The late medieval 
rolls of the justices of the peace and the justices of gaol delivery evidence 
increasing amounts of organized criminal activity in all parts of England. 
Until a detailed analysis of late medieval crime is undertaken we shall not 
be able to speak with confidence about levels and locales of criminal 
activity .9 Nevertheless, if legislation and the extant trials rolls are a guide 
to the perspective of the Crown and bench, we must conclude that 
officialdom perceived a land almost bereft of public order .10 Governance 
9. Hanawalt (Crime and Conflict) has produced such a work for the early fourteenth 
century. No similarly comprehensive study exists either for the late thirteenth century or for 
the century following the Black Death. For an important discussion of the role of arbitration 
as a brake on public disorder in the latter period see Edward Powell, "Arbitration and the 
Law in England in the Late Middle Ages," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th 
ser., vol. 33 (1983), pp. 49--67. 
10. See Kaeuper, "Law and Order," pp. 734-37. 
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involved, it would seem, a constant struggle to gain the upper hand over 
a large criminal population. 
To understand the degree to which the ruling elites focused their 
attention on the worst excesses of public disorder, 11 we must examine the 
history of the attempts to restrain the royal power to grant pardons of 
grace. We have seen that beginning in the 1290s English monarchs 
employed their pardon power to raise a military force and to obtain 
revenue. 12 This flow of pardons immunized large numbers of offenders 
from prosecution for all offenses committed before the date of the pardon, 
and many contemporaries apparently believed that the policy encouraged 
potential offenders, who might expect to secure pardons in the future. 
Parliamentary statutes set limits on the royal pardoning power, especially 
for serious homicides, those committed through ambush or other forms of 
premeditated attack, typically in the course of highway robbery or 
burglary .13 The Crown acceded to passage of these statutes but continued 
to sell pardons to even the worst offenders. Whatever the success of the 
statutes, it is significant that the attack on royal pardons of grace was 
aimed not at all felonies in general but only at the most heinous kinds of 
offenses. The point requires some elaboration for not all historians have 
viewed the matter in this way. 
The earliest statutes declared that the king might pardon only those 
who slew se defendendo or by accident, the traditional grounds for 
pardons de cursu. These statutes, therefore, appear to have endeavored 
to prohibit all pardons of grace, declaring that all felonious homicides lay 
beyond the scope of the royal power to extend mercy. 14 This, in itself, 
nearly defies explanation: surely contemporary conceptions of justice 
required greater latitude than the statutes allowed, and literal application 
11. See McLane, "Royal Courts and the Problem of Disorder," p. 76. 
12. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 88-90. 
13. See above, Chapter 2, n. 134. 
14. As early as 1309, Parliament petitioned the king about the frequent pardoning of 
thieves ("larons") who had been indicted for "larcines, roberies, homicides," and other 
felonies. Those responsible for the indictments, so the petition alleged, feared to remain in 
their communities; many refused to indict out of similar fear. The petition did not suggest 
any specific remedy, but the king replied that in the future he would grant pardons only to 
those found to have slain through misadventure, self-defense, or insanity. Rotuli 
Parliamentorum, 1:444b (1309). The Ordinances of 1311 carried out the royal response in 
more general language: "That no felon nor fugitive be from henceforth protected or 
defended from any manner of felony, by the King's charter of peace ... unless in a case 
where the King can give grace according to his oath, and that by process of law and the 
custom of the realm." Quoted in Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 323-24. The 
Statute of Northampton attempted to limit pardons to self-defense and misadventure, Stat. 
2 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1328), and in 1336 a new statute ordered that the Statute of Northampton be 
observed, Stat. 10 Edw. 3, c. 2. 
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of the wording of these statutes plays havoc with the underlying theory of 
the king as fount ofjustice. 15 It would be a mistake, I believe, to read the 
early pardon statutes too literally. They may in fact have been speaking to 
extreme cases rather than to the large intermediate body of simple 
homicides, and they may have been assuming a distinction close to the 
one that the statute of 1390 made explicit. It is worth considering how this 
legislative perspective may have come about. 
As we have seen, the law of self-defense required the defendant to 
prove that he had acted in extremis. Indeed, by the middle of the 
thirteenth century it was considered felonious for a person who was able 
to flee to strike and cause death, even if he had been provoked and was 
in substantial danger. Yet the early treatise writers, when they considered 
felonious homicide, dealt mainly with its core element, malice, in the 
sense of a deliberate, unprovoked attack. 16 They rarely considered the 
case where the deceased had been the assailant, and the defendant, acting 
without true malice but in unnecessary haste, had chosen retaliation 
rather than flight. It is unclear even that these writers discussed homicides 
committed in the course of a brawl freely joined, where one of the blows 
dealt produced an unforeseen fatal result. Given their definition of 
pardonable self-defense, had they been pressed to define the outer limits 
of excusable homicide they would have had to exclude such acts.17 But 
15. The king sometimes pardoned culpable slayers whose acts either bordered on 
self-defense or for other reasons were not considered especially heinous. See Hurnard, 
King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 244. 
16. Bracton seems to consider an unlawful homicide as one committed "in premeditated 
assault and felony." Bracton, De Legibus, 2:438 (fol. 155). He describes felonious homicide 
"as where one in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain, deliberately and in premeditated 
assault, has killed another wickedly and feloniously and in breach of the king's peace." 
Ibid., p. 341 (fol. 121). Bracton does not here consider the provoked slayer who responds 
merely to save himself without being in extremis. Fleta, written a generation after Bracton, 
refers to wilful homicide as one in which "a man, with corrupt intention, wickedly and 
feloniously slays anyone by a deliberate attack, in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain.'' 
Fleta, 2:60. 
17. Bracton describes self-defense (by implication) as follows: "[I]f avoidable and he 
could escape without slaying, he will then be guilty of homicide." De Legibus, 2:340 (fol. 
120b). Here, Bracton implies the strict rule of self-defense, but does not specifically refer to 
provoked slayings where the slayer might not have acted out of malice. Nor does he refer 
to such acts in his discussion of intentional homicide. See above, n. 16. In his discussion of 
self-defense, where the slaying was "unavoidable," Bracton states that the slayer acts 
"with sorrow of heart," 2:341 (fol. 121), and "without premeditated hatred," ibid., p. 340 
(fol. 120b). But what of the slayer who acts when it was avoidable, though "without 
premeditated hatred" and "with sorrow of heart"? Cf. Fleta, 2:60: "[I]fthe necessity were 
avoidable, without slaying, a man is guilty of homicide, whereas, should the necessity be 
unavoidable, he will not be liable to the penalty of homicide, because he has not slain 
feloniously, but from fear and instinctively, to save himself when he could not otherwise 
avoid his own death." 
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their writings do not articulate a reason for treating these acts as capital 
felonies.1s Thus the practice offocusing only on extreme cases had begun. 
As concern about professional and secret homicide grew, the chasm 
between those acts singled out for special condemnation and those 
meriting pardons de cursu grew wider. The attention of both judges and 
legislators, like that of the treatise writers, may have been diverted from 
the intermediate category of simple homicide. Indeed, this might have 
been a result of the prevailing pattern of jury behavior, which, as we have 
seen, narrowed the courts' focus on homicide to the more extreme cases. 
Yet another factor sheds light on the likely intent of the early-
fourteenth-century pardon statutes: a parliamentary misconception re-
garding the granting of pardons de cursu. In the thirteenth century, kings 
personally oversaw the pardoning process. Under this procedure, a few 
technically undeserving slayers, in the interests of justice, had received 
pardons for self-defense after trial.19 In the early fourteenth century, 
however, the pardoning procedure changed. Routine royal intercession 
ceased, and the chancellor was empowered to issue pardons de cursu in 
the king's name. 20 By virtue of this new procedure, pardons de cursu were 
issued only in those cases where there had been a judicial determination 
that the defendant had met the legal standard for self-defense. Thus, 
although the king retained the power to grant pardons for self-defense to 
slayers who had not met the formal rules of the law,21 this power was 
18. Bracton comes closest to explaining the rationale for the harsh rules of the law, but 
his discussion presumes the possibility of rational decision making. In discussing the capital 
liability of one who "thinking to strike a light blow, ... has struck a heavy one and killed 
... , " Bracton states, "For everyone ought to observe mean and measure in what he does." 
De Legibus, 2:438 (fol. 155b). 
19. These included those whose acts bordered on, but did not fall within, the legal 
category of self-defense (Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 239-43) and on 
occasion even brawlers (ibid., p. 244). 
20. A 1329 Year Book statement reflects the automatic nature of pardons: "Note that 
when a man is acquitted before the justices errant for the death of a man in self-defense 
["soy defendo"], the process is such, that he shall have the writ of the Chief Justice, within 
which writ shall be contained the record of his acquittal to the Chancellor, who shall make 
him his writ of pardon without speaking to the king by course of law." Sir Anthony 
Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgment (London, 1565), "Corone," pl. 361. Cf. ibid., pl. 295 
(1330): "Scrope, C. J., and the other justices ordered the prisoner to remove the record into 
the Chancery; and the Chancellor made him a charter in such a case without speaking to the 
king." Cf. the Commons' petition to the king and the latter's reply in 1309. Rotuli 
Parliamentorum, 1:444b. 
21. It is, of course, possible that the summary procedure for pardons de cursu reflected 
a new royal policy according to which the king conceded his power to pardon except in cases 
of accident or in those cases meeting the strict rules of self-defense. Having so reduced his 
options, he would have little reason to oversee the issuing of pardons de cursu. But it seems 
more reasonable to conclude that the king, in forfeiting the opportunity to pardon some 
offenders after trial, did so only as a by-product of his streamlining the royal administration 
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seldom if ever exercised. It was the rare case in which a defendant could 
convince the judges to carry forward his matter for personal royal 
consideration. The drafters of the early pardon statutes, however, may 
not have fully understood this;22 the statutes may have been drafted under 
the incorrect assumption that such cases might still go forward after trial 
for royal consideration. 
In sum, we cannot be certain that Parliament intended to deprive the 
Crown of its traditional power in cases long thought appropriate for royal 
mercy. By allowing pardons only in cases of accident and self-defense, 
Parliament may well have thought it was leaving intact the royal power 
not only to pardon de cursu according to the strict rules of the law, but 
also to pardon de gratia those simple homicides that the king, out of true 
mercy and by appropriate extension of the legal rules, desired to treat as 
if they met the formal requirements. 
In any event, by the middle of the fourteenth century statutory 
preambles and legislative histories provide a clearer insight into the 
nature of the protest that Parliament had leveled against the Crown. While 
the statutes continued to distinguish between pardons de cursu and 
pardons de gratia, it appears that Parliament, seeking to combat what was 
perceived as a dangerous rise in professional crime,23 was concerned 
mainly with those pardons de gratia obtained by the worst offenders. 
Notorious malefactors who committed homicide in the course of theft 
were quite possibly the main targets of the legislation.24 Persons who had 
of pardons de cursu. At the time he probably imagined that more suspects would then come 
to him before trial for a pardon de gratia in return for money or military service. 
22. Yearbook recognition of the chancellor's summary powers with regard to pardons de 
cursu dates from the early fourteenth century, the period of the early pardon statutes, but 
Parliament may have overlooked this innovation. 
23. There is no systematic study of the growth of professional crime that covers the entire 
course of the fourteenth century. My argument does not depend on the fact of increasing 
crime; it does depend on the contemporary belief in an increase in professional crime. We 
owe much of our evidence to parliamentary attention to the problem (see below, n. 24), 
which may reflect the perception of the higher classes rather than actual conditions. See 
Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, pp. 235-37. The trial rolls from the later decades of the 
fourteenth century indicate frequent indictments of groups of offenders, especially in cases 
of theft, and indictments before justices of the peace also reflect a substantial amount of 
what seems to have been professional crime. See e.g. Putnam, ed., Proceedings before 
Justices of the Peace, pp. 212-39. Gangs seem to have operated openly and ubiquitously. 
See Hewitt, Organization of War, pp. 173-75; Bellamy, "The Coterel Gang: An Anatomy of 
a Band of Fourteenth-Century Criminals," English Historical Review, vol. 39, (1964), p. 
698. For discussions of thirteenth-century crime, seeR. H. Hilton, A Medieval Society: The 
West Midlands at the End of the Thirteenth Century (London, 1966), pp. 248-61; Pugh, 
"Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," pp. 98-99; Given, Society and Homicide, 
passim. 
24. The petition of 1309 had referred to the "too free pardoning of thieves [larons] who 
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acted on a sudden impulse or in the course of a common brawl were 
almost never mentioned, though they were probably responsible for most 
homicides. Parliament dealt, in short, with those acts that incurred public 
outrage and fear and seemed beyond the most generous limits of legiti-
mate mercy. 
During the later decades of the fourteenth century, parliamentary 
concern with the problem of professional homicide steadily increased. 
Possibly as a result of this concern, the terminology of royal commissions 
to justices of the peace came to define more fully particularly heinous 
homicide or "murder," as it once again had come to be called in official 
documents,25 and thus to lend special importance to prosecution in such 
cases. The commission of 1380, for instance, which empowered justices 
of the peace to take indictments in cases of "murder," associated that 
term with ambushing and malice aforethought, or true planning.26 And 
had been indicted" for the crimes Parliament sought to prevent. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 
l:444b (1309). The statute of 1336 recited: "Whereas murderers, robbers, and other felons, 
be greatly encouraged to offend, by reason that Charters of pardon of manslaughters 
["homicides"], robbery, felonies, and other trespasses against the peace, have been so 
lightly granted." Stat. 10 Edw. 3, c. 2. The statute of 1340 (Stat. 14 Edw. 3, c. 15), repeated 
earlier restrictions on pardons: "Charters have been granted without number to felons and 
manslayers ["larons et homicides"], to the evil example and fear of good people and lawful, 
whereby thieves, felons and offenders ["larons et meffesours"] be comforted to do their 
robberies and manslaughters ["roberies et homicides"] and the same do from day to day." 
In a petition of 1347, Parliament referred to malefactors without number who received 
pardons "to the great destruction of the people." Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2: 17la. See also 
Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2:172a (1347). A similar petition of 1353 stated that the king, in 
response to "suggestions" which were less than truthful, had granted pardons to many 
notorious felons ("larons") and to common murderers, who were to fight overseas and who 
returned and plundered the countryside. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 2:253b. Kaye correctly 
notes that Parliament did not distinguish types of felonious homicide in these statutes and 
petitions. Kaye, "Early History," Part I, p. 378. It is possible that Parliament had in mind 
all felonious homicides; but it is unlikely that in its attempt to prevent the pardoning of really 
serious malefactors, Parliament proscribed pardons even to those of generally good 
reputation who, in a sudden quarrel, struck and slew another person. 
25. For an excellent discussion of the use of "murder" as a term of art in justice of the 
peace indictments in the 1380s see Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 383-89. 
The term "murder" had not been commonly employed as a term of art for a particularly 
heinous homicide. But the concept of murder was reflected in the name given to the fine 
imposed on the local community for an unexplained homicide ("murdrum").·Many, but not 
all, such homicides had been committed in secret, the slayer taking his victim by surprise 
and making his escape without detection by third parties. See Plucknett, Concise History, 
pp. 444-45; Meekings, ed., Wiltshire Eyre, pp. 61-65; Hurnard, King's Pardon for 
Homicide, pp. 385-93. The murdrum fine was abolished in 1340 (Stat. 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 
4.) By that time, the term "murder" was once again coming to be identified in official 
documents with slaying itself. See e.g. John B. Post, "Some Limitations of the Medieval 
Peace Rolls," Journal of the Society of Archivists, vol. 4 (1973), pp. 633, 639. 
26. "We have assigned you to inquire ... into all thefts, notorious or open, and mayhems 
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from about that date, legislative demands for limitations on the royal 
pardoning power may have prompted the frequent insertion in pardons for 
"all felonies" clauses excepting "treason, murder, and rape. " 27 In this 
context, "murder" was not employed as a catchall for felonious homicide 
but was a term of arus 
The statute of 1390 gave these legislative demands their fullest embodi-
ment. Limits were imposed on the king's power to pardon homicides 
committed through murder, ambush, assault, or malice aforethought.29 
Pardons for these offenses were made quite expensive; they could be 
obtained only through a request making clear the nature of the killing; and 
to be effective they had expressly to cover these offenses. A trial was to 
be held to determine the nature of the slaying when a general pardon for 
homicide was presented to the court.3o 
Like its precursors, the statute of 1390 limited the king's pardon power 
only in cases of homicide. This supports the view taken here of the kind 
of homicide to which the legislation referred: if the king might not pardon 
any slayers save those who qualified for pardons de cursu, why might he 
pardon virtually all thieves? More likely, the king was allowed to pardon 
all slayers and thieves, save for the most vicious in either class, i.e., those 
who slew through stealth or in the course of an assault involving highway 
robbery or household burglary. For the most part, it was the professional 
criminal at whom the legislation was aimed. And we must suppose that 
officialdom not only sought to close the escape route of the royal pardon 
to such persons but that it also desired to see them brought to justice by 
the juries that tried them. It was these offenders who truly tested the 
system, not those lesser offenders who, with a little more time, money, or 
and slayings of men through ambush or malice aforethought, and murders, and other 
felonies." Rotuli Parliamentorum, 3:84b. "Felonies," I believe, incorporated simple 
homicides. See Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," p. 468, n. 21 and accompanying 
text. 
27. See e.g. C.P.R., March 20, 1381, p. 610; May 7, 1381, p. 624; Dec. 12, 1385, p. 71; 
Jan. 8, 1386, p. 79; Jan. 16, 1386, p. 94; Feb. 27, 1386, p. 128. 
28. See e.g. JUST 3/177, r,n.7/3 (1393), discussed in Green, "Jury and the Law of 
Homicide," p. 466, n. 197. 
29. Stat. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390): "[T]hat no charter of pardon from henceforth shall 
be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the death of a man slain by await, assault, 
or malice prepensed, treason, or rape of a woman ... '' (''[Q]e null chartre de pardon de sore 
soit a/owe devant quiconques Justices pur murdre mort de homme occys par agait ass aut ou 
malice purpense treson ou rape de femme ... "). For a full discussion of the statute see 
Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 462-69. 
30. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390). The section of the statute imposing heavy fines for 
pardons for the named offenses was repealed in 1392. See Green, "Jury and the Law of 
Homicide," pp. 469-70, n. 205. 
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foresight might, through a pardon of grace, legitimately have immunized 
themselves altogether against trial and the verdict of the country. 31 
III 
If the bench, reflecting the attitudes of the elites of English society, was 
concerned for the most part with the most serious offenders, so too were 
juries. We have seen that few perpetrators of casual homicide were 
hanged and that fully half of those alleged to have committed "murder" 
were sent to the gallows.32 Doubtless the bench would have preferred an 
even higher rate of conviction for these latter defendants. They probably 
suspected that graft and fear accounted for many acquittals of profes-
sional thieves and slayers, persons who frequently moved about in gangs 
and who possessed the means to buy off or frighten their prospective 
jurors. Nonetheless, the judges must have recognized that most of the 
law-abiding populace shared a common point of view in this area. This 
community of interest regarding the most serious offenders may have 
conditioned the judicial response to jury leniency toward the least serious 
ones. 
We are unable, however, to determine the extent to which the bench 
acquiesced in jury leniency in simple homicide and much nonprofessional 
theft. Before examining the factors that support the view that there was 
very substantial judicial acceptance of jury behavior, we must take note 
of a few developments regarding the law of pardonable homicide. These 
developments provide a more substantial context for understanding the 
impact of jury leniency than I have thus far set forth. The doctrinal 
changes we must trace are all the more significant because, in the main, 
jury behavior in simple homicide tended to prevent development of the 
substantive law. 
First, I shall briefly outline the reasons for this process of doctrinal 
stultification. Then I shall discuss the changes that did occur and suggest 
that jury behavior conditioned the shape of the evolving law. This 
discussion sets forth the main body of evidence that reflects the judicial 
reaction to jury behavior. I shall argue that jury behavior to some extent 
slowed the development of a policy aimed at reducing serious crime, an 
ironic result of the dialectical process created by the combined adoptions 
of a general capital sanction for felony and a lay criminal trial jury. In the 
final section of this chapter I shall tentatively explore the reasons why the 
Crown retained the capital sanction for all grades of felony despite the 
problems it caused. 
31. For further discussion of this theme see below, section IV. 
32. See above, Chapter 2, text at nn. 16-21. 
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That juries manipulated the evidence in a large class of homicide cases 
can hardly have escaped the bench. Although the justices insisted that 
nothing less than dire necessity justified killing in self-defense, it is 
possible that they tolerated with some aplomb the juries' leniency in the 
face of the strict rules. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the bench, 
remand to gaol to await a pardon and the loss of goods probably seemed 
a small price to pay for those who had in fact committed capital felony. 
This fact, then, may have left the justices loath to undertake any 
extension of the formal law of self-defense. Rather, in every case in which 
self-defense was alleged, they pressed the jury on two questions: Had the 
defendant acted out of total desperation? Had he acted without malice? 
The jury's inclination to shape the facts in the most positive way for 
many favored defendants appears to have significantly retarded develop-
ment of the substantive criminal law. Doctrinal development in the 
common-law system depended heavily upon a flow of cases raising 
problems for which the law had no appropriate answer. This flow was 
choked off early and effectively by the forms and procedures of the 
criminal law. The ab:>ence of special pleading and the inability to raise 
questions of law by way of appeal from the courts' decisions were 
detrimental enough. 33 But jury behavior played an additional and key 
role: juries' efforts to foreclose the possibility of hanging led them to 
adopt a few existing and predictable patterns of response to cover a wide 
variety of situations. Had trial juries put forward in candid terms the 
details of homicides, as inquest juries often did before a coroner, the 
history of the law of homicide might have been different. 
For example, research reveals no settled doctrine during this period 
regarding slaying in defense of one's kin, as opposed to the established 
right to defend oneself. Indeed, no discussion of the question by the 
bench can be found. It is difficult to believe that slaying in such 
circumstances was, in practice, a capital felony. 34 If it was lawful, why 
33. See Milsom, Historical Foundations, pp. 415-17. 
34. One late thirteenth-century treatise, in dealing with homicide that was not felonious, 
refers to a person "who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is defending himself or his 
household at the time." Fleta, 2:61. Compare F. M. Nichols, trans. and ed., Britton 
(London, 1865), vol. l, p. 113: 
Or he may say, that although he committed the act, yet he did not do it by felony 
prepense, but by necessity, in defending himself, or his wife, or his house, or his 
family, or his land, or his body, from death; or that he killed the man in defense of our 
peace, or by some mischance, without any thought of felony; in all which cases, if 
proved, the appellees shall have judgment of acquittal. 
Britton is here concerned only with defenses to an appeal. He does not suggest that all these 
defenses would result in an acquittal if the trial were pursuant to an indictment. Certainly, 
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does the legal process hide that from our view? One theory might have it 
that when a slaying had been in defense of kin, the defendant, after the 
formulistic "not guilty," entered a special plea stating the true facts, and 
the court accepted such a defense when it was corroborated by the jury. 
The clerk might then have enrolled the details, simply as a matter ofform, 
in a manner consistent with the rules of defense of one's person. But that 
theory would have the clerks engaging in deliberate, uniform, and 
pointless falsification of the record. It is more reasonable to suppose that 
the defendant expressed his case in the strongest and safest possible 
terms, or that the jury did so on his behalf, and that the litany of deliberate 
but excusable homicide was always built upon the foundation of saving 
one's own life. 35 Defenders of kin (or of any other person for that matter) 
were reported as self-defenders. The concealment of the true facts was 
total, and the courts never had to grapple with the question of defense of 
another. The formulae of the law had, in the hands of the self-informing 
jury, indirectly stunted doctrinal growth.36 
It is also probable that the conclusory character of jury verdicts 
inhibited the development of more subtle rules on the standards to be met 
by defendants claiming self-defense. If the judges had had to pass upon a 
wide variety of fact situations, ranging along a spectrum from murderous 
attack to genuine last resort, they might have developed a series of 
doctrinal principles and distinctions. The bench might have developed 
rules to deal with defendants who had come under attack and feared for 
their lives but had acted somewhat too hastily in retaliation; or, with those 
whose temper had gotten the better of them, whose malicious intent was 
of the moment and less than homicidal, but whose blow had been deadly. 
Instead, the courts were presented with only two types of homicide 
defendants: those said to have acted feloniously, with malicia precogitata 
and without evidence of mitigating circumstances, and those said to have 
self-defense would not lead to acquittal in such circumstances. Nor, for that matter, is the 
passage clear evidence for the proposition that one who defended his kin was entitled de 
cursu to a pardon of the king's suit. 
35. See above, Chapter 2, text at nn. 58-62. 
36. In 1506 it was held that a servant might justifiably slay in defense of his master if his 
master were otherwise unable to escape, Year Book (Henry VII) (London, 1506), Mich., 21 
Hen. 7, fol. 39, pl. 50, but the first clear reference to defense of kin that I have found dates 
approximately from the 1530s. Spelman noted that 
Fitzherbert showed an indictment [which alleged] that one Parker found a man 
between his wife's legs committing lechery, and he killed the man, and all the justices 
held this to be felony. But suppose a man means to ravish my wife against her will, 
and I kill him, it seems that I can do so in defence of my wife, just as in the case where 
he means to kill her. 
J. H. Baker, trans. and ed., The Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2 vols., (London, 1977-78), 
vol. I, p. 72. 
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slain in extremis, in self-defense. Bothjudicial suspicion of the large latter 
group and the failure of the system to present "close cases" perpetuated 
the strict division between felonious and nonfelonious homicide.37 
Although the development of the substantive law of pardonable homi-
cide was thus limited, some significant legal developments did arise out of 
the judge-jury relationship. I shall refer to two of them here, one involving 
justifiable homicide-in this case, the slaying of thieves caught in the 
act-the other involving accidental homicide. Together these develop-
ments reflect both the conservative tendencies of the bench, for which 
jury behavior was at least in part responsible, and the area of agreement 
between bench and jury concerning particularly heinous social behavior. 
2 
The category of justifiable homicide, meriting acquittal rather than 
pardon and forfeiture, was extended in the fourteenth century to include 
the slayers of felons caught in the act of burglary, arson, or robbery. An 
examination of this development may suggest why those who acted in 
defense of property fared better under the evolving law than those who 
acted solely in defense of their person. 
The line between justifiable and excusable homicide had long been 
unclear and prone to inconsistent judicial treatment.38 From early times, 
execution upon a legal order was justifiable.39 Slaying manifest felons4o 
37. The speculative nature of this section should be obvious. The direct evidence on 
judicial behavior that would provide the most satisfactory support for these conclusions is 
simply unavailable. My argument concerning jury behavior and judicial response is 
developed more fully below, subsection 4. The problem is discussed in the light of general 
developments in the law of nonfelonious homicide and the role that automatic forfeiture 
came to play in the fourteenth century. 
38. See Humard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 88-92. 
39. See Bracton, De Legibus, 2:340 (fol. 120b). 
40. These included "hand-having" thieves, notorious malefactors, and slayers attempt-
ing to escape from the "hue and cry" raised against them. For slayers of hand-having 
thieves, see e.g. J. Parker, ed., A Calendar of the Lancashire Assize Rolls 
[Manchester],l904), p. 87; Maitland, ed., Pleas of Gloucester, p. 23, pl. 89; W. Page, ed., 
Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of Northumberland (Durham, 1891), pp. 78-79, 80, 
84 (hereafter cited as Northumberland Assize Rolls); A. J. Horwood, trans. and ed., Year 
Books of the Reign of Edward the First, (London, 1863), 30--31 Edw. I, p. 512 (1302). For 
slayers of notorious malefactors, see e.g. JUST l/734, m.22d/9 (1256); JUST 1/60, m.23/5 
(1272) (keeper of the peace in Buckinghamshire slew a reputed malefactor who refused to 
give assurance that he would not harm the countryside and who sought, with drawn sword, 
to avoid arrest); KB 27/297, m.26d/l (1334); C 260/55, no. 58 (1343); C 145/21/36 (undated); 
G. Wrottesley, trans. and ed., "Plea Rolls of the Reign of Hen. III," in Collections for a 
History of Staffordshire (London, 1883), vol. 4, pp. 214-15; J. H. Wigmore, "Responsibility 
for Tortious Acts; Its History," Harvard Law Review, vol. 7 (1894), pp. 315, 323. For 
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and those formally outlawed,41 if they resisted arrest, also came to be 
justified. Initially, this may have represented an attempt to harness the 
ancient custom of private retaliation-perhaps because it could not be 
entirely prevented-by legitimating it solely where the wrongdoer refused 
to submit to the judicial process. 42 As the judicial system and the test for 
refusal to submit to it developed,43 these slayings came to be seen as being 
on behalf of the law (pro lege). While for a time some tension between the 
private and pro lege deed may have existed, we may suppose that the 
latter eventually won out. 
By the thirteenth century, most localities were no longer allowed to 
execute captured outlaws and manifest felons without trial; that custom 
had become, by and large, frontier law.44 Indeed, so profound was the 
impress of royal law that thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century judges 
sometimes insisted that the slayer of a resisting outlaw or manifest felon 
show that he had acted as a royal official or pursuant to an official order 
slayers of would-be escapers from the hue and cry, see e.g. JUST 1/56, m.44d/l (1249); 
Northumberland Assize Rolls, pp. 80, 84. 
41. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:362 (fol. 128b) (''An outlaw also forfeits everything connected 
with the peace, for from the time he is outlawed he bears the wolfs head, so that he may be 
slain by anyone with impunity, especially if he resists or takes to flight so that his arrest is 
difficult"). 
42. As early as the seventh century, slayers of outlaws or of manifest felons who would 
not surrender to the ''peace of the king'' were protected by the law against retaliation by the 
kin of the slain. See Ine 33, in F. L. Attenborough, trans. and ed., The Laws of the Earliest 
English Kings (Cambridge, 1922), p. 47: "He who kills a thief shall be allowed to declare 
with an oath that he whom he killed was a thief trying to escape, and the kinsmen of the dead 
man shall swear an oath to carry on no vendetta against him. If, however, he keeps it secret, 
and it afterwards comes to light, then he shall pay for him." Ine's dooms date from about 
A.D. 694. H. G. Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, Law and Legislation from Aethelberht to 
Magna Carta (Edinburgh, 1966), p. 13. For a later (tenth century) law to the same effect, see 
2 Aethelstan 1.2, in Attenborough, ed., Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 127 ("If 
however, [the thief] tries to defend himself, or if he takes to flight, he shall not be spared"). 
Cf. Alfred 5 to Alfred 5.3, in ibid., p. 67. Alfred employed the ecclesiastical "sanctuary" 
laws in his own legislation concerning "house protection," i.e., the protection of a suspect 
who remained in his home and voluntarily gave himself up to stand trial. See generally C. 
Riggs, Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law (Gainesville, Fla., 1963), pp. 31-36. 
43. Riggs describes the procedure that had come to replace the automatic prosecution of 
the feud, Criminal Asylum, pp. 41-42. 
44. See e.g. Northumberland Assize Rolls, p. 70. In a case where a felon was slain, but 
not while in flight, local officials informed the court that it was the custom in 
Northumberland summarily to dispatch robbers taken with goods in hand. The late 
thirteenth-century law book Britton, (vol. I, pp. 36-37), probably reflects the older rule 
rather than contemporary practice: "If any man be found killed, and another be found near 
him with the knife or other weapon in his hand all bloody, wherewith he killed him, the 
coroner shall be presently fetched, and in his presence the felon shall, upon the testimony 
of those who saw the felony done, be judged to death." 
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before he could be acquitted. 45 Other such slayers required royal pardons, 
usually for self-defense.46 Here there was confusion. While it appears that 
it was lawful for anyone to slay an outlaw or manifest felon who resisted 
arrest, it was not uncommon for nonofficial slayers to be recorded, in 
addition, as having suffered attack and therefore slain to save their lives.47 
This, indeed, was the surest defense for one seeking to show that he could 
not otherwise have taken his victim, and it may have been an embellish-
ment intended to allay judicial suspicion of nonofficial slayers. Yet the 
inclusion of details of self-defense, which ought to have strengthened the 
defendant's claim to an acquittal, may well have been responsible for the 
inconsistent judicial treatment of nonofficial slayers.48 By the middle of 
the fourteenth century, however, the confusion was resolved. Most 
slayers of outlaws and manifest felons were acquitted; the courts required 
neither a pardon nor a theory of self-defense.49 
45. See e.g. KB 27/343, m.2/4 (1346) (defendant commissioned by the sheriff of Norfolk 
was acquitted); JUST 3/139, m.27d/l (1356) (five men joined two constables in arresting a 
person who laid waste to goods and chattels of a resident of Norfolk; all were acquitted. The 
court ruled: "And because it seems to the court that what they did in this case, they did 
through the law ["per legem"] and through maintenance of the law, it is considered that the 
aforesaid seven ought to go quit"); JUST 3/135, m/16/2 (1343) (defendant and thirty-four 
others pursued and slew a person who had been indicted for several felonies. The court, 
after determining that the deceased had been indicted before his death and that the 
defendant had a commission based on that indictment, acquitted the defendant and his 
posse); A. Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, "Corone," pl. 288 (1330); Livre des Assises, 
22 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1349). 
46. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 90. 
47. See e.g. JUST l/65, m.47/15 (1286); JUST 3/43/l, m.14d/7 (1325). 
48. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 91, suggesting that in the thirteenth 
century courts may occasionally have seized upon details of self-defense in cases of 
justifiable homicide and thought, somewhat irrationally, in terms of excusable homicide. 
Hurnard observes that courts more often acquitted where the alleged felon had been slain 
while resisting arrest than where he had been slain attempting to commit robbery, and she 
speculates "that it was all too easy for the courts to assimilate [the latter] cases to slaying 
in self-defense." 
49. For example, in KB 27/297, m.26d/l (1334), a certain William, son of Ralph, was 
acquitted for the death of Adam Doughty, whom he had decapitated. According to the jury, 
Adam was a notorious robber who had feloniously burgled the house of Thomas, son of 
Jordan, in Lancashire. William tried to arrest Adam, but Adam stabbed William and fled. 
William pursued and slew Adam. The court specifically asked the jurors whether William 
could have taken Adam in any other way, to which they replied that he could not. There is 
no indication that the bench questioned the jury with regard to self-defense. In JUST 3/135, 
m.13d/3 (1344), the defendant, taking part with others responding to the hue and cry, shot 
a fleeing suspect with an arrow. The court ruled that the defendant had acted as an executor 
of the peace ("ut executor pacis") and acquitted him. In KB 27/528, Rex, m.xlvi/1 (1393), 
according to the indictment, the defendant saw a stranger ("extraneus") leading away two 
horses belonging to others. He raised the hue and pursued the stranger and, in apprehending 
him, struck him on the neck with a sword so that he fell on the ground. Whereupon the 
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As we have seen, the class of manifest felons included the ancient 
"hand-having thief"-quite literally, a felon caught with the stolen goods. 
But it did not include one intercepted in an unlawful attempt to take goods 
or commit an assault. In the course of the fourteenth century, however, 
the courts began to acquit as justifiable slayers some of those who had 
acted to forestall an attempted felony, namely, those who had slain 
burglars or robbers. The self-defender, on the other hand, was subjected 
to the rigor of the law of self-defense for at least another two centuries. 
This uneven development requires explanation. Why the one change 
without the other? 
While thirteenth-century records reveal occasional acquittals of de-
fendants who slew those attempting burglary or robbery,50 most such 
cases resulted in the granting of a pardon for actual, or alleged, self-
defense.51 As with the other early cases, embellishment by the defendant, 
repeated by jurors under oath, produced a sure result where judicial 
response to the bare truth was uncertain. The judges accepted the 
implications for legal theory of this factual grafting. Thirteenth-century 
treatises dealt with defense of property as an extension of self-defense.s2 
defendant beheaded the thief. The court considered the indictment "insufficient" and 
acquitted the defendant. For further examples see JUST 3/43/l, m.14d/7 (1325); JUST 
3/137A, m.21/2 (1353); KB 27/519, Rex m.l/2 (1391). 
50. See e.g. JUST V642, m.16/l3 (1256) (Northumberland Assize Rolls, p. 94). Pollock 
and Maitland cite this case as an unusual one and assert that the defendant was fortunate 
(History of English Law, 2:478). A late thirteenth-century legal treatise refers to such 
slayings in somewhat ambiguous terms: "Anyone, however, who slays a thief by night is not 
held to be a homicide ["non teneatur"], and he who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is 
defending himself or his household at the time, slays justly [" iuste interfecit"], and in the 
same way he who slays another to save himself from death." (Fleta, 2:61). Fleta groups such 
acts with excusable slayings in self-defense, for which a pardon was required. 
51. See e.g. Maitland; ed., Pleas of Gloucester, pl. 362 (1221); C 145/11/33 (1259); C 
145113/21 (1266); C 145/32/20 (1274); C 145/49/49 (1290); JUST 3/91, m.IOd/10 (1293). 
52. See e.g. Bracton, De Legibus, 2:408 (fol. 144b): 
If anyone slays a night thief, he will do so with impunity only if he could not spare him 
without danger to himself; if he could it will be otherwise. For the life and death of 
men are in the hands of the king, (as in the case of a certain man ... to whom the king 
granted a pardon for a death in such circumstances). And so where one defends 
himself against hamsocn, which [the English call] the entering of a house in breach of 
the peace, and the intruder is slain, he will be free of liability if he who killed could 
defend himself in no other way. 
(Footnotes omitted.) For Bracton, to be "free of liability" does not mean, in these 
circumstances, to be free of the need for a pardon: "[H]e who kills a thief, either a day thief 
or a night thief, is not liable, [i.e.,] if he could not otherwise escape danger; if he could he 
is liable. Nor is he liable who kills by misadventure." Ibid., p. 438 (fol. 155). Bracton seems 
to equate cases of misadventure, where pardons were required, with cases of slaying a thief 
to "escape danger." 
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In the fourteenth century, however, the judges formulated a new 
doctrine giving the victim of housebreaking greater latitude in repulsing 
his assailant. The proposition was first stated laconically, as if an 
intonement of the hoary law: "It was presented that a man killed another 
in his own house se defendendo. It was asked whether the deceased came 
to rob him: for in such a case a man may kill another though it not be in 
self-defense. " 53 Moreover, the court sanctioned outright acquittal in this 
case, thus bringing the defendant under the ancient rule applicable to 
slayers of manifest felons. In 1349 Justice Thorpe restated the rule more 
broadly: "And in many other cases a man may kill another without 
impeachment, as if thieves come to rob a man, or to burgle his house, he 
may safely kill them if he cannot take them. "54 
For a time, however, the courts were uncertain about the breadth of the 
rule. In 1357 Thorpe and his fellow justices were confronted with a 
defendant who had slain a burglar. The court ruled: "Because ... what 
the defendant did he did in saving his own life in circumstances in which 
anyone ought to be able to do so lawfully, it is considered that he be 
quit. " 55 This seems to indicate that, while a pardon was not necessary, 
the defendant had to show he acted in self-defense. 
The hesitation of the bench to separate such cases from those of 
excusable homicide was reflected in another case. It seems to have been 
settled by 1353 that a man might slay someone who had entered upon his 
property with the intention of setting his house on fire. 56 Yet thirteen 
years later the justices of gaol delivery of Leicester Castle, Thomas de 
Ingleby and John Cavendish, showed indecision as to treatment of the 
defendant in Neel's Case: 
Reginald W alshman ... came at night around midnight to the house of 
John Neel and called to John who lay there asleep in his bed to let him 
come in; he wanted to slay John in John's house; and John refused him 
entrance, so that Reginald began to break the doors and windows and 
he said he would burn the house and John's wife and everything within 
the house unless John permitted him to enter. And he intended to burn 
the house, and John for fear of his death and the burning and for 
salvation of his life and family got out of bed and went to the door; and 
Reginald was there with a rock which he threw at John's head, and 
John ducked and Reginald stood there with a knife drawn in order to 
53. Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, "Carone," pl. 305 (1330). 
54. Livre des Assises, 22 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1349). See Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, 
"Carone," pl. 261 (1349); Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1353). 
55. JUST 31139, m.29d/4 (1357). 
56. Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1353). See Robert Brooke, La Graunde 
Abridgement (London, 1576), "Carone," pl. 100; Fitzherbert, Graunde Abridgement, 
"Carone," pl. 192 (1353). 
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kill John and attacked him wanting to kill him, and John being naked 
and believing that Reginald intended to burn his house and that 
Reginald wanted to kill him, in saving his own life, stabbed Reginald 
with a knife wherein Reginald was slain. And the jury say that John 
could not otherwise have saved his own life. 57 
Neel was released in surety pending a gaol delivery seven months later, 
when he was acquitted. The court had evidently first considered requiring 
Neel to obtain a pardon, and it appears likely that the element of 
self-defense was crucial to the judgment of acquittal. 
Because the natural inclination of the jury was to embellish instances of 
defense of property with details of defense of one's person, few cases 
presented the courts with the critical test of pure defense of property. And 
those cases that did come forward may have been perceived as ordinary 
homicides with some embellishments concerning defense of home and 
hearth. The mingling of defense of property with defense of person may 
have resulted in judicial caution toward allegations of the former, and it 
may have slowed the expansion of the category of justifiable homicide to 
include defense of property. Nevertheless, that the court in the end 
granted an acquittal in Nee!' s Case suggests that, whether or not 
self-defense remained a necessary element, this expansion had been 
accomplished. Moreover, by the last third of the fourteenth century 
slayers of nocturnal housebreakers ho longer appear among those par-
doned for homicide se defendendo, though earlier such cases had been 
abundant.58 
Thorpe's 1349 ruling had pertained not only to housebreaking but also 
to attempted robbery. 59 This position, or something very close to it, was 
adopted by the whole court when Thorpe put the following case four 
years later: "A man was indicted for homicide; it was found that the 
deceased was a thief who assailed the defendant and pursued him closely 
so that the defendant slew him .... [All] say that he will go quit. " 60 Here, 
too, it appears that some element of self-defense remained crucial to the 
finding of justifiable homicide. The effect of this ruling is more difficult to 
ascertain from the rolls than is the effect of the ruling concerning the 
slaying of burglars. Again, the records of acquittals provide very few 
details about the cases. Moreover, the absence of victims of attempted 
robbery among those pardoned for self-defense is not helpful here. An 
attack in the open had always been described as an assault with intent to 
57. JUST 3.142, m.l7d/l (1366). 
58. See above, n. 51. 
59. See above, n. 54 and accompanying text. 
60. Livre des Assises, 26 Edw. 3, pl. 32 (1353). 
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slay, since this was a necessary allegation in self-defense. Other motives, 
such as robbery, had rarely been mentioned. 
This part of Thorpe's ruling was nevertheless of considerable signifi-
cance because, at least in theory, it broadened the scope of justifiable 
homicide to include slaying to prevent felony. The new rule concerning 
the slayers of housebreakers was perhaps less novel; the wrongdoer had 
already committed the ancient but nonfelonious breach of the peace 
known as hamsocn.6t 
The extension of justifiable homicide to include slayers of would-be 
burglars and robbers was very possibly a response to what was thought to 
be-and may in fact have been-an unprecedented contemporary rise in 
professional crime. Thorpe's ruling was not expanded, however, to 
include slayers of criminals who assaulted with intent to kill rather than to 
rob, not even to include slayers of would-be "murderers," as those who 
committed homicide through stealth were coming once again to be 
known. The failure to treat the slaying of a would-be murderer as 
justifiable homicide is particularly puzzling since by the end of the 
fourteenth century murderous assault was considered especially heinous. 
This is shown, as we have seen, by the 1390 statute greatly restricting the 
grant of pardons "of grace" to perpetrators of stealthy homicide. 
The courts may have drawn this line between professional robbers and 
stealthy killers because the former were considered to be a threat to the 
entire community, while the latter were deemed a threat only to their 
intended victims. But it seems more likely that the judges were respond-
ing to the juries' practice of finding self-defense in many less serious, yet 
felonious and undesirable homicides. The bench must have realized that 
many homicides described as se defendendo had in fact been committed 
in the course of drunken brawls and similar rows. Against these, too, the 
law had to provide deterrence, and the procedure of pardon and forfei-
ture, which was a quasi-sanction, may have seemed an appropriate 
deterrent. The true self-defender, however, especially the one who had 
repulsed a murderous assault, might have deserved better; moreover, in 
his case even the logic of deterrence mandated acquittal. But how were 
the judges to identify the true self-defender? Jury testimony and the 
defendant's own story were so formulistic that discrimination among 
alleged self-defenders was an impossible task. Evidence as to the exact 
nature of the victim's alleged assault would have been difficult to obtain, 
61. Bracton defines "hamsocn" as "the entering of a house in breach of the peace." 
Bracton, De Legibus, 2:408 (fol. 144b). See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 
2:454-58. In two early thirteenth-century cases [F. W. Maitland, trans. and ed., Select Pleas 
Of The Crown (London, 1888), pl. 60, 86],. "hamsocn" (or "hamsoken") was complicated 
by theft. 
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as would have been the truth regarding the defendant's efforts to escape 
without dealing a mortal blow. 
The theory of royal mercy that underlay the granting of pardons may 
also have had something to do with the retention of pardons in self-
defense cases. Although by the fourteenth century pardons for self-
defense and accidental homicide were granted de cursu, the vestiges of 
the earlier idea of special consideration survived at least in the formulae 
that were inscribed on charters of pardon.62 Nevertheless, pardons for 
excusable homicide were retained as a matter of policy as well as of 
tradition. For, as we shall now see, while self-defenders required pardons 
in virtually every case, those who slew by accident did not. "Mercy" was 
required, it seems, only where suspicion of wrongdoing remained. 
3 
Throughout the thirteenth century the prevailing rule in cases of 
accidental homicide was that the slayer was required to obtain a royal 
pardon. The pardon issued as a matter of course upon a finding of 
unintentional homicide (misadventure). Even grossly negligent slayers 
were included within this class of excusable homicide.63 By the late 
fourteenth century, however, the courts frequently granted an immediate 
acquittal for accidental homicide, no longer insisting that the slayer forfeit 
his chattels and secure a royal pardon. Though there is no clear evidence 
as to when and how the new policy was formulated, its widespread 
application is clear from the rolls.64 
62. See e.g. C 66/230, m.21 ("Moved by mercy, we have pardoned .. . "("Nos pietate 
moti perdonavimus ... ")]. The pardon still carried the proviso that the defendant "stand to 
right" ("ita tamen quod stet recto in curia nostra") should the kin of the slain wish to bring 
an appeal (literally, "should anyone wish to speak against him"). By the late thirteenth 
century, if not long before, the kin's right to appeal a pardoned slayer had lapsed. It is 
unlikely that it remained even in theory, though the form of the pardon was unchanged. 
Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 419-20, n. 22. Nevertheless, it is still barely 
possible that this ancient claim to private compensation against an excusable slayer 
accounted in part for the retention of the pardon requirement. One would still have to 
explain why a pardon was required rather than acquittal with an obligation to stand to right. 
The rule of automatic forfeiture suggests that pardoned slayers were disadvantaged for 
reasons other than the kin's right to appeal. Moreover, the expansion of the class of 
justifiable homicide was accomplished without concern for the rights of the deceased's kin. 
It led to acquittal of some who formerly required a pardon for self-defense. As we shall see, 
judicial policy changed with regard to accidental homicide with the same potential effect on 
the theoretical right of the kin to bring an appeal. 
63. See generally Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 98-108. 
64. But see Year Book (Edward III), Hi!., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 44 (1371); Fitzherbert, Graunde 
Abridgement, "Carone," pl. 94 (1371) (judicial statements that acquittal is appropriate in 
accidental homicide cases). For a discussion of an unsuccessful attempt during the reign of 
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The majority of all homicide defendants delivered before the justices 
were acquitted outright. In most of these cases the clerk recorded on the 
trial roll only the homicide for which the defendant had been indicted, the 
date and place of the act, the jury's verdict of "not guilty" ("non est 
culpabilis"), and the court's judgment of acquittal. The evidence does not 
permit us even to estimate how many such cases were acquittals on 
verdicts amounting to misadventure. Occasionally, however, the clerk 
did record the facts of the case in more detail, and from this small body 
of hard evidence it is possible to discern a new departure in the courts' 
handling of accidental homicide. Judges now acquitted many defendants 
who had received a jury verdict of accidental homicide. There is ad-
ditional support for this conclusion: late-fourteenth-century trial rolls 
contain few pardons for misadventures,65 and coroners frequently ne-
glected to record an indictment where the inquest jury found mis-
adventure, as though they believed that the courts were not concerned 
with such cases.66 
The gradual disappearance in the fourteenth century of the pardon 
requirement for accidental homicide may have been the natural outgrowth 
of an older distinction between homicides resulting from the slayer's act 
alone and homicides produced by intervening circumstances over which 
the slayer had no control. Thirteenth-century courts had already more or 
less systematically acquitted in some accidental homicide cases, for 
instance those involving .carts and ploughs.67 From one perspective, 
acquittals in these cases may be taken as a "rough-and-ready" approach 
to the problem of negligence. More often than not the victim, rather than 
the driver, had failed to use care.6s In shooting accidents and other cases 
where the slayer was more likely to have been the negligent party, the 
pardon requirement was maintained. A second plausible explanation of 
the early resort to acquittals in driving cases is that, by and large, the 
slaying could be attributed to a nonhuman agent. The cart, plough, 
horses, or oxen, rather than the driver, might be perceived as the 
Edward I (1272-1307) to reform the law in this direction, see Hurnard, King's Pardon for 
Homicide, p. 279. 
65. E.g., the four rolls discussed in Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," p. 430, 
dating from the period 1351-85, contain many cases of self-defense but none ending in the 
defendant's remand to prison to await a pardon for accidental homicide. 
66. See below, n. 96. 
67. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 101-4. 
68. Ibid., p. 102. See, however, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston, 
1978), p. 359. Fletcher stresses "the important conceptual distinction between acquittal for 
no homicide and a judgment or pardon for an excused homicide." I agree that this was an 
important distinction, but I believe that in some cases the facts supporting a conclusion of 
"no homicide" were false and that the bench therefore sometimes required a pardon. See 
below, text at nn. 91-95. 
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responsible agent. There is an evident confusion between an embryonic 
concept of fault and the ancient theory governing homicide committed by 
a nonhuman agent, for which payment of a "deodand" was required. 69 
The courts' stress on the driver's absence of intent, rather than upon his 
lack of negligence, is therefore revealing. Frequently, when a court had 
determined that the driver had not "intended" to strike the victim, it 
concluded that his horse or cart was to blame. The horse might as well 
have been riderless or the cart empty, for the courts treated such a case 
as no different from that of a death caused by a tree that had been blown 
down in a windstorm. 10 
Most of the late-fourteenth-century accidental homicide cases in which 
the defendant was acquitted involved situations where it was perceived 
that either the slain person himself or an intervening object had been the 
real cause of death. In this sense, these cases represented a logical 
extension of the earlier pattern of acquittals for accidental homicide. 
Archery accidents were among the most common causes of 
unintentional slaying throughout the Middle Ages.71 Target shooting, a 
favorite sport, continued to take its toll despite attempts to require strict 
safeguards.72 Arrows went off course in several recorded instances, one, 
e.g., after striking a tree branch73 and another after glancing off the 
ground.74 The defendant in each of these cases was acquitted, though in 
the second only after the court took the matter under advisement.75 Of the 
shooting-accident cases, these two are the closest in nature to the 
thirteenth-century acquittals. The defendant had set in motion the agent 
of death, but circumstances perceived to be beyond his control had 
69. The deodand (literally, "to be given to God," but in fact given to the Crown) 
represented the value of the agent that caused the death. See Hunnisett, Medieval Coroner, 
pp. 32-34; Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:473-74. 
70. See e.g. G. Fowler, trans., "Roll of the Justices in Eyre at Bedford, 1227," in The 
Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society (hereafter cited as Bedford 
Eyre), vol. 3 (Aspley Guise, 1916), p. 153 (cart); JUST 1/280, m.l8d (1286) (cart); London 
Coroners' Rolls, Roll A, no. 30 (1301) (horse ran over deceased "against [the rider's] will"). 
71. Green, "Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England," pp. 77-82. 
72. Jurors at a coroner's inquest, JUST 2/207, m.2dll (1397), described an accident 
resulting from the slain man's negligence in the course of an event subject to specific 
regulations at a well-marked area: "[I]t happened that ... William Swayn negligently 
["necligenter"] and in a disorderly way stood beyond the marker within the limits and 
bounds set up for the shooting match so that while William Swayn stood negligently in the 
said manner, William Stonehale shot him with one of his arrows." Cf. JUST 2/59, m.18/3 
(1387), where the defendant had yelled a warning to someone who was crossing the shooting 
area. 
73. JUST 3/167, m.72/1 (1384). 
74. JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391). 
75. In this case, the court also ordered forfeiture of chattels . .JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391). 
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determined the outcome; on the other hand, in no way could it be said that 
the deceased had been responsible for his demise. 76 
Cases in which the deceased was said to have been at fault were not 
uncommon,77 however, and in the late fourteenth century they began to 
play a significant role. A few shooting cases suggest that the deceased's 
behavior-contributory negligence, as it were-had become a matter of 
great concern. Indeed, it is in the context of the victim's action in these 
cases that the term negligence first gained prominence on the medieval 
criminal trial rolls. Only on the rarest occasion was that term associated 
with the slayer; his negligence was almost never at issue.7s To the modern 
mind, it might seem strange that the law was more lenient toward those 
who had used lethal weapons in a negligent or even reckless manner79 
than toward those who had retaliated against murderous assaults.so But 
the paradox is easily explained. The court looked solely to the slayer's 
intent, and slaying without malice was not felonious. Thus, if it could be 
shown that the deceased had caused his own death in a manner the slayer 
could not have predicted, there was a strong presumption ofnonmalicious 
76. For an early example of acquittal in a shooting case, see JUST 1/1060, m.13d (1279), 
and the discussion in Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 279. 
77. See above, text at n. 68. 
78. In a 1416 case, JUST 2/170, m.l/2, a coroner recorded the following: "Geoffrey 
Angulluskey drove a cart ... [and) through his negligence and inebriation the nearside wheel 
of the cart ran across the head of Julia who lay at the foot of the wall of her mother, Lucy, 
without any unusual motion of the cart or horses .... The value of the wheel is twelve 
pence; the said wheel killed Julia ... and Geoffrey fled and he has no goods." The coroner 
assigned the negligence to the driver, the only such case I have found on any of the extant 
coroners' rolls, but he then treated the death as a misadventure due to other than a human 
agent. He blamed the death on the wheel, and assessed its value for purposes of the 
deodand. See above, n. 69. Geoffrey's goods were assessed presumably because he fled 
rather than remained and gave evidence. The coroner was subsequently amerced; an assize 
clerk later added: "The coroner is at fault for failing to mention who ought to respond." 
Most likely the assize clerk, like the coroner, treated the case as a misadventure due to other 
than a human agent, and the amercement was for failure to note who ought to respond for 
payment of the deodand. It is possible, although I believe very unlikely, that the clerk, 
noting the coroner's reference to the driver's "negligence," believed an indictment was 
merited and was assessing the coroner for failure to frame one. 
79. See e.g. C 145/11/30 (1261) (defendant threw a knife at a cat but hit and killed his wife 
instead); C 145/85/18 (1320) (defendant threw a knife at a wall but hit and killed his wife 
instead). 
80. Maitland remarks: "That a man who kills another in self-defence should require a 
pardon will seem to us even more monstrous than that pardons should be needed where 
there has been misadventure, for the 'misadventure' of this age covers many a blameworthy 
act.'' Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2:483. In my view, however, the formal 
rules of self-defense took account of the fact that jury verdicts of self-defense concealed 
many blameworthy acts. While this does not account for the leniency toward negligence, it 
does help explain the relative severity of the self-defense rules. 
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homicide. It was to that end that the allegations in shooting cases leading 
to acquittals recited that the deceased had gotten in the way and been 
slain "by his own fault" ("in defectu suo proprio"),81 or that the deceased 
had run into the target area through his own foolishness or negligence. 82 
The allegation that the deceased had been foolish, reckless, or at fault 
runs through the largest and, for legal theory, the most important class of 
cases identifiable as resulting in acquittal for misadventure. These are 
cases in which the defendant had the weapon causing death more or less 
under his control, but the deceased, it was said, ran or fell upon it. What 
came to be of critical importance were the attendant circumstances. 
Acquittals were gained easily in homicides caused by accidental contact 
with sheathed knives in games of football and wrestling. 83 More problem-
atic were cases that fell between self-defense and accident, in which the 
deceased allegedly launched a deadly attack upon the defendant only to 
die "through his own fault," unintentionally plunging upon his intended 
victim's weapon.84 In essence, these were cases in which self-defense had 
been transformed into accidental homicide. 
Accidental death in the course of deadly assault, which appears 
occasionally on the early trial rolls,s5 became very common in the late 
fourteenth century.86 By then, of course, a great deal more was at stake 
and much depended upon the characterization of the defendant's act. 
According to the policy initiated in the 1340s, the excusable slayer not 
only was required to obtain a pardon but lost his chattels whether or not 
he had fled. 87 By the later fourteenth century, however, if the excusable 
81. See e.g. JUST 3/180, m.24d/8 (1393). 
82. See e.g. JUST 2/207, m.2d/l (1397). But see JUST 3/185, m.8d/3 (1398), where similar 
allegations as to the deceased's behavior led to defendant's remand and pardon. 
83. See e.g. JUST 1/1194, m.l/1 (1272) (f~otball); C 145/38/20 (1280) (football); JUST 
3/167, m.30/l (1381) (football); Bedford Eyre, p. 1 (wrestling). Cf. C 144/27/31 (1287) 
(dancing). 
84. Compare JUST 3/176, m.6/2 (1390); JUST 3/181, m.7d/l (1390); JUST 3/179, m.6/2 
(1391); JUST 3/183, m.2/l (1395); JUST 3/179, m.49/l (1397); JUST 3/205, m.lld/7 (1427) 
(cases ending in acquittals); with JUST 3/179, m.31 (1387); JUST 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393); 
JUST 3/179, m.38d/3 (1394); JUST 3/180, m.46d/3 (1395); JUST 3/180, m.14/8 (1397) 
(defendants ordered to obtain pardons). 
85. See e.g. C 260/2, no. 47 (1280); C 144/31/12 (1292); C 260/20, no. 16 (1309). See also 
Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 95-96. 
86. See above, n. 84 and cases cited therein. 
87. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 147. See generally Pollock and 
Maitland, History of English Law, 2:481. It is not possible to determine the exact moment 
this new policy came into being. The first Year Book reference to a general rule of forfeiture 
is Year Book (Edward Ill), Hi!., 21 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1347). See also Year Book (Edward III), 
Mich., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1370); Year Book (Henry IV), Easter, 2 Hen. 4, pl. 6 (1400). 
Examination of the gaol delivery rolls yields very uncertain information. Clerks did not 
always record forfeitures, and, even before 1340, they often failed to note flight. Recording 
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slaying were accidental, the slayer stood an excellent chance of acquittal 
and retention of goods. 88 The court therefore was careful in these cases to 
determine-or at least to elicit a sworn assertion-that the defendant had 
drawn the knife or sword solely for the purpose of self-defense, that he 
had held it steady as a bar to further assault, and that the deceased had of 
his own motion plunged onto the defendant's weapon. The defendant, it 
was sometimes said, had not supplied any motion or force at all.89 The 
tenor and form of the testimony bears a greater resemblance to that 
produced in the late-fourteenth-century shooting accidents than to that 
set forth in the thirteenth-century cases of deaths suffered by negligent 
assailants.9o 
Even with explicit, sworn statements from the jurors, the bench 
appears to have been cautious with allegations of death resulting from 
negligent assault. The acquittal rate when the jury brought back a finding 
of this kind seems to have lagged behind that for misadventures sur-
rounded by other less suspicious circumstances.91 Indeed, the fact that 
very few of these latter cases, such as deaths resulting from target 
shooting, appear on the rolls suggests that they led automatically to 
acquittal with relatively little testing of the evidence. 
flight was unnecessary before forfeiture became general: where forfeiture was indicated 
there must have been flight. Afterward, since flight was no longer a prerequisite for seizure 
of goods, it W<'S an equally purposeless point for the busy clerks to make. Hence, neither the 
failure to indicate forfeiture nor the indication of forfeiture without mention of flight 
necessarily indicates whether the automatic forfeiture rule was in effect. For gaol delivery 
rolls evidencing the haphazard application of the new rule, see JUST 3/129 (1336-46); JUST 
3/131 (1337-55); JUST 3/134 (1341-51), passim. See below, n. 105 and accompanying text. 
88. But see JUST 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391), where the defendant was acquitted but forfeited 
his chattels. 
89. See e.g. JUST 3/137A, m.8/4 (135i) (after the deceased had struck the defendant and 
gravely wounded him, he ran after the defendant, who held a pitchfork between himself and 
his attacker; the deceased then "stupidly ran upon the pitchfork"); JUST 3/176, m.6/2 (1390) 
[the deceased had thrown the defendant into a ditch and had fallen accidentally on the 
latter's knife; the court asked whether the defendant had, out of any malice, held his knife 
upward toward the deceased ("ex aliqua malicia sursum potuit cultellum suum 
versus .. . ")];JUST 3/179, m.6d/2 (1391); JUST 2/60, m.13/2 (1394) (the defendant held a 
sword between himself and his assailant without moving it); JUST 3/179, m.3/l (1389) (the 
jurors stated that the defendant had not moved his weapon but held it still; he nevertheless 
had to obtain a pardon for self-defense). 
90. See above, n. 85. 
91. Cf. cases cited above inn. 84 with cases cited above inn. 83. It is interesting to note 
that Thomas Cauteshangre, one of the coroners who responded to the new judicial policy of 
acquitting in accidental homicide cases by not framing indictments in many such cases, did 
continue to frame indictments in cases where the deceased was said to have run against a 
knife held up in self-defense. See e.g. JUST 2/155, m.9/3 (1382); JUST 2/155, m.10/3 (1383); 
JUST 2/155, m.ll/5 (1385); JUST 2/155, m.16/l (1389); JUST 2/155, m.2l/3 (1392). 
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The more frequent enrollment of details in cases where "accidents" 
stemmed from fights suggests that the courts had some difficulty in 
determining liability in such cases. Perhaps the judges suspected that 
jurors had now found a convenient way to obtain acquittals for those who 
had perpetrated simple homicide: rather than portray them as self-
defenders who struck the fatal blow, jurors could go one step further and 
turn them either into "accidental" slayers on whose weapons murderous 
assailants had, through their own fault, flung their bodies or into 
"nonslayers," the deceased having "slain himself. "92 Evidence of the 
bench's suspicion regarding such verdicts can be gleaned from the fact 
that many of these defendants who were not acquitted, but who were 
instead required to obtain a pardon, were pardoned for self-defense rather 
than for accident.93 Judicial caution in the face of the new formula is 
understandable, yet at times appears extreme. One court, e.g., went so 
far as to discuss whether a pardon was required for a defendant who 
allegedly ran from his assailant and was spared when the latter slipped 
and fell upon his own knife.94 Perhaps the cases involving assailants said 
to have fallen upon their own weapons had multiplied beyond all belief.95 
92. For cases in which the formula "the defendant slew himself" ("se ipsum interfecit") 
appears, see e.g. JUST 3/179, m.4d/2 (1390); JUST 3/179, m.6/2 (1391). In a yearbook case 
[Year Book (Edward III), Mich., 44 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1371)], Knivet, J., stated that had the 
defendant slain in self-defense, pardon and forfeiture would have been required; here they 
were not required because the deceased, in attacking the defendant, had fallen upon the 
defendant's knife and had thereby killed himself. 
A sixteenth-century treatise groups this genre of case with suicide ("felo de se"). William 
Staunford, Pleas of the Crown (London, 1557), p. 20 (1557). At another point, however, 
Staunford treats such cases as though they turned upon the question whether the defendant 
had any recourse other than to draw his knife. Ibid., p. 16a. The implication is that such 
homicides were perceived as accidents for which no blame attached to the defendant rather 
than as true suicides. Staunford distinguishes two fourteenth-century cases in an effort to 
explain why one required pardon and forfeiture while the other did not. A defendant who 
had held his knife in his hand as he lay on the ground had been acquitted while a defendant 
who had remained on his feet and held a pitchfork against his assailant's charge was 
pardoned. In both cases the deceased had plunged onto the weapon, but in the latter, 
Staunford asserts, the defendant had other means of escape. While fourteenth-century 
courts did not in fact adhere consistently to a distinction between defendants lying upon the 
ground and those on their feet, it is possible that in an attempt to weigh the credibility of the 
jury's testimony, the bench found the former cases more persuasive than the latter. It is also 
possible that the former cases more often led to acquittals because they were easier to 
assimilate to accidental homicides where parties engaged in sporting events had fallen upon 
one another. 
93. See e.g. JUST 3/179, m.3/l (1389); JUST 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393). 
94. JUST 3/182, m.l8/6 (1395). The defendant was eventually acquitted. 
95. See e.g. JUST 3/179, m.27/2 (1388); JUST 3/179, m.27/3 (1388); JUST 3/179, m.4d/2 
(1390). 
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This convergence of the self-defense and accident formulae came at a 
moment when the law of misadventure was in ftux96 and the complaints 
about professional crime were intense. The convergence offered an 
opportunity for carving out a species of justifiable self-defense leading to 
acquittal: only those who truly repulsed murderers would fit within the 
class; less worthy "self-defenders" would continue to move through the 
pardoning process, suffering forfeiture of goods and chattels. But the new 
category was based upon a fiction of accidental homicide that itself 
depended upon a tenuous distinction. It is impossible to determine how 
well it worked in relieving true self-defenders of the strictures of the law 
of excusable homicide, or even how long it persisted. The fifteenth-
. century rolls are too incomplete for us to judge. 
It appears that within two centuries of its inception this trend toward 
acquittals in cases of misadventure was reversed. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the rolls once again reflect a need for pardons in 
cases of accidental homicide. It is possible that one of the underlying 
reasons for judicial insistence upon pardons in misadventure was the 
invention and widespread distribution of firearms.97 Whether the courts 
were seeking to deter negligence or to punish suspected malice is 
impossible to determine, but it appears that they returned to pre-
fourteenth-century practice and refused to acquit defendants, whether or 
not the jury stated that the deceased had "slain himself." 
4 
The foregoing study of the late medieval law of nonfelonious homicide 
has centered on the effects of jury behavior on the development of the 
96. The new judicial approach to accidental homicide also caused some coroners to be in 
doubt as to whether indictment was appropriate in cases of accidental homicide. The nature 
and extent of the confusion, however, are difficult to trace. When a human agent was 
involved, the coroner was supposed to record the suspect's name, the value of his goods, 
and, if he had not taken flight, in whose custody the suspect had been placed. Unfortunately, 
the extant coroners' rolls reveal very sloppy recording of the essential details so that it is 
often difficult to determine whether or not the coroner recorded an indictment. Failure to 
assess the suspect's goods and to note his present whereabouts does not necessarily mean 
there was no indictment. Each individual enrollment must be interpreted in the light of the 
entire roll. Some coroners marginated "felonia" beside their indictments, and omission of 
"felonia" only in cases of misadventure almost certainly indicates failure to indict. Failure 
to assess goods only in misadventures indicates that no human agent was being held 
responsible. On the basis of a thorough study of the extant rolls dating from 1350 to 1422, 
it is clear that treatment of misadventures was highly erratic, depending only in part on who 
was coroner; some coroners followed contradictory policies in identical cases. For a review 
of the extant evidence on this matter see Green, "Jury and the Law of Homicide," pp. 
450-51, n. 149. 
97. Ibid., p. 495, n. 299. 
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substantive law. I have suggested that jury behavior in cases of simple 
homicide to some extent stifled legal development. Specifically, I have 
suggested that had there been a free flow of fact situations, judicial 
discussion of "close cases" might have resulted in the elaboration of the 
rules of self-defense and felony, singling out true self-defenders for better 
treatment (acquittal without forfeiture) and producing a class of felonious 
but noncapital homicide. But lacking direct evidence, it is difficult to 
prove that judges were in fact influenced by jury behavior. It is always 
possible, for instance, that judges were mechanically applying the rules of 
self-defense and that they would have continued to do so even if juries 
had acted in accordance with the formal rules of liability for homicide. 
While there can be no empirical evidence about how courts would have 
structured the law had juries behaved differently, there are developments 
in the law of nonfelonious homicide that suggest some legal fluidity and a 
judicial capacity-perhaps after consultation with the Crown-to modify 
the traditional common-law rules. The courts singled out slayers of 
burglars and thieves as justifiable slayers, thus eliminating for them the 
requirements of pardon and forfeiture. And the courts developed the 
theory by which some accidental slayers were acquitted on the ground 
that they were not true slayers but merely instruments by which the 
victims, through negligence, caused their own deaths. 
However, in related areas the courts demonstrated considerable 
reluctance to modify the substantive rules. The slaying of a would-be 
murderer was not included within the class of justifiable homicide, 
and, although acquittals were freely allowed in accidents resulting from 
target shooting, courts were cautious in acquitting for accidental homi-
cides stemming from fights. The pattern of relative nondevelopment in 
areas where the courts were faced with facts that might suggest the 
appropriateness of acquittal is as important as the pattern of fluidity and 
growth. On the one hand, the law remained static just where one 
might expect it to: where the defendant had been involved in a fight 
for which he might have been at least in part responsible. On the other 
hand, the defendant in some of these cases was under unprovoked and 
deadly attack. He was resisting behavior that the law sought specifically 
to deter in much the same way as were those who slew robbers and 
burglars. Yet only the latter were deemed worthy of acquittal. One is 
driven to ask why self-defense, especially in cases of defense against 
murderous assault, resulted in the application of the full rigor of the law 
of excusable homicide. The answer, at least for the fourteenth century, 
cannot lie solely in the mechanical nature of judicial application of the 
law. By then some self-defenders and some perpetrators of accidental 
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homicide were being acquitted; others were not.9s 
A second possible explanation for the courts' behavior might have been 
the Crown's need for additional revenue. As long as true self-defenders 
required pardons, they suffered forfeiture as well. But considering their 
likely numbers, acquittal of all true self-defenders would have cost the 
Crown a relatively small sum, and acquittal only of those true self-
defenders who had slain would-be murderers would have involved a still 
smaller cost. 99 If the Crown could afford to acquit many of those who had 
slain accidentally and most of those who had slain robbers and burglars, 
it could have afforded to acquit those who had slain murderers. 
The most plausible explanation for the retention of the strict rules of 
self-defense was the difficulty, given the pattern of jury verdicts, of 
identifying true self-defenders. But if jury findings that the defendant had 
slain an attempted murderer were suspect, why were findings that he had 
slain a burglar or robber not equally open to doubt? Why did the courts 
treat with caution verdicts to the effect that the defendant had slain 
accidentally in the course of a fight (i.e., where the defendant had stood 
motionless and his assailant had hurled himself upon the defendant's 
knife), while apparently giving credence to verdicts of mischance at target 
shootings? 
98. For a recent, useful comment on this problem see Thomas Glyn Watkin, "Hamlet and 
the Law of Homicide," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 100 (1984), pp. 286-87. Watkin, who 
deals with this matter only in passing, suggests that the "mere attacker, who is not a robber, 
has not at the time of his demise yet committed a felony so as to place himself outside the 
law." The "medieval approach was from the standpoint of the victim not the killer." This 
is an important point and may speak to the early development of the law. By the fourteenth 
century its claim on the juristic mind was probably much attenuated. I am not convinced 
that, by that late date, those who prowled the highways waiting to ambush and slay their 
victims were thought of as truly different from those who came to rob someone in his home. 
Moreover, Watkin's suggestion does not seem to explain the difference between the 
treatment of accidental slayers and slayers in self-defense. 
99. It is impossible to determine either the number of true self-defenders or the 
percentage of them who slew would-be murd·~rers. Of the 10 to 40 percent of defendants who 
received verdicts of self-defense, many, perhaps most, had failed to comply with the strict 
letter of the law. Of those who had complied, many had retreated from an attack launched 
by a friend or neighbor after a heated argument and probably only a few from a truly 
murderous assault. In any case, many defendants had no goods; others had goods but 
disposed of them before trial. Moreover, the Crown could not depend on juries to assess the 
full value of the defendant's goods in cases of true self-defense. 
The Crown did stand to gain from forfeiture as it applied to all cases in which juries 
rendered verdicts of self-defense. See Green, "Pardonable Homicide," pp. 189-90. More-
over, since most of those cases were in fact instances of felonious homicide, the rule of 
forfeiture served important deterrent and punitive purposes. See below, text at n. 105. The 
true self-defenders were, of course, victimized by this interaction of jury behavior and 
judicial response (unless juries refused to state that the true self-defenders had goods). 
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The suggestion here is that juries did not-or that judges supposed 
juries did not-engage in total fabrication of the facts but built upon or 
modified some core of reality. To emphasize the defendant's absence of 
malice, juries were not beyond construing common fights as one-sided 
attacks. They assigned to the deceased responsibility for commencing the 
struggle, often alleging that he had harbored a grudge against the 
defendant or had taken him by surprise. Such descriptions may have been 
ritualistic assertions extended by the jury in its desire to promote the 
defendant's case. Similarly, the assertion that the defendant held his knife 
motionless against his attacker's reckless charge stretches the truth but a 
little further than the clearly acceptable assertion that the defendant 
actively fought back by striking one blow as he stood, gravely wounded, 
with his back to the wall. 
But it would have been quite another thing for the jury to invent a 
shooting match or to place the parties in a field where they labored side by 
side with sharp-edged tools that might go astray. Converting slaying 
during a fight into slaying to prevent a burglary may have demanded more 
distortion than the jury was prepared to countenance. After all, in many 
cases the true facts would have been known to many individuals not 
sitting on the jury. Reducing complicated facts to particular forms that did 
"justice" might not have engendered popular disapproval; complete 
transformation of the facts might have. Moreover, although we cannot be 
certain about the nature of medieval trials, it is possible that in many 
cases the defendant told his story first and that the jury repeated, or built 
upon, his statement. 1oo While the defendant doubtless sought to put the 
best possible face upon the basic fact that he had slain in the course of a 
fight, he may out of prudence have stopped short of attempting to achieve 
acquittal through a total invention. 
The fact that the bench countenanced some change within the area of 
nonfelonious homicide, and that rational explanations are available for 
areas in which the court was reluctant to mandate change, does not, 
however, prove the proposition that, other things being equal, the bench 
would have been willing either to modify the outer limits of nonfelonious 
self-defense or to create an intermediate category of non capital felonious 
homicide. Either of those changes would have meant shifting the line 
between life and death rather than between acquittal and pardon. It is at 
least possible that even had juries behaved differently, the legal definition 
of capital homicide would have remained unchanged-that if all perpetra-
tors of felonious homicide had been convicted of that crime, they would 
all have been hanged. 
100. See ibid., p. 433 text at nn. 76-77. 
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Moreover, even if it is assumed arguendo that judicial confrontation of 
close cases might have resulted in the elaboration of the law of felonious 
homicide and self-defense, it must be conceded that such a development 
could have occurred without a body of close cases. Judges must have 
been aware that many homicides resulted from brawls that defendants 
had freely joined and that juries systematically concealed this aspect of 
the defendant's behavior. The judges could have redefined felonious 
homicide to secure justice, to induce different jury behavior, or both. Yet 
they did not do so. Systematic nullification of the formal rules of felonious 
homicide continued for perhaps two centuries or more.J01 Why did the 
Crown not seek to end such nullification by changing the formal rules? To 
answer this question we must consider once again the development of the 
administration of the criminal law. 
IV 
By way of conclusion to Part I, we should attempt to bring together the 
main themes of these first chapters, to put the problem of the law-finding 
jury in perspective, and to speculate on the role that rule and sanction 
nullification played in the larger world of criminal justice. In doing so, 
however, we must not exaggerate the degree to which any single aspect of 
the administration of the criminal law was shaped by conscious choice. 
The history of the English criminal trial jury has its origins in the 
twelfth-century transformation of the criminal law .102 This transforma-
tion, which represented an evolutionary development about which we 
know very little, involved a shift from a more or less private to a more or 
less public criminal law and a shift from monetary composition between 
private parties to capital punishment at the hands of the Crown. In theory, 
neither development required the use of juries, grand or petty. In 
practice, Henry II, either through improvisation or through elaboration of 
an existing institution, resorted to presentment by a jury oflaymen. It was 
a short step to the employment of the trial or petty jury, though had the 
church not opposed the use of the ordeal, that step might not have been 
taken. The Crown's recourse to the trial jury suggests an acceptance of 
deep-seated social attitudes, an awareness of profound administrative 
weakness, and a sure instinct about how to make things work. It is 
impossible to say how these elements were related causally, if indeed they 
101. There is strong evidence of jury manipulation of facts for the period 1250-1430. The 
rolls for the period 1430-1550 are too sparse for analysis; thereafter, it appears that juries 
infrequently returned verdicts of self-defense. See ibid., p. 493. While there is reason to 
believe the new pattern of jury verdicts began before 1550, the date of the change cannot be 
determined. See below, Chapter 4, text at n. 69. 
102. See above, Chapter l, section I. 
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were distinct. Probably we ought to understand them as different aspects 
of the same relationship between ideas and institutions. 
The juries, both grand and petty, were bound to play a crucial role. 
They made possible the implementation (though only on a selective basis) 
of a royal and capital law of felony precisely because they were of the 
community rather than of officialdom. From the very outset there must 
have been a great deal of discretion in the functioning of presentment 
juries; certainly the trialjury, which reached decisions concerning life and 
death, made broad-based assessments of just deserts. 
Unfortunately we know very little about the administration of the 
criminal law in the pre-trial-jury period. Specifically we do not know 
whether the jury behavior that we can ascertain was anticipated in earlier 
procedures. Until we know a great deal more about the assumptions the 
Crown and royal officials made concerning lay participation, we cannot 
really address the problem of the purpose of the jury. As a result, we can 
only describe how the system of criminal justice functioned and assess 
official response in the period for which we do have evidence, reconciling 
ourselves to the fact that for the most interesting questions we do not yet 
have answers. 
Our primary observation has been that the trial jury mitigated much of 
the harshness of the new system of criminal justice. Given its institutional 
setting and powers, the trialjury was able to impose upon the new, formal 
royal process the traditional attitudes that had predominated in the 
criminal law during its earlier, private phase. This phenomenon is 
traceable in homicide, where one would expect it to occur with greatest 
frequency, but it doubtless affected all areas of crime to greater or lesser 
degree. The substantive law was harsher than social conditions and 
attitudes would allow. Moreover, juries were forced to make decisions 
about individuals partially on the basis of the reputation of those 
individuals in the community. Fact-finding involved an assessment of 
personal worth: Was the suspect the sort of person likely to have 
committed a certain act with malice? And almost inevitably trial jury 
verdicts came to be judgments about who ought to live and who ought to 
die, not merely determinations regarding who did what to whom and with 
what intent. 103 
The official response to jury law-finding is very difficult to reconstruct. 
We have seen that officials were likely to be most concerned with the 
bribing of juries, with extortionate practices, with intimidation by sus-
pects and their associates. Moreover, the attention of officials was drawn 
to the most serious cases. Jury behavior in simple homicide and casual 
103. See Pugh's remarks on this subject in "Reflections of a Medieval Criminologist," p. 
98. 
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theft was to some extent concealed from view. Presentment of the 
innocent and lack of substantial evidence were all too common for judges 
to be certain that a given acquittal was not, strictly speaking, merited by 
the rules of the law. Finally, the bench must have been aware that juries 
were toughest on the worst offenders, that they made distinctions-both 
when they convicted and when they nullified either the rule or the 
sanction in the less serious cases-that corresponded to widely held 
attitudes. 
Jury law-finding, then, was only one aspect of jury deviation from legal 
rules. It reflected disagreement with those rules but not necessarily a 
corruption of legitimate legal process. Although it also reflected the 
Crown's incapacity to achieve enforcement of the law, other aspects of 
jury behavior did so much more dramatically. Moreover, it was an aspect 
of jury behavior that the bench and Crown could accommodate, for it 
could be understood as an appropriate extension of mercy in individual 
cases. 104 
At the same time, jury nullification, particularly in homicide, involved 
some costs, for it slowed development of the law and induced the bench 
to deal too circumspectly with some cases meriting generous treatment. 
The true self-defender suffered most. Those true self-defenders who had 
slain in the course of resisting burglary or robbery were assured of full 
acquittal without the pardon requirement only after the middle of the 
fourteenth century. This seems especially ironic given the bench's 
concern with professional crime. Even in the very late fourteenth 
century, when officialdom was attempting to deal with those who com-
mitted homicide through ambush by removing eligibility for pardons of 
grace, slayers of such offenders still required pardons. Thus jury resist-
ance to the fuH reach of the capital law of felony interfered, albeit 
indirectly, with the judicial attack on the truly pressing problems of the 
criminal law. 
The law of sanctions and the criminal trial jury interacted to produce a 
substantial distortion in the legal process. In the law of homicide, a large 
and mainly false category of self-defense was employed as a catchall for 
less serious forms of homicide. Pretrial incarceration, the strains of 
standing trial, remand to await pardon, and the forfeiture of goods became 
the de facto sanctions for what a later age called "manslaughter." 
Acquittal was probably accorded some true self-defenders, though prob-
ably not most. The Crown maintained the substantive legal rules and the 
institutional structure despite this quite obvious distortion. It did so at the 
104. See ibid., p. 9, for the suggestion that in the late thirteenth century the bench showed 
compassion toward some "imprisoned or fined for appeals which failed," releasing them 
"for their poverty." This "compassion may have infected jurors." 
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risk of increasing difficulties in confronting serious crime. Why, we must 
ask, should this have been so? Why did the Crown not introduce a lesser 
offense corresponding to simple homicide, or casual theft, for which 
imprisonment and/or a fine would be the penalty, thereby singling out the 
worst offenders for capital punishment and the true self-defenders for 
pardon without forfeiture, and removing the aura of suspicion that 
attended slayers in self-defense against thieves and ambushers? 
In one sense, of course, perpetrators of simple homicides who were 
alleged to be self-defenders were fined. At least after 1343, all of them 
were supposed to suffer forfeiture even though they received pardons. 
Indeed, the rule of automatic forfeiture, which penalized the true self-
defenders as well, may have been a belated response to juries' handling of 
simple homicide.tos In another sense, some thieves and some felonious 
105. Maitland ascribes the new rule to royal desire for revenue generally: 
So far as we can see, the homicide who obtained a pardon on the score of 
misadventure or self-defence (unless he had fled on account of his deed), did not in 
Henry Ill.' s time incur that forfeiture of his chattels which was inflicted upon him in 
after days. But very often he had fled, and this, so it seems to us, may have enabled 
our ever needy kings to establish forfeiture as a general accompaniment of the 
"pardon of course." [History of English Law, 2:481]. 
I suspect, but cannot prove, that the bench was influenced by the frequent recourse of juries 
to a verdict of self-defense. The new rule of forfeiture also affected misadventure, but, as we 
have seen, judges began to acquit accidental slayers, except where they suspected 
misadventure verdicts concealed simple homicides. 
There is, howe~er, another explanation, which the bench itself gave as early as 1347. A 
Year Book entry of that year noted that the Statute of Gloucester, Stat. 6 Edw. I, c. 9 (1278), 
authorized a pardon for cases of accident and self-defense but said nothing about saving the 
defendant his goods. Year Book (Edward III) Hi!., 21 Edw. 3, fol. 17, pl. 23 (1347). In fact, 
the Statute of Gloucester dealt with procedures for the granting of writs of inquest into cases 
of homicide. See Hurnard, King's Pardon for Homicide, p. 281; Pollock and Maitland, 
History of English Law, 2:481. It therefore provided no occasion for dealing with the matter 
of forfeiture. 
The same Year Book entry reveals an important misconception of the Statute of 
Marlborough, Stat. 52 Hen. 3, c. 26 (1267). That statute decreed that the murdrum fine (the 
fine imposed upon a hundred for an unexplained homicide) was not to be levied in cases of 
misadventure. The murdrum fine was abolished altogether in 1340, perhaps some decades 
after it had fallen into disuse. The bench in 1347 read the Statute of Marlborough to say that 
misadventure was no longer to be treated as "murder," in the substantive sense of felonious 
homicide. Due to this misreading, the judges concluded that pardons de cursu in accident 
and presumably self-defense cases were of relatively recent vintage (1267), and that the 
procedure in such cases had been developed soon after by the Statute of Gloucester (1278). 
Since neither statute dispensed with the rule of forfeiture, which applied in all cases of 
felonious homicide, the judges' conclusion that forfeiture applied to all of the "new" 
excusable homicides is understandable. For a discussion of these erroneous statutory 
constructions and subsequent commentary upon them, see Pollock and Maitland, History of 
English Law, 2:481-82. 
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slayers could avoid prosecution by paying a ''fine'' -the cost of a pardon 
of grace: money in normal times, forty days of service in time of war. 
Between these two provisions, many thieves and felonious slayers 
suffered a penalty even if they were not prosecuted or, in the case of the 
former, were prosecuted but avoided conviction through securing a verdict 
of self-defense. 
There were advantages to the system as it worked in practice. The 
retention of a general capital sanction in felony meant that many slayers 
and thieves sought a pardon of grace from the Crown. Even those who 
had committed the less serious forms of these offenses may not have 
trusted their lives to juries and, instead, immunized themselves from 
prosecution. They turned themselves in, relieving central and local 
officials of some of the overwhelming burden under which they worked. 
Fewer suspects had to be taken, incarcerated, and tried. The threat of 
execution, in short, automatically acted as a dragnet. 
Moreover, the pardon power gave the Crown considerable control over 
the destiny of many subjects. Recipients of pardons of grace were direct 
beneficiaries of royal largesse. Whether the Crown exacted military 
service or money, or nothing at all, the pardoned offender owed his life to 
the king.J06 This was also true, though in an attenuated form, if the 
offender stood trial. If he was acquitted or was granted a verdict of 
excusable homicide and a pardon de cursu, he stood as the beneficiary 
both of his peers and of the Crown. Of course, the open availability of 
pardons of grace may have increased jury leniency, and judicial toleration 
of jury leniency may have increased the number of offenders who put 
their lives on the country. This, in turn, must have diminished the 
numbers who sought refuge in the Crown. Indeed, as it operated in 
practice, the system probably tended to drive into Chancery seeking 
pardons of grace a disproportionately large number of the most serious 
offenders, i.e., those whom juries were far more likely to convict, and 
tended instead to encourage lesser offenders to stand trial. If so, this 
unintended result must have made enforcement of the statutes limiting the 
royal power to pardon all the more imperative. The advantages of the 
system were intimately connected with its disadvantages. If the pardon 
While the judicial misreadings of earlier statutes are understandable, there remains the 
question of what occasioned judicial inquiry into the problem of forfeiture in excusable 
homicide. Maitland's suggestion regarding the need for revenue and my own related 
suggestion regarding jury behavior in cases that otherwise would clearly have led to 
forfeiture must remain tentative. In any case, my analysis of the effect of the rule once it had 
been propounded does not depend upon my suggestion regarding the motivation of the 
bench in 1347. 
106. For discussion of this theme as it relates to the use of pardons and other forms of 
mitigation in the eighteenth century see below, Chapter 7. 
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power was a source of strength-and certainly it was-it was also 
productive of substantial weakness. 
In any case, casual theft and everyday brawling (with the inevitable 
ensuing deaths) could not be ended altogether by formal legal rules. 
Indeed, from the perspective of the Crown and bench, a moderation of the 
law might only have made matters worse. The adoption of a lesser 
sanction for simple homicide and lesser forms of theft might have seemed 
to condone jury attitudes and thereby resulted in their amplification. Or it 
might have produced more convictions only at the expense of encourag-
ing already endemic physical violence. In short, by adhering at least in 
theory to the strictest rules of criminal liability-by posing what might 
have been thought to be the greatest threat to the greatest number-the 
Crown might well have believed that its approach to homicide and theft 
represented at least a modest deterrent, one that also produced an 
important source of deference, money, and military service. 
On balance, then, it is not surprising that the Crown and bench 
accommodated themselves to jury leniency. Serious offenders were the 
real enemy, and so long as juries were relatively harsh in dealing with 
them the Crown's incapacity to enforce the legal rules against less serious 
offenders was not fatal to the administration of the criminal law. The 
bribing and intimidation of jurors by professional criminals posed a far 
greater threat to the system. Moreover, although jury-based nullification 
in casual theft and simple homicide both slowed the development of 
substantive rules designed to deal with serious offenders and established 
a tradition of community participation that would sometime be difficult to 
control, it also served dramatically to advertise the merciful quality of 
royal justice. 
Part II Transformations 
4 The Transformation of Jury Trial in 
Early Modern England 
The extensive powers of the medieval criminal trialjury resulted not from 
legal theory but from social and institutional circumstances. The jury 
helped the royal administration of criminal law to function, perhaps even 
alleviated tensions that might have brought it to a halt, by exercising its 
mediatory powers in two distinct but related ways. In individual cases, 
juries prevented the imposition of sanctions they deemed too harsh in 
light of the defendant's behavior, reputation, or the hardship he had 
already suffered. More generally, and as the result of its role in individual 
cases, the jury reflected the interests of the local community as opposed 
to those of central authorities. The Crown required the jury to play a role 
the royal bureaucracy was as yet unprepared to undertake-the gathering 
of evidence; this, in turn, enhanced the jury's power to render verdicts 
that both blunted royal power and made what power there was relatively 
palatable. 
The stronger central institutions became, the less they required of 
juries, either as substitute bureaucrats or as political mediators. Indeed, 
the stronger the position of central government, the more it was bound to 
regard the jury as part of the problem rather than as a solution. By the 
Tudor period, jury-based nonenforcement of the rules of law seemed less 
often a political and social necessity and more often an affront to justice. 
The question remained: How far would the government go in its purifica-
tion of the jury? Would an attack on embracery and similar perversions of 
justice suffice, or would the government attempt to remove the jury's 
power to reflect a different notion of justice on the merits of a given case 
than that embodied in formal rules? 
Very little is as yet known about the institution of the trial jury in Tudor 
and Stuart England, about governmental policy toward juries, or about 
the vicissitudes of jury power. Much of what we do know we infer from 
the broader history of criminal law in the period. A virtual revolution was 
under way from the mid-fifteenth century, if not earlier, which had the 
effect of reducing the power of the trial jury and placed greater power in 
the hands of the bench. Although there is uncertainty about the reasons 
for this transformation in the criminal law, the institutional developments 
are unmistakable. The jury ceased during the later Middle Ages to be a 
(mainly) self-informing institution. Although the process by which this 
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occurred and the corollary emergence of the prosecution are largely 
hidden from our view, the later stages of prosecutorial development in the 
second half of the sixteenth century are visible. Crown officials then took 
increasing responsibility for the initiation and prosecution of criminal 
cases and for the management of the trial itself. The effects of these 
changes upon the jury were substantial. For one thing, the government 
sometimes used great art in persuading juries of the defendant's guilt; 
perhaps more significantly, the jury lacked the means to manipulate the 
evidence, to suppress whatever might give the lie to the way it chose to 
view the facts. Moreover, perhaps as a result of these changes, the bench 
brought pressure to bear upon some juries that acquitted in the face of 
inculpatory evidence, binding them over to appear before Star Chamber 
or even fining and imprisoning them directly. 
The government applied the most pressure-took the greatest pains to 
persuade-where its interest was greatest. In a succession of well-known 
state trials, mainly for treason, the Tudor and Stuart monarchs pressed 
their advantage to the fullest. Juries in these cases were probably chosen 
for their presumed loyalty and were discouraged from disappointing royal 
expectations. This is not to say that state trials invariably, or even often, 
ended in the sacrifice of the innocent but that the government tried to 
avoid the acquittal of the guilty through either mismanagement of the 
prosecution or an excess of mercy. 
Yet there is reason to doubt that the state trials accurately reflect 
criminal procedure in the routine felony cases, which the Crown lacked 
both the interest and the capacity to manage. Although in particularly 
serious cases of homicide or theft the bench might take a special interest, 
pressing its view strongly upon the jury, in a far larger number of cases 
the bench actively questioned the defendant and revealed its point of view 
but left the jury to reach its own conclusion. To be sure, the mere fact of 
a prosecution-pretrial examinations available to be read in court, 
witnesses ready to testify for the Crown-must have made some differ-
ence. But in routine cases the jury's traditional role was never expressly 
repudiated. Though usually closely guided by the bench, the jury was 
allowed to weigh all the evidence in light of both the defendant's 
reputation and bearing and its own conception of his just deserts. 
The direct and indirect changes in the administration of the criminal law 
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century produced a pattern of 
verdicts that differed from its medieval counterpart. The new pattern, 
which scholars are only now beginning to sketch out in detail, may 
usefully be summarized at this point. The overall percentage of convic-
tions at assizes was strikingly higher than in the later Middle Ages. This 
was true both in homicide and in theft. The former offense came to be 
divided in the late sixteenth century into murder, which was capital, and 
The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England 107 
manslaughter, which was not unless it was the second such offense. The 
conviction rates were relatively high for both. The crime of theft remained 
divided into burglary and robbery, for which conviction was very 
common, and grand larceny, for which conviction was far less common. 
Many of those indicted for grand larceny were, by virtue of the jury's 
undervaluation of the goods stolen or their own plea of guilty to a lesser 
offense, convicted of petty larceny, which was not capital, just as some of 
those indicted for murder were mercifully convicted of manslaughter. 
Convictions were high in those capital felonies that had long been viewed 
as particularly heinous and in those noncapital offenses that had come to 
serve as catchalls much as self-defense had served in earlier times. This 
series of changes in case outcomes resulted in part from the new divisions 
between capital and noncapital offenses and in part from the pressures 
that officials were able to bring to bear in the wake of changes in the 
administration of criminal law. Still other outcomes reflected age-old 
social attitudes that authorities were either unable or unwilling to resist. 
At some points, there was conflict between judge and jury; at others, 
authorities acquiesced in traditional jury practices, or even encouraged 
those practices. 
The developments of the early modern period, then, mark only a partial 
revolution in criminal process. Moreover, the changes made for little 
difference in most cases, though they made for a dramatic difference in 
cases where the Crown or the bench used the new tools to the fullest. A 
new judge-jury relationship was emerging, but the old habits of thought 
and behavior survived, leaving the implications of the developing law 
obscured. How far the Crown had gone, in at least some cases, toward 
reversing the old, de facto order of things is evident from the attack 
launched on the judiciary during the Interregnum by those proclaiming 
the jury's right to find the law. This attack the Cromwellian regime 
disdainfully brushed aside; neither would the restored Stuart monarchy 
concede such a right to the jury. How well, on the other hand, the 
medieval ethic of the jury's right to find the facts according to its own 
conscience survived is evident in the judiciary's concession in 1671 of the 
principle of noncoercion. The rhetoric of the jury right, the law of 
noncoercion, and their fusion in some legal literature toward the end of 
the seventeenth century are the subjects of the two following chapters of 
this middle section. These chapters analyze the unofficial and official legal 
writings from the years 1640-89 that established the ideology of the jury 
right. 
Before turning to these writers and their discussion of the history and 
role of the trial jury, we shall, in the present chapter, survey the evolution 
of criminal procedure in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
This interpretive and necessarily selective overview is divided into four 
108 Transformations 
sections. The first deals with the major changes in the administration of 
the criminal law and how they came about. The second analyzes some 
effects of the new criminal procedure on the substantive criminal law. The 
third discusses the impact of these procedural and substantive develop-
ments on the trial and on the role of the jury. The final section examines 
the relationship between the problems of the administration of the criminal 
law generally and the bench's handling of individual cases, specifically the 
role that the bench found it convenient for juries to play. I suggest that 
although this period saw a significant shift in courtroom power from the 
jury to the judge, the jury continued in many routine cases to function in 
a manner that provided a credible basis for many of the arguments of later 
pro-jury writers. 
I 
The most important changes in early modern criminal procedure were 
the decline of the self-informing jury and the development of the prosecu-
tion.1 Which of these two developments came first is not known. The link 
between them is a problem of the greatest importance and may provide 
some hint regarding the origin of modern criminal procedure. 
As we have seen, the medieval jury was presumed to know something 
of the events underlying the cases it heard. 2 Doubtless it often knew a 
very great deal-or at least some of its members did. Before the middle of 
the fourteenth century, petty jurors were sometimes among the present-
ers who promoted the case from the start. In the case of homicide, some 
who served on the inquest jury subsequently served on the petty jury or 
spoke of the case to those who did. We have seen also that the discourse 
between the judge and the defendant may have influenced the jury in 
some cases. But the job of the bench was far from easy, for aside from 
what the trial jury reported there was in the formulistic indictments little 
1. I am grateful to Professor James S. Cockburn for allowing me to cite and comment 
upon a typescript version of his forthcoming book, the Introduction to his multi-volume 
edition of Calendar of Assize Records: Home Circuit Indictments, Elizabeth I and James I 
(London, 1975-82). I have incorporated chapter and subsection references to Professor 
Cockburn's forthcoming book (hereafter cited as Cockburn, Introduction) alongside refer-
ences to his earlier works that convey similar information. Where his Introduction modifies 
his earlier work I have so noted. Though it deals only with the Home Circuit, Professor 
Cockburn's detailed study will, upon publication, stand as the most comprehensive account 
of procedure at late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century assizes. My own (largely 
derivative) account of trial procedure, the text of which was completed before I had access 
to Professor Cockburn's Introduction, serves as a framework for my synthetic and 
interpretive essay on the impact of the major procedural changes. My commentary on the 
differences between Professor Cockburn's conclusions and my own is below, n. 179. 
2. For discussion of details in this paragraph see above, Chapter I. 
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evidence about the crimes charged. A clever and steely defendant was not 
easily gotten round. 
By the mid-sixteenth century the situation was very different. There 
were several sources of information to which the jurors were exposed 
after they had been sworn. Much of this information resulted from pretrial 
activity undertaken by the justices of the peace, in accordance with duties 
set forth in the Marian bail and committal statutes.3 The information was 
also available for the use of assize clerks, clerks of the peace, and the 
bench. 4 In two steps, taken in two consecutive years, the traditional but 
intermittent investigatory activities of the justices were regularized and 
significantly elaborated. The Marian statutes mandated practices that for 
a century or more had served to inform grand jurors and that probably 
also established a public version of the facts that came to the attention of 
prospective trial jurors. 
The first step in this process, and possibly the only step that the Crown 
intended at the outset, was the Marian bail statute of 1554, which 
tightened the procedure for the granting of bail. To remedy abuses that 
had frustrated the assize courts in their attempts to try suspected felons, 
the statute ordered that the justices granting bail examine the prisoner and 
"them that bring him" and send the results of the examination, in writing, 
to the judges at the next gaol delivery. 5 The assize courts would then be 
in a position to monitor bail procedure. They would, as Langbein states it, 
3. Stat. 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 13 (1554--55); Stat. 2 and 3 Philip and Mary, c. 10 
(1555). See John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass., 
1974), Appendix A and Part I, "The Marian Statutes"; John H. Langbein, "The Origins of 
Public Prosecution at Common Law," American Journal of Legal History, vol. 17 (1973), 
pp. 315-24. 
4. For an important discussion of the practice regarding use of depositions generated by 
the Marian statutes, see James S. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book? Fact and Theory in the 
Criminal Process, 1558-1625," in J. H. Baker, ed., Legal Records and the Historian 
(London, 1978), pp. 69 et seq. Cockburn argues that most of the "orchestration" at trial was 
done by the assize clerks. Justices were frequently not present; their indictments underwent 
some significant changes. In the present treatment, I assume that witnesses were in fact 
bound over and that some check on them-or prompting of them-was possible through the 
use of the examinations provided by the justices of the peace. See Cockburn, Introduction, 
ch. viii, sect. iii. Cockburn ("Trial by the Book?" p. 69) concedes the role of the justice of 
the peace down to the time of the trial. Orchestration at the trial by the assize clerks and 
bench is fully consistent with the views expressed here. See also Inner Temple Petyt MS 
511113, fol. 69. And see John H. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law," 
in James S. Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, 1550-1800 (Princeton, N.J., 1977), p. 16, for 
a synthesis of the views of Langbein and Cockburn. 
5. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, pp. 10--11; Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," 
pp. 320--21. See also Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, p. 6, for discussion of an earlier (1487) 
attempt to deal with the problem of bailing by justices of the peace. 
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have a basis for reviewing the propriety of the bailment in any case in 
which the accused had turned fugitive and the issue now was whether 
to discipline the bailing JPs. But when the accused was going to be 
gaoled, not bailed, there was no danger that he might not appear to 
stand trial. 6 
In the latter case there was no requirement that the justices of the peace 
make an examination. The bail statute was not concerned with procedure 
at trials of those held without bail-the most serious cases-and had only 
indirect and unintended effect on trials of those who had been bailed. For 
this latter group, the depositions that had been produced to defend the 
bailment might then have been used in court, though there is nothing in 
the statute to suggest that either Crown or Parliament had this in mind. 
The bail statute appears, in short, to have dealt solely with the problem of 
bail. 
Within a year, Parliament passed a second statute, the so-called 
committal statute, dealing with pretrial procedures conducted by the 
justices of the peace. This statute extended the examination and deposi-
tion procedures to cases in which suspects were held without bail. 
Moreover, it ordered the justices to bind over witnesses to appear at trial 
and to give evidence against the accused. The committal statute, it has 
been argued, "turned the pretrial investigation.. into a device for the 
production of prosecution evidence at trial in every case of felony in the 
realm. " 7 The statute ensured the appearance, where it could be had, of a 
private prosecutor. In theory, a private prosecutor was necessary in 
every case; in practice, an official might play the role ofprosecutor.s The 
prosecutor and any other witnesses who had been bound over gave their 
evidence in open court, where they might be prompted by, or examined 
in the light of, their pretrial depositions. Although the written depositions 
were not given under oath and thus were not binding as such, they were 
useful in coordinating and sustaining the case for the prosecution.9 In 
many if not all felony trials, the jury witnessed a rigorous testing of the 
defendant's story. No longer could the defendant tell an elaborate tale and 
then reply to all skeptical queries with mere repetitions of his side of the 
case. The judge was now armed with evidence that he could use to 
challenge the accused's statements. More effectively than in the past, the 
6. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 321. 
7. Idem. 
8. Ibid., pp. 317-18. 
9. For an analysis of the assize clerks' treatment of pretrial evidence see James S. 
Cockburn, "Early-Modem Assize Records as Historical Evidence," Journal of the Society 
of Archivists, vol. 5 (1975), pp. 229-31. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iii. 
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bench could sum up the evidence, comment upon the defendant's story, 
and leave the jury in little doubt regarding its view of the case. 10 
These developments in criminal procedure have the deceptive look and 
feel of carefully planned Tudor governmental machinery. Until recently, 
the Marian statutes were regarded as an imitation of Continental criminal 
process, part of a program to make English criminal procedure more 
efficient and effective. 11 That view is no longer tenable. The procedure 
which the statutes mandated differed crucially from Continental proce-
dure.12 The all-important committal statute appears to have been some-
thing of an afterthought, drafted hastily and with the bail statute as its 
model,B and both the bail and committal statutes may only have made 
mandatory investigatory practices that were already common among the 
justices of the peace. 14 If the examination and binding over of witnesses 
did not begin with the Marian statutes, when and why did they begin? 
Were they nonetheless a tool of Tudor or pre-Tudor statecraft? There is 
as yet no answer to these questions, but we may consider some tentative 
hypotheses. 
The role of the justice of the peace in the prosecution appears to have 
been a natural evolution that took place over a century or more. 15 We 
have seen that the justices were an active part of criminal administration 
from the middle of the fourteenth century .16 Their duties ranged widely, 
from arresting persons suspected of the most trivial offenses and releasing 
them on recognizances for their good behavior, to trying felons at quarter 
sessions, and even to condemning convicted felons to death.J7 From these 
duties grew the justices' capacity as prosecutors. To their duty to arrest 
10. For a contemporary account of a felony trial see Thomas Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum, Mary Dewar, ed. (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 110-16. [The original edition was 
published in 1583; the work was written in the period 1562-65 (ibid., p. 1). I have left 
quotations from Smith in the original, as given by Dewar.] Smith must be used with care; on 
this point, however, his account is probably trustworthy. For a discussion of routine felony 
trials see below, section III. 
11. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 4:528-29. 
12. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, Part I. See esp. pp. 21-33. The central difference was 
that the English deposition was not given under oath and was not an instrument of record. 
13. Ibid., pp. 61-62; Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 322. 
14. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, pp. 79-93. 
15. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," pp. 319-20. Although my account leans 
heavily on Langbein's work, in this and the following several paragraphs I draw conclusions 
(by way of speculation) that Langbein does not draw and for which his work bears no 
responsibility. Professor Robert L. Woods, Jr., is presently completing an important study 
of the early Tudor justices of the peace which promises to expand our knowledge in this area 
substantially. I am grateful to Professor Woods for his comments on this section of this 
chapter. 
16. See above, Chapter 1, text at nn. 84-86. 
17. Putnam, Proceedings before Justices of the Peace, pp. xix-xxxv. 
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persons on susp1c10n was added the power to examine suspects and 
witnesses. 1s From keepers of the peace (with powers of arrest) to justices 
of the peace (with summary powers of conviction in minor offenses) was 
a dramatic step. To dislodge the local constables as law officers was one 
thing; to become a part of the English judiciary was quite another. What 
may have made this step possible was that the keepers' powers to hold or 
release suspected persons were so great that they inevitably involved 
investigation and judgment. The distinction between release on bond and 
release after summary conviction and payment of fine must at some point 
have become negligible, for the bond itself might be set in accordance 
with the quantum of evidence produced against the suspect and the 
seriousness of the act with which he had been charged. 19 
It was natural for the justices to examine suspects in cases in which 
they were bound to render judgment, whether technically a legal "judg-
ment" or something closer to an administrative decision. It was also 
natural for them to examine in cases on which they or some other, higher 
judge would sit pursuant to a grand jury's accusation. Thus, having grown 
accustomed to examining those accused of disturbances of the peace, the 
justices may have treated in similar fashion those suspected of treason, 
theft, or homicide, whom they were to bind over pending the action of a 
grand jury. It is possible that such investigatory action was commenced 
primarily in order to secure an indictment rather than to gather evidence 
for the trial itself. Inevitably, information that led to an indictment would 
subsequently be held over for use at trial. Thus, during two centuries of 
English criminal administration largely hidden from our view there were 
three critical, and probably connected, developments: the justices of the 
peace began to investigate, perhaps even to act as prosecutors; the grand 
jury underwent its metamorphosis from active presenter to passive 
indictor; and the trial jury began to receive most of its evidence at the trial 
itself. 
All of these developments represented a kind of internal institutional 
growth, but at least indirectly they were also responses to external 
pressures. The expansion ofthe duties of the justices of the peace was, as 
we have seen,20 a governmental response to social and economic prob-
lems of the later Middle Ages. Some of those duties, including the power 
to examine, were fashioned specifically to deal with the criminal activity 
that such problems produced. In this sense, the transformation of the 
18. Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," p. 319. 
19. See Harding, "The Origin and Early History of the Keeper of the Peace," pp. 102-9, 
for a fuller discussion. Harding stresses the keepers' role in receiving, and ultimately 
judging, complaints of trespass. 
20. See above, Chapter 1, section III. 
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criminal process was partly the result of governmental action. It is 
difficult to show, however, that in other than this sense the justice of the 
peace as prosecutor was a creature of governmental conception or 
mandate. 
The social changes that created the need for the justices may also have 
helped to shape their specific responsibilities. Both the jury of present-
ment and the self-informing trial jury were by-products of the society 
whose decline the justices were supposed to halt. Those institutions 
presumed a stationary population; their capacities might be outstripped 
by more than modest levels of crime. The increase of serious crime, 
especially that perpetrated by roving gangs or by persons from afar, must 
have revealed the limitations of the two juries ;21 the at least partial default 
of these essentially local institutions left the population without the 
protection it required. A vacuum from "below" drew the justices in at the 
same time that the need to produce indicted and convictable persons 
before commissioners of oyer and terminer constituted pressures from 
"above." Moreover, the pressures from below were more direct and 
suggested the very nature of the remedy: the justices must see to it that 
juries were informed. 
The origins of early modern trial practice are therefore more ancient 
and more complex than the most visible agents of change, the Marian bail 
and committal statutes, suggest. Nevertheless, the Tudors knew a useful 
institution when they saw one, and they were responsible for the 
crystallization of prosecutorial practice. For the transformation of trial 
procedure paralleled-perhaps touched-several interrelated develop-
ments that are commonly associated with early Tudor government. 
Although these developments do not explain the emergence of the 
prosecution, or provide evidence of its pre-Marian stages, they help us to 
understand the nature of the terrain in which the justices came to function 
as quasi-prosecutors. 
The early Tudors sought to ensure the stability of their monarchy 
through making existing institutions work as they were in theory sup-
posed to work. They employed the Council and the court of Star Chamber 
to monitor the actions of royal officials and to root out the abuse of official 
institutions.22 Tudor efforts to purify jury process follow this pattern.23 By 
subjecting to investigation and judgment not only persons believed to 
have tampered with jurors but jurors themselves-in some cases entire 
juries-the Crown opened an important avenue to royal control of trial 
proceedings. For the moment, the object of Star Chamber interest was the 
21. See above, Chapter 3, text at n. 9. 
22. See J. A. Guy, The Cardinal's. Court (Sussex, 1973), pp. 30-31, 52-53,63-64. 
23. Ibid., pp. 61-63, 137. 
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true malefactor: the person who obviously abused the juror's oath to 
render a verdict according to conscience. Unlawful pressures and induce-
ments were alleged and proved: obstruction of the law, not unlawful "law-
finding," was the most common charge against jurors in the early 
sixteenth century. 24 
Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Parliament 
sought in a more traditional manner to render juries impervious to the 
political pressures that local magnates might bring to bear on behalf of 
their retainers. A series of statutes continued and attempted better 
enforcement of property qualifications for prospective trial jurors.zs To 
the extent these were enforced, they must have in the great majority of 
cases separated jurors and defendant both by class and by neighborhood 
and thus exacerbated the problems that social mobility and professional 
crime created for effective operation of the self-informing jury. The 
statutes effectively reduced the pool of eligible jurors, concentrating it 
within a class many of whose members did not desire to serve and found 
means to avoid doing so.Z6 It is possible that this particular governmental 
strategy hastened the day when resort to whomever bailiffs could find on 
assize days regardless of station (the tales de circumstantibus) became, if 
not the rule, something more than the exception.27 
Still, it would be wrong to conclude that the vitality of the concept of 
trial by the country was weakened to the point that the very existence of 
24. See below, n. 149 and accompanying text for discussion of cases in Star Chamber. 
One early statute relating to the Welsh Marches [Stat. 26 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1534)] dealt with 
punishment for pe!jury. It mandated fines for verdicts against "good and pregnant 
evidence," but it seems to presume subornation of pe!jury or browbeating of jurors by 
friends or relatives of the accused: "[D]ivers murderers, friends and kinfolk to such 
offenders have ... suborned [jurors] to acquit [offenders]." See also G. R. Elton, Policy and 
Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Cromwell (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 
310 et seq. Elton's discussion leaves open the possibility that jurors were punished merely 
for being too merciful, but seems to indicate that true pe!jury was almost always at issue. 
Elton's analysis of jury decision making is perhaps the most interesting "inside" look in the 
literature. 
25. For statutes relating to criminal trial jurors, see e.g. Stat. 2 Hen. 5, st. 2, c. 3 (1414): 
lands or tenements of an annual value of 40 shillings; Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 13 (1531): in trials 
of murder and felony in cities and towns,jurors shall have forty pounds (suspending freehold 
requirement to prevent constant challenges on basis of previous statutes and substituting 
total worth requirement). For a complete listing of statutes, 1225-1730, see James C. 
Oldham, "The Origins of the Special Jury," University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 50 
(1983), Appendix, pp. 214-21. 
26. James S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes (Cambridge, 1972), p. 118. See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i. 
27. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 118. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, 
sect. i. See Stats. 4 and 5 Philip and Mary, c. 7 (1557-58) and 14 Eliz., c. 9 (1572) for 
extensions of the use of the tales to criminal cases. 
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the institution was brought into question. Rather, the unquestioned right 
to trial by peers underlay the urgency of the reform measures; abolition 
was not a live issue. There were doubts in some circles about the 
effectiveness of the institution of the trial jury but not about the need for 
its continued use. 28 Early sixteenth-century judges were not unmindful 
that the jury shielded them from a role they had little desire to play. 29 A 
century and a half later even so powerful a figure as Sir Matthew Hale 
conceded that rendering verdicts on the facts was an awesome responsi-
bility that the bench should not be anxious to shoulder. 30 
The sanctity of the trial jury was revealed in yet another way. Charges 
of subornation of jurors had been leveled at grand juries as well as at trial 
juries. With the development of the indictment process, control over the 
grand jury was greatly increased, for royal officials were no longer at the 
mercy of the hundredors' selective memories. In turn, increased royal 
control of indictment helped make possible the mid-sixteenth-century 
changes that increased judicial control over the trialjury.3I But in the late 
fifteenth century control over indictment coincided with the moment of 
greatest threat of political decentralization, and the Crown's mastery of 
the indictment process depended upon its leverage over the powerful 
local figures who administered grand jury proceedings. Although the trial 
jury seemed to require men of greater substance, the grand jury might 
well-from the Crown's point of view-have benefited from an infusion of 
thinner blood. The government of Henry VII, drawing upon the momen-
tum of its centralizing progra.ns, attempted to avoid the grand jury 
altogether in noncapital, statutory offenses. The infamous statute of 
1495,32 as short-lived as its drafters, Empson and Dudley,33 introduced 
28. Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:106-7. (Italics indicate references to 
Baker's "Introduction.") 
29. Ibid., p. 43: "The judges sought refuge from the evils of mankind and the agonies of 
decision by umpiring the ancient game strictly according to the rules, and by refusing to 
meddle with questions of fact." (Baker here seems mainly to refer to civil trials.) See also 
ibid., p. 138: "No doubt judges could exert influence on a jury, but the forms of charge and 
oath made plain that the ultimate responsibility for a conviction rested on the jurors' 
consciences. The judges' task was to see that the rules were observed, and they evidently 
performed that limited role with absolute propriety.'' See Sir Thomas More, The Apology of 
Sir Thomas More, Knight (London, 1930), p. 150. More wrote in 1533 that "I durst as well 
trust the truth of one judge as of two juries. But the judges be such wise men, that for the 
avoiding of obloquy they will not be put in the trust.'' 
30. Sir Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the 
Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1778), vol. 2, p. 313. 
31. See below, section III. 
32. Stat. II Hen. 7, c. 3 (1495). [Repealed: Stat. I Hen. 8, c. 6 (1509)]. 
33. On Empson and Dudley see G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors (London, 1958), 
pp. 56-57; Kenneth Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 
148-49. According to Pickthorn: "The main motive of repeal was certainly not a sense of 
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prosecution on informations into criminal procedure in noncapital cases. 
By its terms, however, it virtually conceded the requirement of an 
indictment jury in capital cases;34 and by implication, the statute and the 
crisis it provoked recognized the requirement of a trial jury in all felonies. 
The experience strengthened the foundations of jury theory by drawing 
attention to the argument that the defendant's right to trial by peers 
involved not one, but two, decisions by the country.35 
There were, of course, limits to the role that jury reform alone could 
play in the efforts to create a greater degree of social order. The 
prosecution and condemnation of serious offenders had long been ham-
pered by the system of royal pardons;36 secular court jurisdiction over 
felony suspects had, in the course of the fifteenth century, been substan-
tially reduced due to expansion of the benefit of clergy;37 and to a more 
limited but significant degree, the privilege of sanctuary38 became a 
serious problem in the early sixteenth century. The early Tudors took 
steps to bring these impediments to order under control, though not to 
eliminate them entirely. The closest Henry VII and Henry VIII came to 
eliminating one of the ancient privileges was their handling of sanctuary, 
a subject we need not pursue here.39 In the case of pardons of grace, the 
outrage in a public mind saturated with jurisprudence, jealously tenacious of law above 
statute, but rather a determination of the propertied to be done with the exactions of 
Empson and Dudley" (ibid., p. 149). 
34. "Provided always that any such information extend not to treason, murder or felony, 
nor to any other offence wherefore any person shall lose life or member." 
35. The statute and the roles played by Empson and Dudley figure prominently in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jury tracts. See e.g. below, Chapter 6, n. 116. 
36. See above, Chapter I, text at nn. 88-90. 
37. See below, nn. 42-50 and accompanying text. 
38. A felon who had escaped to a church or other designated holy place could remain 
there inviolate for forty days. If he confessed his felonies to a coroner within that time, he 
was allowed to abjure (swear he would leave) the realm. The coroner then assigned the 
abjuror a port and gave him a cross to carry as a sign of his abjuration. So long as the felon 
headed straight for the port, no one was permitted to harm him. See Hunnisett, Medieval 
Coroner, pp. 37-54. See generally N. Trenholme, The Right of Sanctuary in England 
(Columbia, Mo., 1903). For the Anglo-Saxon background of medieval sanctuary see Riggs, 
Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 31-36. 
Although sanctuary was not abolished untill624 (Stat. 21 Jas. 1, c. 28, §§ 6, 7), the Tudors 
set strict limits upon the institution. Abjurors were branded to ensure their identification 
[Stat. 21 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1529)), and the statute of 1530-31 did away with abjuration of the realm 
(Stat. 22 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 1). Now the felon in sanctuary was to choose, or be assigned to, one 
of a number of appointed sanctuaries in England. Thereafter, he could not leave that 
appointed sanctuary without pardon or special license. See R. F. Hunnisett, "The Last 
Sussex Abjurations," in Sussex Archaeological Collections, vol. 102 (London, 1964), p. 39; 
I. D. Thornley, "The Destruction of Sanctuary," in R. W. Seton-Watson, ed., Tudor 
Studies Presented . .. to Alfred Frederick Pollard (London, 1924), pp. 198-207. 
39. See Eric W. Ives, "Crime, Sanctuary, and Royal Authority under Henry VIII: The 
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Crown did not seek their elimination but sought intermittently to employ 
them in a manner that discouraged, rather than encouraged, heinous 
offenses by accepting legislation that revived the medieval proscriptions 
against the pardoning of particularly serious offenders.40 Pardons de 
cursu, on the other hand, continued to flow copiously in cases of 
"self-defense"-until, that is, the reform of the privilege of clergy and 
the mid-century developments in the criminal jury trial combined to 
create a workable law of felonious but noncapital manslaughter. 41 
The institution of benefit of clergy took its basic form during the 
late-twelfth-century struggle between church and state, symbolized in the 
clash between Henry II and Thomas Becket. 42 The Crown conceded to 
the Church ultimate power to try and punish ordained clergy, but it 
ordered that a cleric first be tried in a royal court and, if convicted, that 
he then be delivered over to the bishop as guilty in the eyes of the secular 
law.43 Access to benefit of clergy originally required that letters of 
ordination be formally presented to the trial court. By the late fifteenth 
century, however, mere literacy, and even feigned literacy, had come to 
suffice, so that even some of the worst lay offenders could avail them-
selves of the benefit. 44 
In 1489 the Crown sought to reduce the impact of benefit of clergy by 
prohibiting a layman from twice having recourse to it for homicide, rape, 
robbery, theft, "and all other mischievious deeds. " 45 In order that the 
court might know who had already been once benefited, the offenders 
were ordered branded after first conviction. For "manslayer," the brand 
letter was '' M'' ;46 for all other felonies, of which theft was by far the most 
common, "T." An offender other than an actual cleric may not have been 
Exemplary Sufferings of the Savage Family," in Arnold et aL, eds., On the Laws and 
Customs of England, ch. 10. 
40. Statutes granting pardons were issued frequently, but typically they excluded serious 
homicide, burglary and robbery. See e.g. Stats. I Edw. 6, c. 15 (1547); Eliz. I, c. 30 
(1562-63); 13 Eliz. I, c. 28 (1571); 27 Eliz. I, c. 30 (1584-85); 3 Jas. I, c. 27 (1605-6). For 
references to cases in which defendants charged with homicide pleaded eligibility for such 
a pardon on grounds they had slain "on a sudden occasion," or the like, see below, n. 63. 
41. This development is discussed at length in section II. 
42. See G. Dalzell, Benefit of Clergy in America (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1955), pp. 9-42; 
Leona Gabel, Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages (Northampton, Mass., 
1929); Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:441-57. 
43. See e.g. JUST 3/l27D, m.lld (1337): "And in order that it might be ascertained in 
what capacity [the prisoner) should be delivered, let the truth of the matter be inquired into 
by ajury." 
44. Plucknett, Concise History, p. 440; Joel Samaha, Law and Order in Historical 
Perspective (New York, 1974), pp. 57-62; Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 1:459-64. 
45. Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 13 (1488). See also Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:329. 
46. "Murder" was at this time used as a catchall term embracing all felonious homicide. 
See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 473-74. 
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turned over to the church; certainly he was not after 1576. If after 
conviction he successfully pleaded clergy, he was subjected to branding 
and, at the discretion of the court, up to a year's imprisonment.47 This 
important curtailment of benefit of clergy was only the beginning. Soon 
thereafter, legislation excluded laymen from pleading clergy for petty 
treason, that most heinous of common law felonies. 48 Subsequently, in 
piecemeal fashion, most other serious offenses were similarly placed 
outside benefit of clergy for laymen.49 
As we shall see, this regulation of the benefit of clergy bore rich fruit. 
Statutory recognition of clergy for virtually all ''literate'' male offendersso 
for the first commission of a lesser felony (including manslaughter and 
simple theft) removed much of the pressure from juries, at least in some 
cases. Where clergy was proscribed the pressure remained, but this 
cannot have been serious so long as the parliamentary approach to the 
gradation of punishment and the typical juror's concepts of liability 
continued to overlap. Where these were in conflict, the jury presumably 
sought to use its de facto power to put the defendant beyond the law. 
Until the jury's power to do so was substantially reduced, the system 
would, in cases of conflict, function much as before. 
II 
The development of English criminal trial procedure was more evolu-
tionary than sudden. We have seen that the Marian statutes dealt with 
practices that to some extent predated the 1550s; and it has been 
47. 18 E1iz. 1, c. 7, § 2 (1576). See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 76. See Cockburn, 
Introduction, ch. xi, sect. ii. 
48. Stat. 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496-97). See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of 
Homicide," p. 475, n. 223. 
49. E.g. robbery or murder (used as term of art) in a church, on the king's highway or in 
the victim's house: Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1 (1512) (statute only temporary); arson added to 
previous list: Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. I; buggery: Stat. 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533-34); piracy: Stat. 27 
Hen. 8, c. 4, § 3 (1535-36). 
50. See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 77: "Between 1559 and 1589 the assize files 
do not reveal a single instance in which clergy was denied because the claimant failed the 
reading test." Thereafter, such failures were noted; Cockburn suggests that the evidence 
"indicates the reemergence of benefit of clergy as a meaningful test of literacy," and that its 
reintroduction was connected with the "introduction of 'plea bargaining' at assizes." See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. xi, sect. ii. For an important discussion of the treatment of 
women at the Home Circuit assizes see ibid., ch. xi, sects. ii, iii, and vi (table II). Women 
were not allowed benefit of clergy until 1693 (stat. 4 Wm. and Mary, c. 9). By virtue of a 
statute of 1623, however, they were allowed to claim the benefit in cases involving larceny 
of goods worth ten shillings or less (stat. 21 Jas. I, c. 6). Many women did claim pregnancy, 
a claim that was often false or that was made "true" through conception during imprison-
ment after conviction (technically, too late, but often allowed). 
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persuasively argued that the procedures outlined in the statutes rep-
resented an ideal that, in practice, did not become universal until long 
thereafter.s1 The line of development is flatter than focus on the statute 
book alone would suggest. Nonetheless, the Tudor and early Stuart 
period witnessed a sharp and important increase in the production of 
pretrial examinations and witness testimony for use in criminal trials. This 
is reflected in virtually every aspect of the system.s2 Though we know 
little about how such testimony was employed, who employed it, and on 
whose direction they did so, it is likely that the assize clerks wielded 
significant influence in the conduct of trials and that they were in some 
fairly direct fashion carrying out government policy.s3 But it is not 
altogether clear just what the government policy was or whether the 
changes that flowed from that policy were foreseen. 
The shift from a trial dominated by the self-informing jury to a trial 
based mainly on evidence produced by the prosecution not only trans-
formed the relationship between judge and jury but gave greater op-
portunity for judicial instruction and enhanced the growth of the substan-
tive law. Open confrontation between the witnesses and the defendant 
must have produced far more candid testimony than the conclusory tales 
that juries had formerly recorded in their verdicts. Now close and difficult 
cases came inescapably to the attention of the bench. Complicated 
testimony of a sort not often heard before allowed the bench to refine and 
elaborate rough distinctions, and to apply and elaborate those already 
propounded in the Inns of Court. In this process the law of crimes took on 
its modern form. 54 
The paradigm example of substantive legal development is once again 
the law of homicide. 55 Of the two other principal concerns of the royal 
courts, treason and theft, little will be said. The law of treason was 
51. Cynthia Herrup, "The Common Peace," doctoral dissertation (Northwestern U niv., 
1982), ch. 5. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. ii. 
52. See Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" passim, whose discussion assumes the 
existence of a substantial body of pretrial documents. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, 
sect. iii. 
53. Idem. 
54. Baker (Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:303) has definitively shown that discussion of 
the substantive law had already begun at the Inns in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries. Some of this discussion was prompted by cases wherein defendants based claims 
upon statutes dealing with clergy and pardons. My own discussion focuses on the 
application and further development of the emerging law in actual cases before the royal 
courts. I have on a previous occasion overstated the degree to which the post-1550 
development was innovative rather than elaborative ("The Jury and the English Law of 
Homicide," pp. 491-92). 
55. This discussion is a foreshortened version of my fuller account in Green, "The Jury 
and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 473-97. 
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elaborated in a series of statutes and applied in state trials that are now 
famous and have been described at length elsewhere.56 There were 
notable developments in the law of theft, but they were either statutory 
and geared mainly to increasing the scope of capital theft by the 
preclusion of benefit of clergy for specified offenses,57 or judicial and 
concerned largely with the definition of physical circumstances involved 
in such offenses as burglary and robbery. 58 Few of the changes in 
commonly tried cases of theft involved the theory of felonious intent and, 
as we shall see, it was this problem that lay at the heart of future tensions 
between judge and jury. 
The development of the substantive law in homicide as in other crimes 
involved a dialectical process that centered on the judge-jury relationship 
but which was affected by much else, including, of course, the Tudor use 
of the benefit of clergy. The statutes defining eligibility for benefit of 
clergy, unlike the medieval statutes dealing with pardons of grace, 
succeeded in making a lasting impact on the substantive law of felonious 
homicide. Perhaps the most important difference between those two 
attempts to deal with professional or otherwise serious homicide was the 
stage of the judicial process at which the protection proscribed by the 
legislation was normally obtained. As we have seen, pardons of grace 
were obtained before trial, and, until 1390, they foreclosed prosecution. 
Thereafter, while courts were in theory required to test such pardons, 
they generally took at face value almost all pardons set before them and 
thus, by default, left administration of the statute of 1390 to the Crown. 59 
56. John Bellamy, The Tudor Law of Treason (London, 1979); G. R. Elton, The Tudor 
Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 59-60, 80-81. For a 
study of the application of the law of treason during the Reformation, see G. R. Elton, Policy 
and Police, pp. 384-400. 
57. See above, n. 49. 
58. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedures," p. 41. For an example of the interplay out 
of which rules developed (though in this case not a new rule), see J. H. Baker, "Criminal 
Justice at Newgate 1616--1627: Some Manuscript Reports in the Harvard Law School," Irish 
Jurist, vol. 8, new ser. (1973), p. 313. In an indictment for theft [Harvard Law School 
(hereafter, H.L.S.) MS 112, p. 296], where a servant stole from his mistress and placed the 
stolen items in his own trunk (as the evidence showed), the jury, having left the bar, returned 
to ask advice of the court. Their concern was that it had not been shown that the trunk had 
been removed from the house. The Recorder told the jury that under the law the alleged 
deed was a felony, for the act of putting the goods in the trunk and afterward denying that 
he had done so indicated that the defendant had taken the goods with felonious intent. (The 
jury convicted the defendant and he was hanged.) 
In the sixteenth century, the bench began to exclude from the categories of "luxuries," 
which could not be the subject of an indictment for theft, certain edible birds and animals, 
thus increasing the scope of the law of capital theft. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John 
Spelman, 2:318. 
59. See Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 469-72. 
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Benefit of clergy operated in a different way. Although in the Middle Ages 
the benefit could be pleaded either at the outset of the trial or after an 
adverse verdict,60 the trial was always held, a jury impaneled, and a 
verdict given. That remained the case as clergy expanded; indeed, with 
that expansion, it came to make no sense at all to turn over to Church 
courts most of those who benefited from "clergy." 
Because many convicted defendants were likely to plead clergy ,61 and 
because clergy was not available for all offenses, the nature of the 
felonious homicide became an important jury question. For the first time, 
it would seem, juries had to be questioned closely concerning the specific 
nature of the defendant's felonious act. 62 For the first time, ajury verdict 
of "felony but not murder" might save the defendant's life, even though 
it would not spare him entirely from punishment. 63 The new statutory 
scheme regarding clergy presented an important opportunity for legal 
growth. 
The combined effects of the clergy statutes and of the transformation of 
the trial itself were significant. Some of them are easily traceable in the 
reports and legal literature of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries; others are less well understood. One clear result of these changes 
was that the law of homicide as applied by the courts evolved within a 
matter of decades into one of the most complex areas of the substantive 
criminal law. For the purpose of determining eligibility for clergy, the 
general rule of Salisbury's Case,64 which distinguished deliberate but 
sudden homicide from homicide through something approaching true 
60. In the reign of Henry VI, it was established that the "clerk" had to be convicted 
before claiming the benefit. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, 1:460. See Leona Gabel, 
Benefit of Clergy, p. 30. 
61. See Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 129 (20 percent of all felony defendants 
for the period 1558-1714); see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. ii (46 percent of men, 
1559-64); Samaha, Law and Order in Historical Perspective, p. 62 (28 percent of all felony 
defendants in Essex for the period 1558-1602). See Green, "The Jury and the English Law 
of Homicide," p. 493. 
62. Salisbury's Case (1553) [Edmund Plowden, Les Commentaries (London, 1558), fol. 
100] is the earliest recorded case that demonstrates this point. See below, n. 64 and 
accompanying text. There are no gaol delivery or criminal assize rolls for most of the 
fifteenth century or the first half of the sixteenth century. 
63. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:305, n. 5, for two cases (1531, 1540) 
in which defendants, claiming eligibility for statutory pardons, pleaded that they had 
committed felonious homicide but not murder. Such cases may have required close 
questioning of the jury, but it is unlikely that there were a great many of them (as there were 
regarding benefit of clergy). Nevertheless, the development of the law of homicide resulted 
in part from the Tudor revival of the medieval statutes precluding pardons of grace in 
murder. 
64. See above, n. 62. And see my discussion in Green, "The Jury and the English Law 
of Homicide," pp. 484-85 and accompanying notes. 
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premeditation, was further refined. 65 For example, of all the new doc-
trines which emerged from the bench in its treatment of complex cases, 
none was more difficult to apply than the rule of manslaughter committed 
in "hot blood," or "continuing fury. " 66 Rules applicable to the slaying of 
officials-most important, the rule of implied malice, which made such 
slayings murder-also took a heavy toll of the once-streamlined law of 
intentional slaying. 67 
A second, less easily traceable result of the benefit of clergy statutes 
and the changes in trial procedure was their effect upon the treatment of 
defendants in homicide cases. Since assize records are primarily indict-
ments with brief and sometimes ambiguous notations as to the outcome at 
the trial stage,68 they do not provide much insight into jury behavior. 
Nevertheless, the pattern oflate-sixteenth-century jury verdicts in homi-
cide is revealing. Compared with the fourteenth century the conviction 
rate was high (50 percent or more as compared to 20-25 percent), but the 
percentage of defendants actually condemned remained about the same 
(20-25 percent) and the percentage of self-defense verdicts was signifi-
cantly lower (3-8 percent as compared to 10-40 percent).69 Thus it 
appears that juries, recognizing that benefit of clergy provided an alterna-
tive sanction for simple homicide, or, as it was now coming to be called, 
"manslaughter," felt free to convict in many cases they had formerly 
described falsely as acts of self-defense. The formal rules and the social 
response had come closer together. And we may speculate that more 
often than in the past recipients of pardons for self-defense were in fact 
true self-defenders. The extension of justifiable homicide by a statute of 
1532 to cover slayers of would-be murderers70 may have been facilitated 
by a lessening of the fear that manslaughterers would be acquitted along 
with true self-defenders. Indeed, although officially the medieval treat-
ment of excusable homicide was not abolished until 1828,71 there is 
evidence that judges frequently allowed self-defenders, whether they had 
slain murderers or not, to go quit without pardon or forfeiture as early as 
65. J. M. Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," pp. 590-92. 
66. Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," p. 492, n. 286. 
67. Kaye, "Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," pp. 591-92. 
68. James S. Cockburn has edited the extant assize indictment files for the reigns of 
Elizabeth and James I. See his forthcoming introductory volume (Cockburn, Introduction) 
for his analysis of these records. 
69. Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," p. 493. Not all of the 
"condemned" were in fact hanged. Some probably were pardoned or had their sentences 
commuted. See below, nn. 162-68 and accompanying text. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. 
ix, sects. iii-vi. 
70. Stat. 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532). For a discussion of the intended scope of this statute, see 
Green, "The Jury and the English Law of Homicide," pp. 480-82 and nn. 245-48. 
71. Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10 (1828). 
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the sixteenth century.72 This too may have reflected heightened confi-
dence in jury verdicts. 
The history of the judicial treatment of accidental homicide, on the 
other hand, appears to be more complex. It is difficult to chart the line of 
development in this area from the adoption, in the fourteenth century, of 
the rule of automatic forfeiture for excusable homicide to the abolition, in 
the nineteenth century, of both pardon and forfeiture. At the outset, we 
have seen, the judicial handling of accidental homicide was relatively 
lenient: the courts granted acquittals in a wide variety of cases that had 
formerly led to pardons for accidental homicide. 73 The theory most often 
employed to rationalize acquittal in these cases was that the deceased, 
through his own actions, had slain himself. Although this theory was 
repeated in the sixteenth century ,74 and might still have governed the 
outcome of some cases, it is clear from the notations of judgments on the 
late-sixteenth-century Chancery records that pardon procedures were 
followed in the majority of accidental homicide cases.75 
The reasons for this strict treatment of accidental homicide are not 
altogether clear. The most dramatic aspect of the new approach was the 
insistence upon initiating the pardon procedure for deaths resulting from 
shooting accidents, both by bow and arrow and by firearms.76 The latter 
72. Very little is now known (or may ever be known) about judicial treatment of 
defendants for whom a jury returned a verdict of self-defense. Scholars have assumed that 
even before the statute of 1828 (Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10), judges allowed juries to acquit 
such defendants, but the evidence these scholars have adduced is inconclusive. See Michael 
Foster, Discourse on Homicide (2nd ed., London, 1776), pp. 288--89; Pollock and Maitland, 
History of English Law, 2:481, n. 3; Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 3:76-77. See also 
Joseph Beale, "Retreat from a Murderous Assault," Harvard Law Review, vol. 16 (1903), 
pp. 573-76. 
The evidence from the assize rolls is also unclear on this point. In the late sixteenth 
century there were still cases ending in verdicts of self-defense and, apparently, an order 
that the defendant obtain a pardon. See e.g. James S. Cockburn, ed., Calendar of Assize 
Records: Sussex Indictments, Elizabeth I (London, 1975), p. 319, no. 1639 (1596). In other 
self-defense cases there is no indication that a pardon was required. See e.g. ibid., pp. 
281-82, no. 1475 (1594); p. 333, no. 1714 (1597). 
The strongest evidence for the proposition that self-defenders were not required to obtain 
pardons is the fact that Chancery class 260, which contains many post-1550 cases in which 
the pardon procedure was required for accidental homicide, contains practically none by 
that late date for homicide in self-defense. 
73. See above, Chapter 3, text at nn. 64 et seq. 
74. See William Staunford, Les Flees del Coron (London, 1557), p. 16a, commenting on 
a 1370 case (Y.B. Hil. 44 Edw. 3, pl. 94). 
75. See Chancery classes 260 and 244, passim. The hundreds of cases where pardon 
procedure was followed for accidental homicide between 1550 and 1650 suggest that judges 
were infrequently allowing such defendants to go quit. 
76. See e.g. C 260/166, no. 20 (1573); C 260/171, no. 46 (1583); C 260/173, no. 52 (1588); 
C 260/184, no. 131 (1631). 
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devices, of recent invention and currency, were responsible for close to 
40 percent of the accidental homicides for which pardons de cursu were 
granted in the century 1550-1650.77 The special dangers surrounding the 
use of firearms no doubt contributed to judicial conservatism in accidental 
homicide generally, and this concern might explain the insistence on 
pardons in cases of unintentional slayings through the use of more 
traditional weapons. 
It is also possible that the flow of evidence now revealed more clearly 
than before the degree of negligence attributable to the defendant in 
accident cases. Juries, having lost most of their control over the produc-
tion of evidence, might have found it more difficult to persuade the court 
that the deceased had been responsible for his own death. Indeed, jury 
verdicts of excusable accidental homicide might have been returned in 
cases that, according to the evidence produced at trial, appeared to the 
bench to fit within the emerging category of involuntary manslaughter. 78 
Surely, in these cases, the bench might have deemed insistence upon the 
pardon requirement appropriate. In those (presumably) rare instances, on 
the other hand, where trial testimony was consistent with a special verdict 
that the deceased had slain himself in the course of an attack upon the 
defendant, the bench might have felt greater confidence in assimilating the 
cases with self-defense and allowing an acquittal.79 If so, this was one 
more example of the effect of the new trial procedure onjudicial treatment 
of excusable homicide. But this remains a matter of speculation.so 
77. This estimate is based upon a study made for me by David Clark, formerly of the 
Public Record Office, of the post-1550 cases contained in Chancery classes 260 and 244. 
78. This category was recognized as early as 1576. See Robert Brooke, La Graunde 
Abridgment (London, 1576), "Carone," pl. 229. See Kaye, "Early History of Murder and 
Manslaughter," p. 593 for a discussion of Brooke's view. See also Baker, ed., Reports of Sir 
John Spelman, 2:314. Baker cites an early sixteenth-century reading that sets forth the 
distinction drawn by Brooke. 
79. Such cases rarely appear among those accidental homicides for which pardons were 
granted. 
80. The history of the jury and the law of homicide after 1550 remains shrouded in 
mystery. The subject requires a systematic analysis of the series of criminal assize records 
that begin in the 1550s. 
I have suggested that the emergence of a large category of noncapital felonious homicide 
and the beginnings of modern trial procedure produced changes in the behavior of both 
bench and jury. My tentative thesis is that the conditions that had produced the earlier 
pattern of jury behavior and judicial response had been substantially removed. There were 
fewer verdicts of self-defense and probably there was greater judicial leniency in those cases 
that did occur. Factors other than the existence of a category of noncapital felony and the 
new trial procedure probably played an important role. But these factors, I believe, must be 
considered in relation to the formal law and trial procedure. Juries might have been 
comprised of persons less inclined to save defendants through verdicts of excusable 
homicide, but it may still be true that, absent the category of manslaughter, they would not 
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Certainly tension between judge and jury as to the border between 
manslaughter and excusable homicide was still common after the middle 
of the sixteenth century. s1 
The rough distinctions in the Tudor law of homicide reflected age-old 
attitudes regarding capital liability. The success of the new use of the 
benefit of clergy, the chief agent for introducing these distinctions into 
daily courtroom judgments, depended upon a means of monitoring the 
veracity of verdicts. Without such a means, there would have been no 
assurance that the new category would not suffer at the hands of jurors. 
The substitution of clergy for pardons de cursu would have availed the 
Crown and bench almost nothing. For although the law of homicide was 
being made to reflect social attitudes, its operation was also intended to 
set limits where particular juries might otherwise respond to ''un-
warranted" feelings of mercy or illegitimate forms of pressure. 
Although the friction between law and social attitudes was greatly 
reduced, it was by no means eliminated. And, in time, as the law of 
murder and manslaughter was further refined, the potential for disagree-
ment increased. The policy that led the bench to "imply malice" or to 
take a strict line with the negligent use of firearms must have had some 
connection with widespread social views. But the fit between judicial 
policy and a jury's sense of justice could not be perfect. The judicial 
concern with application of the law to set an example, for instance, might 
make the bench impatient with a jury's merciful desire, in a given case, to 
overlook the general reasons for concern with a certain sort of behavior. 
have been willing to convict. Judges might have threatened and fined juries to force 
convictions, but it is hard to see how these measures could easily have been applied had trial 
procedures remained unchanged: as in earlier times, it would have been extremely difficult 
to separate the cases of honest verdicts from the cases of pure fabrication. 
I introduced statistics (above, p. 122) on verdicts to suggest a relationship between the 
structure of formal legal categories and jury behavior, and to suggest that, taken at their 
broadest, characteristics of social attitudes toward homicide remained fairly constant 
throughout the period 1300-1600. I do not mean to suggest that these observations constitute 
an in-depth picture of the social history of the law of homicide in Elizabethan England. 
Further research can shed light on a number of important questions and provide significant 
refinement of the rough outline presented here. It is possible to determine the social status 
of defendants and jurors in homicide cases and to correlate that information with verdicts. 
It may be possible also to establish differences in the practices of justices of the peace and 
the bench. See e.g. Samaha's analysis of the extant Essex criminal records (Law and 
Authority in Historical Perspective). See also Joel Samaha, "Hanging for Felony: The Rule 
of Law in Elizabethan Colchester," Historical Journal, vol. 21 (1978), pp. 763-82; Herrup, 
"Common Peace," ch. 5; J. A. Sharpe, "Enforcing the Law in the Seventeenth-Century 
English Village," in V. A. C. Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law: The Social History of 
Crime in Western Europe since 1500 (London, 1980), ch. 4. 
81. See below, Chapter 6, text at nn. 70-83. 
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The jury's most important factual inquiry, and the one that most often 
led to friction with the bench, involved its assessment of the defendant's 
intent. Of course, judge and jury sometimes disagreed on the matter of 
whether the defendant had struck a blow, shot a gun, or taken an object 
of value, but disagreement was far more likely to concern the defendant's 
motives. The factual issue of intent was complicated enough, but it was all 
the more so when juries brought to it powerful feelings about the 
defendant's personal worth and the justice of taking his life for the act he 
had committed. Although Tudor developments in criminal procedure did 
not el~minate the jury's field of play regarding these considerations, they 
may have substantially circumscribed jury discretion by making recourse 
to it visible to the bench. It is ironic, then, that the ambiguity of the 
merciful role of the jury was intensified. 
Part of the ambiguity surrounding the trial jury resulted from the jury 
playing a different role in each of the three main kinds of cases it 
commonly faced. Its role in homicide cases was the most complex. The 
emergence of the distinction between culpable-but-sudden homicide and 
slaying through malice aforethought simultaneously reduced the number 
of cases involving judge-jury tension and built into the fact-finding 
process more room for the kind of discretion juries had always exercised. 
The flow of evidence provided some control, but in fact many cases lay so 
close to the legal line between capital and clergyable homicide that the 
bench had no grounds for second-guessing the jury. s2 Moreover, homicide 
had always involved a large number of cases of relatively little interest to 
authorities. Casual fights that resulted in death were always of less 
concern than were homicidal attacks in the course of robbery or arson. 
For centuries the law reflected an attempt to prevent the kind of brawling 
that might result in serious injury, but the administration of criminal 
justice reflected also the recognition that such a policy could have only a 
very limited impact. The transformation of the criminal process, to the 
extent that it was planned at all, was not effected in order to deal with 
such cases. Nor did it in fact have a determinative impact on the historic 
role of the jury in its resolution of those cases. 
Theft, like homicide, was a routine felony. Much of it was casual, in the 
sense of opportunisticS3 rather than truly planned, and much of it was 
perpetrated by vagrants filching to sustain a mean existence rather than 
by gangs of professional thieves. Nevertheless, even much casual theft 
82. The difference between capital homicide and true self-defense had of course been 
very clear. The new line between murder and manslaughter was blurred, as was that 
between manslaughter and true self-defense, for manslaughter covered the entire universe of 
cases that had not in reality fit within one of the two more ancient categories. 
83. See e.g. J. S. Cockburn, "The Nature and Incidence of Crime in England 
1559-1625," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 63-64. 
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was committed stealthily, and by outsiders, and if it was not specifically 
planned, it was nonetheless committed by persons ready to seize upon an 
unexpected opportunity. There was no element of provocation, at least 
not in the ordinary sense; one did not (typically, at least) steal to defend 
one's honor. If the petty thief was pitied it was because necessity had 
stripped him of any honor whatsoever. 
The line between nonclergyable and clergyable theft was mechanical, 
but it perhaps corresponded roughly with a general view that trivial, 
nonviolent takings ought not to place the thief beyond redemption and 
that even some substantial nonviolent ones ought to be forgiven at least 
once.84 The preclusion of clergy in robbery and burglary may have been 
popular, for many such cases involved gang attacks or truly professional 
crime; the conviction rates in these offenses were relatively high. 85 Of 
course, these lines could make but rough approximations. There may in 
general have been opposition to the literacy standard. In particular cases, 
a robber or burglar might seem to have more in common with an unlucky 
petty thief, and the fact that he took several pounds rather than several 
pence might reflect nothing more than the fortuity of his victim's wallet. 
The jury's role in such cases was quite different from its role in 
homicide. Because there was in theft little question regarding intent, there 
was little opportunity to conceal a merciful verdict. Juries were forced to 
acquit the defendant, perhaps against substantial evidence that he was 
involved, i.e., to deny robbery or burglary when one or the other had in 
fact been proven, or to undervalue goods despite incontrovertible evi-
dence of their real worth. The jury's role in theft was open to view, 
especially after the decline of the self-informing jury. Moreover, justices 
of the peace, assize clerks, and the bench probably took an active role in 
cases that fell within the statutes of preclusion, for these cases rep-
resented a kind of behavior that Parliament had singled out as especially 
threatening to the social order. Merciful verdicts were not unknown in 
theft; in fact they were very common. In the Elizabethan and Jacobean 
period many defendants indicted for grand larceny were, through open 
undervaluation of the goods that had been stolen,86 found guilty of 
84. The effect of the statutes regulating benefit of clergy was to make larceny of twelve 
pence or more capital for the second offense. Multiple offenses oflarceny ofless than twelve 
pence remained petty larcenies and noncapital. 
85. Herrup, "Common Peace," pp. 267 et seq. See also Cynthia Herrup, "Law and 
Morality in Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present (forthcoming, 1985), for an 
important discussion of mitigation and conviction in theft cases. I am grateful to Professor 
Herrup for allowing me to cite her unpublished manuscript. 
86. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. i. It should be noted that where a 
defendant's act was clergyable he might be indicted for petty larceny, or found by the jury 
to have committed petty larceny, in order that he might be whipped, a harsher punishment 
128 Transformations 
noncapital petty larceny. But most of these merciful verdicts were 
strongly recommended by, or in any case undertaken with the leave of the 
bench, and they did not lead the bench to conclude that what the jury was 
doing was deciding difficult questions of law. There is some indication 
that a social theory of necessity was coming to play a quasi-legal role,87 as 
simple homicide had done in the Middle Ages. By and large, however, to 
the extent that there was conflict between judge and jury in cases of theft, 
it was a matter of differing opinions on the appropriateness of extending 
mercy (in specific cases) to thieves who clearly fell within the new classes 
of capital theft. 88 
Treason cases became common in the sixteenth century, especially 
after the English Reformation. They were complex cases that raised legal 
and factual issues of nearly every kind. Treason, which was altogether 
nonclergyable, went through many changes in its definition, but at its core 
the crime included writing or speaking words signifying an intent to do the 
Crown serious harm. 89 It was not always easy to prove that a person had 
spoken certain words, and often their correct interpretation was not 
obvious without reference to the demeanor and inflection of the speaker.9o 
Here, within factual issues involving both commission and intent, there 
was more than enough room for jury discretion, but acquittals in treason 
than mere branding for a first offense. This practice was common in the late seventeenth 
century, until transportation was ordered for clergyable felony. At that point, verdicts of 
simple grand larceny increased and a harsh punishment (short of execution) was achieved. 
See below, Chapter 7, n. 30. I am grateful to John Beattie for this important point. 
87. For evidence that some commentators thought necessity might even be a legal 
defense, see Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:300, 323. For discussion of 
necessity in theft cases, see Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence of Crime," pp. 60-61. The 
notion of necessity was reflected in the justifications stated for pardons (usually commuta-
tion) granted after conviction. It is possible that juries began to take such considerations into 
account (as though it was a form of mitigation at law) in reaching their verdicts. See below, 
Chapter 7, section III, for discussion of this kind of jury behavior in the eighteenth century. 
88. But see Baker, "Criminal Justice at Newgate," p. 314, where the jury may have been 
attempting to reject the law (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 296). The defendant was indicted as an 
accessory to a burglary; it appeared on the evidence that he had received the principals and 
the goods but had not had knowledge of the breaking and entering. The jury convicted the 
principals of burglary and the accessory of mere felony (clergyable). The judge directed the 
jury "not to distinguish whether the party were accessory to the burglary or to the felony 
only," but one of the justices "was in doubt." The jury "were very much unsatisfied, yet 
they went and afterwards returned and found the accessory guilty of accessory to the 
burglary." 
89. Bellamy (Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 31-33) argues that this had been the law since 
1352 (Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2), and that it is wrong to think that the 1536 statute (Stat. 
28 Hen. 8, c. 10) originated the standard that required no overt act beyond words proving the 
intent. 
90. Ibid., p. 178. 
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were far fewer in number than in homicide and theft.91 The Crown paid a 
great deal of attention to treason prosecutions, making certain that the 
evidence for conviction was very strong. On occasion, judges spared no 
effort to charge the jury with the importance of conviction and the 
inappropriateness of mercy. 92 There is some question concerning how far 
the Crown went to ensure that the jury would be sympathetic to its point 
of view, but it cannot be doubted that the Crown exerted pressure in some 
cases. 
In summary, at the same time that advances in criminal procedure 
strengthened the position of the bench vis-a-vis the jury, developments in 
the substantive law reduced the area of conflict between the two institu-
tions. Conflict remained, but in varying degrees, depending on the kind of 
case involved. Treason cases were few enough, and important enough, 
for the Crown to manage most of them in a way that avoided conflict. In 
theft, the new form of prosecution made it difficult for the jury to conceal 
merciful verdicts within findings of fact; if there were merciful verdicts, 
they were recognized as such-even encouraged-by the bench. Homi-
cide presented far fewer instances of conflict than in the past because of 
changes both in substantive law and in procedure. But fact-finding was, if 
anything, more complex than ever, especially in cases close to the 
borders of the newly drawn legal categories. Here the jury continued to 
have some freedom of action, and, unlike the situation in theft, its 
freedom extended beyond the open granting of mercy to the concealed 
finding of law. 
III 
The extent to which juries exercised discretion in routine cases, or were 
led to believe that they might legitimately do so, naturally depended on 
the manner in which judges oversaw trials, charged juries, and reacted to 
verdicts that displeased them. These are subjects about which all too little 
is known.93 Trial records are somewhat fuller for the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries than for the Middle Ages, but they remain 
opaque on the point that most interests us, the judge's handling of the 
jury. Nor is there abundant material reflecting official views (bench, 
91. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 387. See also Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 117. 
92. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 164-65. 
93. See generally Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" and Cockburn, History of English 
Assizes, pp. 120-24. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv. The only comprehensive 
contemporary description of a routine case in the pre-Restoration period is Smith, De 
Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar; pp. 110-16. Additional glimpses are provided by accounts 
in State Trials and in early seventeenth-century chapbooks. See Langbein, "Origins of 
Public Prosecution," pp. 324-34. 
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council, or Crown) ofthe jury's role. Enough of the official view remains 
for us to be certain that trial juries were thought to be fact finders and 
assessors of the credibility of those who testified at the trial, not law 
finders. But on the question of the limits of appropriate jury discretion, 
especially as regards the granting of merciful verdicts, the evidence is 
ambiguous. What does emerge, however, is the outline of the central 
paradox of the early modern history of the criminal trial jury. The devel-
opment of controls over the jury, and their use in some cases (mainly the 
so-called state trials), produced a reaction in which it was asserted that 
the jury possessed a legitimate law-finding role. At the same time, judicial 
attempts to deal with the great press of routine cases led to a form of 
judicial dependence upon the jury. It began to appear that efficiency and 
at least a limited degree of jury discretion were natural allies. As a result, 
although the bench's position vis-a-vis the jury became stronger, the 
system of criminal law continued to function in a way that allowed for the 
inferences that proponents of jury law-finding desired to draw. 
Although the Tudor transformation of criminal procedure appears to 
have redesigned the balance of power between judge and jury and 
between defendant and prosecution, it did not immediately result in a 
much more highly structured trial. Rather, a few substantial changes 
radiated new prosecutorial powers in ways that were sometimes dra-
matic, sometimes subtle. The extent to which these powers were used 
depended upon the government's interest in a given case or upon its 
concern with establishing an efficient process for a large class of cases. 
Because so little of the trial was formalized and so much of it proceeded 
according to the needs of the moment, it is difficult to speak of the 
"typical" trial. There were relatively few state trials, where governmen-
tal interest and power were most determinative; there were numerous 
routine felony trials, where the courtroom balance of power was more 
even; there were a myriad of trials that fell between these two extremes. 
Most of the extant evidence regarding the management of the Tudor 
and early Stuart criminal prosecution comes from the collections of state 
trials, predominantly composed of treason cases. These trials were well 
known in their own day, both because of the personalities involved and 
because of the government's interest in publicizing the prosecutions of 
suspected traitors.94 Most of the important treason trials were held in 
London, either before King's Bench or before justices of oyer and 
terminer ,95 and thus they were assured of a large and politically significant 
94. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 137. 
95. Ibid., p. 133. For a decision to remove a case to London see Sir James Dyer, Ascun 
Nouel Cases. Les Reports des divers select matters et Resolutions, 3 vols. (London, 1794), 
vol. 3, p. 286b (Hil., 1570). 
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audience. But the point of the prosecution was not lost on the county 
where the offense was committed, for indictment proceedings continued 
to be held locally.96 Those who knew anything at all about criminal trials 
must have been aware of the difference between proceedings at the great 
political trials and proceedings in more routine cases at the assizes. But 
the differences were largely of degree and may have been thought to 
reflect-as they almost certainly did-different levels of governmental 
interest in getting all of the facts before the jury. What was apparent was 
that the government had not taken political cases out of the hands of the 
jury, however much more pressure it in fact brought to bear upon jurors 
to render a verdict of guilty. 
As we have seen, early modern criminal procedure was distinguished as 
much by the passive indictment jury as by the passive trial jury. The 
Crown could assert itself by handpicking the grand jury97 or by over-
whelming it with evidence. The latter strategy was usually successful and 
can hardly have been thought illegitimate. Most of the important state 
trials for treason followed upon reports to the Council, which then carried 
on an extensive investigation and forwarded the most promising cases to 
grand juries.9s Indictment under these circumstances was nearly a fore-
gone conclusion.99 The resulting document was usually long and denun-
ciatory, embodying the essentials of the Crown's case, and very likely 
drafted in part for its dramatic effect upon a hushed courtroom, as the 
defendant-perhaps a once-mighty subject-stood at the bar listening to 
the charges against him. It was in any case more elaborate and devastat-
ing in tone than the typical charge of homicide, theft, or other routine 
felony. 
An overwhelming majority of defendants in most kinds of cases pleaded 
not guilty-in this there had been no change since the Middle Ages-even 
in response to the most detailed indictments, including those based upon 
examinations of the accused himself. 100 In some treason trials this meant 
96. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 133. 
97. British Library (hereafter, B.L.) MS Caligula B. i, fol. 319. According to Bellamy 
(Tudor Law of Treason, p. 128): "In the sixteenth century, when the government felt it to 
be necessary, it did not hesitate to appoint the [grand) jurors itself." 
98. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 125-27. Perhaps a quarter of the cases 
investigated in the period 1532-40 were dropped. See Elton, Policy and Police, pp. 386-88. 
99. Statistics regarding specific kinds of cases are difficult to compile. Typically, bills not 
found were discarded. See Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," pp. 19-20; Cockburn, 
"Trial by the Book?" p. 71. Elton's statistics (Policy and Police, p. 387) indicate that not 
more than 5 percent of treason cases put before grand juries resulted in an ignoramus. For 
common-run cases see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. v, sect. iv. 
100. But see Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73. Cockburn notes that there were, 
apparently, no confessions at assizes between 1558 and 1586, but that thereafter confessions 
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the repudiation of an alleged confession, with occasionally the implication 
that the confession had not been voluntary .101 In all felony cases the court 
was supposed to ensure that defendants were fully aware of the implica-
tions of a guilty plea, 102 although by the end of the sixteenth century there 
is substantial evidence of a form of "plea bargaining" that produced 
confessions to reduced, noncapital charges.103 
We have seen that the early Tudors continued the late medieval 
campaign to obtain twelve honest men, if not a jury downright solicitous 
of the Crown's interests. In the mid-1580s, the forty-shilling requirement 
was raised to four pounds, a figure that remained in force with minor 
exception until the late seventeenth century .104 These efforts were often 
frustrated by nonattendance of the panel at the assizes. Thus the growing 
dependence upon the tales, and, ironically, the decline-rather than the 
upgrading-of the common-run felony trial jury .10s 
At state trials, however, this was rarely the case. Royal officials were 
generally too careful on such occasions, and failure to attend was less 
often braved by those called.1°6 How far the government went in state 
trials to secure a friendly jury is still a matter of debate. Surely it defended 
itself against a jury inimical to its interests. There is some evidence of the 
"preparation" of jurors before the trial got under way, even an indication 
that Star Chamber played a role in pretrial rehearsals of the case for the 
became common in theft, when there were experiments with "plea bargaining." See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iii. 
101. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 164. 
102. Seventeenth-century sources reveal this. See e.g. Hale, History of Pleas of the 
Crown, p. 225: "[B]ut it is usual for the court, especially if it be not of clergy, to advise the 
party to plead [not guilty] and put himself upon his trial." See, however, Baker, "Criminal 
Justice at Newgate," p. 315, for a report of a case (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 297) in which one who 
had "confessed the indictment" and "afterward, being asked what he would say why 
judgment of death should not be given against him, answered that he was not guilty and that 
his former confession was out of ignorance and unadvised. But [the Recorder] cited the 
example of David with the Amalekite, Samuel2, Cap. I, that his blood must be upon his own 
head." 
103. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73; See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iii. 
Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 35. 
104. Stat. 27 Eliz. I, c. 6 (1584-85). For the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see 
below Chapter 7, n. 4 and accompanying text. For discussion of the impact of inflation on 
sixteenth-century juror-qualification requirements see Oldham, "Origins of the Special 
Jury," pp. 148-50. Oldham concludes that the real value of the property requirements was 
small, even after the statute of 1584-85. 
105. Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:107; Cockburn, History of English 
Assizes, p. 118. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i; see also Oldham, "Origins of the 
Special Jury," pp. 146--47. 
106. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 168. Jurors at state trials were frequently men of 
substance, both socially and economically. See Oldham, "Origins of the Special Jury," p. 
154. 
The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England 133 
prosecution. 107 In general, however, the Crown seems to have relied upon 
the force of its case and upon the defendant's lack of opportunity to 
foresee the elements of the Crown's case rather than upon true jury 
packing. The government's efforts may as well have been aimed at 
countering the impact of local interests that might sway a jury to acquit; 
for it must have been the case that the classes from which the Crown 
sought to select trial jurors were subject to the very pressures of county 
politics that the elaborate ritual and presentation of monarchical sanctity 
were designed to erode. 108 In more routine cases, local sympathies rather 
than politics had to be overcome. But there were simply too many cases, 
too few willing jurors, and too little effective governmental machinery to 
ensure that even a "neutralized" jury would always be impaneled. It 
seems likely that the government achieved less through efforts at jury 
selection than it did through charging (and threatening) those selected.J09 
Just as one must be alert to the difference between state trials and 
common-run proceedings, one must also recognize that trials in London 
and other urban centers generally differed in important respects from 
trials in the provinces. This was especially true with regard to the 
relationship between jurors and defendants in cases of theft, which 
dominated the assize calendars. Smith, whose account is open to question 
on many points, probably was accurate in stating that in London 
defendants rarely knew the jurors, and vice versa, for they came from 
very different classes. 11o London assizes processed a virtual parade of 
lower-class robbers and pickpockets, many of them professional; even 
men of the tales must have been a cut above these rogues. In the counties, 
and especially in rural areas, the jurors far more frequently faced their 
neighbors or village ne'er-do-wells of whom they had long been aware, or 
with whose more fortunate relations they fraternized. 111 
107. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 167-68. 
108. Ibid., p. 181. See Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541), which empowered the Crown to hold 
treason trials upon commission of oyer and terminer in the shire of the Crown's choosing. 
109. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 123. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, 
sect. i. But see below, n. 179 and accompanying text for discussion of this problem. In my 
view, the bench exercised its power selectively. Cockburn himself notes ("Trial by the 
Book?" p. 73) that the court apparently manipulated the law to counteract jury leniency; if 
so, the bench could not always rely on its own powers of persuasion to obtain the verdict it 
preferred. 
110. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 113. 
Ill. For a study of trial jury composition at early seventeenth-century quarter sessions 
and assizes see Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 5. Herrup found that those (mainly 
quarter-session) jurors whom she could trace came from the lower end of the yeomanry, 
lower-middling persons of some property who were used to undertaking official responsibili-
ties that the more wealthy, substantial freeholders were able to avoid. Herrup's conclusions 
accord roughly with those of Joel Samaha ("Hanging for Felony," p. 781): "The trial juries 
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Smith's point, however, was that defendants rarely challenged prospec-
tive jurors: neither knowing them nor being known by them, they had 
little reason to do so.m Whatever the truth of Smith's remarks about 
class differences, such differences as there might have been hardly suffice 
to explain the relative rarity of recourse to challenges in criminal cases 
over practically the entire early history of jury trial. 113 Traditionally, 
defendants had been entitled at common law to three dozen peremptory 
challenges. 114 This number had been reduced in the 1540s to twenty,l15 
though it is difficult to imagine why anyone paid attention to the matter. 
In 1554, however, Throckmorton probably set a record by challenging as 
many as ten of his panel, 116 and in the following year Parliament increased 
the allowance in treason to the original thirty-six. 117 Perhaps these 
maneuverings were purely symbolic. The fact is that, by exercise of their 
challenge rights, defendants could have brought assizes to a standstill. 
Either they did not know this, or they were discouraged from such lawful 
sabotage. 
Having been selected and sworn, jurors once again heard the indict-
ment against the accused. 118 At state trials the impact of this recital upon 
the jurors (and those in attendance) was meant to be very great. In more 
routine cases, where jurors might hear up to a half dozen or more cases 
before reaching their verdicts, 119 the court supplied them with notations 
of the prisoners' names and the charges brought against them. 120 Except 
for the great state causes, most trials were very brief. From the jurors' 
perspective, trial was a contest in which accuser and accused exchanged 
[in Colchester] were comprised of ordinary people in the town-petty tradesmen such as 
alehouse keepers and occasionally even day labourers." 
112. Idem. But see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i, for exceptions. 
113. The medieval trial records are unhelpful on this point. For the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean periods, see Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 120; see Cockburn, 
Introduction, ch. vi, sect. i; Herrup, "Common Peace," p. 376, n. 2. Apparently, challenges 
were more common in the early sixteenth century in urban areas where defendants sought 
to remove those who failed to meet statutory property qualifications [see Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 
13 (1531), which removed the freehold requirement and substituted a high (forty pounds) 
personal worth standard. Above, n. 25]. 
114. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 36. For contemporary discussion of 
challenge (in assize order books) see B.L. MS Harleian (hereafter cited as Harl.) 1603, 
fol.76v. and B.L. MS Lansdowne (hereafter cited as Lansd.) 569, fol. 9v. 
ll5. Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541-42). 
116. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 140. 
117. Stat. 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 10 (1555). 
118. B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol. llv. 
119. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 119. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, 
sect. ii. 
120. [T. W.], Office of the Clerk of Assize (London, 1676), p. 48; B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol. 
llv. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. ii. 
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their stories in a heated give-and-take. The accuser might be prompted by 
the bench, which had in hand a written record of the charges he had laid 
before the justices or, in pretrial sessions, before the assize clerks.121 The 
accuser's statement was supposed to correspond closely with the actual 
indictment upon which it had been based, lest the indictment be quashed 
for variance. In fact, there were frequent variances in details, which were 
rarely challenged. Nonetheless, the jurors' impressions of the main 
elements of the case against most defendants must now have been distinct 
and convincing. 122 Other witnesses123 for the Crown then spoke, perhaps 
prompted by the bench, 124 sometimes adding little to the prosecution case 
beyond emphasis and whatever force their reputation, demeanor, and 
number might have carried. It is not clear whether the jurors always heard 
the pretrial examination of the accused; where it supported the Crown's 
case they almost certainly did, but probably in other cases they did not. 125 
The case for the defense was put by the accused, for himself and by 
himself. No one interceded on his behalf to influence the impression he 
made upon the jurors. In rare cases, the accused had the assistance of 
counsel at the outset of the proceedings in order to make objections on 
matters of law as they arose from the indictment;126 but at trial, upon 
indictment,m the accused was not allowed counsel, a rule that persisted 
in treason until 1696 and in all other capital cases until well into the 
eighteenth century. 128 We may never, at this remove, understand how 
contemporaries felt about the denial of counsel. Some apparently be-
lieved that the judge served as counsel to the defendant, 129 or that the 
government's case had to be so strong to convict that it would be beyond 
the power oflegitimate legal advice to refute it. Do Most may have worried 
that intervention by counsel would make it more difficult for the jury to 
121. See above, text at nn. 8-9. 
122. For discussion of Cockburn's contrary view (Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vii, sect. 
ii) see below, n. 179. 
123. On witnesses see B.L. MS Harl. 1603, fols. 76v-77. See also Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum, ed. Dewar, pp. 113-14. 
124. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38. 
125. T. G. Barnes, ed., Somerset Assize Orders, 1629-1640 (Frome, 1959), p. xviii. See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. ii. 
126. Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (4th ed., 
London, 1669), p. 137. 
127. The rule was different in appeals and misdemeanors, where counsel was allowed. 
Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 37. 
128. Stat. 7 and 8 Wm. 3, c. 3 (1696) (treason). The extension of the right to counsel in 
felony [see Stat. 6 and 7 Wm. 4, c. 14 (1836)] was recognized in practice long before it was 
made statutory. 
129. For a relatively late expression of this view see William Hawkins, Pleas of the 
Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1721), vol. 2, p. 400. 
130. Rex v. Thomas, 2 Buist. 147, 80 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1613), per Coke, C.J. 
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get at the truth, m and this appears to be the way that contemporaries 
rationalized a rule that was sometimes subjected to telling criticism. 132 
Some of the criticism of the denial of counsel stemmed from the fact that 
counsel for the prosecution played a prominent role in state trials. There 
was a hollow ring to the bench's refusal to even the scales in such 
cases,m and the belief that the rule was intended to secure convictions 
may have carried over into attitudes toward the handling of routine cases 
where counsel rarely appeared for the Crown. 
However much ammunition the Crown employed in a given case-the 
coaching of witnesses, the reading of examinations (including those few 
induced by torture), the use of counsel for questioning the defendant or 
for making dramatic, inflammatory speeches-from the jurors' perspec-
tive the defendant's answer remained the crux of the contest. The 
government may have therefore assumed that the truly innocent person 
could not be made to appear guilty, whereas the guilty might not reveal 
themselves without being subjected to the most searching interrogation. 
For the Crown forced the defendant to rebut evidence he had not seen 
beforehandl34 and to answer questions designed to throw him off balance. 
Moreover, the Crown employed sworn witnesses to aid private prosecu-
tors, while only grudgingly allowing any witnesses, and never sworn 
ones, for the accused. 135 It appears that the Crown devised a proceeding 
wherein the accused was stripped of defenses that, from its perspective, 
only stood in the way of truth and aided the accused in the too-easy task 
131. Staunford, Les Plees del Coron, fols. 15lv-52; Ferdinanda Pulton, De Pace Regis et 
Regni (London, 1609), pp. 184-85: "[P)eradventure, [the defendant's) conscience will prick 
him to utter the truth, or his countenance or gesture will show some tokens thereof, or by 
his simple speeches somewhat may be drawn from him to bolt out the verity of the cause." 
Cf. the earlier eighteenth-century rationale of Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 2:400: "This 
indeed many have complained of as very unreasonable, yet if it be considered, that generally 
every one of common understanding may as properly speak to a matter of fact, as if he were 
the best lawyer; and that it requires no manner of skill to make plain and honest defence, 
which in cases of this kind is always the best; the simplicity and innocence, artless and 
ingenuous behaviour of one whose conscience acquits him, having something in it more 
moving and convincing than the highest eloquence of persons speaking in a cause not their 
own ... whereas on the other side, the very speech, gesture and countenance, and manner 
of defence of those who are guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help to 
disclose the truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial 
defence of others speaking for them." 
132. E.g. Robert Parsons, The Jesuits Memoria/for the Intended Reformation of England 
under their first Popish Prince (London, 1690), p. 249. 
133. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 142. 
134. See Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 1:227-28, n. 239. 
135. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38. Witnesses for the accused were not 
allowed to be sworn until1696 in treason and 1702 in felony. Stats. 7 and 8 Wm. 3, c. 3, § I; 
I Anne, st. 2, c. 9, § 3. See also B.L. MS Lansd. 569, fol. II. 
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of fooling his countrymen or playing upon their compassionate tenden-
cies. Smith's description of a routine felony case is famous: the accused 
and accusers stood in "altercation"; 136 the judge asked questions, guided 
by examinations that the defendant would have ex tempore to explain 
away. All of the pressure was brought to bear on a single point: the jurors 
waited to hear the accused speak for himself. 
It is easy to underestimate the importance of the oral and personal 
aspect of trial by jury. The proceedings I have described in summary 
fashion were weighted in the Crown's favor, but they did not do away 
with the centerpiece of the medieval trial: the defendant's unsworn 
testimony and tacit appeal to his countrymen. That remained inviolable. 
None of the pretrial examinations was of record; the defendant might 
repudiate any confession he had made; and every prosecution witness had 
to testify personally, regardless of the strength of his deposition.137 The 
coordinated prosecution developed within the logic of the English trial by 
peers; it was not an attempt to undermine that form of trial. From the 
government's perspective, it redressed a severe imbalance that had 
resulted from the inability to challenge the defendant and thus turn the 
trial into a proper test. Juries typically had been inclined to hang only the 
nastiest offenders, and even these they sometimes acquitted out of fear, 
pity, or infirmities of evidence. The Crown had a long way to go if it was 
intent upon substantially broadening the field of offenders it could convict 
of capital charges, or significantly reducing the chances that an individual 
offender would mislead the jury. In state trials, where the stakes were 
especially high, each "mistaken" acquittal loomed very large. Pre-
cautions were called for, the more so because defendants were often 
clever, in league with others, and politically powerful enough to sway an 
insufficiently "neutralized" jury. Common-run felonies were handled 
differently. The prosecution could go only so far, given the press of time 
and the difficulty of securing detailed evidence. Far less was at stake, and 
jury leniency was to be expected, indeed, to a certain extent, tolerated. 
The odd case of unwise leniency, or plain obduracy, could be dealt with 
by stern treatment by the bench or even by procedures in Star Chamber. 
At some point the judicial coercion of juries violated the sanctity of trial 
by peers, but it is not clear just where that point was. This problem has 
received more attention than careful sorting out. Although little will be 
offered here by way of firm conclusions, it is necessary to provide a 
background to the discussion in Chapter 6 of the debate over the legality 
136. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114. 
137. An exception was made where the deponent had died or fallen gravely ill before the 
trial. See Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:284-85. 
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of threatening and punishing juries that was carried on in both lay and 
official literature of the mid-seventeenth century. 
From medieval times the bench played a leading role in the questioning 
of defendants. Medieval juries had two overlapping and presumably 
complementary duties: to state what they knew and to render a verdict. 
They were not under a duty to know all the facts. They might, and often 
did, say they did not know the truth of the matter, but they were not to 
suppress what they did know or to avoid the opportunity to become better 
informed. At the trial the principal source of information, over and above 
what the jurors had already learned, was the defendant himself. The fact 
that the jury was "self-informing" in no way implied that their verdict 
was to be settled by the time they were sworn. Like the judge, they were 
sworn ''to hear and to determine,'' and they were expected to put 
questions where they desired further information. Having consented to be 
tried by the country, the defendant could be examined by them, or by the 
judge on their behalf. If there were limits to the judge's role of informing 
the jury, they were imposed by his dependence upon the defendant and 
the jurors for evidence. 
The transformation of the trial in the early modern period did not bring 
this judicial role to an end. Quite the opposite: it enhanced that role, and 
made it far easier to play. Even the appearance of counsel at the state 
trials was in service to the bench, which followed up the counsel's 
questions or the accused's replies to them with questions of its own. Of 
course, it was impossible for the bench to take so active a part in the 
trying of the accused without signaling to the jury its own view of the truth 
of the matter. This must have been all the more inevitable as the flow of 
candid evidence increased. Whether the practice of commenting upon the 
evidence followed from the fact that often the judge's views were at all 
events obvious, we cannot say. We do know, however, that the practice 
was common by the mid-sixteenth century, if not long before,138 and it 
may have been thought a part of the judge's duty to help inform the jurors. 
Judicial impartiality did not require that the judge keep his opinions to 
himself but only that his comments be favorable to the defendant where 
that was appropriate. As we shall see, there developed a significant 
tradition of favorable comment on the evidence and on the desirability of 
a "partial," or saving, verdict. 139 The tradition of the active judge was 
integral to trial by peers, and it remained so long after "coercion" was 
ruled unlawful. 
138. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:141. Baker asserts that the bench 
used this role with discretion. 
139. See below, Chapter 7. 
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There was no real separation between the judge's comments upon the 
evidence and his charge to the jury. The charge might embody the most 
direct statement of the judge's point of view and must have been 
influential in many major trials. During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries it does not appear that charges were elaborate in most routine 
cases: the law was typically straightforward and the judge rarely bothered 
to sum up his views of the facts. 140 Many cases must have resolved 
themselves into assessments of credibility that the bench either happily or 
for a lack of time or interest was willing to leave to the jury. The judge's 
charge always invoked the jurors' duty to God and their consciences,141 
and it was upon that admonition that the trial proper ended and the jury's 
resolution process began. About that process we know very little. It is not 
even clear whether juries typically retired from the bar to discuss cases 
or, as appears to have been the case at eighteenth-century Surrey assizes, 
simply huddled together in front of the bench. 142 Juries usually heard 
several or more cases before "retiring" to resolve them and, in the press 
of time, must have reached their verdicts quickly .143 Having been guided 
by the bench, jurors probably knew how they would determine most 
cases even before they gathered for discussion. They probably also knew 
which cases remained unclear and had been left largely to their discretion, 
the judge having given only some indication of his view concerning the 
range of appropriate results.144 
Where the bench believed that the jury had convicted the defendant 
against the evidence, it might reprieve the defendant and request that the 
Crown pardon him either. freely or upon condition, 145 a practice that 
140. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 122. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, 
sect. iii. For what was probably a typical charge, see Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. 
Dewar, p. 114. 
141. See Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance, p. 50. Langbein quotes a 
"charge" that seems to have been in its entirety: "Doe in it as God shall put in your hearts" 
[The wonderful discoverie of Elizabeth Sawyer a witch ... written by Henry Goodcole, 
Minister ... and her continual Visiter in the Gaole of Newgate (London, 1621)]. See also 
Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114: "[D]oe that which God shall put in your 
mindes to the discharge of your consciences, and marke well what is saide." 
142. There is some evidence that in this period the jury left the bar and sequestered itself. 
See STAC 5, A3, no. 30 ("in usual manner did sequester themselves"); Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 114. See however Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iv, who 
suggests that juries may have deliberated at the bar. 
143. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. ii. 
144. But see Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. iv, and ch. ix. Cockburn suggests that 
juries did not exercise much discretion; resolutions, he believes, were made speedily and 
largely ratified the views of the bench. For my comments on Cockburn's conclusions see 
below, n. 179. 
145. See below, nn. 165-67 and accompanying text. 
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extended even to some state trials. 146 Most instances of judge-jury 
disagreement, however, involved perceived acquittals against the facts, 
and here the bench often confronted the jury head-on, using what 
pressure it could. Judicial coercion must be kept separate from the judge's 
unquestioned right to make his views known to the jury. Coercion 
involved threat of punishment for not finding as the judge deemed 
appropriate. At some point, even the physical discomfort involved in 
being held without refreshment or sleep by a judge who would not accept 
a verdict amounted to coercion, but it was, of course, its least serious 
form and the one most difficult to characterize as unlawful. 147 The judge 
might examine each juror individually in the hope of breaking his 
resolve, 148 but probing the jurors to make certain they were firm in their 
view and forcing them to consider further and to report again was a 
standard and accepted part of trials. Threatening to punish, and actually 
punishing, were of another sort of behavior-one that historians are only 
now beginning to explore in depth. 
We have seen that the early Tudors took steps to punish bribery and 
extortion at all levels, including such behavior when it touched criminal 
trial juries. Star Chamber was active in these cases, and, no doubt, this 
was one part of the Court's business that made it popular. The use of 
examinations and witnesses for the prosecution made it easier to monitor 
such behavior, for the presumption of embracery or perjury was strong in 
cases where the verdict clearly flew in the face of the evidence. Did the 
Crown use the theory of true perjury as a makeweight in prosecutions of 
jurors who were not thought guilty of bribe taking or other "ministerial" 
wrongdoing but were thought nonetheless to have found against the 
evidence? Perhaps so. More likely, however, the Crown typically pre-
sumed that a finding against the evidence involved bribery or similar 
wrongdoing and punished the jury accordingly within accepted notions of 
its duty to enforce the law. 
The surviving records of Star Chamber proceedings do not settle all 
questions regarding the theory upon which that institution punished 
juries. During the reigns of the first three Tudors, such prosecutions were 
common enough, but they appear to have been aimed mainly at ministe-
rial wrongdoing. 149 Thereafter the quantity of Star Chamber prosecutions 
146. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 303. 
147. It was a longstanding rule that jurors were not to eat or drink until they rendered 
their verdict. See e.g. B.L. MS Harl. 1603, fol. 77. 
148. B.L. MS Add. 25228, fol. 41, pl.850 (1620). 
149. See e.g. STAC l, II, no. 121 (perjury); STAC 2, XXIII, no. 114 (perjury); STAC 2, 
XXIV, no. 199 (peijury). "Peijury" may in fact be the charge when the jurors were thought 
to have been too merciful. More likely, authorities believed the jurors had gone against their 
oaths knowingly and for an ill motive. STAC 3, VI, no. 69: the information charged that half 
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of jurors increased. Although in 1554 the entire common-law bench ruled 
that it could not on assize fine or imprison jurors, 1so its members 
occasionally continued to do so as well as to exercise its increasing power 
to monitor juries by binding them over to Star Chamber, 151 typically for 
finding ''contrary to the evidence,'' a phrase that had become common by 
the later decades of the sixteenth century. In many such cases where 
juries were bound over to Star Chamber or were subsequently summoned 
to appear there, the informations aver that the jurors acted for personal 
gain or out of favoritism, or the interrogatories include questions concern-
ing allegations of bribes. 152 A few of them may be interpreted to proceed 
of the jury were "men corrupted," but this may mean only that they went against the 
evidence. See also above, n. 24 (regarding punishment for "peJjury" of jurors in the Welsh 
Marches). 
150. "Dalison's Reports," B.L. MS Harl. 5141a, fol. 27. The report states that the bench 
proscribed fining by courts presided over by justices of assize, justices of oyer and terminer, 
justices of the peace, or justices of gaol delivery. This accords with the view expressed by 
Hale in the 1660s, when he grudgingly admitted King's Bench's right to fine (or, at least, its 
immunity to collateral review) because it was a superior court. See below, Chapter 6, text 
at n. 38. 
151. For juries bound over to Star Chamber see below, nn. 152-56. For juries fined (or 
threatened with fines) by assize judges see Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 123. See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv. See also Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. 
Dewar, p. 121. Smith remarked that juries sometimes "not onely be rebuked by the Judges, 
but also threatned of punishment, and many times commaunded to appeare in the 
starrechamber, or before the privie counsel! for the matter. But this threatning, chaunceth 
oftener than the execution thereof, and the [jurors] answere with most gentle wordes, they 
did according to their consciences, and pray the Judges to be good to them, they did as they 
thought right, and as they accorded all, and so it pas seth away for the most part.'' Smith may 
have understated the use of coercion in such cases. [Cockburn ("Trial by the Book?" p. 72) 
calls it a "pious disclaimer." But see his Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv, for practice on the 
Home Circuit after the mid-1570s, and my comments below, n. 179. Herrup's study of early 
seventeenth-century East Sussex quarter sessions and assizes ("Common Peace"), how-
ever, suggests that judicially imposed fines were rare and that Star Chamber was employed 
primarily where there was suspicion of outright corruption.] Smith noted that he had "seene 
in [his] time" a jury "for pronouncing one not guiltie of treason contrarie to such evidence 
as was brought in were not onely imprisoned for a space, but an houge fine set upon their 
heads, which they were faine to pay.'' This seems to refer to the punishment of the jury in 
Throckmorton's Case (see State Trials, 1:901-2 and Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 
172-73). Smith concluded: "But those doinges were even then of many accounted verie 
violent, and tyrannical, and contrarie to the libertie and custome of the realme of England. 
This cometh verie seldome in use, yet so much at a time the enquest may be corrupted, that 
the Prince may have cause with justice to punish them: For they are men, and subject to 
corruption and parcialitie, as others be." 
152. E.g. STAC 4, VIII, no. 17. The interrogatories in this case follow a common form 
used even where, as here, the extant record of the information states only that the jurors 
found "against pregnant evidence." The questions put to the jurors were designed to 
determine: how the jurors came to serve; whether they had been chosen by the defendant 
or by his friends or relatives; whether they had received money; what evidence the jurors 
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solely upon the theory that the jury wrongly but with good intention took 
the law into its own hands, or extended mercy where doing so was 
inappropriate, but typically the charges were much stronger.I 53 In most of 
the cases brought into Star Chamber the jurors actively defended them-
selves by asserting that they had evidence of their own154 or that the 
evidence presented in court seemed to them to be inconclusive. 155 
Occasionally some members of a jury claimed that they had been 
persuaded by their cojurors. 156 By and large the jurors deposed in Star 
Chamber asserted their right to assess the evidence as they saw it and 
denied having acted out of corrupt motives. 
based their verdict upon. STAC 4, X, rio. 31: one of the jurors disclosed after the trial that 
the other jurors had forced him to go along with an acquittal. He stated that two others had 
gone along on the belief that the remaining nine "be all bribed and have received money." 
These allegations led to the entire jury being bound over to Star Chamber. STAC 4, X, no. 
32: strong suggestion that Star Chamber was investigating a charge of bribery; STAC 8, II, 
no. 42: the jurors denied corruption or hope of gain, as alleged; STAC 8, II, no. 46: 
corruption and subornation alleged in the information; STAC 5, A 34, no. 3: the jurors 
denied that they had been "laboured" or spoken to on the defendant's behalf. 
153. E.g. STAC 4, III, no. 41; STAC 4, Ill, no. 43: some suggestion that the foreman 
overbore the others for a corrupt motive; STAC 4, VIII, no. 16: information alleges that the 
jury "most wilfully, falsely and untruly found ... not guilty"; STAC 4, VIII, no. 16; STAC 
4, X, no. 35; STAC 5, A 3, no. 30. 
154. STAC 4, III, no. 41: the jurors were charged with neglect of duty to find according 
to "pregnant evidence" and for "little dreading the offense of pe!jury." Most of the jurors 
said that they were "near neighbors" of the parties and the witnesses and knew "the credit 
and estimation of every of the same deponents and witnesses, and also some of the said 
defendants, knowing more of themselves in that matter than was openly given in evidence.'' 
STAC 4, X, no. 35: one juror deposed that six of the others "said of their own knowledge 
they knew that [the defendant] was not at the felony and further said that their own 
knowledge was as good to them and better than any evidence" given in court. STAC 5, A 
51, no. 6: jurors said that the chief witness for the Crown was known to most of them "to 
be of light behavior and small credit although he was not so known to the judges." See also 
STAC 5, A4, no. II. 
155. E.g. STAC 4, III, no. 41: the jurors said that "they did according to their oaths, 
consciences and the truth of the matter justly and truly give their verdict.'' They said that 
"all of the evidence given against [the defendant] was only matter of suspicion and 
presumption, not sufficient in the conscience of the [jurors] .... All which matters the said 
defendants are ready to aver and prove as this honorable court shall award, and [they] pray 
that they may be dismissed out of this honorable court without any further vexation or 
trouble." (No result noted.) STAC 5, A4, no. II: jurors gave a very detailed answer 
reviewing the large body of testimony given against the defendant (for counterfeiting coin) 
and explaining why it seemed insufficient for a conviction. See also STAC 5, A 34, no. 3; 
STAC 5, A 51, no. 6; STAC 5, A 52, no. 34. 
156. STAC 4, III, no. 43: Eleven of the jurors stated that the foreman was the only juror 
who could read and that he convinced them that there was no evidence against the 
defendant. The foreman said that he believed the defendant to be innocent and admitted to 
some persuading of the others. STAC 4, VIII, no. 17: Two jurors claimed that although they 
opposed the others' opinion that the defendant had acted in self-defense they finally gave in. 
They gave their verdict "against their minds." See also STAC 4, X, no. 35. 
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It would appear that as common as the binding over of juries to Star 
Chamber became, the theory upon which such treatment proceeded never 
entirely detached itself from the traditional notions of jury corruption 
over which, it was agreed, Star Chamber hadjurisdiction. 157 Nearly all of 
the disputed verdicts were given in trials on indictments for what 
authorities deemed particularly egregious behavior. From their perspec-
tive, the jury was either corrupt, in the sense of acting for personal gain, 
or wilfully dishonest, in the sense of going against their true beliefs out of 
contempt for the law. It is significant, for example, that these cases did 
not raise the kind of issues raised by cases on the border between murder 
and manslaughter. These issues did emerge by the middle of the seven-
teenth century, by which time the common-law courts had inherited from 
Star Chamber the power to monitor verdicts and to fine and imprison 
jurors who acted wrongfully .158 By then, surely, the courts no longer 
always required a theory of ministerial wrongdoing, and the true issue of 
coercion-as opposed to protecting against foul play-was squarely 
presented. As we shall see, coercion on such grounds was practiced, but 
also protested, and never entirely assimilated. 
Whatever the theory was upon which jury verdicts were monitored and 
jurors punished, because of the presumption of ministerial wrongdoing 
that theory was broad enough to cover virtually any case wherein the 
bench believed the defendant ought to have been found guilty on the 
evidence. In practice, then, juries were sometimes "menaced" or even 
punished, and whether one thinks contemporaries viewed these con-
straints as prevention of perjury or as coercion of jurors' consciences, 
they were a part of the criminal process that presumably left its mark both 
upon the fate of defendants and on contemporaries' understanding of the 
role of the criminal trial jury. 
157. See William Hudson, A Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, in Francis Hargrave, 
ed., Collectanea Juridica, 2 vols. (London, 1791-92), vol. 2, p. 72. Hudson addresses the 
issue of peijury, which he does not define. He asserts that in the Tudor period "there was 
scarce one Term pretermitted but some grand inquest, or jury was fined for acquitting felons 
or murderers; in which case lay no attaint.'' Hudson gives several examples, some of which 
relate to grand juries, a coroner's inquest jury, persons 'lying in an affidavit or examination. 
Six appear to be trial juries: Throckmorton's jury and five others (including the one that 
acquitted one Hoody, who may be the same Hoody as in STAC 5, A 3, no. 30, above, n. 
153). Hudson does not make clear the reasons for the fines. Peijury probably means a 
conscious lie under oath, and excludes merely foolish (or otherwise) opinions about the 
evidence. It might include "lying" in order to extend mercy in a case where the jury 
honestly believes mercy is appropriate, but possibly it was charged only where, on the 
bench's view of the evidence, the jury was acting out of fear, favoritism, or contempt for the 
law. See also R. Crompton, Authoritie et Jurisdiction des Courts (London, 1637), fol. 32b. 
158. See below, Chapter 6, section II. 
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IV 
The increased duties and activity of the justices of the peace insured 
that the institution of indictment by true bill would supplant the more 
ancient system of presentment. The indictment procedure and the prepa-
ration necessary to it paved the way for the pretrial examinations and the 
production of witnesses that were central to early modern prosecutorial 
practice. In turn, systematic in-court presentation of evidence enhanced 
the powers of the trial judge, while it diminished the evidence-gathering 
role of the jury, and thus its powers. The new triangular relationship of 
prosecution, judge, and jury accompanied the development of substantive 
legal doctrine, a development that the Tudor adjustment of benefit of 
clergy helped greatly to stimulate; doctrinal refinement and gradation of 
offenses eased the tension between judge and jury, though tension 
remained and occasionally the bench used one technique or another to 
induce the outcome it desired. But trial by jury had by no means become 
trial by the bench: older traditions were maintained, depended upon, and 
further sanctified. 
One important measure of the harshness of early modern criminal 
process is the rate of execution for treason, murder, and felony. Modern 
historians have recorded their shock at the numbers sent to the gallows, 
for by eighteenth-century standards, not to mention later ones, the 
numbers are high. 159 From the perspective of Elizabethan and Jacobean 
Englishmen, too, these figures may have seemed lamentably high,J6o 
though the execution scenes themselves were boisterous and revealed a 
fascination with morbidity that was fueled by the popular chapbooks of 
the day. 161 Nevertheless, although the numbers of men and women 
hanged may have been high in absolute terms relative to those executed 
in the Middle Ages, the percentage of those tried who were found guilty 
of capital crimes and condemned was no higher than it had been for the 
three preceding centuries, and the percentage of accuseds actually hanged 
was substantially lower.J62 
159. See Donald Veal!, The Popular Movement for Law Reform (Oxford, 1970), p. 3. 
Veal! quotes statistics from J. C. Jeaffreson, ed., Middlesex County Records, 4 vols. 
(London, 1886-92), vol. 2 (1887), p. xvii, and vol. 3 (1888), pp. xvii, xix, for executions in 
Middlesex, 1608-58. 
160. See Coke, Third Part of the Institutes, p. 255. 
161. See Langbein, "Origins of Public Prosecution," pp. 326-34. 
162. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, pp. 128-31. Cockburn estimates that "only 
about ten per cent of those convicted were actually executed." He apparently is including 
many who were convicted of a noncapital offense by virtue of jury leniency as well as those 
convicted of a capital offense and subsequently favored by Crown or bench. His figure, then, 
does not include those indicted for a capital offense who were ultimately acquitted. The 
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Some of the means used to avoid carrying out sentences of death were 
in the hands of the bench or Crown. Here, too, the transformation of 
procedure played a role. The Crown now embarked on the large-scale 
posttrial system of pardon and commutation that was to dominate the 
administration ofthe criminal law well into the nineteenth century. To be 
sure, reasons of state-rewarding the turning of state evidence, obtaining 
fit and able military conscripts-accompanied the application of emerging 
penological ideas and the influences of post-Reformation religious 
thought. 163 But pretrial depositions as well as posttrial petitions rational-
ized selection of those to be saved. In this regard, the flow of evidence at 
trial was of particular importance where the bench reprieved offenders it 
believed had been convicted against the evidence. 164 Some of the of-
percentage of medieval accuseds hanged was 20-30. See above, Chapter I, n. 79. See also 
Herrup, "Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century England," nn. I, 9. 
163. The problem of postconviction mitigation of the law of sanctions in the eighteenth 
century is treated below, Chapter 7. The beginnings of this development have received 
relatively little attention in the literature on the history of the criminal law. See Cockburn, 
History of English Assizes, pp. 128-31; Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 75. See 
Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. vi. Pardons granted at the request of justices of assize 
cited a variety of reasons for clemency. As a group, they are not markedly different in this 
respect from the many more such pardons granted in the eighteenth century. See e.g. C 
66/1329, mm.25-26 (July 2, 1584): (infanticide) on the information of the Mayor and J.P. and 
on the plea of mercy from the jury; C 66/1256, m.32 (March 22, 1585): (clipping coin) in 
consideration of convict's confession of the crime, his informing against an accomplice, and 
the trivial extent of the offense; C 66/1388, m.27 (May 27, 1592): (housebreaking) a young 
man led astray by comrades, able to do good service, and his first offense; C 66/1426, 
mm.20-21 (July 14, 1594): (treasonable words) that she was pregnant at the time and in 
compassion for thefrailty of her mind; C 66/1413, mm.ll-12 (May 24, 1596): (burglary) truly 
sorry for his offenses, has revealed many criminals, some of whom have threatened him with 
death or robbed him of his goods; C 66/1591, m.22 (Nov. 14, 1602): (highway robbery) acted 
on the instigation of an accuser and also he is young and it is his first offense. 
164. Smith provides insight into reprieve on grounds of an unsafe verdict (De Republica 
Anglo rum, ed. Dewar, p. 120): "If the enquest of xii men do seeme to the Judges and the 
Justices to have gon too violently against the evidence given in matters criminall, either it is 
that upon slender evidence they have pronounced him gilty, whom the judges and most part 
of the Justices thinkes by the evidence not fullie prooved guiltie, or for some other cause, 
do thinke the person rather worthie to live than to die. The enquest is neverthelesse 
dismissed: but when the Judges should pronounce the sentence of death ... he [sic] will 
differ it, which is called to reprive the prisoner (that is to say to send him againe to prison) 
and so declare the matter to the Prince, and obtaineth after a time for the prisoner his 
pardon: for as for provocation and appeale which is used so much in other countries, it hath 
no place in England, after sentence given by the xii." 
The bench might also seize upon technical error in the indictment (so that the defendant 
might move to quash the indictment) where it believed the verdict unsafe or the punishment 
too harsh. See Baker, ed., Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:301. 
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fenders who were reprieved were conscripted into the military, 165 trans-
ported overseas, 166 or unconditionally pardoned167 after sentence had 
been pronounced. More were never sentenced at all but were allowed 
clergy despite their ineligibility or their failure to read, or were allowed 
claim of pregnancy although they were not in fact pregnant, or had not 
been at the time of their conviction. 168 In these latter cases, too, the 
defendant's fate was in the hands of the bench, although it is possible that 
the jury that convicted had reason to anticipate such merciful treatment. 
Leaving aside all such instances of postconviction escape from the 
gallows, the percentage of accuseds the jury had reason to believe it was 
condemning to death was little if at all higher than in the Middle Ages. It 
is, then, fair to ask whether very much had changed with regard to the 
balance of power between judge and jury. 
Indeed, there had been change. By redefining the scope of capital 
felony, the Crown turned a significant percentage of the cases involving 
concealed verdicts against the law into lawful verdicts of clergyable 
felony or simple misdemeanor. These verdicts had the imprimatur of the 
bench; juries in these cases were now finding fact in accordance with the 
accepted view of their role. Moreover, in some cases where the jury left 
to its own devices might have found a clergyable offense, the bench 
induced, even directed, a verdict of capital felony. And probably in many 
cases in which the defendant received merciful treatment, it was the 
bench, not the jury, that made the decision to mitigate the law. This was 
obviously so where reprieve or pardon followed conviction; it was 
arguably so where the jury extended mercy on the recommendation of the 
bench, a matter to which we shall turn in due course. 
165. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 129. See Cockburn. Introduction, ch. ix, 
sect. vi. 
166. Ibid., p. 130. See M. S. Gretton, ed., Oxfordshire Justices of the Peace in the 
Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1934), pp. lxxxix-ci. 
167. See class C 66 passim. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. ix, sect. ii. 
168. Cockburn, History of English Assizes, pp. 128-29. The bench might, on the other 
hand, apply the literacy test strictly. See Baker, "Criminal Justice at Newgate," p. 315, 
where the Recorder (H.L.S. MS 112, p. 297) doubted that a convicted felon who read 
"distinctly and well" could in fact read. Believing the defendant had memorized the usual 
lines, the Recorder assigned the defendant another passage. [The defendant read the new 
passage with ease; the reporter "doubted whether (the defendant) ought to be put to read 
again." Had the "Quod legit ut clericus" been entered on the record, the reporter stated, 
"clearly ... (the defendant) ought not then to have had another (passage) assigned him."] 
On judicial treatment of convicted women who claimed pregnancy see Cockburn, Introduc-
tion, ch. xi, sect. iii. As Cockburn points out, the bench often exercised leniency in such 
cases. According to Cockburn's figures [ibid., ch. xi, sect. vi (table II)], about 15 percent of 
indicted persons were female; about 40 percent of indicted females were convicted; of those, 
about one third successfully claimed pregnancy. See also Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 5, 
for similar indictment and conviction figures. 
The Transformation of Jury Trial in Early Modern England 147 
In sum, the Tudor transformation of criminal procedure combined 
several interrelated factors that greatly increased judicial control over the 
exercise of discretion. In a sense, the Crown and bench had turned their 
weakness into a strength. Unable to impose rules of law greatly at 
variance with widespread social attitudes, authorities modified the sub-
stantive law, implicitly recognizing the power of those attitudes and 
dramatically reducing the field of disputed cases. Resolution of these 
cases was kept largely in governmental hands: making use of the tools of 
pretrial examinations and witnesses for the prosecution, the bench 
monitored verdicts, employed blunt threats, and, where necessary, called 
upon the support of Star Chamber process. Having secured convictions in 
apparent conformity to the rules of law, the bench made a show of its 
beneficence through relieving the rigors of these very rules in selected 
cases. 
There were, of course, limits to the Tudor and early Stuart revolution 
in criminal trial procedure. Even in state trials, where acquittals were 
relatively rare, 169 some juries stood firm although the evidence against the 
accused was strong enough to produce a close case. 170 In routine felony 
trials juries held out more frequently in the face of pressure from the 
bench. 17 1 Jury finality regarding the facts put in evidence was by no means 
completely overthrown; not only did it remain a matter of daily practice 
but, given the narrowness of the government's most commonly stated 
rationale for the punishment of juries, it retained vitality at the level of 
legal theory .172 Finally, and most important, the relative strength or 
weakness of the government was reflected in the scope of the cases it 
chose-or dared-to dispute. 
For a variety of reasons, the government often chose to work with and 
not against juries in order to achieve its central aims. The administration 
of the criminal law had made important strides forward with regard to 
determining the outcome of significant cases, but those cases were still a 
very small percentage of the total number of criminal offenses. Much 
crime went unreported, or unprosecuted;m evidence in routine cases 
169. See Elton, Policy and Police, p. 397; Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, pp. 169-72. 
170. Bellamy, Tudor Law of Treason, p. 181. 
171. Cockburn, "Trial by the Book?" p. 73 (by implication; see above, n. 109). Cockburn 
(Introduction, ch. vi, sect. iv) argues that after the mid-1570s the jury was very passive, as 
evidenced by, inter alia, the absence of Home Circuit bindings over to Star Chamber. See 
my comments below, n. 179. 
172. See also below, n. 179. 
173. Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence of Crime," pp. 50-5!. Cockburn cites the "not 
implausible" estimate of a contemporary magistrate, Edward Hext, that 80 percent of all 
criminals evaded trial. See Cockburn, Introduction, ch. viii, sect. i. See also Bruce Lenman 
and Geoffrey Parker, "The State, the Community and the Criminal Law in Early Modern 
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often was hard to obtain; and only so many juries could be brought under 
control. The machinery of detection and prosecution simply failed to hold 
its own. Moreover, so many offenders had been statutorily precluded 
from pleading benefit of clergy that in property crimes especially the rules 
of law and social attitudes remained apart. 174 The number of cases in 
which jury and bench were bound to clash was once again on the rise. At 
the same time, by the late sixteenth century the continued increase in 
criminal activity had reached what authorities thought were crisis levels. 
This may have increased the interest of society in prosecution, convic-
tion, and punishment, but only to a point: the severity of the law of 
sanctions and perhaps also a growing sense that much property crime was 
less the product of inherent evil than the result of the economic troubles 
of the day175 undermined the effectiveness of law enforcement at all 
stages. 
Then as now authorities lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with 
serious criminal behavior. Rather, they responded in several contradic-
tory ways. On the one hand, authorities apparently experimented with a 
form of "plea bargaining," reducing charges from nonclergyable to 
clergyable (or to petty larceny) in return for guilty pleas. In so doing, the 
bench implicitly conceded that it could not ensure a guilty verdict at the 
capital level or even count on a given jury to convict of minor theft or of 
manslaughter rather than acquit the defendant altogether. 176 On the other 
hand, the bench urged-even coerced-juries to convict defendants in 
order to set an example. In still other cases, the bench encouraged juries 
to undervalue goods and convict the defendant of a clergyable offense, 
Europe," in Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western 
Europe since 1500, pp. 18-20. 
174. Probably this was not so with regard to professional criminals or hardened rogues 
who committed highway robbery and burglary; it may have been so with regard to first 
offenders who committed these offenses "opportunistically." Inflation had driven many 
petty robbers into the ranks of the nonclergyable. 
175. The problem of the relationship between jury behavior and attitudes toward the 
causes of crime is addressed below, Chapter 7, section III, with reference to the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the 
evidence is sparser and more difficult to assess. Some contemporaries seem to have equated 
crime and poverty, not always in a sympathetic fashion. Cockburn, "Nature and Incidence 
of Crime," pp. 60-61. Society as a whole may have adopted a more sympathetic view. Much 
remains to be done, perhaps county by county. See Herrup's pioneering work, "The 
Common Peace," ch. 6. Herrup assesses the relationships among religion, poverty, crime, 
and mercy in her study based upon early seventeenth-century East Sussex quarter sessions 
and assizes. See also T. C. Curtis and F. M. Hale, "English Thinking about Crime," in 
Louis A. Knafia, ed., Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and Canada (Waterloo, 
Ontario, 1981), pp. I 16-26. And see my comments below, Chapter 9, section III. 
176 .. Cockburn (Introduction, ch. vi. sect. ii) suggests that "plea bargaining" was 
undertaken to avoid time-consuming jury trials. 
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either to avoid the possibility of a full acquittal against the evidence or, 
out of compassion, to do rough justice in cases where the punishment 
would otherwise have appeared disproportionate to the culpability of the 
offender. Inevitably, especially in close cases, the bench had either to 
fight with juries or to adopt their standards of justice and, having thus 
stamped most resolutions as in accordance with judicial will, to allow 
juries some leeway in reaching their verdict. 177 There was a cost in this: 
the failure to contest the verdicts of merely merciful juries, seen alongside 
the determined attempt to overturn verdicts authorities viewed as corrupt 
and truly damaging, must have reinforced society's sense that jury 
insistence upon the former kind of verdict was appropriate. The bench 
strove, of course, to retain its substantial degree of control over such 
discretion. By recommending merciful acquittals or partial verdicts, the 
bench attempted to maintain the notion that the discretion to mitigate the 
law lay with it and not with the jury. But not all could have been really 
deceived. It was in fact a shared power, and the age-old view that a shared 
power was integral to the very right to trial by peers survived the legal 
transformations of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries .178 
Two important additional factors guaranteed the survival of the tradi-
tion of the jury's right to exercise discretion. The fact that the trial 
remained oral and personal reinforced the popular conception that the 
trial was as much an assessment of just deserts as it was a search for the 
truth in the case at hand. This was not, of course, the way in which 
authorities viewed the matter. The oral and personal trial was also 
consistent with the view that the jury was bound to find the facts and 
nothing else. It represented both the concession of a fundamental right to 
have the truth of accusations tested under the most grueling circum-
stances and the potentially contradictory notion that the accused could 
not be shielded by another personality from the heat of the contest. 
Nevertheless, so long as the sanction for felony remained so severe, and 
so long as it applied at least in theory to so large a field of cases, the very 
nature of the trial was bound to be seen as related to the concept of 
merciful verdicts. 
Moreover, the development of the substantive law of homicide at once 
reduced the number of disputed cases and provided cover for jury 
discretion in some of those cases in which the jury was inclined to go its 
177. I deal with this point more generally, below, Chapter 7, section IV. 
178. Some contemporaries may have exaggerated the barbarousness of English law, 
because, as Baker points out (Reports of Sir John Spelman, 2:299, 300), of their understate-
ment of the "extent to which sanctuary, abjuration, clergy and the jury system itself, saved 
lesser felons from the gallows." But it is likely that society at large, though it may have 
viewed the law of sanctions, and occasionally its application, as "barbarous," understood 
the extent of mitigation of the law in practice. 
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own way. The question of life or death more than ever depended upon a 
subtle assessment of intent, and that assessment had to be made retro-
spectively by way of inferences drawn from the defendant's present 
assertions and demeanor. 
The survival of the right to grant merciful verdicts did not, in logic, 
imply the survival of the power to find the law. This power had never had 
a grounding in theory; the medieval jury's de facto power to find law had 
always been founded on the realities of process. The age of nearly 
unlimited jury control of evidence was passing; the age of the law and of 
the bench was commencing. The conflict between judicial and social 
concepts of liability remained, to be played out perhaps less often but far 
more visibly in the courtroom relationship between judge and jury. 
Whether the jury would return a verdict clearly at odds with the evidence 
set forth by the prosecution, in the face of judicial charge and threat of 
punishment, was now the question upon which control of the legal 
process depended. The right of the jury to do so had now to be invented 
and given a place in political and constitutional theory .179 
179. How far the balance of power had in fact shifted from jury to judge-leaving aside, 
for a moment, the question of society's perception of the matter-remains unclear. 
Marshaling evidence regarding several related points of procedure, Cockburn (Introduction, 
ch. x) draws the inference that on the Home Circuit after the mid-1570s the jury was virtually 
a passive body. I do not find the arguments for such a view of the jury entirely persuasive 
even for the Home Circuit. (Cockburn concedes that his conclusion might not apply to other 
circuits.) I shall summarize and comment upon Cockburn's main points. 
Cockburn notes that the increase in the number of indictments in the latter half of 
Elizabeth's reign led the bench to experiment with plea bargaining, thereby removing many 
cases from the jury. To speed up trial procedure and to reduce the total number of jurors 
required to hear cases, judges increased the number of cases that a single jury heard before 
retiring. Each case, Cockburn concludes, must have proceeded rapidly, given the number of 
cases tried in the few days during which the bench sat; the relatively inexperienced jurors 
(most sat at only one assize) cannot have found it easy to keep each case separate or to recall 
much more than the judge's opinion as to the appropriate outcome. Few cases (5-10 percent) 
resulted in partial verdicts, which suggests relatively little recourse to discretion on the part 
of the jury. After 1575, there is little evidence of judicial punishment of jurors, which again 
is suggestive of the degree to which the jury did as the bench bade it to do. 
The overall trend seems clear, and in the main we are in accord on the point that the bench 
exercised very substantial control. Certainly this seems to have been the case at Home 
Circuit assizes. But judicial control had its limits; and even when it was dominant, it did not 
preclude some significant degree of jury-based mitigation. I have dealt in my own essay with 
some of the factors to which Cockburn points, but have not drawn from them the same 
inference with regard to the role of the jury. 
I think it particularly important that redrafted indictments and plea bargains siphoned off 
a large number of cases in which the jury might otherwise have exercised discretion, though 
it seems to me that this suggests not only that judges sought to expedite process but also that 
they entertained doubts about their ability to obtain a capital conviction in such cases. At 
any rate, this hardly accounts for the great majority of cases; and Cockburn himself shows 
that much mitigation was postconviction, by virtue of judicial intervention. Thus not all 
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cases where mercy was thought appropriate had been dealt with before they went to the 
jury. We cannot assume, therefore, that the jury did not have the opportunity to extend 
mercy; more likely (as Cockburn would agree), the jury substantially reduced the number of 
cases that the bench would otherwise have dealt with through posttrial reprieve and 
recommendation for pardon. The question remains, Did the jury do so solely on judicial 
mandate? 
Multiple arraignments must have made it somewhat more difficult for jurors to keep 
individual cases in mind. But jurors would not have found it beyond them to recall the one 
or two (if that many) of the six or so defendants arraigned for whom they independently 
concluded that death was too harsh a sanction. As Cockburn establishes, ten to twenty cases 
per day meant that each case averaged no more than half an hour, and many cases took no 
more than fifteen or twenty minutes. But jurors (on Cockburn's evidence) did not deliberate 
after each case. Rather, they deliberated toward the end of a two-or-three-hour period of 
testimony. For all we know, many cases took a mere ten minutes and the total time for 
deliberation was that much longer. For the few "difficult" cases there may well have been 
ample time. It is premature to conclude that jurors, who typically sat only at one assize 
session, were too inexperienced to reach decisions on their own: they may well have sat 
previously at quarter sessions or on any of the many other kinds of juries of the day. 
Doubtless, service before royal judges was more awe-inspiring and induced an unusual 
degree of timidness. Cockburn's findings concerning frequent resort to mere bystanders and 
the apparent institution of professional jurors are in this regard of great importance. It is not 
clear, however, that these corruptions rendered jurors "passive" in all, or even most cases. 
Judicial attitudes probably deterred acquittals in egregious cases and ensured them where 
the offense was slight: as I have argued, changes in the law and the use of benefit of clergy 
had brought judge and jury closer together. But judicial attitudes had probably changed in 
other ways, too, perhaps also because of the press of business. We cannot be certain that the 
bench cared very deeply about the ultimate resolution of all those close cases that had not 
already been resolved through bargain. It is true that there were relatively few partial 
verdicts on the Home Circuit, but there were many acquittals. Why should not these stand 
as some evidence of jury-based discretion? Many acquittals followed a pattern that suggests 
that the quantum of evidence was not the sole determinant. It is, of course, possible that the 
bench told juries to acquit women or persons who stole one kind of object rather than 
another; more likely, however, juries were themselves inclined to do so, and where the 
offense did not seem particularly serious, or definitively proven, the bench did not attempt 
to dissuade them. 
It is not even clear that in the more serious cases the bench always had its way. Cockburn 
(Introduction, ch. ix, sect. i) states that "forty two percent of those tried for non-clergyable 
highway robbery were acquitted." This was a relatively serious offense, and Cockburn cites 
the acquittal rates as dramatic evidence of the reluctance to send offenders to the gallows. 
But whose reluctance? Can all these acquittals really have been mandated by the bench? 
Moreover, there were cases, Cockburn states (idem), where, because "attempts to 
influence the jury were time consuming," judges "simply ignored the jury verdict and 
ordered the punishment of prisoners whose delinquency was, presumably, notorious or had 
been demonstrated to the judge's satisfaction by the evidence. Despite acquittal, such men 
might be whipped [or] imprisoned." This in itself suggests a certain degree of jury 
independence, and it reveals the effects on the bench of the all-important constraints oftime. 
Juries in such cases might have been frustrated in their desire to acquit, but not in their 
desire to prevent execution. They might in fact have been well satisfied with the "compro-
mise" punishments that were inflicted. 
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In some other, perhaps less serious cases, jury resolution probably went on as before, at 
least in the popular imagination. Surely the bench often recommended a specific verdict, but 
it was still the jury that actually rendered that verdict. In form, certainly, the jury undertook 
the exercise of discretion. Often it did so in substance as well, in a certain sense: i.e., if we 
ask, not merely whether the bench gave orders, but whether jurors thought of themselves as 
sharing in the decisions they were rendering. For even when judges were dominating juries, 
they were often using them to register verdicts that departed from the letter of the law and 
accorded with widely held social attitudes; and, from the point of view of the bench, so 
much the better if the jury genuinely favored the result. To be sure, Cockburn's important 
work suggests we must proceed with great caution. Nonetheless, I believe it remains a fair 
conclusion that, amid all the abuses, shortcuts, and cynicism, from the perspectives both of 
jurors and of the observing community, the exercise of jury-based discretion remained a part 
of the doing of justice, even at Home Circuit assizes. Surely this could have been the case 
on other circuits. As Cockburn points out (Introduction, ch. ix. sect. i), partial verdicts 
appear to have been common at London and Middlesex trials, and the struggle between 
bench and jury reflected in punishments at the bar or in Star Chamber continued in still other 
parts of England, long after Home Circuit justices had, for whatever reason, abandoned the 
practice of formally disciplining jurors. 
5 Conscience and the True Law: The Ideology of Jury Law-Finding 
in the Interregnum 
The government that tried and condemned Charles I in January, 1649, 
found later the same year that it was unable to have its way with John 
Lilburne. As leader of the Levellers, the most imposing of the groups that 
clashed with the Cromwellian regime, Lilburne appealed to his jurors, in 
a celebrated phrase, "as judges of law as well as fact. " 1 When the jury 
acquitted him of treason, this claim to a "jury right"-a right of the jury 
to decide the law-brought the criminal trial jury for the first time into the 
forefront of English constitutional and political debate.2 
The emergence of a theory of the jury's right to decide the law was not 
in any simple way a reaction to the transformation of criminal process in 
early modern England. On the one hand, much of what the radical 
reformers attacked predated the Tudor period; on the other, much of their 
program was inspired by the political crisis that accompanied the struggle 
against the Stuart monarchy .3 Nevertheless, the Leveller attack on the 
judiciary in criminal cases was a response to the power and behavior of 
the bench, and that power and behavior were largely owing to new forms 
of criminal procedure. 
1. See below, text at nn. 67-77. On the Levellers see e.g. H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers 
and the English Revolution (London, 1961); Joseph Frank, The Levellers (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1955); G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Levellers in the English Revolution (London, 1975), 
pp. 9-55. Aylmer reviews the history of the Levellers and discusses recent literature that 
points to important differences among the leaders of the movement. See also Robert B. 
Seaberg, "Remembering the Past: Historical Aspects of Leveller Political 
Thought, "doctoral dissertation (Syracuse University, 1977). Seaberg takes issue with much 
recent writing on the main thrust of Leveller thought; see below, n. 32. 
2. This obviously has relevance to debate in published works. The issue appears not to 
have been formulated as one regarding a right to "find law" until the late 1640s either in 
published writings or in discourse generally. If it was formulated earlier, it appears not to 
have attained widespread currency. 
3. In one sense, the Leveller program was aimed at the Westminster bench as it had 
developed since the twelfth century. I suggest below (text at nn. 36-37) that the Levellers 
overstated the actual powers of the bench (and understated those of the jury) in the medieval 
period. In their minds, they were attacking usages that long predated the Tudor period. Not 
only were they attacking what they took to be ancient practices, but they were also 
contending with particularly virulent symptoms of what they believed to be the Norman 
disease that had manifested themselves in the Parliamentary struggle against Charles I. 
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At the same time, the radicals' insistence on a community-based 
system of criminal justice was not a claim to an entirely novel approach 
to the criminal law. For, as we have seen, even as the power of the bench 
increased, some substantial degree of reliance on the trial jury's discre-
tion continued. And if the bench viewed such discretion as appropriate 
within fairly narrow limits, others might have inferred from actual 
practice that the jury was supposed to have considerable leeway in 
rendering verdicts according to its sense of justice. Of course, what the 
radicals most insisted upon the actual administration of justice did clearly 
deny them: truly local trials before a lay bench or before a weak official 
bench.4 For the government, jury discretion was tolerable only within the 
context of a centrally administered, closely overseen, and highly managed 
system of criminal law. For at least some of the government's opponents 
the purpose of jury discretion-the essence of the historic right to trial by 
peers-was being frustrated by what had become the official approach to 
the administration of the criminal law. 
What did Lilburne mean by the jury's right to decide "law as well as 
fact"? What was the source of his theory of trial by jury? How did that 
theory evolve during the Commonwealth? In the discussion that follows, 
I shall attempt to answer these questions through an analysis of Leveller 
political theory and the conception of English history on which it was 
based. The "jury right" was more than just another Leveller reform item: 
the supposed right lay at the very heart of Leveller political and social 
theory, and at least in its theoretical implications the right involved the 
gravest threat that the Levellers posed to the governments of the 
Interregnum. For Lilburne and for some of his followers, the coercion of 
jurors meant more than the deprivation of the defendant's right to trial by 
jury. Coercion of jurors also meant the loss by Englishmen of control over 
the law. Finality of the verdict of the country had long implied the sanctity 
of the community's judgment concerning the accused. Now it also came 
to stand for the sanctity of the community's judgment regarding the 
substance of the ''true law.'' 
The Levellers were only one of many groups that comprised the 
mid-seventeenth-century movement for reform of the law. There were 
many sides to that movement, nearly all of which, save for the debate 
over the criminal trial jury, have received significant scholarly attention. 
It may be useful to sketch the outlines of the entire movement and the 
Levellers' distinctive place within it against the background of the Civil 
War and its immediate aftermath, the Interregnum governments. 5 
4. See below, text at nn. 85 et seq., for discussion of such writers as John Jones and 
James Frese. 
5. The most recent and comprehensive account of the movement for law reform is Donald 
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Even before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Long Parliament forced 
upon Charles I the abolition of the Courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission. 6 Reform of the common-law judiciary included dismissal 
and punishment of those judges who, in Parliament's eyes, had rendered 
unconstitutional decisions; after the Civil War began in 1642, it also 
included attempts to subject the bench to parliamentary (as opposed to 
executive) control.7 The legal reformers in Parliament moved against 
feudal tenures and the Courts of Wards and Liberties, and reflected broad 
agreement among the propertied as a whole on the need to undertake 
reform of some of the procedures that resulted in excessive costs and 
delays both in the common-law courts and in Chancery. 
Divisions among groups demanding law reform were soon mirrored by 
divisions within the revolutionary movement. The Levellers were among 
the first to challenge the moderate goals of the parliamentary leadership 
during the Civil War. They were a mixture of soldiers from the ranks of 
the New Model Army that had been formed under the leadership of Oliver 
Cromwell in 1645, and civilians, who by the mid-1640s experienced 
disenchantment with the limited goals espoused by the leaders of the 
parliamentary cause.s The surrender of Charles I in 1646 and the 
commencement of negotiations between the king and Parliament for a 
reformed constitutional monarchy alienated the burgeoning Leveller 
movement and gave it a basis for opposition. In a profusion of tracts and 
broadsides, this embryonic opposition proclaimed its demands for reform 
of suffrage and for social and legal reform. The last entailed a trenchant 
attack on the common law, both private and public, and particularly on 
Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform (Oxford, 1970). See also Stuart Prall, The 
Agitation for Law Reform during the Puritan Revolution (The Hague, 1966); Barbara 
Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," American Journal of Legal 
History, vol. 19 (1975), pp. 288-97; G. B. Nourse, "Law Reform under the Commonwealth 
and Protectorate," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 75 (1959), pp. 512-29; C. R. Niehaus, "The 
Issue of Law Reform in the Puritan Revolution," doctoral dissertation (Harvard Univ., 
1957); Mary Cotterell, "Interregnum Law Reform: The Hale Commission of 1652," English 
Historical Review, vol. 83 (1968), pp. 689-704. 
6. For the abolition of Star Chamber (and the conciliar courts of the Council of the 
Marches of Wales and the Council of the North) see Stat. 16 Chas. I, c. 10 (l64l); for the 
abolition of High Commission see Stat. 16 Chas. I, c. II (1641). 
7. See Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," and sources cited 
therein. 
8. Mark A. Kishlansky, "The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney," Historical 
Journal, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 795-824. Kishlansky downplays Leveller influence in the army 
before late 1647. Moreover, until 1647 the Levellers' disenchantment with Parliament had 
mostly to do with Presbyterian measures against the separatists and with their own 
"ill-treatment" at parliamentary hands. See below, text at nn. 9 et seq., for discussion of the 
post-1647 Leveller movement. 
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the control over the common law manifested by the centralized bench at 
Westminster and the elitist legal profession. 
Negotiations with the king were paralleled in late 1647 by discussions 
between Cromwell and the Army representatives of the radicals, many of 
whom were now openly known by the epithet of ''Levellers.' '9 The 
stalemate in the latter negotiations was followed by an outright conflict 
between the Army's establishment leadership and some radicals, but the 
escape of Charles and commencement of the second phase of the Civil 
War (1648) brought all opponents of the king closer together. Lilburne 
(who had been held in the Tower for his attacks on Parliament, then 
released in 1647 only to be sequestered once again the following year), 
Richard Overton, and William Walwyn were by now widely recognized as 
the leading Leveller publicists. w Rapprochement with Cromwell in 1648 
halted neither Leveller diatribes against the Presbyterian-dominated 
Parliament (including demands for religious toleration) nor their proposals 
for "universal" male suffrage and a system of law accessible to the 
common man. 
Purged by the Army, the rump of the Long Parliament proceeded to 
bring the captured king to trial and public execution. In February, 1649, 
a Commonwealth was established to bring order to the strife-torn coun-
try. Although the Levellers had taken part in the discussions that led to 
the purge and to the execution of Charles, they remained suspicious (to 
put it mildly) of the Rump's membership, especially after the readmission 
of the Conformists, and hostile to its reforms. These reforms included 
appointment of a High Court of Justice, which did not provide for trial by 
jury, and the passage of a series of Treason Acts .11 Leveller disenchant-
ment and published criticism of the new regime resulted in the arrest of 
Lilburne, Overton, Walwyn, and Thomas Prince. In May, the Army put 
down a small Leveller rising at Burton with force. By the autumn of 1649, 
when Lilburne was brought to trial, the movement had been largely 
destroyed. 
Political and religious radicalism, though no longer perceived as a 
threat to the very existence of the regime, both pushed the Rump forward 
and intensified its determination to embrace only a very moderate reform 
program. It led, also, to the Rump's decision to afforce the activities of its 
own parliamentary law committee by the creation of an extraparliament-
ary law reform commission under the leadership of the respected barrister 
9. For discussion of the "Putney debates" see e.g. Brailsford, Levellers and the English 
Revolution, ch. 13; Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 28-29, 32-33. 
10. See sources cited above, n. 1. On Lilburne's career, arrests, protestations, etc., see 
Pauline Gregg, Free-Born John: A Biography of John Lilburne (London, 1961). 
11. Veall, Popular Movement for Reform, p. 163; Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English 
Revolution, pp. 45-46. 
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Sir Matthew Hale .12 Although the Hale Commission functioned during the 
early 1650s to draw the steam out of the radical reform movement, it 
promoted a number of substantial, moderate reform measures.B Its 
failure to effect many of these, despite the dissolution in 1653 of the 
Rump, reflected the power of the prevailing legal establishment and the 
deep suspicion, prevalent even among moderates, of those groups, 
largely, by this time, religious radicals, most insistent upon purifying the 
common law and its institutions. The demonstrations surrounding 
Lilburne's trial in 1653 for returning to England without permission while 
under decree of banishment cannot have helped matters. 14 
From late 1653, Cromwell was Lord Protector by virtue of a new, 
written constitution. 15 For the next five years, until his death and brief 
succession by his son Richard, the movement for far-reaching law reform 
slipped into the background. Some changes in the legal system were 
effected by the essentially moderate government, changes that did not 
meet the demands of either the remnant of the Leveller movement or the 
religious radicals (The Fifth Monarchy Men). These reforms, as well as 
other moderate proposals for reforms that were debated but not enacted, 
touched private common law, the Court of Chancery, the system of land 
registration, and some aspects of the law of sanctions. 16 The record, by 
the end of the Protectorate and the Restoration in 1660 of Charles II, was 
one of intense and widespread interest in eliminating that part of the legal 
quagmire that inconvenienced the propertied classes, but little more. As 
we shall see, there were proposals regarding the jury. These, however, 
were in the direction of securing more trustworthy jurors, not of democ-
ratizing the institution or of shifting power to it and away from the bench. 
The jury reforms that the radical Levellers demanded were never seri-
ously considered. 
12. The definitive study of the Hale Commission is Cotterell, "Interregnum Law 
Reform." Many members of the committee that selected the Hale Commission members sat 
on the Parliamentary Law Committee. A majority of those selected either had been called 
to the bar or had at least studied at one of the Inns of Court. Cotterell (ibid., p. 692) found 
that thirteen members of the Commission were not radicals but were "men of power, wealth 
and position, devoted to the pursuit of power and status, whose interest lay with a strong 
establishment. ... They sought, not an overturning, but the reform continuity for which 
Cromwell stood." Five "radicals" sat on the Commission. Three of the twenty-one 
members cannot be assigned to either group (ibid., p. 693). 
l3. Ibid., pp. 695-704. See also Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century En-
gland," pp. 291-97. 
14. For Lilburne's 1653 trial see below, section VI. 
15. For discussion of the "Instrument of Government," see J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart 
Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 333-35; Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660 
(Oxford, 1959), pp. 176-77. 
16. See sources cited above, n. l3. 
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The term "Leveller"-it should be stressed at the outset-is employed 
largely as a term of convenience. The Levellers were not a unified group; 
those who called themselves Levellers, took part in Leveller demonstra-
tions, or signed Leveller petitions stood for different positions on a 
variety of issues.J7 Even those usually referred to as leaders of the 
Levellers were by no means in agreement on all matters. Lilburne and 
Walwyn differed in their religious views. Overton and Walwyn have been 
considered "true Levellers," being more radical on social and economic 
issues than Lilburne, Prince, and John Wildman, the "constitutional 
Levellers." 18 As I shall indicate, there was no one Leveller theory 
regarding the criminal trial jury. Nonetheless, there may have been more 
agreement regarding that institution than any other. Political and social 
disagreements were probably more pronounced with regard to the civil 
jury, especially as it dealt with property issues, just as disagreements over 
the institution of property itself loomed large among Leveller leaders and 
their followers.I9 
The account I shall give of Leveller political and historical theory is 
generalized and obscures some differences among the leading Leveller 
writers, but, again, these differences did not necessarily affect Leveller 
views of the criminal trial jury. Most Levellers-indeed most Leveller 
leaders-did not think deeply about the history of the jury. Although their 
views about the jury were probably influenced by Lilburne's 1649 trial, 
they did not develop a systematic theory that explained why the jury 
ought to have the powers Lilburne claimed for it. 
In what follows, I shall delineate the framework of ideas-political, 
legal, social, and religious-into which contemporary radical claims 
concerning the criminal trial jury seem to have fit. Though we cannot 
know how many caught up in the Leveller movement viewed the 
institution in any one way, we can attain a collective impression of the 
range of views they held. I shall also identify the strain of Interregnum 
radical (or law-finding) jury theory that was passed on to posterity. Here 
disagreement between Lilburne and other more radical Leveller leaders 
proved important. From the perspective of this book, it is the Leveller 
legacy that is of greatest interest. In this essay, however, it is the more 
radical, stillborn jury theory that receives greatest attention. In its light 
we may understand the distance between many of the Levellers and the 
Cromwellian regime; we may see how central the institution of the 
17. For an excellent summary of the recent scholarship on Leveller factions and 
disagreements among Leveller leaders see Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, 
pp. 9-55. 
18. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (New York, 1972), pp. 86-120. 
19. Ibid., pp. 91-99. 
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criminal trial jury was to a truly revolutionary conception of society; and 
we may marvel both at the manipulation of contemporary historical 
learning and at how far that learning was from the actual history of the 
criminal trial jury. 
There were three phases in the mid-seventeenth-century criminal trial 
jury debate. In the first phase, up to Lilburne's 1649 trial, "radical" law 
reformers combined an insistence on the right to indictment and trial by 
peers with specific demands for frequent, convenient, and local trials. 
Jurors were to be "of the neighborhood," for such persons were best 
informed regarding the circumstances of the felony and the credibility of 
the witnesses and principals. There was in this first period little, if any, 
public discussion of the jurors' knowledge oflaw; indeed, the early tracts 
assume the correctness of the "old decantatum": judges are to determine 
the law; jurors are to determine the fact.2° 
What Lilburne meant when he claimed in 1649 that his jurors were 
"judges of law as well as of fact" is not entirely clear. The writings 
occasioned by his 1649 trial, as the debate over the jury deepened, 
represent the second phase of the jury argument. John Jones, who seems 
to have shared many of the Levellers' ideas, gave meaning to Lilburne's 
aphorism in the course of his elaboration upon traditional Leveller 
historiography. His works set forth a far-reaching argument for total jury 
control over the law, an argument that may have been no more than a 
posthumous statement of Leveller theory a year after the Cromwellian 
regime had largely destroyed the Leveller movement.21 Jones provided a 
rationale for taking nearly all power out of the hands of the bench. His 
defense of the jury right combined his own version of Leveller historical 
views with a radical Puritan argument concerning the right of the people 
to interpret the law as they would interpret Scripture, which he conceived 
to be the law's principal basis. 
The final phase of the debate over the jury right began with the regime's 
second prosecution of Lilburne in 1653. Lilburne now enunciated a more 
precise theory of the jury right, one that appears to have taken its form 
from the specific circumstances of his prosecution. He claimed that the 
statute of banishment under which he was tried was not valid under 
English law. The jury had the right and duty, he argued, to judge a statute 
or an indictment in the light of English fundamental law, and to acquit the 
defendant if, despite a judicial charge to the contrary, the jury found that 
the statute was void. Moreover, Lilburne now asserted that the jury ought 
to acquit the defendant if it believed that the prescribed punishment was 
20. See below, text at nn. 48-50. 
21. For a discussion of the decline of the Leveller movement see Christopher Hill, The 
Century of Revolution (Edinburgh, 1961), pp. 134, 139, 169-70. 
160 Transformations 
unconscionably severe in light of the acts proved to have been committed 
by the defendant. The jury should test the "legality" of the indictment 
and decide the fairness of the prescribed punishment. The elements of this 
new law-finding theory proved to be of great significance. They did not 
perish with the opposition to the Interregnum government but rather (as 
we shall see in Chapter 6) passed into the hands of the Quakers and 
subsequently became a staple of post-Restoration pro-jury argument. 
I 
For seven years the jury debate smoldered in revolutionary and 
Commonwealth England. The debate began with Lilburne's 1646 tract, 
The Just Man's Justification, and ended with the last of Lilburne's trials 
in 1653. Ironically, the most intense discussion of the jury came in the 
wake of Lilburne's trial in September, 1649, when the Levellers were no 
longer a large and unified force. Only then did it become clear that, at 
least for some of the more significant writers, the jury issue represented 
one of the truly unifying themes of Interregnum radical political theory. 
However, at the outset of the entire reform movement, which en-
compassed the activities of many different groups reflecting various 
political views, the role of the jury in the everyday criminal trial was not 
of great concern. For virtually all reformers, other demands respecting 
the criminal law took precedence over the jury: among them bail, speedy 
trials, reform of the law of sanctions, and prison reform.22 These 
demands, which had their origin in early seventeenth-century reform 
agitation,23 continued throughout the Interregnum to interest most re-
formers, including both moderates and those radicals who came to oppose 
the new Cromwellian regime. Moreover, against the backdrop of the 
entire law reform movement, reform of the criminal law was for most 
reformers only one of many issues, and it was concerned less with a 
vision of a new society than with mitigation of the necessary evils of the 
old society. In time, the criminal law might wither away; for the present, 
it ought not to be so repressive. 
The modest aims of early Leveller thought regarding the jury are 
reflected in the third Agreement of the People (1649), which declared that 
"judgments of conviction of life, limb, liberty or estate" must not be 
achieved other than by "twelve sworn men of the neighborhood; to be 
22. See e.g. Richard Overton, Certain Articles for the good of the Commonwealth 
(London, July 17, 1647), [British Library (hereafter, B.L.): E. 398(28)], reprinted in Aylmer, 
ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 82-87. See generally Veal!, Popular Movement 
for Law Reform, chs. 5-7. Cotterell ("Interregnum Law Reform") provides the best account 
of the "moderate" reforms that were eventually taken up by the Hale Commission. 
23. Shapiro, "Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England," pp. 281-88. 
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chosen in some free way by the people ... and not picked and imposed, 
as hitherto in many places they have been.' ' 24 This declaration brought 
together the three principal pre-1649 demands about the criminal trial 
jury: that all felony trials be jury trials, that the jury come from the 
neighborhood where the crime was committed, that the jury be selected 
by the people rather than by officials. 
Speedy, cheap, and local trials met with the approbation of many early 
reform writers. Several tracts complained of the time-consuming and 
costly trips to Westminster, though it is true that these complaints were 
mainly directed at the hardships of civil pleas.zs But the decentralization 
issue was not one-sided: critics countered that the hundreds could not 
produce a sufficient number of competent persons, either literates or men 
of reputation. 26 For the most part, consideration of convenience and 
capacity dominated the discussion concerning jury trials until, in late 
24. An Agreement of the Free People of England (London, May I, 1649), [B.L.: E. 
571(10)], p. 6, § xxv, reprinted in William Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Leveller 
Tracts (Gloucester, Mass., 1964), pp. 318-28. (This tract was probably authored by 
Lilburne, William Walwyn, Overton, and Thomas Prince.) In an earlier section of the 
Agreement the authors stated that in all capital cases other than treason "recompense shall 
be made to the parties damnified, as well out of the estate of the malefactor, as by loss of life, 
according to the conscience of his jury" (p. 6, § xxi). 
The 1647 Agreement of the People (London, Nov. 3, 1647), [B.L.: E. 412 (21)], reprinted 
in Aylmer, ed., Levellers in the English Revolution, pp. 89-96, did not deal directly with the 
jury. The 1648 Agreement of the People (London, Dec. 10, 1648), [B.L.: E. 476(26)], 
provided that "judgment or conviction of life, liberty, or estate" should be "only by twelve 
sworn men of the neighborhood" (p. 14, § 9). 
25. E.g. To His Excellency Thomas Lord Fairfax: . .. The Humble Representation of the 
Desires of the Officers and Souldiers ... for the County of Northumberland (London, Dec. 
5, 1648), [B.L.: E. 475(13)], p. 5; The Declarations and Humble Representations of the 
Officers and Souldiers in Colonel Scroops [etc.] Regiment (London, Dec. 7, 1648), [B.L.: E. 
475(24)], p. 5; A Petition presented by the Inhabitants of Newport-Paynell (London, Dec. 
26, 1648), [B.L.: 669 f. 13(63)]; The Humble Petition and Representation of the Officers and 
Soldiers of the Garison of Portsmouth (London, Jan. 18, 1649), [B.L.: 699 f. 13(73)]. See 
also Gerrard Winstanley, More Light Shining in Buckinghamshire (London, March 30, 
1649), in G. Sabine, ed., The Works of Gerrard Winstanley (Ithaca, N.Y., 1941), p. 638: 
"[T]hat all trials be in every hundred by twelve men of the same neighborhood"; The 
Remonstrance of( those Reproachfully called) the Levellers (London, Sept. 21, 1649), [B.L.: 
E. 574(15)], p. 6. 
26. E.g. The Representative of Divers well-affected persons in and about the City of 
London (London, Feb. 6, 1649), [B.L.: E. 541(16)], p. 1: "[I]t is impossible to find a 
competent number of jurors to try any criminal or civil matter within any Hundred in 
England ... whereunto there shall not be put in a lawful challenge, that they are either 
kinsmen, friends, tenants, parties, or concerned in the matter"; William Ashurst, Reasons 
against Agreement with . .. The Agreement of the People (London, Dec. 26, 1648), [B.L.: 
E. 536(4)], p.ll: "And all this justice to be done, and lie in the breasts of twelve men in every 
hundred, who may be chosen of men that can neither write, read, nor have any estates." See 
also below, nn. 112-20 and accompanying text. 
162 Transformations 
1649, Lilburne focused attention on the law-finding role of the criminal 
trial jury. Only then did discussion center on the history and purpose of 
the institution rather than on its formal attributes. 
Nevertheless, from 1646 on, Lilbume was feeling his way toward the 
proposition he announced in the heat of his 1649 trial. Just Man's 
Justification had called for trials "in the County, or Hundred ... without 
any appeal but to a Parliament." All causes civil and criminal should 
"monthly be judged by twelve men, of free and honest condition, chosen 
by themselves, with their grave or chief officer amongst them .... " 27 For 
Lilburne, local trials meant both freedom from the obfuscations of 
Westminster jurists and jury control over determination of guilt or 
innocence. Jurors were to "judge" cases, a term Lilburne did not explain; 
control over law, as separate from and in addition to control over fact, 
was at most an implicit assumption of this early tract. Lilburne criticized 
what he implied were typical aspects of the criminal trial-the formidable 
justices, whose rulings were both incomprehensible to the defendant and 
beyond challenge by him; the incompetent jury, selected from know-
nothings of the city rabble and willing to follow the judge's lead.28 
Lilburne sought in his 1646 tract to return the trial to what he deemed its 
historic place in the local community. The tenor of the tract suggests that 
despite the routine nature of the demands in successive versions of the 
Agreement of the People, the criminal trial jury played a significant role 
in Leveller thought.29 
The Leveller conception of the criminal trial jury was based upon a 
distinctive view of the history and nature of English law. How was it that 
the Levellers' legal theory could combine systematic criticism of the 
common law with a glorification of the jury system? To answer this 
question, it will be useful to set forth some elements of the Levellers' 
"Norman Yoke" theory of history, which was a reaction against the 
establishment historical view inherited in the late 1630s from Sir Edward 
Coke. 
27. John Lilburne, The Just Man's Justification (London, June 10, 1646), [B.L.: E. 
340(12)], p. 15. 
28. Lilburne railed against the use of Latin ("and so without [the people's] understand-
ing" [ibid., pp. 11-12]), the inconvenience of the Westminster courts, and the coercive 
aspects of the Westminster bench (ibid., p. 15). 
29. See also John Lilburne, The Copy of a Letter (London, Aug. 9, 1645), [B.L.: E. 
296(5)], p. 17, which may refer mainly to civil cases: "Oh for Justice! Justice betwixt a man 
and his neighbour, impartially, without respect of persons, which alone under God is the 
only cure of all England's maladies." Hill [Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1958), pp. 
76-77] recognized the importance of the criminal-trial jury for Lilburne in the pre-1649 
period. 
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Coke had found a basis both for growth of the common law and for 
resistance to Stuart divine right pretensions in the common law itself. The 
common law in its purest form was expressive of reason; through long and 
careful study of it one might grasp the reasoning process that allowed for 
determination of what was right. This formulation had proved convenient 
to the common lawyers for denying the king's claim to be able to interpret 
the law. 30 
Moreover, Coke's view was attractive to the parliamentarians who 
beheaded the king in the name of the law. For if the common law was as 
old as English society and had never been supplanted by monarchical 
force-in 1066 William had confirmed and assented to the liberties of the 
common law-then law preceded kingship. Thus kingship and prerogative 
were part of and must conform to the rules of the common law, and the 
assembly of the kingdom was responsible for defense of the fabric of the 
common law. While this view of the common law and common law 
reasoning supported an argument against a particular king and against a 
peculiarly royalist concept of the law, it did not constitute an argument 
against kingship, as the rulers of the interregnum period came increas-
ingly to understand. Coke's proposition was an argument for the common 
law and for reform of that law on an incremental basis, as those 
professional lawyers and judges trained to understand the legal system 
saw fit. It rested on an ingrained trust in the common law. The Puritan 
Revolution did not, after 1649, move steadily to the left until a reaction set 
in. The revolution, at least with regard to the essential structures of the 
common law, was the reaction.JI 
The Norman Yoke view, on the other hand, cut against the most 
fundamental political and social conceptions of the Cromwellian ruling 
elite. The Leveller historical argument constituted an attack on feudalism 
and on what were alleged to be Norman feudal perversions of the ''true'' 
law. The attack focused on the Norman invasion, which cut feudal 
England off, historically, from its Anglo-Saxon past. The Leveller 
"myth" of Anglo-Saxon liberties argued that in that almost forgotten age 
all men were "free," held their land freely, met in free popular as-
semblies, declared the law, and judged one another in their free, local, 
and popular courts. These assumptions were employed both sincerely and 
polemically to buttress arguments against a social and political hierarchy 
30. On Coke and the common-law tradition see e.g. J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, 1957), chs. 2-3; Christopher Hill, Intellectual 
Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965), ch. 5; Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp. 
57-67. 
31. See Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp. 57-67; Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law, pp. 125-26. For discussion of the Parliamentarians' approach to law 
reform see below, n. 109 and accompanying text. 
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that not only placed power in the hands of the central government but also 
drastically limited representation in Parliament. 32 
The Levellers drew their political theory from history and Scripture.33 
They found in these sources the basis for a contractual form of civil 
polity, one that England's rulers had often breached but which had always 
been revived, and one that would once again be restored by a new 
"Agreement. "34 Their approach to Parliament reflected a deep ambiva-
lence concerning the limits of valid delegation of authority. A people's 
representatives could not be deputized to pronounce law that conflicted 
with God's will. The remedy was either to reinstate the ancient tradition 
of local assemblies or to make Parliament more representative and to 
resist a Parliament that defied divine command. 35 
32. See e.g. Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, pp. 75-82; W. Schenk, The Concern for 
Social Justice in the Puritan Revolution (New York, 1968), pp. 78-79. See also Robert 
Seaberg, "The Norman Conquest and the Common Law: The Levellers and the Argument 
from Continuity," Historical Journal, vol. 24 (1981), pp. 791-806. Seaberg argues, against 
Hill (idem.), Pocock (The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, pp. 125-27), and Richard 
T. Vann ["The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth," Journal of the History of Ideas, 
vol. 19 (1958), p. 268] that the Levellers did not reject the notion of historical continuity, 
though the one they adhered to differed from that adopted by Coke and his followers. 
Seaberg rightly stresses the overlay of Norman procedures that, from the Levellers' point of 
view, undermined the true substance of the common law. He argues that the Levellers 
believed that the "true substance" remained implicit in the law and that the Levellers did 
not retreat from a historically based theory of rights to one based on "natural right and 
reason" (Pocock, p. 126). Rather, they called for a reform of institutions and procedures that 
would save the historically identified "true" law. This essay is not the place to attempt a 
resolution of the on-going debate on Leveller political and social ideas. Suffice it to say that 
not all Levellers agreed on this issue, and that arguments from history and from "natural 
right and reason" lay side by side in Leveller (as well as in other contemporary) thought. My 
discussion of the Leveller perspectives on the institution of the criminal trial jury 
complements Seaberg's approach. 
33. For the Levellers' reliance on history see above, n. 32. I argue that the Levellers drew 
upon Scripture (see below, text at nn. 105-7) with regard to the criminal law and the rights 
of Englishmen before the law. I believe that some of the Levellers tended to equate the 
Anglo-Saxon past with a society that lived according to Scripture. This was the social 
context they hoped to revive; at some level it had never entirely lapsed, though Norman rule 
had nearly destroyed it. Thus, although the Leveller claims do have a "natural rights" ring 
[see Quentin Skinner, "History and Ideology in the English Revolution," Historical 
Journal, vol. 8 (1965), p. 162; Perez Zagorin, A History of Political Thought in the English 
Revolution (London, 1954), pp. 27-29], they do not constitute a rejection of historically 
based rights. See below, n. 107. 
34. Seaberg deals extensively with this important point: "Remembering the Past," pp. 
49-64, 138-39, 211 ff., 279, 317, 337, 339, 341-42, 461-63. See also [Richard Overton?], 
Regal! Tyrannie Discovered (London, Jan. 6, 1647), [B.L.: E. 370(12)], p. 42: "[T]he King 
receives his crown by contract and agreement." 
35. See Aylmer's summary statement in Aylmer, ed., The Levellers in the English 
Revolution, p. 13. 
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The Leveller argument was an argument not only for political leveling 
but for legal leveling as well. Law, according to the Leveller view, was a 
form of divine command comprehensible and accessible to the common 
man. Legal procedures and institutions could-and since Norman times 
did-vitiate the substance of true law. Thus the Levellers joined those 
who criticized the use of Law French, complicated legal terminology, 
expensive writs, inconvenient delays, and the other obstacles to speedy 
and "equal" justice. Legal institutions were supposed to guarantee that 
equal justice prevailed, and no institution was more important in this 
regard than the criminal trial jury. 
Although the Levellers shared the Coke ian view that the jury preceded 
the Conquest, they broke with that view on two fundamental issues. First, 
the Levellers asserted that the jury also preceded an organized judici-
ary.36 Second, they argued that Norman feudal governance, far from 
embracing the jury, nearly destroyed it. According to the Levellers, the 
Normans and their successors had attempted to pervert and eliminate the 
jury, despite the fact that Magna Carta had confirmed its use and a 
succession of medieval monarchs had in turn confirmed Magna Carta. 37 
Of the true history of the criminal trial jury, they, like Coke, knew very 
little. The fact that the criminal trial jury emerged after Magna Carta; that 
its original role was, at least in the main, to gather evidence; that the 
medieval jury had nevertheless been able to apply the law almost at will; 
that its de facto role had been greatly reduced only in the sixteenth 
century: all this would have come as a surprise to the Levellers. Not only 
would it have clashed with the Levellers' reading of history, it would have 
undermined an important element of their argument concerning the 
practical impact of Norman and Plantagenet rule on English liberties. 
Although the Levellers identified the jury as one of the first elements of 
English social and political life, they said very little about the institution's 
historical role. They appear at first to have accepted the view that the 
jurors' task was to find fact; law was for the (preferably community-
36. E.g. [Richard Overton?], A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens (London, July 
7, 1646), in Don M. Wolfe, ed., Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution (New York, 
1944), p. 125; [Overton?), Regal/ Tyrannie Discovered, p. 16. Overton probably assumed 
that someone from the community served as judge. His main point was that the Normans 
created a centralized judiciary that was not responsive to community mores. By "organized 
judiciary," I refer to the Norman itinerant justices. Some Leveller writings are ambiguous 
even about the existence of a local judge and seem to treat the early jury as a group of law 
sayers. 
See Seaberg, "The Norman Conquest and the Common Law," p. 801. Seaberg contrasts 
the views of the chroniclers Holinshed and Daniel (''who judged trial by jury as a Norman 
custom") to the view shared by both Coke and the Levellers. 
37. [Richard Overton?], Vox Plebis, or, The Peoples Outcry (London, Nov. 19, 1646), 
[B.L.: E. 362(20)], pp. 6, 9-10. 
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based) judges to pronounce. But if the judges found the law ineptly or 
wrongfully, they ought to be removed and punished according to the 
example set by the Levellers' hero, King Alfred. 38 Before 1649, the 
Levellers did not go beyond this remedy to embrace a theory of jury 
intervention on behalf of the true law. Their predominant concern was to 
resist attempts to pack, influence, or overbear juries or to eliminate them 
altogether. The Levellers' glorification of the jury may have drawn them 
closer to the position that the jury, representing the people, ought to find 
the ·law directly rather than merely apply it in accordance with the 
instructions of the people's delegates and the delegates' chosen function-
aries. But that position remained latent in the Levellers' political theory, 
in their understanding of institutional history, in their concept of the 
source and nature of law. 
A modest form of law-finding was latent, too, in the Levellers' 
arguments for reform of the law of sanctions. The Levellers constantly 
invoked the notion of the "reason" and "equity" of the law. 39 In their 
view, a true or godly magistracy interpreted the law in the light of 
"conscience," thereby doing justice according to God's will. 40 And just 
as legal forms ought never to soil this process of doing justice, legal 
sanctions ought not to deviate from divine mandates concerning just 
deserts. Thus, the Levellers' (and others') attack on the death penalty in 
cases of theft was scripturally based; to take life for simple theft was 
contrary to equity and conscience, literally contrary to Scripture.4 1 It may 
38. For discussion of the role of Alfred see Seaberg, "Remembering the Past," pp. 43, 
374. See also e.g. [Overton?], Vox Plebis, p. 6; John Lilburne, An Impeachment of High 
Treason Against Oliver Cromwell (London, Aug. 10, 1649), [B.L.: E. 568(20)], p. 6; James 
Frese, A Second Why Not (London, Sept. 3, 1649), [B.L.: 669 f. 14(72)], p. viii. 
39. E.g. John Lilburne, England's Birthright Justified (London, Oct. 10, 1645) in William 
Haller, ed., Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647, 3 vols. (New York, 
1934), vol. 3, pp. 2, 32; William Walwyn, England's Lamentable Slaverie (London, Oct. 11, 
1645), [B.L.: E 304(19)], p. 5; Richard Overton, The Commoners' Complaint (London, Feb. 
10, 1646), in Haller, ed., Tracts on Liberty, 3:380; Richard Overton, A Defiance against all 
Arbitrary Usurpations (London, Sept. 9, 1646), [B.L.: E. 353(17)], p. 6; John Lilburne, The 
People's Prerogative and Priviledges, asserted and vindicated (London, Feb. 14, 1648), 
[B.L.: E. 427(4)], p. 41. 
For a discussion of the Leveller concept of "equity," see J. C. Davis, "The Levellers and 
Christianity,'' in Brian Manning, ed., Politics, Religion and the English Civil War (London, 
1973), pp. 227-34. 
40. E.g. Richard Overton, England's Miserie and Remedie (London, Sept. 19, 1645), 
[B.L.: E. 302(5)], p. 3; Richard Overton, An Appeal (London, July 17, 1647), in Wolfe, ed., 
Leveller Manifestoes, p. 159. 
41. Overton, An Appeal, p. 193: "That according to the law of God, and the old law of 
the land, matters of theft may not be punished with death"; William Cokayne, The 
Foundations of Freedome, Vindicated: or, The Reasons of William Ashurst ... Examined 
and discussed (London, Feb. 17, 1650), [B.L.: E. 541(25)], p. 10; See Veal!, Popular 
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be that the Levellers considered the role ofthe trial jury to be particularly 
important in such cases. Whether the jury acted on its own or at the 
behest of the bench, it applied the law according to "conscience" in order 
to ensure that the defendant would receive his just deserts. This may be 
what Lilburne had in mind when he referred to the ancient practice by 
which jurors would "judge" cases. Reform might be achieved by statute, 
but statute could go only so far: each case, each instance of finding fact, 
required its own verdict according to "conscience. " 42 
In the years preceding Lilburne's 1649 trial, Leveller political thought 
emerged largely piecemeal in tracts that were responses to immediate 
political developments. Moreover, before 1649 the chief political threat to 
Leveller leaders (and specifically to Lilburne) came not from the common 
law bench but from Parliament.43 Thus, alongside the reform movement's 
denunciations of Norman legal institutions and procedures, there devel-
oped an attack on the parliamentary exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
commoners. It was in this context that Walwyn, Overton, and Lilburne 
charged that Parliament had adopted the tyrannical ways of the Stuarts. 
Parliament (or what remained of it) had become, they charged, an 
arbitrary lawmaking body rather than a representative of the people that 
defended God's law on the people's behalf. Instead of stripping away the 
hated Norman perversions of the true common law, Parliament employed 
them for its own ends. Vindication of the "equity, justice, and mercy" of 
the law had not been achieved and could not be unless subjects were 
allowed recourse to their traditional right to trial by peers before a truly 
law-abiding magistracy. 
Movement for Law Reform, pp. 128-36, for a discussion of the movement to abolish capital 
punishment for theft. 
42. Lilburne wrote, in 1653, that laws should be devised so that "as little as possible ... 
should be left to the discretion, will or pleasure of the Administrator." The Upright Mans 
Vindication (London, Aug. I, 1653), [B.L.: E. 708(22)], p. 14. As we shall see, however, this 
did not apply (as of that date) to Lilburne's views on the jury with respect to its taking notice 
of the probable sanction. 
43. Lilburne, The Copy of a Letter, pp. 1-2. Lilburne had been arrested and imprisoned 
by the House of Commons in 1645. He sought specification of the cause of his imprisonment 
and asserted that he was entitled to "the lawful trial of his equals." Overton, England's 
Miserie and Remedie, pp. 1-6. Overton wrote on behalf of Lilburne, similarly castigating 
Parliament. Walwyn (England's Lamentable Slaverie, pp. 1-6) joined the chorus of criticism 
of Parliament's treatment of Lilburne in Oct., 1645. Lilburne's major tracts decrying his 
imprisonment in 1649 and continuing his claim to a right to trial by jury include: The Legall 
Fundamentall Liberties (1st ed., London, June 8, 1649), [B.L.: E. 560(14)]; An Impeachment 
of High Treason; Strength out of Weaknesse (London, Sept. 30, 1649), [B.L.: E. 575(18)]. 
See also Walwyn, The Bloody Project (London, Aug. 21, 1648), in Haller and Davies, eds., 
Leveller Tracts, pp. 135-46. 
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Lilburne' s attacks on Parliament grew out of his arrest and imprison-
ment for allegedly libelous writings between 1646 and 1648.44 During 
those years he attacked both the laws he was charged with breaking and 
the claims of the Lords and the Commons to jurisdiction to try him. 
Lilburne's most powerful pre-1649 tracts on the role of judge and jury 
date from early 1648, when he was seeking a writ of habeas corpus.45 
After the writ was refused Lilburne (and others on his behalf) criticized 
the courts for acceding to parliamentary despotism. When Lilburne was 
eventually brought before King's Bench and the court denied having 
power to release a person held by order of Parliament, Lilburne criticized 
and belittled the common law bench for its timidity. 46 None of Lilburne's 
writings during this period articulates a jury law-finding argument; their 
focus is the right to trial by peers and the alleged usurpation of legal 
authority by Parliament. The members of Parliament were neither his true 
judges nor his true jurors. Parliament, he claimed, had resolved law-
finding and fact-finding into a single power and had taken that power upon 
itself.47 
Lilburne at this early stage expressed a traditional view of the common-
law judge-jury relationship. His aim was to deny the right of Parliament to 
try him; he asserted that Parliament had in notorious instances 
arbitrarily and tyrannically summoned and convened men before them 
(for things decideable and determinable only at common law) without 
any due process of law, and have taken upon them, contrary to all law, 
justice, equity, and conscience, to be both informers, prosecutors, 
witnesses, parties, jury, and judges, and thereupon have passed most 
illegal, arbitrary, and tyrannical censures upon the free Commons of 
England ... when as by the fundamental law of the land, no judge 
whatsoever, can be judge of matter of law and fact both, it being the 
proper right of the jury of twelve men, of a man's peers or equals to be 
judge of matter of fact, which must be proved by legal witnesses duly 
44. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 135-249. 
45. Lilburne's pleas for a writ of habeas corpus and for trial by common-law judge and 
jury include, e.g., The Prisoners Plea for a Habeas Corpus (London, April4, 1648), [B.L.: 
434(19)], p. 8 (Lilburne sought "justice without partiality, mercy, pity, or compassion"); 
The Prisoners mournful cry, against the Judges of the Kings Bench (London, May 9, 1648), 
[B.L.: E. 441(17)], p. 5 (Lilburne sought "the benefit of the law ... that is all the favor, 
mercy, pity, and compassion he craves"). 
46. John Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral (London, May 15, 1648), [B.L.: E. 442(13)], pp. 1, 
26, et seq. , 
47. Lilburne, People's Prerogative and Priviledges, p. 41; Lilburne, A Whip fo'r the 
present House of Lords, or the Levellers Levelled (London, Feb. 27, 1648), [B.L.: E. 431(1)], 
pp. 16-17; Lilburne, A Plea, or Protest (London, March 17, 1648), [B.L.: E. 432(18)], pp. 
13-14; Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral, p. 7. 
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sworn, and not by the complainer, prosecutor, or party, and then the 
judge is only to be judge in matter of law. 48 
Lilburne's division of law and fact, and his assignment of the former to 
the judge, can be found also in the writings of Overton and, indirectly, 
John Wildman.49 Wildman approvingly reprinted the petition to the House 
of Lords in February, 1648, of the conservative Parliamentarian John 
Maynard, who had met and befriended Lilburne in the Tower. Maynard 
argued that the "jury are sworn to find according to the evidence." They 
are "bound to indifferency and impartiality," for they may themselves be 
passed upon as defendants on another occasion. The jury are to be of the 
neighborhood, for 
the law presumes, that such may have either some cognizance of the 
fact, or of some circumstances thereof, or of the party accused, whose 
condition and manner of conversation is much to be regarded, for 
discovering his intention in any fact supposed to be treason or felony. 
The matter of law, on the other hand, is entrusted to the judge "for 
preventing all errors, confederacies or partiality." 50 
During the spring of 1648 Lilburne continued to seek release from the 
Tower and a trial by judge and jury.51 He never abandoned the conven-
tional law-fact distinction, although at one point he characterized the jury 
"as it were the God Almighty" and the judge "as the minister or priest to 
pronounce and declare the sentence and judgment of the God Al-
mighty."52 When King's Bench refused to free him in May, Lilburne 
declared that the judges were "indeed and in truth mere ciphers." 53 They 
were "ciphers" because they deemed themselves powerless to overturn 
the unlawful acts of the House of Lords, "their superiors. "54 Lilburne 
would use the epithet ''ciphers'' to great and different effect in 1649, when 
48. Lilburne, People's Prerogative and Priviledges, p. 41. See also Lilburne, A Plea, or 
Protest, pp. 13-14. 
49. [Overton?], Vox Plebis, p. 18: "That which is of matter of fact, is to be tried, per 
legalemjudicium parium, or a lawful trial of a man's peers: That which is of matter of law, 
is to be tried by the judges"; John Maynard, The Humble Plea and Protest (London, Feb. 
14, 1648), reprinted in John Wildman, The Lawes Subversion (London, Mar. 6, 1648), [B.L.: 
E. 431(2)], p. 35: "The matter of fact is only intrusted to the jury, and the matter of law to 
the judge, for the preventing of all errors, confederacies or partiality." 
50. Maynard, Humble Plea, pp. 34-35. 
51. Lilburne, A Plea, or Protest, pp. 13-17. 
52. Ibid., p. 17 (margin). 
53. Lilburne, The Lawes Funeral, p. I. 
54. Idem. Lilburne repeated this charge in the spring of 1649, in a letter to Lenthall, the 
speaker of the House of Commons, to whom Lilburne complained about his imprisonment 
on order of the Lords. By allowing the Lords to act as they did, the Commons made 
"ciphers of [themselves]" (The Legall Fundamentall Liberties, p. 13). 
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he was allowed trial at common law by judge and jury. Then, when the 
target was no longer a parliamentary tribunal, Lilburne found the bench 
too powerful, declared that judges ought to be "mere ciphers," and 
claimed that his jurors were judges both of law and of fact. 55 
Lilburne's 1649 charge that the judges were mere "ciphers" and that 
the jurors were true judges went to the heart of what the Levellers 
believed was the establishment fallacy. The allegation challenged the 
view that the government, rather than the community at large, was 
ultimately responsible for determining the law. It also brought the myth of 
the Anglo-Saxon popular (and law-deciding) jury into the courtroom and 
into political debate. The impact of Lilburne's aphorism upon the history 
of the English criminal trial jury was profound. But at the time of its 
introduction, it was merely an aphorism and one without a fully articu-
lated historical basis. 
II 
Lilburne was tried in October, 1649, at the Guildhall, before a commis-
sion of oyer and terminer on a charge of high treason. 56 The Rump 
Parliament had passed several statutes of high treason in the spring of that 
year, a period during which Lilburne was engaged in almost constant 
publication against a government he succinctly characterized in the title 
of perhaps his most famous pamphlet, England's New Chains .57 The new 
Treason Acts extended the crime to include expressions of opinion.5s The 
55. See below, text at nn. 67-77. 
56. State Trials, 4:1269-1470. This account of the trial is a reprint of The Trial! of Lieut. 
Collonel John Lilburne [compiled by Clement Walker] (London, Oct., 1649), [B.L.: E. 
584(9)]. Walker worked "under Lilburne's direction, from documents provided by him and 
a stenographic report of the trial" (Haller and Davis, eds., Leveller Tracts, p. 31). My 
account of the trial stresses Lilburne's invocation to his jury and his defense of his claim to 
the jury right, a subject to which other accounts (understandably) give little space. For other 
discussions of the trial see the splendid account in Brailsford, Levellers and the English 
Revolution, ch. 30; Gregg, Free-Born John, ch. 25; Frank, The Levellers, pp. 325-26, n. 105. 
The Commission included inter alia the Lord Mayor of London, the justices and barons of 
all the courts of common law, and Richard Keble, one of the keepers of the Great Seal 
(Brailsford, p. 528). As Aylmer remarks (Levellers in the English Revolution, p. 46), it is not 
clear why the authorities did not try Lilburne, without a jury, before the High Court of 
Justice. Perhaps they did not dare. The jury had been "impanneled by the sheriffs of 
London," presumably in the usual way. See John Jones, Jurors Judges of Law and Fact 
(London, Aug. 2, 1650), [B.L.: E. 1414(2)], p. 57. Lilburne challenged four of the original 
panel before his jury was fully selected (Brailsford, p. 592). 
57. John Lilburne, England's New Chains Discovered (London, Feb. 26, 1649), in Haller 
and Davies, eds., Leveller Tracts, pp. 157-70 and The Second Part of England's New 
Chains Discovered (London, Mar. 24, 1649), in ibid., pp. 172-89. 
58. Veal!, Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 163. 
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accusation against Lilburne was that by his writings he "maliciously, 
advisedly, and traiterously did plot, contrive and endeavour to stir up, 
and to raise force" against the government, and that to this end he both 
denied the supreme authority of the House of Commons and asserted that 
the government was tyrannical, usurped, and unlawful.S9 
The trial is now famous and Lilburne's defense is well known. At the 
outset he denied both the authority of the trial commission and the legality 
of the proceedings, including the closing of the trial to the public.6° He 
strongly asserted a right to counsel to assist him in making his way 
through trial formalities (that he claimed mystified him) including a statute 
as well as an indictment written in foreign tongues.61 Lilburne's initial 
protestations produced a remarkable reply from Judge Jermin that re-
vealed how similar were the antagonists' conceptions of the ultimate 
source of law, despite their differences on questions of the delegation of 
authority, the role of the judiciary, and, hence, the allocation of power in 
the courtroom: 
[B]ut you must know that the law of England is the law of God .... It 
is the law that hath been maintained by our ancestors, by the tried rules 
of reason, and the prime laws of nature; for it does not depend upon 
statutes, or written and declared words or lines .... Therefore I say 
again, the law of England is pure primitive reason .... A pure innocent 
hand does set forth a clear unspotted heart. . . . If you refuse to [hold 
up your hand] you do wilfully deprive yourself of the benefit of one of 
the main proceedings and customs of the laws of England.62 
Although Lilburne had spoken (without elucidation) of a "pretended 
crime" as the basis of his accusation, his plea, when it was finally coaxed 
from him, revealed no objection to the Act of Treason, either to the 
procedure that occasioned its passage or to its substance. He pleaded: 
"That I am not guilty of any of the treasons in manner and form, as they 
59. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 294-95. Gregg lists the pamphlets named in Lilburne's 
indictment: An Impeachment of High Treason, A Salva Libertate, The Leg all Fundament all 
Liberties, Outcry of Apprentices, Hue and Cry. According to an article in the weekly 
Mercurius Elencticus (London, Oct. 22-29, 1649), [B.L.: E. 575(38)] at p. 208, the grand jury 
foreman told the bench: "We have only found [Lilburne] guilty of writing some part of those 
books he is charged with in the indictment, but not of high treason: which so astonished the 
judges, that they looked as if they would have eaten the jury." This (allegedly) occurred in 
open court; Lilburne had asked that the grand jury that had indicted him appear and repeat 
its indictment. There is no mention of this incident in the State Trials account. A similar 
version of the incident is recounted in The First Days Proceedings (London, 1649), pp. 
10-11. 
60. State Trials, 4:1270-83. The doors to the courtroom were subsequently opened to the 
public. 
61. Ibid., pp. 1291-94. 
62. Ibid., pp. 1289-90. 
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are there laid down in that indictment.'' If Lilburne' s formal plea was that 
the Act was null and void, he gave no hint of it in the version of his plea 
that he himself later recorded. 63 
In the trial the government first presented its evidence, introducing 
witnesses to Lilburne's role in the "treasonous" publications and then 
reading at length from some of them. 64 Lilburne's renewed request for 
counsel was met with the assurance that the court itself would act as his 
counsel when a matter of law arose. The bench was his protector; as 
Keble put it, "[W]e are on our lives too as well as you. " 65 Thus having 
pleaded to the indictment, Lilburne raised two main arguments on the 
merits: there was no proof that the writings were published after the 
passage of the Treason Acts, an important factual issue; and the evidence 
did not suffice for a conviction, because the government could not meet 
the "requirement" of two witnesses or prove unlawful intent. The latter 
argument mixed a question of law (on which the court ruled, against 
Lilburne, that two witnesses were not required) and a question of fact, 
sufficiency of the evidence of intent (on which, it is possible, the jury, 
having set its own standard, based its acquittal of Lilburne).66 
63. Ibid., p. 1294. But see Diane Parkin-Speer, "John Lilburne: A Revolutionary 
Interprets Statutes and Common Law Due Process," Law and History Review, vol. 1 (Fall, 
1983), pp. 276-96. Parkin-Speer, whose article appeared while my book was in press, makes 
an interesting case for reading Lilburne's assertions to the bench at his 1649 trial in light of 
several claims made by Lilburne in Legal! Fundamental! Liberties, published earlier that 
year. The assertions themselves should not be assumed to be part ofLilburne's formal plea, 
but they are integral to his overall defense. How many of them were made before his jury 
is not clear; most were made to the bench before Lilburne's jury was selected and sworn. 
But the assertions and the claims in Legal! Fundamental! Liberties do indicate the direction 
in which Lilburne's thought was moving. Parkin-Speer stresses Lilburne's view that the 
special commission of oyer and terminer and, indeed, the continuation in power of the Rump 
itself, were unlawful. Presumably, this would have made the Act under which Lilburne was 
tried unlawful, though Parkin-Speer doesn't stress this point (perhaps because Lilburne 
seems not to have stressed it). Parkin-Speer emphasizes Lilburne's view that "when an Act 
of Parliament is against common right, or reason, or repugnant ... the common law shall 
control it, and adjudge this Act to be void" (Legal! Fundamental! Liberties, p. 50). This 
view, drawn (indirectly) from Coke's famous dictum in Bonham's Case, was applied to the 
Act that continued the Rump in power. Parkin-Speer discusses Lilburne's view that, absent 
a lawful Parliament or bench, the defendant was left to interpret the common law. This the 
defendant could do given the nature and source of common law; Parkin-Speer relates 
Lilburne's view in this regard to his "Protestant individualism," and I do not think her 
approach here differs markedly from my own. My lengthy discussion of John Jones, below, 
provides a link between this view of law and the Leveller appeal to the jury, a matter about 
which Parkin-Speer has very little to say. 
64. State Trials, 4:1320-73. 
65. Ibid., p. 1317. 
66. Ibid., pp. 1373-76, 1382-93. The jury's reason for acquitting Lilburne will never be 
known. It is less likely that the jury nullified the Treason Acts on which the indictment was 
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Having been denied assistance of counsel in making his defense, 
Lilburne asked the court whether he might then speak to the jury on 
matters of law as well as fact: 
that I may speak in my own behalfunto the jury, my countrymen, upon 
whose consciences, integrity and honesty, my life, and the lives and 
liberties of the honest men of this nation, now lies; who are in law 
judges of law as well as fact, and you [i.e., the court] only the 
pronouncers of their sentence, will and mind ... 
Lord Keble: Master Lilburne, quietly express yourself, and you do 
well; the jury are judges of matter of fact altogether, and Judge Coke 
says so: But I tell you the opinion of the Court, they are not judges of 
matter of law. 
Lilburne: The jury by law are not only judges of fact, but of law also: 
and you that call yourselves judges of the law, are no more but Norman 
intruders; and in deed and in truth, if the jury please, are no more but 
ciphers, to pronounce their verdict. 67 
It is difficult to find a source for this remarkable claim as it applied to 
the jury; it does not appear in the pre-1649 writings. 68 As it happened, it 
was Lilburne' s adoption of the role of defense counsel that occasioned his 
invocation of the jury's right to judge matters of law. Had the court 
acceded to Lilburne's extraordinary claim to counsel, he might never 
have made his claim to a jury right, although he could have hoped to 
provoke a debate on the law between his own counsel and the 
government's attorney, a debate which the jury might then have resolved 
by its verdict, with or without the approval of the bench. Lilburne's 
jury-right claim was, in part, couched in the familiar terms of the Norman 
Yoke theory. His judges were but "Norman intruders," agents of the 
usurper William and his successors. But what was Lilburne's conception 
of the pre-Conquest trial? Were there local "judges," or did jurors fill the 
"judicial" role? In their writings Lilburne and the other Leveller leaders 
had left their view of the original role of the jury unclear; there is only 
based than that it determined Lilburne did not "traiterously ... plot" to stir up revolution. 
(In his defense, Lilburne did not spare the jury the details of his acts of patriotism during the 
Civil War.) 
67. Ibid., p. 1379. Note Keble's use of the word "ciphers" earlier in the proceedings 
(ibid., p. 1314): "You [Lilburne] would make yourself judge in your own cause, which you 
are not, and so make ciphers of us." 
68. Hill (Puritanism and Revolution, p. 77) notes that, on an earlier occasion, Henry 
Marten "told [his] jury to put their hats on in court, to demonstrate the fact that they were 
'the Chief Judges in the Court,' and the judges inferior to them.'' But it is not clear that this 
meant judges of law; Marten may have been insisting upon the jurors' right to make 
untrammeled determinations of fact. 
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occasional indication that they believed that pre-Conquest jurors were 
"judges. " 69 
We may learn something of the nature ofLilburne's theory of jury right 
from his ensuing colloquy with the bench. Lilburne turned the court's 
attention to his copy of Coke's Commentarie upon Littleton, which he 
had with him throughout the trial. The first page he quoted related to the 
assize of novel disseisin: "In this case the recognitors of the assize may 
say and render to the justices their verdict at large upon the whole 
matter. "7o This practice, Lilburne asserted, was common in "all actions 
of trespass or assault, where the jury do not only judge of the validity of 
the proof of the fact, but also the law, by assigning what damages they 
think just. "71 Moreover, he noted, Coke stated that verdicts might be 
general or special, and Littleton observed: "Also in such case, where the 
inquest may give their verdict at large, if they will take upon them the 
knowledge of the law, upon the matter they may give their verdict 
generally. " 72 Coke, Lilburne stated, supported Littleton on this point. 
This, and only this, was the case that Lilburne put at his trial for his claim 
that jurors were judges of the law. His closing speech dealt with disputed 
questions of fact (the date of publications alleged to be his; the testimony 
of the witnesses; his intent), and assertions that his treatment, from the 
time of his arrest until the closing moments of his trial, prevented him 
from making a proper defense. Toward the end, he repeated his claim to 
the right of the jury to judge law as well as fact, again in the course of a 
protest against the absence of counsel. 73 
The bench thought little of Lilburne's jury-right assertions. They 
dismissed his contention without addressing themselves to it. Keble's 
reply to Lilburne' s citations from Coke was blunt: "You have spent a 
little time, but you have done yourself no good; I thought you had 
understood the law better than I see you do. "74 According to the 
surviving record, the bench was content to let the matter drop, as 
Lilburne turned immediately to matters of fact and thereafter made only 
rhetorical reference to the jury right. 
The court may have considered Lilburne's jury-right claim too in-
substantial to require rebuttal. At most, Lilburne had pointed out that 
where there were "mixed" questions of law and fact, the jury was 
permitted to apply the law to the facts as it found them. It is difficult to 
believe that Lilburne was unaware that the civil jury to which Coke was 
69. See above, n. 36 and accompanying text. 
70. State Trials, 4:1381 (Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 366). 
71. Idem. 
72. Idem (Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 368). 
73. Ibid., pp. 1382-1401. 
74. Ibid., p. 1381. 
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referring was subject to attaint for mistaking the law. Surely nothing he 
read out suggested either that judges might not charge juries on the law or 
that juries might with impunity disregard judicial charges. Actually, 
Lilburne had disregarded Coke's contrary views in the very source from 
which he read to the court. At the end of Littleton's short statement on 
juries in cases of novel disseisin, from which Lilburne had drawn his first 
citation, Coke had appended his famous dictum: judges, not juries, are to 
respond to questions of law; juries, notjudges, are to rule on questions of 
fact.75 In counterpoint to Littleton's most general statement about jury 
verdicts, the last to be cited by Lilburne (and the one Lilburne appeared 
to find most helpful), Coke had immediately juxtaposed: "Although the 
jury, if they will take upon them (as Littleton here says) the knowledge of 
the law, may give a general verdict, yet it is dangerous for them so to do, 
for if they do mistake the law, they run into the danger of an attaint. 
... "76 Lilburne had in fact read to the court from Coke's comment, but 
only so far as the words "general verdict"; on the matter of attaint, he 
had remained silent. 
Lilburne's assertion regarding the jury right remained merely rhetori-
cal, not surprisingly since there was no basis at English common law for 
the proposition that jurors were the only judges of law, and barely any 
that they might take their own knowledge of the law as their guide. 
Moreover, Lilburne did not distinguish civil and criminal cases. He found 
nothing in the law books that diminished the authority of the bench in the 
conduct of jury trials, though it was at least in part from his disrespect for 
judges that his inspiration regarding jurors was derived. He quoted out of 
context, in what the bench must have taken to be an outrageous fashion. 
Finally, Lilburne gave the jury little direction on those questions of law he 
apparently meant them to take upon themselves. He seems to have 
wanted the jury to find unlawful the entire proceeding, especially the 
standard refusal of counsel, and to acquit him on that account: Lilburne 
did not at this juncture specifically allege that the law on which he was 
indicted was void, due either to its substance or to the procedure 
attending its passage. He seems to have stood on his initial argument 
concerning the number of witnesses required in cases of treason, and he 
may have wanted to argue the law of intent. These were weak reeds, but 
perhaps they were among the issues of law on which his "countrymen" 
were to pass their judgment. n 
And pass judgment they did. Lilburne's jury took less than an hour to 
find him not guilty. Brailsford has described the ensuing scene: 
75. Coke, Commentarie upon Littleton, p. 366. 
76. Ibid., p. 368. 
77. See above, nn. 63-66 and accompanying text. 
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The jury were then discharged, and through the cheering multitudes 
Major-General Skippon escorted the prisoner back to the Tower. The 
very soldiers who guarded him shouted for joy .... At the Fleet Bridge 
the people lit bonfires .... As the evening wore on, the church bells 
rang out and bonfires sprang up all over the City, while the people in 
their thousands shouted and drank and feasted in the streets. 78 
In honor of the jury a medal was soon struck bearing their names, 
Lilburne's portrait, and an inscription: "John Lilburne, saved by the 
power of the Lord and the integrity of his jury, who are judge of law as 
well as fact. " 79 At least in London, events had given prominence to 
Lilburne's invocation to his jury, whatever the common man took its 
meaning to have been. 
The weakness of Lilburne's jury-right claim must have been apparent 
to many contemporaries. Certainly it was apparent to lawyer Henry 
Parker, a proponent of moderate law reform, who launched a powerful 
attack on Lilburne in his tract, A Letter of Due Censure, published in the 
spring of 1650.80 (Parker's tract took no account ofthe recently published 
Judges Judged, the first of John Jones's two tracts in defense of Lilburne. 
That tract and Jones's second one-a reply to Parker-will be considered 
together in the next section.) Parker made short work of Lilburne's 
''authorities'': 
All that is affirmed by Littleton and Coke is this, that in some cases the 
inquest may render a verdict at large upon the whole matter .... In the 
application of these authorities, you rush hastily upon three gross 
errors. For first you strain these authorities to all cases and questions 
of law, whether easy or uneasy whatsoever, and this cannot be done 
without manifest violence to the words of your authors. Secondly, you 
strain these authorities to all jurors whatsoever, whether they have 
knowledge of the law, or not. ... Thirdly ... you infer: therefore the 
judges are mere ciphers, therefore the judges have no right or power 
to deliver their judgments, therefore the determination of the judges is 
no way forcible or obliging. This is a non sequitur. For though the 
verdict be given in upon the whole matter, and so enclose law as well 
as fact, yet the binding force of the verdict, as to matter oflaw, may be 
derived from the sanction and ratification of the judges, not from the 
jurisdiction of the inquest. And it may well be supposed, that the jurors 
may err in matter of law, in which case the judges must alter the 
erroneous verdict by a contrary judgment. 81 
78. Brailsford, Levellers and the English Revolution, p. 602. 
79. Ibid., p. 603. 
80. Henry Parker, A Letter of Due Censure (London, June 21, 1650), [B.L.: E. 603(14)]. 
81. Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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Parker excoriated Lilburne for belittling his judges and mocked him for 
setting up his jurors above the bench. Among the "common tradesmen, 
and husbandmen, such as ordinarily [are] empanelled, there is not one of 
a thousand that understands law in a point of any intricacy. "82 Lilburne, 
Parker retorted, had concluded that ''judges, because they understand the 
law, are to be degraded.' '83 
These were all points well taken. Lilburne appears foolish to have taken 
his stand on Coke, and the reliance on civil cases made his invocation of 
jurors' knowledge of law all too suspect. But Lilburne was headed in 
another direction. His claims were based not upon existing law or jury 
practice, but upon what he conceived to be his heritage, his birthright. 
They were claims upon "good law" and upon a tradition of resistance to 
longstanding adulterations of that law.84 Although Lilburne did not 
elaborate the point, the jury right was a claim-an aphorism-based on 
the Levellers' political theory. If Lilburne' s claim is viewed in the light of 
the Levellers' understanding of England before the Conquest, that claim 
gains considerably in force and content. 
HI 
Lilburne's aphorism was given specific meaning in the two most 
detailed and interesting of the Interregnumjury tracts, The Judges Judged 
and Jurors Judges, written in 1650 by John Jones. 85 These tracts were at 
once commentaries on Lilburne's 1649 trial and attacks on Coke's version 
of the history of the criminal trial jury. Jones's writings, which contained 
the most important discussion and analysis of trial by jury in England 
before the Restoration, built upon Leveller historical learning and politi-
82. Ibid., p. 24. 
83. Ibid., p. 21. 
84. See The Second Part of the Trial/ of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn (London, Dec. I, 1649), 
[B.L.: E. 598(12)], written by Clement Walker with Lilburne's help (see Frank, The 
Levellers, p. 227). The author(s) claim that in the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton 
("Throg-Morton") in 1554 "the jury took upon themselves to be judges of law as well as 
fact, and against the will and minds of all the judges acquitted the prisoner, and at the Bar 
justified their verdict and would not revoke it. ... Without doubt ... Lilburne had seriously 
read over that notable trial of ... Throgmorton, in whose very steps he treads, in making 
his application to the jury, as the absolute guardians and judges of his life, as he in Queen 
Mary's time did" (pp. 27-28). Lilburne had probably found the account of Throckmorton's 
trial in Holinshed. See Raphael Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland 
(orig. published ca. 1579, 6 vols., London, 1808), vol. 4, pp. 31-55. In Holinshed's account, 
Throckmorton told the jury that the statutes applied in his case were not according to God's 
law (p. 54), but in his final statement to the jury he did not directly appeal to them as judges 
of law (p. 55). 
85. John Jones, Judges Judged Out of Their Own Mouthes (London, May 6, 1650), [B.L.: 
E. 1414(1)]; Jurors Judges of Law and Fact (London, Aug. 2, 1650), [B.L.: E. 1414(2)]. 
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cal theory. Although Jones was not, strictly speaking, a Leveller, his 
works reveal the radical implications of the Leveller position.s6 
In Judges Judged, Jones labored to demonstrate that the later medieval 
monarchs had overturned a system of local determination of pleas in 
which the original royal justices in eyre had played a crucial and popular 
part. This historiographical tour de force, based upon an intricate and 
novel argument, developed more systematically than any other contribu-
tion to the Norman Yoke tradition an attack on the Westminster judiciary 
in general and on Sir Edward Coke in particular. 
Are not all the people of England disseised of their freehold, liberties, 
franchises, and free customs, when they are deprived of that justice 
which they ought to have administered amongst them at home by virtue 
of the King's writs ... directed to sheriffs of their own choice, in their 
own counties or stewards of hundreds, and courts baron, in their 
precincts, where the free-holders themselves are judges themselves, by 
ancient common-laws, and customs of England, before Magna Charta 
and by it declared, and confirmed unto them as aforesaid?S7 
The answer to this rhetorical question was obvious. 
But how had the original system of justice lapsed? King's Bench, Jones 
argued, had imposed itself upon the system of popular justice. The critical 
turning point in the history of the judicial system, according to Jones, 
began with the failure of King's Bench to follow up on indictments before 
sheriffs and itinerant justices that had not led to trial and punishment 
before justices in eyre. The Statute Articuli Super Cartas (1300) sought to 
remedy this situation.88 It provided, said Jones, for temporary commis-
sions to royal justices, the later justices of trailbaston, who were 
empowered to act on their own discretion in pursuing indictments that had 
not been prosecuted. The result of this series of events was the under-
mining of the justices in eyre. This was doubly unfortunate. First, the 
justices in eyre had not been responsible for the original defects; the fault 
lay with King's Bench, which had failed to ensure the making of 
indictments. Moreover, Jones asserted, the justices in eyre had never 
been entrusted with discretion to decide whether fines or imprisonment 
86. Veal! (Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 103) describes Jones as a pamphleteer 
"sympathetic to the Levellers." My discussion places Jones as a critic of contemporary 
lawyers and legal practices, whose historical account of the bench and jury has much in 
common with Leveller notions about the source of human rights, the delegation of authority, 
and the constraints on the power of delegates. In the main, I believe that on these issues 
Jones was elaborating on Leveller thought in a way that the leading Leveller writers (who 
admittedly did not themselves speak with a single voice) would have approved, at least as 
of 1649-50. 
87. Judges Judged, p. 36. 
88. Stat. 28 Edw. I. 
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ought to be imposed. The grant of that power to royal justices in 
Westminster represented an unwelcome shift of power away from the 
local community. The final stage, regular and routine trial by royal 
justices of gaol delivery, destroyed whatever vestiges of the old, locally 
based system had persisted into the fourteenth century.s9 
Jones argued that, unlike King's Bench, the justices in eyre predated 
Magna Carta and were confirmed by that document. 9o Further, the 
justices were "chosen by the people,"91 a conclusion Jones drew from 
Coke's assertion that "[o]fficers or ministers ... for execution of justice 
... were ... chosen in full and open county, by the freeholders ... , ''92 
which in reality referred to sheriffs, keepers of the peace, and coroners, 
but not, of course, to justices in eyre. Jones read Magna Carta's 
prescription "that all offenders ought to be amerced by their equals, 
according to the quantity of their trespass" to have given freemen the 
power, in county court, before sheriffs or justices of local choosing, to 
determine fines and sentences of imprisonment. Jones purported to have 
understood this system to have predated Magna Carta, and· in its 
essentials to have predated Henry II. He berated Coke for failing to 
acknowledge the seniority of the justices in eyre to the more recent King's 
Bench, ascribing Coke's view to "spite and envy." 
And where, in this leaf, he would persuade the people to suspect 
justices in eyre of corruption and of monopolizing justice to wrong the 
people that chose them, can the people believe that these justices (who 
are to be chosen by them, and to be displaced by them, when and as 
often as they see cause) will, or can wrong them more than those 
chosen by the King and his servants, without their consent, unless they 
can believe that they may be persuaded to give their consent to wrong 
themselves ?93 
Finally, Jones argued that the Crown had duplicitously turned the 
Statute Articuli on its head. The statute's provision to supply justice 
"where no remedy was before," he asserted, had in fact been intended to 
give justices in eyre power to move against the king's servants in 
Westminster, who had failed to give force to the original system. The 
justices in eyre were supposed to remain an instrument of the people; 
their jurisdiction was to extend beyond enquiring into offenders against 
the laws-they were now to hear of the failure of royal justices to execute 
89. Ibid., pp. 75-82. 
90. Ibid., p. 79. 
91. Idem. 
92. Idem; Sir Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 
(3rd ed., London, 1669), fol. 558. 
93. Judges Judged, p. 80. 
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upon the people's indictments and assignments of punishment. Coke's 
interpretation of the statute had supported that of the Crown, which, 
Jones argued, turned the mandate of Parliament against the people's 
courts and judges, and instead concentrated all judicial power in the 
hands of royal servants, the justices of King's Bench-a concentration of 
power to which Coke was himself heir.94 
Jones's use of historical evidence was, to say the least, amateurish and 
manipulative. He primarily depended upon Coke's flawed account, which 
he reworked to suit his own point of view. The immediate target of 
Jones's attack was the Commonwealth bench. Rather than reject the 
entire history of the royal judiciary, Jones sought to divorce the early 
period of the eyre system from its successor stages. In this lay his 
originality, a flight of fancy that led to ludicrous conclusions: the hated 
eyres, whose justices were the scourge of the countryside, appeared in 
Jones's account as popular visitations to local tribunals whose ancient 
and definitive powers continued unabated, before whom fines and 
amercements were imposed by "equals," as ordered by Magna Carta. 
Judicial history had been rewritten in a way that actually glorified one of 
its darker moments.9s 
Jones's version of legal history after the Conquest deemphasized the 
importance of the Conquest itself and thus did not depend so heavily as 
some other accounts on the sparse Anglo-Saxon evidence. Unlike 
Lilburne's or later versions, it conceded a role for royal justices, while 
accounting for their authority in such a way as to make them agents of the 
people. Nevertheless, this elaborate attack on Coke and on the 
Westminster bench shared a central objective with the Leveller writings 
of the late 1640s: the resurrection and strengthening of the imaginary 
"original" jury system at the expense of the bench. Jones's history of the 
judiciary was in fact a history of the jury system, and it promoted two of 
the most important aims of the radical reform movement, the de-
centralization of legal institutions and the conferral upon the jury of 
control over the law. Jones's tract distorted history in the service of a 
theory of a community-based system of law and legal administration. 
In Jurors Judges of Law and Fact Jones turned his attention more 
directly to the question of the role of the jury .96 This essay, published in 
August of 1650, filled in his historical account of the judiciary by 
94. Ibid., pp. 79-82. 
95. See above, Chapter I, text at n. 43, for a discussion of the judicial eyre. 
96. See above, n. 85. In Judges Judged, Jones had written about the jurors as judges of 
fact: "Are not men's lives triable for matter of fact, and not of law (except treasons that 
reach to thoughts?) Are not jurors the judges of matters of fact? What great learning, or 
experience in law is requisite for a judge to pronounce the sentence of death, where the 
verdict has determined the life?" (p. 27). 
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describing (once again in details drawn largely from Coke) the powers of 
jurors who gave evidence before royal officials. The tract also set forth a 
theory oflaw that substantiated Leveller claims. The occasion for Jones's 
tract on jurors was the publication in June of Henry Parker's A Letter of 
Due Censure, which attacked Lilburne's arguments to the jury in his trial 
of the preceding year.97 Jones replied to Parker: 
In the next place, where you say Mr. Lilburne promoted his twelve 
men to a new jurisdiction: I am sure, that is another lie of yours, for 
you may read in the Lord Coke's Institutions upon the thirty-fifth 
chapter of Magna Charta that county courts, courts baron, sheriff's 
tourns, and leets were in use before King Alfred's time; in all of which 
courts the jurors were the judges, and their then untra versable verdicts 
were the judgments in all causes; and sheriffs and stewards, who were 
the King's commissary judges in their tourns, and leets, ... were and 
still are but the suitors' clerks in counties, hundreds and courts baron, 
to enter their judgments, and do execution thereupon by themselves 
and their bailiffs, as public servants, or ministers of common justice, to 
their jurors, and the rest of the Commonwealth.98 
Jones's account oflegal institutions in the period before King's Bench and 
its circuit justices took control of all felonies managed to jumble public 
and private courts, criminal trials and view offrankpledge, local and royal 
officials, and, indeed, prefeudal and feudal England. All judicial proceed-
ings, Jones asserted, culminated in the "untraversable" verdicts of 
jurors, verdicts that were attended and later executed by royal officials.99 
That such officials had no power save that of execution and that such 
power involved no discretionary aspects was clear in Jones's mind. 
Indeed, these were propositions that flowed from the nature and sources 
of legal command: 
And what is dissenting, or not assenting to jurors' verdicts, but a 
denial, which is more than a failure of justice, for the speeding whereof 
they [i.e., the judges] may have no negative voice; for ordinary 
jurisdiction that was the Supreme One that gave the sovereign (which 
is superior to every singular person) to Kings (as now to the keepers of 
the liberties of England); there is still the superlative jurisdiction 
beyond all comparison, that can be inferior to no authorities, but God's 
that gave it to his people, to his children, not to be given by them to any 
above them in their generalities, but himself, from whom they have 
received, and to whom they must restore themselves and all that is 
theirs, but to be contrived, and substituted by them unto the worthiest 
97. Parker, A Letter of Due Censure. 
98. Jurors Judges, pp. 24--25. 
99. Idem. 
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men amongst them, to be employed for and under them, as they might 
find most convenient for their worldly peace and subordinate govern-
ment; to which end they deputed kings, as now the Parliament hath 
done keepers of the liberties of England, reserving so much of their 
ancient ordinary jurisdiction to freemen, that none but such may be 
jurors, and none but such may be their judges for their lives, lands, and 
estates. And therefore as the keepers of our liberties are subordinate to 
the Parliament, so are their commissaries to them, and both in their 
judgments, to the verdicts of the jurors, which [are] their true saying of 
the whole matter, as well for law, as fact.JOo 
All that remained was the power, and duty, of execution, for which legal 
orders-writs de procedendo ad judicium, attachment, and compulsion to 
execute-were provided. The remedy of attaint was also available to the 
prosecution or the defendant, Jones announced, but it gained its force and 
effect only through the verdict (on law as well as fact) of a subsequent 
jury.tot 
It was this system of jury domination of the law, Jones argued, that 
later and unwarranted extensions of power to royal justices undermined. 
The original and total jurisdiction of jurors derived from God's grant of 
divine command to the people. All power was thereafter delegated by the 
people, through monarchs, their agents, to royal officials. Jurors were 
more "ancient" than such officials and retained full power over the law; 
as officialdom grew, embroiled itself in civil wars, and changed its form, 
"always the freemen judged their neighbors constantly." to2 Until, i.e., 
the destruction of justices in eyre by the Westminster bench. Thereafter 
the history of the judiciary was the history of the usurpation of a power 
implanted in the people by God. It was an account of a changing structure 
of officialdom, of centralization, and of waning local judicial institutions, 
that, by the seventeenth century, had produced a perversion of justice: 
But how many true men have been hanged, and thieves saved by 
judges interposing, and obtruding their pestiferous pretended learning 
and experience in their laws between the weak consciences of ignorant 
jurors, and the truth? Which kind of jurors they make sheriffs return for 
such purposes, when they may have such returned as know the facts, 
and have sounder learning and experience in express law than them-
selves.103 
100. Ibid., pp. 32-35 (emphasis added). 
101. Ibid., pp. 35, 44. 
102. Ibid., p. 47. See also ibid., pp. 49 et seq., for Jones's challenge to Parker's assertion 
that "mechanics, bred up illiterately to handicrafts" were not capable of understanding the 
law. 
103. Judges Judged, p. 27. Jones's (surprising) remark about thieves suggests that, 
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IV 
Jones's history ended where the jury debate had begun: the complaints 
about judicial packing and badgering of juries that arose just before the 
creation of the Commonwealth. Jones resorted to historical discussion in 
order to counter the view that Lilburne' s defense was based upon a 
fictional jury right. According to Jones, the right to jury trial was ancient 
and had never wholly been taken away, though its true purpose had been 
undermined by the development of the judiciary. Not only was jury trial 
ancient, but through usage and through that compilation of good usage, 
Magna Carta, it had been confirmed as one of the liberties of Englishmen. 
It was, however, more than one of the fundamental liberties. The very 
existence of jury trial, and the scope of the jurors' power, rested 
ultimately on the source of law. God had granted to the people-to the 
community-knowledge of his law. Though the people had, in turn, 
delegated ministerial functions to officials, judicial responsibility had been 
retained by the community; the jurors declared and applied the law in 
judging their fellows. Judicial badgering usurped the people's right and 
duty not only to find fact but to decide the law. To the people, as the 
source of knowledge of the true law, fell the responsibility to interpret the 
law. In this theory lay the originality and power of Jones's version of 
radical jury ideology. 
At first glance, Jones's concept of the source of law does not seem a 
radical departure from Interregnum political theory. Even the most 
fervent republicans, who accorded absolute power to parliamentary edict, 
would have agreed that statute represented an application of divinely 
inspired reason by delegates of the people. The striking feature of Jones's 
view, however, was its insistence that the power of ultimate declaration 
of the law had not been delegated-not, at least, that declaration oflaw to 
be made in the context of judgment by peers. Presumably such judgment 
would by its nature conform to the essence of statutory pronouncement, 
but the latter was a collateral lawmaking process, less fundamental and 
less pure precisely because it was the by-product of the delegation of 
authority to enact law on divine command. 
Establishment political theory developed the notion of delegation much 
further than Jones (and perhaps the more radical Levellers) allowed. 
Prudence-divinely inspired reason, Commonwealth officials might have 
said-dictated that because the law was by nature complex, its interpreta-
tion was beyond the lay mind. Consistency, fairness, and adherence to 
legislative intent required the knowledgeable guidance of the judge. The 
despite his strong reliance on Scripture, he was not among those who opposed the death 
penalty for theft-at least not in some kinds of cases. 
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people's legislative representatives had spoken in the framing of laws; 
what remained was the interpretation of those laws by trained legal 
minds. Jurors therefore had nothing to do with law; their province was 
solely the finding of fact. 
In an attempt to defend Lilburne's claim regarding the right and duty of 
the trial jury, Jones drew upon ideas in Leveller writings of the late 1640s, 
making explicit for the first time the implications of those ideas. For most 
Levellers, as we have seen, the institution of the bench and its role in 
stating the law was a given. They shared Jones's view of the source and 
nature of law and seem to have gone well beyond the official notion of the 
jury's role in their discussion of verdicts according to conscience. But 
they had subsumed the jury's interpreting of legal mandate and its doing 
of discretionary justice within the fact-finding process. 104 Jones spoke for 
all the Levellers when he articulated the relationship between jury 
verdicts and ultimate justice but only for some in his denial of a 
law-declaring role for the bench. History and theory mandated for Jones 
a conclusion that logic supported but did not necessitate. In reality, we 
have seen, judge and jury shared the law-finding power that traditional 
legal theory gave exclusively to the bench. So long as the bench accepted 
even discretionary, merciful jury verdicts as though they were purely 
findings on fact, the fact-finding process remained relatively open-ended 
and the Leveller discussion of the role of conscience and just deserts 
could be understood as a commentary upon that process. Disagreement 
might arise concerning the considerations appropriate to the finding of 
fact, but disagreement need not take the form of a debate over the 
legitimacy of the traditional law/fact dichotomy. 
Lilburne's trial and Jones's tracts, however, made it difficult to view 
Leveller thought as concerned only with fact-finding. They brought the 
latent law-finding tendencies of Leveller writings to the surface, thereby 
seemingly connecting Leveller political and social thought to a theory of 
the trial that threatened governmental control over law and legal proceed-
ings. Through Jones's tracts we may better understand not only the 
implications of Lilburne' s claims but also how far those claims and the 
tendencies of the pre-1650 radical law tracts, even those with a conven-
tional view of institutional arrangements, must have suggested a revolu-
tion in the administration of criminal law. 
At base, the most radical theory of jury trial clashed with the Cokeian 
view on the issues of delegation and the nature, if not the original source, 
of law. The Levellers insisted that law was not inherently complex; in 
criminal trials it was just a matter of right and wrong. Law came to the 
104. See above, nn. 39-41 and accompanying text. See, however, James Frese, A Second 
Why Not, p. viii. 
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mind and conscience of the simplest man. The very nature of law 
presumed judgment by peers in accordance with standards comprehen-
sible to the defendant. Jury trial was not to be formed in the image of 
enacted laws; rather, enacted laws were to conform to the logic and 
purpose of trial by jury. The more they did so, the more they would 
become simple and direct expressions of reason based on divine com-
mand.Jos 
Simple, direct expressions of reason: such were the worldly embodi-
ments of God's law. If only the common law might be reduced to that 
form. There was, of course, an available source for determination of right 
and wrong and of the punishment appropriate to specific wrongful acts: 
Jones and most of the Levellers were ready to advert to the Scriptures. 
But what constituted commission even of those wrongs? When was there 
malice in the heart? That mixed question of law and fact required 
interpretation, an application of reason to the facts and, thus, a judgment 
according to divine inspiration. In short, it was within the province of the 
jury. There had been a time, so the theory ran, when the jury functioned 
in its purest form, before the growth of a meddling judiciary, and while 
laws were yet in the language of the people and were pronounced publicly 
by the wisest in the hundred moot. Those were the days of the vindication 
of God's law, as that law was meant to be vindicated. Now the 
post-Reformation Church had once again been purified, stripped of its 
diverting ritual, its members brought close to God. The importance both 
of the relationship between man and God and of the ongoing process by 
which men achieved an understanding of the meaning of God's will had 
been affirmed: each person would read, comprehend, and interpret 
Scripture for himself. Thus could the common law now be purified, 
returned to its original form and meaning, made conformable to the 
essence of Scripture. Like the Anglo-Saxon "lawmen," the latter-day 
jurors would come to know and interpret the law. Judgment would be 
passed as the conscience directed.J06 
"Conscience," of course, embodied the community's sense of justice. 
Only the community could know the particular nature of the actor and his 
deed. Legal decentralization meant less expense and delay, greater 
freedom from judicial interposition; but it also meant community control 
and a resurrection of the true jury of neighbors. It meant as well 
vindication of the community's sense of justice as guided by its knowl-
edge of the defendant and his act, and as guided by its understanding of 
law. Thus were the most radical legal minds radical purifiers. Their vision 
105. Schenk, Concern for Justice in the Puritan Revolution, pp. 78-79. 
106. See Hill, Puritanism and Revolution, p. 81, for discussion of the importance of the 
translation of the Bible into simple and direct language. 
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of the true English society imagined a pre-Conquest community of Puritan 
freemen, equal in the eyes of God, whose judgments they passed upon 
their peers gone astray .101 
So read, the arguments of the radical Levellers augured a truly 
decentralized system of criminallaw. 108 Not only would trials be local, 
but-as authorities especially might have perceived it-law itself would 
be local and no longer "common" in the original sense of that term. 
Moreover, the very purpose and nature of the legal system, as rep-
resented by the handful of most radical tracts, had little in common with 
the established understanding of that system. For the radicals, the 
criminal law was a matrix of community mores, to be imposed com-
munally-neighbors judging neighbors. Shared experiences and context 
would guarantee fairness. This system was corrective, perhaps in a 
therapeutic sense, or retributive, as in the Old Testament tradition. The 
radical reformers were not primarily concerned with a national crime 
wave, with judicial administration, or with interpretation and enforce-
ment of parliamentary statute. For them the criminal law was primarily a 
process of community self-identification and confirmation, and only 
second a system of rational self-defense. 
v 
Both Cromwell and the radical Levellers began with the Scriptures; 
their legal theories shared the same ultimate premise. For Cromwell, 
however, the exigencies of governance revealed the divine origins of 
delegation of authority to the Godly Magistrate. The criminal trial jury 
was a tool devised and employed by the Magistrate. It informed him in the 
use of his wisdom but only in a most limited sense. It comes as no surprise 
that Interregnum law reform conceded the existence of juries but not 
much more. Between 1652 and 1655, during the period in which the Hale 
Commission was active and after the publication of nearly all of the 
radical Leveller pamphlets, the government entertained proposals regard-
107. This I take to be the implication of Jones's account oflaw, community; and jury trial. 
I am bringing together a body of radical Leveller ideas in a way that not even Jones did in 
order to suggest what must have underlain Jones's view of the jury. It also seems to me that 
Jones saw in the jury the true embodiment of historical continuity-or the institution that 
retained the potential for vindicating God's law, the true theory of delegation, and the 
revival of England's "pure" society. Although the rights of Englishmen could be understood 
as "natural rights," they could also be identified with the original English society. See 
above, nn. 32, 33. 
108. Hill (Puritanism and Revolution, p. 81) states that the oft-repeated Leveller demand 
for trials in the county or hundred was "like the elevation of the jury over the judge ... an 
appeal from the existing state power to surviving vestiges of the old communal institutions.'' 
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ing jury composition and challenges to jurors, with the end of making the 
jury a more reliable system of fact-finding.Jo9 The reforms were based on 
the assumption that the judges found the law and that the judges were 
themselves tightly controlled agents of a centralized system. 
The law tracts ofthe early 1650s reveal the distance between the radical 
Leveller conception of the criminal trial jury and the perspective of 
moderate reform proponents. Though it was during this period that 
reform activity reached its height, it proceeded largely on establishment 
terms. The principal areas of reform interest included private law, equity, 
and court procedure. On the criminal side, the law of sanctions garnered 
most interest; and there was talk of gaol reform: even the most compla-
cent men of affairs knew a scandal when they saw one.uo 
The question of jury reform centered more often on the civil than on the 
criminal trial jury. The tracts resonate with the traditional concerns of 
men of property. Even the Levellers-men of property themselves-ll 1 
complained as much or more about the costs, delays, and inconveniences 
of private suits. Nevertheless, the criminal trial jury had come to 
symbolize the real testing point regarding lay participation in matters of 
government. The debate between Lilburne and Jones on the one hand, 
and Parker on the other, continued to reverberate even after the eclipse of 
the Leveller party. 
Parker himself continued to criticize the Levellers' program of de-
centralizatbn. In a tract on the resolution of "Cases Testamentary" 
Parker advocated reforms that would reduce the "surplusage of testa-
mentary business," but he opposed shifting the locus of litigation from 
Westminster to the provinces. Conceding that local litigation was "the old 
manner of jurisdiction, which was used in England long before the 
Norman Conquest," Parker asserted that England was no longer "a 
cantonized country" that "obeyed several petty princes." He attacked 
"that party which would cantonize us the second time" and thereby 
increase "quarrels and controversies." Parker's targets here were "il-
literate judges, and unexpert counsellors" rather than jurors who were 
109. The Commission's discussions of reform proposals are preserved in "Minutes of the 
Extra-Parliamentary Committee for regulating the law," B.L. MS Add. 35,863. Discussion 
of the jury (mostly civil) is at p. 41 (juror qualifications and methods of appointment), p. 65 
(jurors to value land for payment of debt), pp. 77-81 (juries to be retained in probate cases). 
I am most grateful for the help of Professor Cotterell, who kindly furnished me with a guide 
to these and other parts of the "Minutes." She corroborated my own conclusion that the 
Commission was attempting to strengthen the jury system by raising qualifications with 
regard both to economic status and to literacy. 
110. Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform, Chapter 6. 
111. Ibid., p. 100. 
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not up to the task.1 12 Other moderate reformers, however, did not spare 
the jury. Henry Robinson complained that ''most commonly one or two 
active and nimble-pated men oversway all the rest ... and too often for 
the worst." Moreover, they escaped punishment: 
If they give a corrupt or erroneous verdict, there cannot justly be any 
penalty inflicted on them, because they may pretend they did at first 
declare themselves unfit for such employment: that they undertook it 
unwillingly, but were compelled thereunto; and when they saw there 
was no avoiding it, they endeavored to proceed therein according to 
the uprightness of their own consciences; if they be thought to have 
done amiss, it was but what they could not remedy, and are heartily 
sorry for it. 113 
Robinson, whose main concern was with civil causes, preferred a 
county-based system with one judge for each hundred. The judge, who 
would not be elected by residents of the locale, so that he would not be 
"swayed with alliance," would decide cases without the use of ajury.114 
John March, who professed to respect the jury in civil and criminal cases 
as ''the most exact and equal way of trial in the world,'' pleaded for 
reform of the rules of qualification. 115 He sought ''twelve able understand-
ing gentlemen . . . such as are known in their country to be men of 
competent worth for so great an employment [i.e., jury service]." This 
would preserve the institution of the jury as ''the only judges of matters 
of fact." March resisted the notion that the jury ought to be closely 
directed by the judge. He acknowledged that juries were "weak and 
ignorant," but sincerely desired to see the institution strengthened. 
March believed jurors ought to "judge [fact] according to their own 
conscience"; they might ask the judge's advice but were not bound to do 
so, nor if they did ask were they "tied to follow it." 116 Only reform could 
save the virtues of the jury system, and that reform ought to deal with 
procedures for securing responsible (and respectable) jurors, not with the 
existing relationship between judge and jury. This was in fact the path of 
reform taken by the Hale Commission.m 
112. Henry Parker, Reformation in Courts, and Cases Testamentary (London, Nov. 14, 
1650), [B.L.: E. 616(5)], p. 7. 
113. Henry Robinson, Certain Considerations ... to a more speedy, cheap and equal/ 
distribution of Justice (London, Nov. 14, 1650), [B.L.: E. 616(2)), pp. 2-3. 
114. Ibid., p. ll. 
115. John March, Amicus Reipublicae. The Commonwealths Friend or An Exact and 
Speedie Course to Justice and Right (London, May 19, 1651), [B.L.: E. 1360(1)], p. 100. 
116. Ibid., pp. 104, 103, 102, 103. 
117. See "Several Draughts of Acts ... "(London, July 12, 1653), in A Collection of 
Scarce and Valuable Tracts (Somers' Tracts), 13 vols. (2nd ed., London, 1809-15), vol. 6 
(1811), pp. 218-19, § xxx-xxxiii. 
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The voices of radical trial jury proponents were still audible during 
these years, but barely so. Stripped of a movement-even, for a time, of 
a prominent leader-and with no foothold within the moderate law reform 
camp that dominated the work of the Hale Commission (whose own place 
within the councils of government was tenuous), radical jury proponents 
were left to aim their arguments and epithets at a deaf political establish-
ment. Walwyn's Juries Justified, the most significant jury tract to appear 
after the publication of Jones's writings and before Lilburne's 1653 trial, 
was a reply to Robinson's critique of the jury. Walwyn reiterated the 
Leveller historical position. Never one to accept all of Magna Carta 
uncritically, Walwyn distinguished its "superstitious" elements ("[that] 
are but as a French garb or clothing, which the Conqueror and his 
successors, by main strength, forced our forefathers to put on") from its 
"true English liberties" that had been "reduced into that excellent law 
... the Petition of Right, and wherein trials per juries is the principal." 11s 
Robinson was wrong, Walwyn asserted: there were "understanding fit 
men" in every hundred. Everything depended, of course, upon what one 
thought the nature of law and the jury's task ought to be. For Walwyn, the 
jury was to discern "right and wrong," what "an ordinary capacity 
(careful to keep a good conscience, and [one] that is tender of an oath) 
shall soon perceive the true state thereof; and be able to do right therein 
according to the evidence." 119 
Walwyn denied that one or two wrongheaded jurors could determine 
the outcome; the unanimity requirement prevented that. Moreover, he 
rebutted Robinson's charge that there was no penalty for a corrupt or 
erroneous verdict; the jury, he said, faced the possibility of an attain1.12o 
Perhaps Walwyn, like Robinson, had civil causes mainly in mind, for a 
controlled tone pervades Juries Justified. The issue was the right of the 
local community to resolve its own "causes and controversies" between 
private parties rather than to resolve those between society and an alleged 
criminal offender. 
Walwyn's renewal of the Norman Yoke theme was carried forward in 
early 1652 by several tracts. Their authors opposed the setting of a steep 
property qualification for jury service, which would "violate" the "fun-
damental constitution. "121 Causes were to be tried locally by people, to 
118. William Walwyn, Juries Justified: or, a Word of Correction to Mr. Henry Robinson 
(London, Dec. 2, 1651), [B.L.: E. 618(9)], p. 5. 
119. Ibid., pp. 4, 9. 
120. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
121. The Onely Right Rule for Regulating The Lawes and Liberties of the People of 
England (London, Jan. 28, 1652), [B.L.: E. 684(33)], p. 6. This tract also asserted "that until 
the Norman Conquest, the Nation never knew or felt the charge, trouble, or intanglements 
of judges, lawyers, attorneys, solicitors, filors, and the rest" (p. 5). See also To the Supreme 
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whom, in the words of one writer, "the laws shall be read by the minister 
... four times a year. " 122 In two of these tracts there was a distinctly 
religious tone reflecting the views of the radical religious reformers who 
had begun to figure more prominently than the remnant of the Leveller 
party .123 And there was, too, a shift of focus from the role of the jury to 
the appropriate sanctions for serious offenses. 124 Here the last voices of 
the Leveller movement melded with those of many Interregnum reform 
proponents. It had long been common, and even respectable, to oppose 
the imposition of capital punishment for theft. One had only to separate 
the question of who would control the determination of punishment from 
the matter of what that punishment ought to be to gain an ear among even 
the moderate proponents of law reform. 
The movement for reform of sanctions, which lasted until the closing 
years of the Interregnum, united those who believed that the criminal law 
ought to conform to scriptural command with those whose main concern 
was more practical-that, e.g., thieves, with little to lose, were more 
inclined to kill their victims so that they could not bear witness against 
them.12s The movement produced the first great burst of English penologi-
cal writing, which subsequently fed into Continental streams and re-
emerged in England a century later. 126 The English writings were them-
selves influenced by the early New England experience, where the ideas 
they expressed had been put into practice three decades before. In that 
setting, the administration of the criminal law was dominated by godly 
magistrates; the criminal trial jury played as yet a less significant role than 
it did in the parent country .127 The English experience, on the other hand, 
Authority, the Parliament of the Common-Wealth of England (London, June 29, 1652), 
[B.L.: 699 f. 16(54)]. 
122. Articles of High-Treason . .. against One Hundred and fifty Judges, Lawyers, and 
Attornies (London, Feb. 21, 1652), [B.L.: E. 655(10)], p. 8. For the Levellers this did not 
mean the most common people. As has often been said, the Diggers viewed the jury, even 
the Leveller version of it, as an instrument of the propertied classes. See, e.g., Veal!, 
Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 156. I suspect, however, that Winstanley's political 
(as opposed to religious) objections to the jury had more to do with the civil than the criminal 
jury (save perhaps for criminal cases involving trespass to land). 
123. Articles of High-Treason, p. 8. See also John Cook, Monarchy no Creature of Gods 
making (London, Feb. 26, 1652), [B.L.: E. 1238(1)]. Cook argued that law should be "that 
which the judicious and most learned men judge so to be, not the sense or judgment of any 
private man" (p. 34). See below, n. 125 and accompanying text. On religious radicalism and 
law reform see Shapiro, Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England, p. 290. 
124. E.g. The Onely Right Rule, p. 9; Articles of High Treason, p. 8. See above, n. 41 and 
accompanying text. 
125. For the movement to abolish the death penalty see Veall, Popular Movement for 
Law Reform, pp. 128-36. 
126. See below, Chapter 7, section III. 
127. See e.g. George L. Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts (New York, 
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was doubtless influenced by the fact of juries and jury behavior. Reform 
writers rarely referred to actual practice, but it is difficult to believe that 
they were not seeking to legitimize attitudes given daily expression in the 
courts of law, where judge and jury shared the power of mitigation 
generally and in cases of theft especially. 128 Moreover, most reformers 
were proposing an alternative sanction that accorded with prevailing 
notions of justice: imprisonment at hard labor, rehabilitation, and, above 
all, restitution.129 
Within this embryonic movement the contribution of the Levellers was 
distinctive. More than any other group, they connected the scriptural 
approach to sanctions with the role of the criminal trial jury .Bo We have 
seen that for many Levellers the apportioning of just deserts was integral 
to the fact-finding process. 131 After 1649 claims regarding the jury's duty 
to play this particular role melded with a broad-based assertion of the 
jury's right to find the law, a development that helped pave the way for 
Lilburne's 1653 defense. If the government would not reform the law of 
sanctions, or charge defendants at a level that accorded with justice, it 
was the jury's duty to intervene and to vindicate God's law on earth. 
In some important respects, Lilburne' s own position fell short of that of 
his most radical followers. Although his writings evidence a progression 
from his 1649 aphorism to a better defined position in 1653, they also 
suggest that he did not follow Jones in equating law with unmediated 
Scripture. Instead, he clung to the more traditional notion that English 
fundamental law was historically evolved but remained consistent with 
Scripture, and thus with a more traditional form of political and legal 
theory.m By 1653 the jury, for Lilburne, was the common political 
1960), pp. 118 et seq. The jury played an important role in felony cases, but these constituted 
a relatively small percentage of the cases before early and mid-seventeenth century colonial 
courts. 
128. See above, Chapter 4. 
129. On prison reform, rehabilitation, and restitution, see Veall, Popular Movement for 
Law Reform, pp. 132-37, and works cited therein. 
130. The "moderates" sought to rein in the jury; religious radicals sought to replace the 
common law with Scripture and frequently favored application of statute by a magistrate. 
See Shapiro, Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England, p. 290. 
131. See above, nn. 39-41 and accompanying text. 
132. I believe Parkin-Speer ("John Lilburne: a Revolutionary Interprets") would agree 
with this. See above, n. 63. See also Schenk, Concern for Social Justice in the Puritan 
Revolution, pp. 78-79. Schenk distinguishes the more radical Levellers from Lilburne with 
regard to the quest for equality, making a point similar to the one I have developed here: 
"The radical Levellers, inspired by beliefs derived from both books of the Scriptures and by 
various conceptions of a state of nature, envisaged a federation of small communities of 
neighbours, fairly equal in ownership and status, ruling themselves without the interference 
of professional magistrates or lawyers according to simple and well-known laws. This ideal 
... was not entirely absent from Lilburne's mind, but in his case it was obscured by his 
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denominator. That it was of the English people at large was as important 
as that it was of the local community. The people did not ab initio find the 
law; rather, they retained the ultimate authority to overturn a judicial 
ruling, indictment, or statute on the grounds that it did not accord with the 
substance or sanctions of the fundamental law. He had not yet in 1649 
formulated the argument, with specific reference to the jury, in just that 
way. He would do so four years later in what ultimately proved the most 
important of his trials. Then, in the shadows of Leveller defeat, he 
formulated an argument less radical than that of Jones and other propo-
nents of a purely scripturally based and jury-found law but one that was 
to outlive the Cromwellian period. 133 
VI 
Lilburne's 1649 trial suggested an expansion of the jury's function, 
thereby giving direction to Leveller and other early Interregnum political 
writings on law and legal institutions; his trial in 1653 produced a more 
enduring argument respecting the jury, one that survived among dis-
sidents and reappeared a decade later in the aftermath of the Restoration. 
Lilburne returned to England in June of 1653 after two years of a 
perpetual banishment imposed upon him in 1651 by parliamentary stat-
ute.B4 According to the terms of the statute, by returning Lilburne 
subjected himself to arrest, trial (to determine whether it was the real 
John Lilburne who had returned), and, potentially, sentence of death.t35 
By the time of his return, Cromwell had dissolved the Rump Parliament, 
and Lilburne, still a popular figure around whom political opposition to 
the regime might coalesce, evidently hoped that his statutory judgment 
would similarly be dissolved.B6 Lilburne believed the statute to be void, 
an unlawful attainder passed upon him ex parte and without trial on the 
grounds of his alleged slander (against the privileges of a member of 
Parliament) of Sir Arthur Haselrig and the Committee of Haberdashers' 
Hall.m It is ironic that the most feared political opponent of the 
preoccupation with purely political reforms and the limitations of his desire for equality. 
Lilburne's chief aim, we might sum up, was equality before the law; that of his more radical 
friends, equality established by law." 
133. For an interesting discussion of the mid-l650s jury debate, local politics, and jury 
selection see Stephen Roberts, "Jury Vetting in the Seventeenth Century," History Today, 
vol. 33 (Feb., 1982), pp. 25-29. 
134. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 321-23. 
135. State Trials, 5:408-9. 
136. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 320; Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform, p. 165. 
137. John Lilburne, A Second Address directed to his Excellency the Lord Cromwell 
(London, June 16, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(20)): "Parliament in the said Act did not judge your 
petitioner an offender according to any law in being."; "(T]he said Act is a law made after 
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Cromwellian regime had been placed in extremis because of his remarks 
opposing the resolution of a case involving the sequestration as royalist 
property of a Lilburne family colliery .13s The statutory judgment, the 
basis for the 1653 trial, proved to be crucial to the shaping both of 
Lilburne's defense and of his theory of the jury's right to decide questions 
oflaw. The development of this theory marked the third, and final, phase 
of the Interregnum jury debate. 
Lilburne's defense and the surrounding pamphlet literature, which he 
publicized on his own behalf between the time of his return and arrest in 
mid-June and his acquittal in mid-August, dealt both with the allegedly 
unconstitutional nature of the statute of banishment and with the in-
equitable and, hence, unlawful sentence of death for a minor crime.l39 
The defense was anticipated in a remarkable tract, A Jury-man's Judge-
ment upon the Case of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn, which was written 
anonymously (but likely by Lilburne himself) and published within a week 
of Lilburne's arrest. By subtitle the tract purported to prove to "every 
jury-man's conscience" that he "may not, cannot, ought not find 
[Lilburne] guilty upon the Act of Parliament"; to do so would make a 
juror a murderer "by the law of England. "14o 
Addressed to "my dear friends and loving countrymen," A Jury-man's 
Judgement warned that it was necessary to "consider things very well 
beforehand, and come substantially furnished and provided with sound 
and well-grounded consciences," lest one be called upon to serve and 
then to find himself, from "fear, hope or favor," a murderer. 
[E]xcept we are fully satisfied in our consciences, that [Lilburne] has 
committed ... some crime, which in the known law of England and the 
very nature of the offence is felony, and justly deserves to die for it, 
with what conscience can any of us pronounce him guilty? ... [N]o, 
the law of England has not placed trials by juries to stand between men 
the fact is done."; "[Y]our petitioner was not tried with liberty of defense."; "[T]hat 
sentence is not proportionable to the offense." 
138. Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 305-11. 
139. E.g. Humble Petition of divers well-affected people including the Cities of London, 
Westminster . .. (London, June 24, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(24)); To the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of England. The Humble Petition of many grieved People ... (London, July 
26, 1653), [B.L.: 669 f. 17(35)]; [John Lilburne], Lieut. Col. John Lilburn's Plea in Law (2nd 
ed., London, July 2, 1653), [B.L.: E. 703 (12)); John Lilburne, Malice detected (London, 
July 15, 1653), [B.L.: E. 705(19)); Lilburne, The Exceptions of John Lilburne . .. To A Bill 
of Indictment (London, July 16, 1653), [B.L.: E. 705(20)); Oyes, Oyes, Oyes (London, July 
30, 1653), [B.L.: E. 708(7)); Lilbume, The Upright Mans Vindication. See Gregg, Free-Born 
John, p. 326, and Frank, The Levellers, pp. 233-34, for Lilbume's orchestration of the 
pamphlet and petition campaign. 
140. A Jury-man's Judgement upon the Case of Lieut. Col. John Lilburn (London, June 
22, 1653); [B.L.: E. 702(6)). 
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and death to so little purpose, as to pronounce men guilty without 
regard to the nature of the offence, or to what is to be inflicted 
thereupon. 141 
Moreover, jurymen must be "satisfied in [their] understandings of the 
Parliament's authority to make such an Act." The author denied that 
it was ever a felony under English law ''to scandalize members of a 
committee" or "to break the unknown privileges of a Parliament. " 142 
Thus the Act of banishment was "null and void."143 Moreover, the 
parliamentary judgment itself was ''contrary to the standing laws of the 
nation" because it was a judgment of life and limb without trial by 
peers and without the due process entailed in such trials.144 Had 
Lilburne had such a trial "the jury [would have] been bound by the law 
of England to have proportioned the punishment to the offense. "145 
The tract exhorted its readers to consider that ultimately they too 
would be judged: 
[F]or what shall it profit us, either to please the malice or opinions of 
men, for to lose our own souls, rather let it be our choice not to fear 
those that can kill these bodies of ours, but to fear him who is able to 
cast both our bodies and souls into hell fire .... [T]he justness of our 
proceedings is that which will bear us out in the great and terrible day 
of the Lord. 
And let us all pray earnestly unto God, that he will be pleased to give 
us all eyes to see, and hearts to consider, how much the safety and 
happiness of us all depends upon our sticking close to the old and good 
laws of the land, and to lay to heart how much it concerns the good men 
of England, the jurymen, especially, who are to determine all causes, 
to be able to judge, and to distinguish between true and counterfeit 
laws.146 
The proceedings against Lilburne at the Old Bailey began in mid-July 
(from the thirteenth to the sixteenth) and were carried over to mid-August 
(from the eleventh to the twentieth) .147 Lilburne refused to plead before 
seeing a copy of the indictment. 14S Here he won a great victory: a copy of 
the indictment and assistance of counsel were allowed him; indeed he was 
given time to enter written exceptions. In the course of arguing for these 
"rights," Lilburne established the framework of his defense, stating by 
way of "exceptions" several of his central claims. He questioned whether 
141. Ibid., pp. 1-2, 6. 
142. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 6. 
143. Ibid., p. 7. 
144. Idem.: " ... by twelve good men of his neighbourhood, giving also liberty of 
exception and challenge of five and thirty, without showing cause." 
145. Ibid., p. 8. 
146. Ibid., pp. 10, 12-13. 
147. State Trials, 5:407-19, 419-44. 
148. Ibid., pp. 416-19. 
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the ''Act for the Execution of a Judgment'' was an act of a true parliament 
of England. Furthermore, he asserted that a judgment of the sort 
contained in the act could only follow "an indictment, presentment, or 
some information or accusation" for "some crime," and a trial at which 
the accused was present; otherwise it was void in law and any indictment 
for breach of a condition of the judgment was likewise void. 149 The 
exceptions did not, however, focus on the failure of the Act to state facts 
that amounted to capital felony under the English law. This charge 
Lilburne reserved for the jury stage of his trial, which came on, after a 
month's recess, in mid-August. 
Lilburne's speeches to the court andjury in August of 1653 are not well 
preserved. 150 But it seems clear that the defendant termed the Act 
grounding his indictment ''a lie and a falsehood, an Act that has no reason 
in it, no law for it.'' 151 He repeated his charge that no true parliament had 
passed the Act and that, in any case, the judgment it imposed could only 
be imposed by a jury following trial at common law. Lilburne then called 
upon his jury to decide law as well as fact, to acquit him on the ground 
that the Act, the judgment, and the ensuing indictment were all null and 
void under the true law of England.152 It appears, also, that Lilburne 
reiterated the exhortation contained in the opening paragraph of a short 
tract, anonymously authored, which he circulated at the outset of the 
August session. A Word to the Jury in the behalfe of John Lilburn153 
blended the Old Testament flavor of the radical Puritan jury tracts with 
the forthright appeal to English law that had been sounded in A Jury-
man's Judgement: 
You [i.e., the jury] are of the neighbour, and Christ shows in the lOth 
[chapter] of Luke that that person is a neighbour that does works of 
love and mercy; it would be an abominable cruelty if you should find 
him guilty upon that pretended Act of Parliament, in regard he was not 
legally accused or convicted of any crime or fact for which he was 
banished or that it could be made felony if he returned. 154 
149. Ibid., pp. 419-41. 
150. Ibid., p. 443. The account in State Trials, written mainly by Lilburne, states that 
"[n]othing of these three last days [August 18-20] proceedings are printed." What we infer 
about Lilburne's speeches on these days comes from contemporary tracts, including those 
by Lilburne himself. See Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 331-32 and 395, n. 31. 
151. Ibid., p. 443. See Lieut. Colonel John Lilb. Tryed and Cast: Or, His Case and Craft 
discovered (London, Nov. 22, 1653), [B.L.: E. 720(2)], p. 125. See also John Lilburne, The 
Tryall of L. Col. John Lilburn at the Sessions House in the Old Baily (London, Aug. 19, 
1653), [B.L.: E. 711(9)], pp. 4-6. 
152. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 332; State Trials, 5:443-44. 




The tract characterized the Act as a bylaw, "such as have been . 
made [by tyrants] to succour themselves in their tyranny." The Rump 
Parliament had set itself up as a supreme power despite the flow of 
petitions exhorting its members ''to surrender their power to a new 
Representative equally chosen by the people." The tract spoke also to the 
"soldiery," which had been raised to aid the people against tyrants and 
which was now obliged to use its arms "against those that impose such 
illegal, cruel, and bloody commands. " 155 The merciful neighbor was to 
judge statute in the light of good English law and, finding it the law of a 
tyrant, to oppose it. Thus had Parliament's act of banishment provided a 
basis for the merger of the jury-right claim and the long-standing argument 
against the very basis of the Rump's power. Whereas the 1649 trial had 
produced a remarkable attack upon the judiciary, that of 1653 resulted in 
an attack on Parliament. The theory of a jury right remained the same: 
original power lay in the people; trial by jury assured protection against 
the usurpation of that power, whether by King, Cromwell, or Parliament, 
at least where it threatened to result in judgment of life and limb or in 
forfeiture of estate. 
A second anonymous tract, More Light to Mr. John Lilburnes Jury,156 
published during the course of the trial, began with Coke's passage on 
chapter 29 of Magna Carta and with the crimes of Empson and Dudley, 
who (like the present judges) executed "unlawful Acts of Parliament. "157 
Again, Parliament had usurped the role of the jury: "For they judge him 
that are not by law his judges; that belonging only to juries .... " 158 
Moreover, Parliament judged him without due process and for a fact 
that was never before known, or declared by any law to be a crime, 
whereby Mr. Lilburne or any other could be warned from the same. 
And the reason is evident, for if there should be no firm, standing and 
established unalterable law which Parliaments, juries and all people 
were bound to maintain, no man could be certain of anything.159 
Thus it was more than a question of an unjust law; even conceding its 
justice, it had been applied to Lilburne after the fact, in a manner that he 
could not have foreseen. 
If the jury convicted Lilburne, according to More Light, it would "give 
encouragement" to Parliament.16o Not only would the jurors condemn 
155. Idem. 
156. More Light to Mr. John Lilburnes Jury (London, Aug. 16, 1653), [B.L.: E. 710(23)]. 
157. Ibid., p. 3. 
158. Ibid., p. 4. 
159. Ibid., p. 5. 
160. Ibid., p. 6. 
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Lilburne, they would condemn everyone, including themselves. The jury 
was bound in conscience, therefore, "to try all laws made by Parliament, 
by the fundamental laws." They could not "expect the direction of judges 
and recorders in the case, who many of them lie under sore temptations 
oflosing their honors and places of profit" to go against Parliament's will: 
"[B]ut since it is evident to every one of your consciences, that [Lilburne] 
is not charged with anything that in the true law of England is a felonious 
crime, nor has in the least deserved to die, you can do no less than 
pronounce him not guilty."161 And this, on August 20, is what Lilburne's 
jury did. "John Lilburne," the jury said, "is not guilty of any crime 
worthy of death. "162 
That Lilburne's jury, or at least that several of its members, took 
themselves to be judges of law as well as fact is evidenced by statements 
made to the Council of State, which examined the jurors closely on 
August 23. 163 Some jurymen stated that they were dubious whether the 
John Lilburne who was tried was the same John Lilburne who was 
referred to in the Act, an obvious ploy .164 It is clear from the examination 
that the bench, in its charge to the jury, had stated that the jurors were 
judges of fact only. One juror asserted that, notwithstanding the charge, 
"the jury were otherwise persuaded from what they heard out of the law 
books. " 165 This may refer to the long speech Lilburne addressed to the 
jury toward the end of the trial. An account of what he said has been lost, 
but we can infer that Lilburne challenged the validity of the Act, raised 
questions regarding proof of his being the John Lilburne, and, citing 
"relevant" authorities, exhorted the jury to find the law void and the 
sentence unlawful in its relationship to the crime alleged.l66 
Lilburne's aphorism regarding the jury as judges of the law had been 
given new definition and effect. In one regard, though, the claim Lilburne 
made in 1653 was more limited than his earlier one. Lilburne did not as a 
general matter deny the authority of the bench; nor did he deny the right 
of the bench to instruct jurors on the law.l67 Rather he invoked the jury as 
a shield, adjuring them to reject "void" law and to act on behalf of the 
161. Ibid., pp. 6, 8. 
162. Gregg, Free-Born John, p. 332; State Trials, 5:446. See Thurloe, State Papers, 1:442. 
163. State Trials, 5:445-50. Lilburne was held in prison pending the results of the 
examination. See John Lilburne, An Hue and Cry after the Fundamental Lawes and 
Liberties of England (London, Sept. 26, 1653), [B.L.: E. 714(1)]. He was thereafter ordered 
to be held prisoner "for the peace of this nation." He remained a prisoner of State until his 
death in 1657. See Gregg, Free-Born John, pp. 333-34. 
164. E.g. Juror Emanuel Hunt (State Trials, 5:447). 
165. Juror Gilbert Gayne (ibid., p. 450). 
166. Lilburne, Trya/1 of L. Col. John Lilburn, pp. 4-6. 
167. Lilburne, The Afflicted Mans Outcry (London, Aug. 19, 1653), [B.L.: E. 711(7*)], 
pp. 1-9. 
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people, whose powers of delegation of authority to true representatives 
had been wrongfully usurped. His judges were not "Norman intruders"; 
they were, in a sense, weak and dependent, mere extensions of an 
unlawful Parliament. Free elections and adherence to the fundamental 
law of England were the proper correctives, not political decentralization 
and adherence to local community mores. 
As we have seen, Lilburne only hinted at the substance of his views on 
the jury at his 1649 trial. He invoked the Leveller version of English 
history without connecting it explicitly to his theory of jury right. Perhaps 
he had not worked through in his own mind the problem of the origins of 
the jury. Subsequently, the "logic" of his position was developed by John 
Jones and others, though it is not clear how far Lilburne agreed with 
them. In the event, the 1651 statute on which he was tried in the summer 
of 1653 inspired a different argument concerning the jury's duty. The Act, 
both in the procedures attending its passage and in its substance, was 
easier to characterize as in conflict with the common law. Lilburne's 1653 
defense strategy revealed how vulnerable Cromwell's new government 
might be made to appear and resulted in a constitutional debate concern-
ing the constituency of the Rump and the legal basis of its acts. 
Moreover, the facts alleged to be criminal were less serious than those 
for which English law had in the past exacted the penalty of death. It was 
this aspect of the prosecution that came closest to reviving the concept of 
"neighbors doing justice to neighbors." The jury was an instrument of 
mercy, its verdict mandated just deserts. It was, therefore, of no small 
importance that the jury found Lilburne "not guilty of any crime worthy 
of death.'' Lilburne had effectively drawn upon this most ancient aspect 
of the jury's role. He thus united his call to the jurors to resist tyranny 
with the claims of the many Interregnum reform writers who opposed the 
imposition of capital punishment for theft.l68 As we shall see, this 
juxtaposition of ideas became a significant motif in eighteenth-century 
writing on the criminal trial jury. 
For the moment, however, the most significant aspect of Lilburne's 
1653 claim was his invocation of the jury's duty to examine the charges 
against the defendant and to reject them if it found that the facts cited did 
not amount to a crime under English law. The claim was particularly well 
suited to political cases, whether for crimes that were statutorily based or 
for ones that depended upon judicial construction, that brought the 
government into conflict with vocal opposition. Passed on to the next 
generation of jury proponents, this claim dominated the Restoration 
literature on the jury. In the mid-1650s the Quakers inherited both the soul 
168. See above, n. 41. 
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of Lilburne, who converted to their cause two years after his acquittal, 169 
and his new concept of the right and duty of the true English criminal trial 
jury.17o 
169. Gregg, Free-Born John, p, 344. 
170. See below, Chapter 6. For a different example of the influence of Lilbume's trial 
tactics see Colonel Penruddock's "Directions for all my Fellow Prisoners, now to be tried 
for their Lives by a Special Commission of Oyer and Terminer" (1655), in A Collection of 
Scarce and Valuable Tracts (Somers' Tracts), vol. 6 (London, 1811), pp. 325-29. 
Penruddock had taken part in an abortive Cavalier rising against Cromwell in 1655. 
"Directions" refers to Li1burne and his "several juries" (p. 329). Penruddock, who wrote 
the tract while awaiting his trial for treason, advises his codefendants to exercise their full 
right of challenge, to "say we conceive the indictment is not sufficient in law," to ask for 
counsel, etc. (p. 325). The defendants should put their "plea to the jury, and put it upon their 
consciences, that God has made them over judges between us and the judge .... If the jury 
seem fearful to clear us absolutely, tell them that it is safest for the jury to find a special 
verdict, which gives the point in law to all the judges whether or not it is treason ... and 
[places] all the bloodshed upon the judges" (p. 263). Penruddock addressed his ownjury in 
these terms (State Trials, 2:261) but he was found guilty and beheaded. The device of a 
special verdict, or a variation upon it wherein the jury returned a verdict of "guilty of 
[certain specific facts]" without asking the bench to apply the law, was frequently employed 
by the Quakers and by jurors in trials for seditious libel. See below, Chapters 6 and 8. 
6 The Principle of Noncoercion: The Contest over the Role of the 
Jury in the Restoration 
The principle of noncoercion of jurors was established in 1671 in Bushel's 
Case. 1 Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion is now famous: a judge may not 
punish or threaten to punish jurors for their verdict. Historians, however, 
have not always agreed about either the basis for, or the meaning of, 
Vaughan's opinion. What right did Vaughan intend to affirm? On which 
tradition of jury right did he draw? And which tradition did his opinion 
further? To answer these questions, we shall turn first to the background 
of Bushel's Case, then to Vaughan's opinion, and, finally, to the inter-
pretation that some contemporaries put upon that opinion. We shall be 
tracing the development of the true law-finding, or nullifying, tradition. 
As we shall see, this tradition, to which Lilburne's 1653 trial had pointed 
the way, evolved almost accidentally out of different but related aspects 
of the administration of the criminal law. Its relationship to the older 
tradition of merciful application of the law in common-run felonies was 
complex. The two law-finding traditions developed partly in tandem, 
partly separately, each being pushed forward in a kind of chain reaction 
of events. Although the true law-finding view was a dissident position, it 
gained support on the eve of the Glorious Revolution from an important 
segment of the political establishment. After 1689 Englishmen were left to 
draw different conclusions about the legitimacy of the tradition, about its 
relationship to merciful application of the law in routine cases, and about 
its place in the evolving English constitution. 
Section I of this chapter deals with the Quaker trials of the 1660s. Some 
Quakers argued for a jury law-finding power like that urged by Lilburne at 
his 1653 trial. While their arguments fell short of the most radical Leveller 
notion of law-finding, they went well beyond the conventional and, for the 
most part, accepted notion of jury-based application of law. Other 
writers, however, conceived of the jury verdicts in the Quaker cases 
simply as findings of fact. For them, judicial berating and fining of jurors 
was an invasion of what everyone agreed was a fundamental aspect of the 
trial jury's role. Their concern about the behavior of some members of the 
bench was complemented by the concern of some parliamentarians and 
lawyers about judicial badgering of jurors in common-run felonies. This 
l. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006. 
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concern was manifested when the House of Commons censured Chief 
Justice Kelyng, whose rough treatment of juries-mainly in homicide 
cases-seemed to deny their traditional power of mitigation. I shall 
consider this problem in section II. 
The most famous of the Restoration Quaker trials, the prosecution of 
William Penn and William~Mead, produced a tract literature in which the 
various strands of jury argument that had been developing since 
Lilburne's day converged. In section III I shall examine the trial and the 
defendants' claims, both as to law-finding and fact-finding and as to the 
fining of jurors for their verdicts in criminal cases. Against that back-
ground section IV considers Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's 
Case. Vaughan, active in the parliamentary censure of Kelyng three years 
before, chose to view the case solely in terms of the jury's age-old right 
to find fact. He argued from that indisputable right to the conclusion that 
the judge was never in a position to say with certainty that a jury had 
found against either law or fact. 
If Vaughan provided a lasting rationale for the jury's freedom from 
coercion, he did not lay to rest the debate over the jury. His opinion failed 
to confront the law-finding issues of the day and was thus vulnerable to 
appropriation by those who favored jury law-finding, especially by those 
who opposed the later Stuarts' treatment of defendants and juries in 
treason and sedition cases. The tracts and issues of the late 1680s are the 
subjects of the concluding section, V. 
The principle of noncoercion by no means crippled the bench, nor even 
greatly affected the daily administration of the criminal law. Many 
institutional devices remained by which the bench could, if it chose, 
influence the verdict of all but an intransigent jury. In most routine cases, 
moreover, judge and jury agreed on standards of just application of the 
law. As we shall see in Part III, although the administration of the 
criminal law in the eighteenth century created even greater judicial 
dependence than before upon jury mitigation of the law of sanctions, the 
fact that the bench had lost the ultimate means of coercion scarcely 
affected the processing of routine felony cases. In political cases, how-
ever, where from the government's point of view something more was at 
stake, the principle of noncoercion represented a roadblock for authori-
ties. The bench's approach to the allocation of judicial and jury duties in 
the law of seditious libel may have reflected the government's frustration 
with the principle of noncoercion. This problem, which is introduced in 
section V, is also properly the subject of Part III. 
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Bushel's Case brought to an end the legal proceedings that began with 
the arrest and indictment of William Penn and William Mead.2 In the 
course of his trial, Penn, a leading Quaker preacher, requested that the 
court read his indictment to the jury, so that the jurors might "measure 
the truth of the indictment" ;3 almost certainly, Bushel, and the three 
other jurors who insisted that Penn had been guilty of "preaching only" 
and refused to convict him for unlawful assembly and disturbance of the 
peace, believed the indictment to be defective. They did not doubt the 
truth of the facts alleged; that Penn preached, that a crowd formed, and 
that a tumult resulted was certain. What these jurors doubted, however, 
was that those facts amounted to the commission of the crime of taking 
part in "an unlawful assembly" or of causing a "disturbance of the 
peace" by a person who peacefully preached religious doctrine. In 
acquitting Penn and in thereby implicitly rejecting the theory ,underlying 
the indictment, Penn's jurors were responding not only to Penn's entreat-
ies but also to those of Quaker writers since the early 1660s. Thus, the 
refusal of Bushel and the others to accept the official legal theory 
underlying the indictment did not mark the emergence of a new theory of 
jury nullification. Indeed, by 1670 the argument that the petty jury had a 
duty to scrutinize both the law and the indictment upon which the 
prosecution was based had attained widespread currency. 
Restoration persecution of the Quakers began with the 1662 Quaker 
Act4 and reached its height in 1664, the year in which Parliament passed 
the Conventicles Act, which made most nonconformist religious meetings 
unlawful. 5 The Conventicles Act, part of the "Clarendon Code," played 
a significant role in the enforcement of Anglicanism during the first decade 
of the restored Stuart monarchy. 6 By the terms of the Act, which 
elaborated upon the Act of 1662, those convicted of meeting in groups of 
five or more persons under pretense of religion, but not according to the 
forms of the Anglican Church, were to be imprisoned for three months 
unless they paid a fine of five pounds. For conviction on a second offense 
the penalty was more onerous, and those convicted of the third offense 
would suffer seven years' transportation or a fine of 100 pounds.? 
2. State Trials, 6:951 (1770). See below, sections III and IV. 
3. Ibid., col. 958. 
4. Stat. 14 Chas. 2, c. I (1662). See George Clark, The Later Stuarts (2nd ed., Oxford, 
1955), p. 22. 
5. Stat. 16 Chas. 2, c. 4 (1664). 
6. On the Clarendon Code see e.g. David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 2 vols. 
(2nd. ed., London, 1956), vol. I, pp. 206-7. 
7. Stat. 16 Chas. 2, c. 4, sects. 1-3, 5. 
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The Act to prevent and suppress seditious conventicles was literally 
interpreted by the Stuart bench. The Act's preamble declared that 
Parliament sought to suppress seditious conventicles, but the body of the 
Act proscribed meetings, "under pretence or colour of religion" without 
repeating the adjective "seditious." The bench concluded that the jury 
must convict if there was manifest proof that the defendant had taken part 
in what appeared to be such a meeting, unless the defendant showed 
either that the meeting was not under pretense of religion or that it was 
not nonconformist. Conviction did not require proof of seditious purpose. 
That, the bench ruled, was presumed by law.s 
The trials of Quakers in 1664 under the Act occasioned the first major 
campaign in print since Lilburne's day regarding the powers of the 
criminal trial jury. A considerable number of Quaker tracts described the 
sect's travails before the law and exhorted prospective jurymen to apply 
the Conventicles Act "lawfully"-by which was meant to require proof 
of sedition.9 The Quakers established an effective program of legal 
education within their own ranks and perhaps also persuaded many 
non-Quaker jurors to the Quaker view of the statute's meaning.JO The 
Quakers' position, as it unfolded over the course of a year, mixed 
moderate and radical claims regarding the jury's role in the application of 
the Conventicles Act. 
The most substantial analysis and discussion of the Conventicles Act 
was embodied in The Jury-man charged, which was published late in 
8. See e.g. William Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation of the Proceedings ... 
August, 1664 (London, 1664), pp. 3-4. 
9. E.g. A Declaration of the Present Suffering (London, 1664); The Liberty of the Subject 
by Magna Charta; Or, Several weighty things to be considered (London, 1664); The 
Jury-man charged; or, A Letter to a Citizen of London (London, 1664); William Smith, 
Some Clear Truths (London, 1664); William Smith, The Innocency and Conscientiousness 
of the Quakers (London, 1664); The Cry of the Innocent and Oppressed for Justice: Or A 
brief Relation of the Late Proceedings ... London ... October 1664 (London, 1664); Smith, 
A True, Short, Impartial Relation of the Proceedings ... August, 1664; William Smith, A 
Second Relation from Hertford; containing the unjust proceedings ... [October], 1664 
(London, 1664); Another Cry of the Innocent and Oppressed . .. or, A Second Relation of 
the unjust proceedings ... London ... December, 1664 (London, 1664); Another Cry ... 
or a Third Relation of the unjust proceedings ... London ... February [1665] (London, 
1665). Much of the discussion that follows is based upon an analysis of these tracts. 
10. Most Quakers were convicted, but many jurors resisted finding the defendants guilty 
until pressed to do so by the bench. See below, n. 17. It is evident that some jurors did not 
believe Quakers ought to be punished for their worship, which they did not believe had been 
proved seditious (or even against the true liturgy). It is difficult to determine whether they 
believed the statute did not reach Quaker worship or believed that although it did, it ought 
not to be enforced. For cases in which Quakers were acquitted, see Alfred W. Braithwaite, 
"Early Friends' Experience with Juries," Journal of the Friends' Historical Society, vol. 50 
(1962-64), pp. 217-27. 
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1664. The tract was in part a commentary upon proceedings at the 
Hertford summer assizes, perhaps the most significant episode in the 
Quaker trials under the 1664 Act. Like most of the Quaker tracts on the 
subject, The Jury-man charged argued that the Act had been incorrectly 
applied by the Stuart bench: 
[T]he intention of the Parliament is manifest from the title and preface 
of the Act: the title, an Act to prevent and suppress seditious 
conventicles: but what sedition in worshiping God erroneously? The 
preface, for remedy against seditious sectaries and other disloyal 
persons, who under pretence of tender consciences, do at their 
meetings contrive insurrections, etc .... 11 
Thus, the author concluded, Parliament sought to punish those who only 
pretended to take part in religious exercise, but who in fact used their 
meetings to further their seditious ends. Echoing Lilburne's 1653 defense, 
the author asserted that the very nature of the punishment-banishment 
for seven years-indicated that this was what Parliament had in mind: 
"[F]ar be it from us to think so unworthily of an English Parliament" that 
it would impose a "horrid banishment" for religious practice according to 
an imagined "erroneous persuasion, ... for in all just laws the penalty is 
not greater than the nature of the fault requires.'' 12 
Finally, the author of The Jury-man charged criticized the bench's 
attempt to make guilt or innocence turn mainly on the question of 
presence at a religious exercise "in other manner than is allowed by the 
liturgy or practice of the Church of England." 13 How were witnesses to 
know whether the exercise was allowed or not? The bench's interpreta-
tion supposed either that witnesses were authorities on matters of 
religion, or that witnesses would simply describe what they had seen and 
the bench would inform the jury whether these practices were allowed. 
The former notion was unrealistic; the latter course was totally unaccept-
able: 
But will this satisfie you sir? Can you take a passionate and testy 
judge's word as your infallible director in so many most difficult 
controversies as must in this case be decided? Will you pin your faith 
upon the judge's sleeve in matters of religion (of which perhaps he 
knows no more than he can find in the statute book)?14 
Must not the conscientious juror, if the question resolves itself to this 
point, look to the Scripture rather than take his rule from the judge? The 
11. Jury-man charged, p. 13. 
12. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
13. Ibid., p. 7. 
14. Ibid., p. 9. 
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question at most of the hundreds of Quaker trials in the mid-1660s did not 
resolve itself into this point, at least not overtly. Nevertheless, the appeal 
to the jurors' understanding of the true religion, of the unity of sincere 
worship, was a constant theme in the tracts, as one defense against the 
strict judicial interpretation of the Act. 
As The Jury-man charged suggests, there were two aspects of the 
judicial interpretation of the Conventicles Act that Quakers opposed both 
in their writings and at the trials: that proof of a meeting under color of 
religion and contrary to the allowed liturgy sufficed for conviction; and 
that proof of mere presence at a Quaker meeting cast upon the defendant 
the burden of proving either that the meeting had not been for religious 
worship, or that the worship had been according to the Anglican form. 
Typically at the trials, there was little testimony about what had tran-
spired at an alleged meeting; since the meetings were held in silence, the 
witness could testify to the defendant's presence but little more. Their 
religious nature had to be inferred, and the bench frequently pressed 
witnesses in vain for evidence that the meeting involved prayers. Is Ifthe 
jury believed that the meeting was under color of religion, evidence that 
Anglican prayers had not been said aloud was held to be sufficient proof. 
As Orlando Bridgeman, who presided at the Hertford summer assizes, 
instructed the jury: 
[You] are not to expect a plain, punctual evidence ... for [Quakers] 
may speak to one another though not by or with auricular sound, but 
by a cast of the eye, or a motion of the head or foot. ... [l]f you find, 
or believe in your hearts that they were in the meeting, under colour of 
religion in their way, though they sat still only, and looked upon each 
other, seeing they cannot say what they did there: it was an unlawful 
meeting. 16 
Bridgeman's instructions became the model for most judges during the 
ensuing months, as proof of presence at a Quaker meeting came to suffice 
for conviction under the 1664 Act. 
Juries, then, if they were not to follow the lead of the bench (although 
most of them did),P naturally took their lead from the defendant. On 
occasion defendants put to the task of showing that they had not been 
15. E.g. The Cry of the Innocent, pp. 19 et seq. 
16. Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 3. 
17. E.g. Another Cry .. . or a Third Relation, p. 14: The jury first returned a verdict of 
"guilty of meeting," but subsequently, apparently under some pressure, changed their 
verdict to "guilty."; Another Cry ... or, A Second Relation, p. 14: At first eleven of twelve 
were found guilty but doubt was expressed about the twelfth, then the twelfth was 
convicted. The trial accounts were written by Quakers and may overstate the juries' original 
reluctance to convict. 
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engaged in religious exercise remained silent, but many invited the 
inference that they had met to worship God. 18 If the defendant admitted 
presence but not worship, the jury might acquit on insufficiency of proof 
of contrary religious practices. If the defendant admitted presence and 
worship, but denied seditiousness, his jury-if it sought to avoid finding 
him guilty-found that there had been a meeting and worship, but that the 
defendant had not broken any "true law. " 19 
Thus it was that the tracts implored jurors to reject the judge's view of 
the statute-to find law insofar as that involved finding the true meaning 
of the statute. 20 As this exhortation was repeated during the fall and 
winter of 1664-65, more and more defendants admitted to having been 
present at religious meetings-i.e., they took their stand on what they 
asserted was the "true law. " 21 Frequently, Quaker appeals to jurors to 
find law as well as fact were only implicit: they were couched in the claim 
regarding the jurors' duty to apply what the tract writer took to be the true 
meaning of the statute.ZZ Indeed, these writers appear to have conceived 
of the jurors' duty as one of mere fact-finding. Sometimes the writers 
challenged the judges' ruling that mere presence at a Quaker meeting 
sufficed for a guilty verdict, asking prospective jurors to find that worship 
had not been proved. Or they beseeched jurors to find that there had not 
been proof of seditious activity-again a finding offact.23 For a jury to find 
these facts, of course, it had first to reject the bench's ruling as to the 
question of what facts were to be found. But recognition of this level of 
law-finding often remained submerged. For instance, Another Cry of the 
Innocent and Oppressed, for the most part a description of the Old Bailey 
18. E.g. Smith, A Second Relation from Hertford, pp. 1 et seq.; Another Cry ... or, A 
Second Relation, p. 14 (first defendant remained silent; second defendant was not given an 
opportunity to answer; third defendant denied being at a "seditious meeting or conven-
ticle"; fourth defendant asserted that "there is nothing proved that the meeting I was at, is 
unlawful"; fifth defendant: "I was at no unlawful meeting"; sixth defendant admitted 
meeting "amongst the dear children of the Lord"). 
19. Joseph Besse, A Collection oft he Sufferings of . .. Quakers ,from . .. [1650 to 1689], 
2 vols. (London, 1753), vol. I, p. 401. The jury in the case Besse epitomizes brought in a 
verdict of "guilty of meeting, but not of fact." The jurors said there was no evidence 
concerning what was done at the meeting, but when asked whether they believed "in their 
consciences, that [the defendants) were there under colour and pretense of worship,'' two 
replied that they did, but the worship was "in truth." One of them said: "[l)f any man in the 
world worship God in the spirit, he doth not worship contrary to the liturgy." [Several 
jurors, presumably including these two were bound over to King's Bench "for their 
misdemeanor" (Besse's phrase).) 
20. E.g. Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 8. 
21. E.g. Another Cry . .. or, a Second Relation, p. 17. 
22. Jury-man charged (subtitle: "Wherein is shewed the true meaning of the Statute 
... "); Smith, A True, Short, Impartial Relation, p. 8. 
23. Jury-man charged, p. 13. 
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Quaker trials before Justices Robert Hyde and John Kelyng in December, 
1664, appealed to jurymen "to consult the law itself, which declares what 
the fact is," and not to rely on the judge's statement of what the law 
declares the facts to be. 24 Nevertheless, Another Cry describes this aspect 
of the jurors' role as resulting from their duty as "sole and absolute judges 
of matter of fact.' '25 
The furthest reaching articulation of the Quaker position was set forth 
in the closing pages of Some Clear Truths, a tract written by William 
Smith in the fall of 1664.26 In the "Postscript to all Honest, Sober and 
Impartial Jurors," Smith asked his readers to consider, when hearing a 
case, "whether it be properly and truly law that [the defendant] is tried 
by"; and "whether the thing done be really an offense against the law. " 27 
Law was based, Smith said (echoing early Leveller writings), on "mercy, 
justice and equity. " 28 An interpretation that does not meet this standard 
does not "unite with the body of the law," and thus such a law is void. 29 
The Conventicles Act will "unite" only if it is interpreted to require 
evidence of true seditiousness;jurors who convict on less evidence would 
wrongfully condemn the defendant.3o In asking prospective jurors to 
judge the law as stated by the bench in the light of general principles of 
justice, Smith went beyond The Jury-man charged, and beyond nearly all 
of the other significant tracts, which advised jurors to take the "intended 
meaning" of the Act not from general principles, as such, but from the 
wording of its preamble (which was particularly to be understood in the 
light of the recent history of armed insurrection). Some Clear Truths was 
one of the most radical of the Quaker writings, but in its very broad 
implications for jury law-finding and in its explicit invocation of the jury's 
duty generally to measure indictments against ''true law,'' it remained an 
anomaly. 
Thus, for the most part, the Quakers' appeal to jurors was narrow. The 
Quaker writers made no assertion regarding the general duty of juries to 
state the law for the community; certainly there is little indication that 
they conceived of the English criminal law as merely a modern edition of 
the Scriptures. While they implicitly carried forward Lilburne's appeal 
not to find the defendant guilty of what they believed to be ''void law,'' 
24. Another Cry ... or, A Second Relation, p. 19. 
25. Idem. 
26. Smith, Some Clear Truths. 
27. Ibid., p. Jl. 
28. Ibid., p. 7. 
29. Ibid., p. 12. See also p. 8: "And it is very clear and plain, that if there be no 
wrong-doers, as the object of the law, that then the law in itself is silent, as having nothing 
to operate upon that offends it." 
30. Ibid., p. 12. 
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they assumed the validity of the statute in question in order to address 
instead the issue of its "true" meaning. Nonetheless, the Quakers 
believed that no juror in good conscience could convict a person who 
worshipped God according to the ''true religion.'' For the ''conscientious 
Quaker," no statute that proscribed this form of worship-should Parlia-
ment ever create such a statute-could be valid. For the authority that 
constituted the ultimate legal command imposed the ultimate claim upon 
a man's conscience. 
Thus, by the time Penn's case came to trial, the groundwork for his 
appeal to the jury had been thoroughly prepared. Ultimately, Penn would 
draw upon the example of John Lilburne. Yet the image of that figure of 
earlier, more tumultuous times had been perpetuated, albeit in a slightly 
different form, by the Quaker writers of the mid-1660s. Their calls to 
jurors to consider the ''true law,'' although couched as appeals to jurors' 
consciences, were modest in their implicit acceptance of traditional 
common-law guideposts. The force of the Quakers' exhortations, how-
ever, was heightened by the special context in which they were raised, for 
theirs was an argument mainly against persecution of peaceful spiritual 
activity. The circumstances that gave rise to Penn's prosecution were 
similar but at least one step removed. The charge against Penn was not 
that a certain form of religious preaching or meeting was unlawful per se 
but rather that his actions amounted, under the circumstances, to causing 
an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the peace. In Penn's Case the 
question of what circumstances were in fact involved was as complex and 
doubtful as the question of whether such circumstances amounted, in law, 
to a disturbance of the peace. This additional factual matter complicated 
both the nature of Penn's claim and the bench's reaction to his acquittal. 
For, as we shall see, the issue of finality of verdict regarding fact was itself 
very unsettled. 
II 
Though Penn's trial was the highpoint of the long line of Quaker 
prosecutions, it should also be viewed as an important sequel to the 
parliamentary censure of Lord Chief Justice John Kelyng for his menac-
ing, fining, and imprisoning of jurors. That parliamentary incident, which 
will be reconstructed below in some detail, resulted in what many 
contemporaries must have taken to be sincere support for the principle of 
noncoercion of jurors. Indeed, it quite possibly sent shocks through the 
legal world in a way that the Quaker proceedings did not. The charges 
against Kelyng related to trials at the Old Bailey and on the Western 
Circuit between 1665 and 1667, proceedings involving both grand and trial 
juries, one prosecution for violation of the Conventicles Act and several 
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others for homicide. The manner in which Kelyng treated jurors was 
probably an exaggeration of the practice rather than an exception to it. 31 
We have seen that since the middle of the sixteenth century, if not earlier, 
judges had at times imposed their views upon petty jurors-and even 
fined and imprisoned them. However, the theory upon which the bench 
acted had never been clearly articulated, and until the Restoration the 
legality of coercion remained largely untested. 
Though fining jurors did not begin with the Quaker cases of the early 
1660s, the practice may have been accelerated by judicial reaction to jury 
recalcitrance in those cases. As we have seen, the Quakers found 
supporters among their jurors. Some juries, refusing to convict defend-
ants prosecuted under the Conventicles Act, acquitted; others rendered 
something akin to a partial verdict ("guilty of attending a meeting") that 
took the form of a special verdict but, not being stipulated as such, 
threatened to bring the proceedings to a stalemate. During (and shortly 
after) Sir Robert Hyde's tenure as Chief Justice of King's Bench, at 
sessions presided over by him or by his fellow justices-Twisden, 
Bridgeman, or Kelyng-juries were frequently threatened, fined, and 
ordered to remain in prison until the fines had been paid. 32 
31. The assize records for the decade beginning with the Restoration reveal only two 
instances of judicial fining of jurors in common-run cases, both in the years just preceding 
Kelyng's conflicts with juries. In both cases Hyde fined jurors and bound them over until the 
next assize (Shrewsbury Assizes, July 25, 1662, Oxford Circuit Crown Book, ASS! 2/1, fols. 
83v-84, 93v; Gloucester Assizes, March 31, 1663, Oxford Circuit Crown Book, ASS! 2/1, 
fols. 95v, 96v). In the first case (homicide), Hyde fined two jurors ten pounds apiece "in 
regard they were most obstinate and did mislead the rest,'' and the other jurors four pounds 
apiece. In the second case (burglary), Hyde fined all the jurors five pounds apiece. 
There are no details regarding the acquittal of the defendant charged with burglary. In the 
homicide case, the jury insisted on returning manslaughter se defendendo, despite the fact 
that, according to the report, the defendant "did pursue [the deceased] with his rapier drawn 
when the [deceased] ran from him and had no weapon but a stick in his hand and did 
endeavour as much as he could to fly from [the defendant]." The defendant was the 
deceased's master. It is impossible to tell whether the jury was acting "mercifully" or from 
some other motive, or how the court viewed the jury's motive. According to the report, the 
jury "did wilfully refuse to observe the directions of the court in point of law therein given 
to alter the [verdict]" and the jurors "did go positively against full evidence and the 
direction of the court in point of law." 
The assize records are by no means a reliable guide to the frequency of the fining of jurors. 
Those several cases involving fines cited as precedent in 1665 and 1670 and those charged 
against Kelyng in Parliament do not appear on the assize records themselves. 
32. See e.g. above, n. 19, and below, nn. 33-36. See also the contemporary accounts 
listed above, n. 9. My discussion of the fining issue in the several years before the 
proceedings against Kelyng in the Commons has benefited from access to the excellent and 
far more detailed account in Alexander Scherr, "The Genesis of Bushell's Case: John 
Vaughan and Legal Change," (unpublished paper, University of Michigan Law School, 
1981), pp. 17-37. 
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In some quarters there were doubts about the legality of fining, 
especially when it was undertaken by an inferior court. Matthew Hale, 
Chief Baron of the Exchequer, shared those doubts about what he termed 
an "arbitrary practice." In his History of the Pleas of the Crown he 
expressed his views as of the mid-1660s: "I have seen arbitrary practice 
still go from one thing to another, the fine set upon grand inquests began, 
then they set fines upon the petit-juries for not finding according to the 
directions of the court.'' The practice, Hale thought, was both of recent 
origin and on the increase. Significantly, it was not confined to the highest 
courts, but it "was endeavored to bring the practice of the King's Bench 
into use before justices of gaol delivery and oyer and terminer.' '33 It is not 
surprising, then, that in two such cases where fines were estreated into 
Exchequer, process was stayed "as being contrary to law. " 34 
Fines set directly by King's Bench were less prone to attack. In several 
1664 cases, including Rex v. Selby and Leech's Case, King's Bench 
ordered an information against the offending jurors and fined them 
substantial amounts. 35 Jurors who refused to pay the fines were im-
prisoned until they relented. There was no protection available from a 
sympathetic Exchequer, and contest by means of a writ of habeas corpus 
brought the jurors back before King's Bench. Thus, in Wagstaffe's Case, 
which resulted from a trial before Kelyng in the summer of 1665, after 
Hyde's death and before Kelyng rose to Chief Justice, King's Bench 
tested and upheld the legality offining.36 The decision, handed down after 
Kelyng became Chief Justice, set the stage for conflict within governing 
institutions over the question of coercion. 
Wagstaffe's Case was typical of many Quaker prosecutions. It was 
clear that there had been a meeting, but there was no direct evidence that 
it had been held for religious purposes. Following common practice, 
Kelyng had instructed the jurors that evidence of a meeting sufficed and 
that it was for the defendants to prove that the meeting was not ''under 
ptdense" of non-Anglican worship. Perhaps out of frustration, he fined 
the recalcitrant jurors, not even bothering to order an information against 
33. Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1800), vol. 2, 
p. 160. It appears that the bench had ruled in 1554 that judges could not fine on assize (but 
presumably could in King's Bench). See above, Chapter 4, n. 150 and accompanying text. 
See also Barnes, ed., Somerset Assize Orders, p. 32, for coercion of a coroner's jury. 
34. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:312. 
35. Rex v. Selby, 1 Keble 769, 83 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1664); Leech's Case, Sir T. Raym. 98, 
83 Eng. Rep. 53 (1664). Braithwaite ("Early Friends' Experience with Juries," p. 223) 
accepts contemporary evidence that the jurors in Leech's Case were bound over but not 
fined. 
36. Rex v. Wagstaffe, 1 Keble 934, 83 Eng. Rep. 1328; 1 Keble 938, 83 Eng. Rep. 1331; 
Sir T. Raym. 138, 83 Eng. Rep. 75; 1 Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1665). 
The Principle of Noncoercion: Contest over the Jury Role 211 
them.37 The jurors turned first to Exchequer, certifying Kelyng's action as 
error and requesting that the fines be removed from the record. Even Hale 
concurred with his brethren that Exchequer could not review a sister 
court in such a case. Though he doubted the legality of the fine, Hale 
directed the petitioners to sue a habeas in King's Bench.38 
The return to the jurors' writ asserted that the jurors had found ''contra 
directionem curiae in materia legis et contra plenam evidentiam, " 39 the 
form of return that would be employed five years later in Bushel's Case. 
From what little is preserved in extant accounts, it appears that opposing 
counsel established a pattern of argument that was to figure importantly in 
the later case. Counsel for the Quakers asserted that the return failed to 
state a legal basis for the fine, by which was meant that the return did not 
(nor could not) restate the entire proceedings in a way that allowed for 
review of the trial court's conclusion that the jury had found against fact 
and law. Thus, counsel alleged, there could be no effective remedy 
against the imposition of such a fine. The power to fine inevitably left 
lower courts far too much discretion and must, ultimately, undermine the 
fact-finding role of the trial jury. Maynard, in reply, sidestepped this 
charge, focusing on the situation that would result if judges did not have 
the power to fine. He stated Kelyng's views as of the summer of 1665: 
because attaint did not lie in criminal cases, without the power to fine 
there would be a failure of justice. A new trial, he asserted, would not be 
appropriate. In the end, "[t]rust must be laid somewhere," and the law 
presumed that it must reside in the wisdom and discretion of the judges of 
King's Bench.4o 
The various reports suggest that all of the judges agreed on several 
rationales that both upheld the fines and provided some limits upon the 
fining power. In theory, these unanimously held views might be said to 
constitute the opinion of the court. 41 But in practice, Kelyng and Twisden 
were in command, and they were determined to apply the furthest 
reaching doctrine of the case. So far as they were concerned, there would 
be no distinction between "superior" courts that could fine and "infe-
rior" ones that might not. Nor would an information be necessary: the 
fines might be applied directly. As Twisden had stated, "The judge is 
entrusted with the liberties of the people. " 42 The bench would determine 
whether jurors went against the evidence, for jurors "are not judges of 
37. 1 Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101; Hardres 409, 145 Eng. Rep. 522 (1665). 
38. Idem. 
39. I Sid. 273, 82 Eng. Rep. 1101 (1665). 
40. 1 Keble 938, 83 Eng. Rep. 1331; I Sid. 273,82 Eng. Rep. 1101. 
41. See above, n. 36. 
42. 83 Eng. Rep. 75 (1665). 
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fact so as to go clearly against it. " 43 The precedents that were cited (or 
that can be found in Kelyng's reports or elsewhere) fall either in 
Elizabeth's reign or very recently in King's Bench itself. 44 They are 
surprisingly meager. Kelyng was persuaded by them, but apparently he 
was moved most by the practical effect of an absence of power to fine. 
Kelyng was possibly emboldened by the decision in Wagstaffe's Case, 
for in 1666-67 he attempted openly to control grand and petty jury 
verdicts, not merely in Quaker cases, where jurors practiced what most 
observors took to be true nullification of the law, but also (perhaps 
fatefully) in homicide trials, where jurors sought to exercise what had long 
been treated as a quasi-legitimate form of discretion. It was Kelyng's 
handling of a Western Circuit grand jury, and in particular of one of its 
members, Sir Hugh Windham, that brought the charges against him in 
Parliament.45 Contemporaries identified Windham with the "country 
party" and some of them seem to have regarded the attack on Kelyng as 
in large part politically inspired. 46 Nonetheless, Kelyng's behavior in 
several other cases was also at issue, and there appears to have been 
strong sentiment against his treatment of juries and in favor of a bill 
making menacing and fining illegalY 
Proceedings against Kelyng commenced October 16, 1667, when the 
Chief Justice "was complained of by some of the House for his severe and 
illegal fining and imprisoning juries, both the grand and petty juries, for 
their verdicts, and also for giving some worthy gentlemen that served 
uncivil and insolent language.' '48 A committee was appointed to study the 
matter and to report back to the House.49 According to John Milward, a 
43. Ibid., p. 1331. 
44. See also below, n. 177 and accompanying text. 
45. Cockburn, English Assizes, pp. 123-24, 166; Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before 
the Lawyers," Chicago Law Review, vol. 45 (1978), pp. 298-99 and nn. 106-8. See below, 
n. 57. For a recent review of what is known about Kelyng in the years leading up to his 
confrontation with Windham, see Eric Stockdale, "Sir John Kelyng, Chief Justice of the 
King's Bench, 1665-1671," Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, vol. 59 (1980), pp. 
43-53. 
46. Langbein ("Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," p. 299, n. 106) cites Roger North's 
attribution to his brother Francis of the view that "changing the law" to disallow fining "was 
popular" [Roger North, The Life of the Right Honourable Francis North, Baron of Guilford, 
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, under King Charles II and King James II (London, 1742), 
pp. 66-67]. 
47. I draw this conclusion from the language of the resolution passed by the House of 
Commons (see below, text at n. 51) and from the language of the parliamentary diaries. This 
is not to deny that politics had a great deal to do with shaping attitudes; it is only to say that 
those attitudes may have come to be sincerely held by some both in and out of Parliament. 
48. The Diary of John Milward, ed. Caroline Robbins (Cambridge, 1938), p. 88. 
49. Idem.; Journals of the House of Commons, 9:4, cols. 1-2; J. Hatsell, Precedents of 
Proceedings in the House of Commons, 4 vols. (London, 1776-1818), vol. 4 (1796), p. 113. 
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member of Parliament who kept a diary of Commons proceedings, the 
disposition of the House in establishing the committee was ''to the intent 
that a course may be taken that judges may not at their own wills and 
pleasures impose fines and imprison or affront either grand juries or petty 
juries for giving and adhering to the verdicts. "5o The committee set forth 
its charges before the House on December ll, and concluded with a 
resolution: 
That the proceedings of the Lord Chief Justice, in cases now reported, 
are innovations in the trial of men for their lives and liberties; and that 
he hath used an arbitrary and illegal power, which is of dangerous 
consequences to the lives and liberties of the people of England; and 
tends to the introducing of an arbitrary govemment.51 
The charges themselves fell under several heads but are beyond precise 
reconstruction. Apparently, one case was a trial of Quakers at the Old 
Bailey from the summer of 1665. The case seems to have preceded 
Wagstaffe's Case by no more than a month and took largely the same 
form. 52 On trial for their third offense, the defendants said they had come 
together "[t]o seek God in the spirit." The jury refused to convict them, 
according to Milward's version of the committee report, "because they 
had no full proof that there was not any religious [Anglican] worship 
performed.' '53 Kelyng, it was charged, told the jury that the evidence was 
manifest and sent the jury out again, virtually ordering them to find the 
defendants guilty. Because ''the jury would not alter from their verdict,'' 
Kelyng "imprisoned and fined some of them one hundred marks a piece, 
which fine some of them paid. " 54 The committee report stated that Sir 
William Wild, the Recorder of London, who sat with Kelyng, attempted 
"to delay the fine" and to give the jury another opportunity to change 
their minds, but Kelyng "answered that he would make them know 
themselves, and said they were peremptory saucy fellows. " 55 
50. Diary of John Milward, pp. 88-89. 
51. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:35, col. 2. 
52. Hatsell (Precedents of Proceedings, p. 114) understandably suggested that the case 
was Wagstaffe's Case. Thomas Rudyard, who was convicted by a new jury shortly after 
Penn's jury was sequestered, wrote from Newgate in early 1671 that Wagstaffe's Case was 
at issue in the proceedings against Kelyng: "Appendix" to William Penn, Truth Rescued 
from Imposture (London, 1671), in William Penn, A Collection of Works of William Penn, 
2 vols. (London, 1726), vol. 1, pp. 511-20. This appears not to have been the case; the jurors 
in Wagstaffe's Case were all fined in the same amount, which was not true in the case at 
hand. See below, text at n. 156. 
53. Diary of John Milward, p. 159. 
54. Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
55. Ibid., p. 160. 
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The other matters charged against Kelyng involved homicide cases. 
Clearly the most important was the incident that resulted in Windham's 
Case.56 Sir Hugh had served on a Somerset grand jury that returned a 
finding of manslaughter-possibly of death per infortunium-which "did 
not agree with his Lordship's sense." When they refused to alter their 
finding, Kelyng fined the grand jurors "and told Sir Hugh that he was the 
head of a party.'' Windham replied that he was a member of Commons 
and claimed his privilege, whereupon, according to Milward, "The Chief 
Justice told him that he would make him know that he was now his 
servant and that he would make him stoop. " 57 Two other cases involved 
petty juries that refused to find murder. In one, a master's helper had 
beaten a boy "about the head with a broomstaff" for doing careless work. 
Kelyng would not accept a verdict of manslaughter and threatened the 
jury with a fine. This produced the result he wanted: murder was found, 
the defendant was hanged, in spite of the recommendation of "gentle-
men''. of the county that he be spared. 58 Yet another petty jury responded 
to Kelyng's threats by modifying their finding of self-defense to a verdict 
of manslaughter. 59 There were also one or two other charges of insolent 
language and arbitrary rulings,60 but the coercion of juries lay at the core 
of the charges. Kelyng was said to have so "discouraged" grand and 
petty jurors that they might refuse to "serve upon any future juries if he 
be judge at that circuit." His behavior, the charges concluded, en-
dangered lives and liberties and tended "to the introducing of an arbitrary 
government. " 61 
The Chief Justice was not without his supporters, several of whom 
spoke in his defense. They portrayed Kelyng as essentially honest and in 
the right (though perhaps indiscreet), and moved that the Chief Justice be 
allowed to defend himself at the Bar of the House of Commons.62 The 
56. Rex v. Windham, 2 Keble 180, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (1667). 
57. Diary of John Milward, pp. 162-63; See also Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of 
Commons From the Year 1667 to the Year 1694 (London, 1769), 1:62-63: "Sir Hugh 
Wyndham (who first complained to the House of this business) [Kelyng] reproached for 
being the head of a faction, for no other cause, than finding a bill according to his 
conscience. He drew the verdict and made the jury find it. Sir Hugh said, he was the King's 
servant and Member of Parliament (upon his reproaches). [Kelyng] told the grand jury they 
were his servants, and he would make the best in England stoop." 
58. Diary of John Milward, pp. 160, 163; Grey, Debates, p. 63. 
59. Diary of John Milward, p. 160. 
60. R. Latham and W. Matthews, eds., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ll vols. (London, 
1970-83), vol. 8 (1974), pp. 483-84; Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings, pp. 113-14; Grey, 
Debates, p. 63. 
61. Diary of John Milward, p. 163; Grey, Debates, p. 63; Journals of the House of 
Commons, 9:35, col. 2. 
62. Diary of John Milward, p. 163: "Sir Thos. Higgins made an excellent speech in the 
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motion was accepted. Kelyng's speech on his own behalf two months 
later showed belated tact and careful planning. Though it failed by itself 
to stem the movement for a bill against the fining of jurors, it largely 
defused the attack against him. 
Kelyng's most detailed reply was to the charge that he had fined a jury 
for refusing to convict several Quakers. The case in question appears at 
length in a manuscript of Kelyng's reports. 63 It was not included in the 
printed Reports, perhaps because it had received rough treatment at the 
hands of the Commons. In the Commons Kelyng claimed that the jury 
''pretended that they had not full evidence,'' and he described how he had 
questioned the jury on all of the facts that he considered dispositive. The 
jurors had admitted that the defendants were at the Bull and Mouth, a 
notorious Quaker meeting place, and that they were "worshipping of 
God." But there was no direct evidence "that they were there under 
pretence of religious worship in other manner than appointeth. "64 This 
was clearly a ruse, the same one employed time after time at Hertford, 
London, and other assizes.65 Kelyng evidently did not explain to the 
House that he had charged the jury that the defendants were required in 
law to prove they were together for a lawful purpose. Nor did he state, as 
he did in his report, that he told the jury that the defendants' claim of 
privilege against self-incrimination was a "confession." But he did report 
that the defendants had said the Church of England was not a true church 
and that this, too, was before thejury.66 Kelyng must have been confident 
about his ground: Wagstaffe's Case had upheld fining in just these 
circumstances, and Kelyng reminded the House that "it is resolved, by all 
the judges, that juries are fineable. "67 Surely the Commons was aware 
that the jury in the case at hand had taken part in a widespread campaign 
defense of the Chief Justice. That although his passions might lead him a little out of the way 
sometimes, yet he was a very good and just judge, and had done nothing against the law." 
Grey, Debates, p. 64: "[Higgins) says, Lord Kelyng [is) a man of choler and passion-
Right-handed faults his zeal for the laws, but no ill man of bribery or corruption." Others 
who spoke on Kelyng's behalf were Sir Humphrey Winch, Sir Anthony Jerby, and Thomas 
Street. 
63. "Lord Chief Justice Kelyng's Reports," B.L. MS Hargrave (hereafter cited as Harg.) 
103, fols. 34v-37. 
64. Ibid., fol. 35v. 
65. See above, text at nn. 20-23. 
66. B.L. MS Harg. 103, fol. 35: "I told [the defendants] that they being indicted for an 
unlawful meeting, the proof lay on their part to make it appear what they were doing, and 
so to excuse, which they refused to do"; fol. 36: "I told [the jury) that [the defendants) being 
asked what they were doing, they answered they were not bound to accuse themselves 
which is a kind of confession that they were there under pretense of religious worship.'' See 
Diary of John Milward, p. 166, for an account of Kelyng's "defense" of his behavior in this 
case. 
67. Grey, Debates, p. 67. 
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to render an Act of Parliament (the Conventicles Act) ineffective. 68 Given 
their responses under close questioning, there could be no credible claim 
that the jurors had exculpatory knowledge of their own or that they did 
not believe the witnesses. There was no true disagreement on the facts 
proved but rather upon the question (always one for the bench) of what 
facts were required to be proved. In reaching its own answer to this 
question, the jury had taken the law into its own hands, or so it seemed 
to Kelyng. If this case involved wrongfuljudicial behavior, it was because 
threatening and fining were wrong as a matter of constitutional principle, 
and in all cases short of outright corruption, not simply because jurors 
might have knowledge of their own. 69 
Kelyng turned next to the several homicide cases, beginning with the 
fray that ended in a slaying the jurors found to have been self-defense. On 
his view of the facts, Kelyng thought the case either murder or man-
slaughter, for the defendant had either commenced the fight or responded 
to insult with a drawn sword before finding his life in danger and 
retreating. Evidently, Kelyng charged the jury on a point of law and fined 
them for their recalcitrance in returning self-defense. Kelyng apparently 
had no reservation about reporting this case in Commons. The jury, he 
thought, had clearly found against the facts, refusing to apply rules of the 
law of homicide that had been settled for centuries.?o 
68. According to Milward (Diary, p. 167) Kelyng told the Commons: "[I]fhe had not thus 
far proceeded against the Quakers and the jurors he did assure himself that he had not 
proceeded justly according to the act of Parliament.'' 
69. The jurors almost certainly did believe that they had knowledge of their own. From 
their perspective, the defendants were innocent unless they had engaged in seditious 
activity. They believed that Quaker worship, though outside the pale of the established 
Church, was not seditious; their knowledge of the Quakers, of their loyalty to England, and 
of their religious spirit was an important factor. Given the official interpretation of the 
Conventicles Act, this did not constitute relevant evidence. The bench could be certain that 
jurors did not have knowledge of their own that the defendants were engaged either in 
Anglican worship or in peaceful nonreligious activity. 
70. Diary of John Milward, pp. 160, 167. According to the charge against Kelyng, 
"[T]here happened a fray in which one man was slain; it was proved that the man that killed 
him was set upon and so did it in his own defense." Kelyng described the case in Parliament 
as follows: "Two men fell out, had their swords drawn and were parted, and after a while 
fell to fighting again. One of them was slain, but because it was said that he that killed the 
other fled to the wall and afterward slew him therefore the jury would not find it murder." 
It appears that this was a typical case of generous application of the law of self-defense. It 
is difficult to see how Kelyng thought "murder" not only an appropriate but the preferred 
verdict, but it is easy to understand the view that a verdict of manslaughter, not self-defense, 
was called for: the slayer had engaged in the fight before retreating. Moreover, the evidence 
of retreat probably was given in pro forma fashion, according to a tradition of which Kelyng 
disapproved (but in which the bench had long acquiesced). 
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Kelyng's Reports evidence great attention to the substantive law of 
homicide and his insistence upon verdicts that were commanded by the 
law .71 One ancient doctrine concerned the manner in which a master or 
his helper might punish an apprentice, the subject of another of the cases 
charged against him. In his defense to this charge in Commons, Kelyng 
first cited a particularly gruesome case (as though it had been charged 
against him in the Commons, though it had not) wherein "a smith struck 
his prentice with a bar of iron [and] broke his skull." The jury, Kelyng 
said, would not find murder until he threatened them. Subsequently, he 
stated, "the judges in Westminster Hall gave their opinion that it was 
murder," for one may not chastise with "any ... weapon or instrument 
to kill them. " 72 According to Kelyng' s Reports, this case was tried in 
London, not on the Western Circuit, and the jury returned a special 
verdict, though it is possible they had been urged to do so. 73 The 
Westminster bench ruled in this case that the facts amounted to murder. 
It thus provided Kelyng with powerful precedent and, moreover, allowed 
him to parade his generosity of spirit, for, as he stated in the Commons, 
after the Westminster ruling the defendant (presumably with Kelyng's 
leave) was pardoned due to his good reputation. 74 Kelyng appears to have 
employed this case tactically in the Commons in order to buttress his 
defense on the charge of inducing a murder verdict in the case actually 
charged against him. Though in the case charged the "instrument" of 
chastisement was less lethal (a broomstick), the master's servant, Kelyng 
apparently said, "beat [the apprentice] about the head ... until the blood 
gushed out of his nose, mouth and ears." Kelyng stated that he caused the 
jury to "bring it in murder," for which the defendant was hanged.75 
Again, Kelyng viewed the initial verdicts in the case of the fray and in 
both of the master-servant cases as directly contrary to settled rules of 
law. In this he was correct, but possibly on weaker ground, for these 
cases could be assimilated to cases in which there was room for true 
disagreement on the facts. Unlike Quaker trials, these were not cases in 
which the bench was confronted with what could be read as systematic 
appeals for jury nullification. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a true dispute 
over either law or fact existed in cases that involved the line between 
murder and manslaughter, or in ones that involved the line between 
culpable homicide and self-defense. For example, in even the most 
71. E.g. Kelyng 56, 58, 61-2, 84 Eng. Rep. 1080-83 (1666). 
72. Diary of John Milward, pp. 167-68. 
73. Kelyng 64-65, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084-85 (1666). 
74. Diary of John Milward, p. 168: "But although this man was condemned yet because 




egregious case, that of the smith who struck his apprentice with an iron 
bar, it is unlikely that the jury rejected the proposition that such 
chastisement might constitute murder; as for the facts, probably so much 
was proved. But there were other considerations, ones that applied as 
much or more to the defendant who used a broomstick to chastise. Had 
the defendant acted out of sudden anger? Did he intend to kill as opposed 
seriously to hurt the deceased? Was the defendant of good reputation? 
None of these factors altered the law: strictly speaking, only provocation 
on the part of the deceased could reduce the crime to manslaughter. 
Nonetheless, there was in practice room for play, especially where there 
was no evidence either of true premeditatiorr Or of slaying in the course of 
robbery or burglary. The concept of "deliberateness" could be viewed 
differently in different cases that fell within the genre of those charged, 
even, strictly speaking, "against the facts." This was part of the jury's 
traditional de facto role-the merciful application of law to facts. At times 
the bench acquiesced in the jury's exercise of such discretion, at times 
not. The problem for contemporaries was, What might a nonacquiescing 
bench do to a jury that applied the law to the facts in this way? Kelyng had 
no doubts, and some precedent; but there was precedent (in the form of 
practice) in the other direction as well. 
Kelyng's handling of the Windham affair in Parliament shows him at his 
most tactful. He asserted that the grand jury brought in a bill of death per 
infortunium and that for this reason he had explained to them that they 
must return either billa vera or ignoramus: "[I]fthey find the proofs to be 
slight or not material, then to find it ignoramus, and if it be sufficiently 
proved then to bring it in billa vera, and then to leave it to the trial of the 
court. " 76 Kelyng told the grand jury, he now said, that it may not judge 
''of point of law,'' by which he meant that it must find only the fact of the 
killing by the accused and not the legal nature of the deed. Because the 
grand jury persisted in its verdict, Kelyng admonished them ''better to 
consider of it that night," but they did not change their minds. It was for 
this behavior, Kelyng said, that he fined some ofthe grand jurors. He had 
offered to withdraw the fine "if they would submit." When the matter 
came to a hearing, "the judges with one consent said that I was in the 
right." Afterward he nonetheless-so he now asserted-"caused the 
clerk of the assize to remit their fines. "77 
Kelyng made no reference to his interchange with Windham, and he 
perhaps took more credit for the discharging of the fine than was his due. 78 
76. Diary of John Milward, p. 68. 
77. Ibid., p. 169. 
78. For the alleged interchange with Wyndham, see above, n. 57. According to an 
anonymous report of the subsequent proceedings before King's Bench, the grand jurors 
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It appears that the grand jury returned a verdict of manslaughter, not of 
per infortunium, an unimportant slip on Kelyng's part.79 Nonetheless, 
Kelyng was correct on the law and must have felt confident about his 
position so long as he could divert attention from his insults to Windham. 
Perhaps significantly, Kelyng made no reference to his more extreme 
view that in some cases of homicide the question of whether the slaying 
had been murder or manslaughter was not even for the trial jury. On this 
view, where the Crown produced evidence of deliberation and the 
defendant failed to show provocation, the trial jury would merely find the 
fact of the homicide; it was for the court to "imply" malice. If the jury in 
such a case found a degree of homicide less than murder, it would incur 
punishment. Indeed, in Rex v. Hood, Kelyng fined a petty jury on just 
those grounds. 8o 
According to Milward, the House debated Kelyng's behavior for four 
hours or more before resolving that fining and imprisonment were illegal 
and that a bill should be drafted to that effect, but that there should be "no 
further prosecution or proceedings against the Chief Justice. "8t It is 
were discharged without fine "because it was a mistake in their judgments rather than any 
obstinacy." (B.L. MS Harg. 339, fol. 2). Keble [2 Keble 180-81, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (1667)] 
reported that the fine was not assessed "because they were gentlemen of repute in the 
country." 
79. B.L. MS Harg. 339, fol. 2. The bill proffered to the grand jury stipulated "murder." 
80. Kelyng 50-51, 84 Eng. Rep. 1077-78 (1666). It appears that Kelyng believed it was for 
the bench to determine whether the defendant had shown provocation: "[U]pon the 
evidence it appeared that [Hood] killed him without any provocation, and thereupon I 
directed the jury, that it was murder; for the law in that case intended malice; and I told them 
they were judges of the matter of fact, viz. whether Newen died by the hand of Hood; but 
whether it was murder or manslaughter, that was matter in law, in which they were to 
observe the direction of the Court." Kelyng fined the jurors forty shillings apiece. Hatsell 
(Precedents of Proceedings, p. 114) suggests that Hood's Case was among those charged 
against Kelyng. Probably he confused this case with the one involving the fray (see above, 
n. 70 and accompanying text). The more common (and the correct) practice was for the 
judge to charge the jury that absence of provocation implied malice; that whether there had 
been provocation was a question of fact for the jury to determine; that it was for the jury to 
apply the law (of implied malice) to the facts the jury found; that the jury was to state in its 
verdict whether the defendant was guilty of murder, manslaughter, homicide in self-defense, 
or was not guilty. This practice, of course, enabled the jury to conceal a rejection of the law 
of implied malice within its finding of fact, and it is this that Kelyng sought to prevent. 
81. Diary of John Milward, p. 170: "Many did aggravate, others did extenuate [Kelyng's] 
failings." Pepys recorded: "Here I did also see their votes against my Lord Chief Justice 
Keeling, that his proceedings were illegal and that he was a contemner of Magna Charta, the 
great preserver of our lives, freedoms, and properties-and an introduction to arbitrary 
government-which is very high language, and of the same sound with that in the year 1640" 
(Diary, p. 577, under date: 12 Dec. 1667. Almost certainly this was the thirteenth of 
December). According to Grey (Debates, p. 67), Wyndham moved "that since the Chief 
Justice had forgot to answer the reproachful language he gave him, that the House would 
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impossible to determine the precise reason for the House's decision on 
the bill. Possibly it reflected concern about the Crown's use of the bench, 
and about the strongly royalist tendency of some of the judges, as well as 
fear that the bench might use its monitoring of judicial proceedings to fine 
or imprison its political enemies. 82 Perhaps largely political concerns that 
were readily translated into "constitutional" concerns fostered wide-
spread doubts about the legality of fining and made acceptable the view 
that, whatever one might make of the precedents, fining was, pure and 
simple, unlawful. Had the main consideration been Kelyng's treatment of 
recalcitrant juries in prosecutions of Quakers, the result might have been 
very different, for most Parliamentarians believed that the Quakers posed 
a threat both to public order and to respect for statute law. s3 But most of 
the cases with which the House had had to grapple were homicides, 
where something less was at stake. Kelyng's behavior-because it 
touched the most routine area of the administration of the criminal law-
may have been taken to suggest how far the Stuart bench was prepared to 
go to revise long-settled practices involving the criminal trial jury. 
The bill to declare illegal the fining and imprisonment of jurors died in 
committee. It had received two readings before the House in mid-
February, 1668, and among those who had spoken to the bill after its 
second reading was John Vaughan, who would three years later write the 
opinion in Bushel's Case. Vaughan appears to have adopted a middle 
position, arguing that prohibition of "menacing" ought to be dropped 
from the bill, "it being a word of too large extent." A judge ought to be 
able to ''tell a corrupt jury of the danger of an attaint, in a case where they 
shall proceed wittingly against both their oaths and duties." What 
Vaughan meant by "corrupt" is unclear; nor can we know whether 
Vaughan, as of 1668, would have endorsed the fining (as well as the 
"menacing") of jurors had he believed an attaint was unavailing and that 
likewise forget it, for he [Wyndham] did." See also, Journals of the House of Commons, 
9:37, col. 2. 
82. See A. F. Havighurst, "The Judiciary and Politics in the Reign of Charles II," Law 
Quarterly Review, vol. 66 (1950), pp. 62, 229. See also Jennifer Carter, "Law, Courts and 
Constitution," in J. R. Jones, ed., The Restored Monarchy (London, 1979), p. 86; J. P. 
Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), p. 420. 
83. For the background to the renewal in 1670 of the Conventicles Act see Douglas 
Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics in England, 1661-1689 (New Brunswick, 1969), 
pp. 58-61; Grey, Debates, pp. 146, 174,220-22,226-28,230,245-47,254,263-64,295,300. 
Vaughan spoke against the bill "because it crosses the fundamental laws of the nation" 
(presumably because it did not provide jury trial in some contexts); Hansard, ed., 
Parliamentary Debates, iv:4l3, 421, 444-47; Journals of the House of Commons, 9:60-61, 
66, 78, 87, 101-2, 104, 108-9, Ill, 113, 123, 128, 129-31, 135-36, 147, 150, 154; Journals of 
the House of Lords 12:237, 260, 262, 305-6, 308-10; 312, 317-18, 320-21, 324-26, 333, 
335-36, 338-40, 342, 349-50. 
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a "failure of justice" was thus possible. 84 The bill was then committed to 
the study of Vaughan and nearly three dozen others.ss That committee 
was subsequently saddled with consideration of a bill regarding the 
procuring of able and sufficientjurors.86 Debate resumed in the House in 
early April, 1668, reviving the Committee's activity concerning judicial 
treatment of jurors-new complaints, this time regarding Justice Tyrrell, 
were aired-but the bill never received a final reading. 87 Largely in 
response to concerns of London authorities about Quaker preaching, the 
question of continuing the Act to prevent and suppress seditious Conven-
ticles seems to have taken precedence, and, perhaps significantly, there 
was substantial overlap between its members and those on the committee 
for the jury bill. 88 By the end of the year Vaughan had been appointed 
Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and complaints about treatment of jurors 
had diminished. Kelyng, who had formerly been so active, soon passed 
from the scene altogether. 89 
III 
The prosecution of William Penn and William Mead grew out of the 
continuing struggle between the Quakers and City of London authorities. 
Despite continued arrests and fines, Quaker leaders continued to preach 
at large and well-publicized meetings. London officials had ordered that 
traditional meeting places of the Friends be locked and guarded by 
soldiers, but this only forced preaching out onto the streets where crowds 
gathered and-as city authorities saw it-the public order was threat-
84. According to Milward (Diary, pp. 190-91), Vaughan concluded his comments with the 
observation "that there ought also care to be taken to prevent miscarriage of juries as well 
as the severity of judges." 
85. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:51-53; Diary of John Milward, pp. 187, 190-91; 
Grey, Debates, p. 84. 
86. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:65, 70-71. A total of fifteen more persons were 
added to the committee (idem). 
87. Ibid., 9:74-75, 77, 83-84. See Diary of John Milward, p. 243, for the complaint 
"brought in against Judge Tyrell [for] forcing a jury to go out again upon a prisoner after he 
had been tried before Chief Justice Kelyng, and had been acquitted by the jury ... Judge 
Tyrell being present at the trial" (April 3, 1668). On that day Milward himself was added to 
the Committee (Journals of the House of Commons, 9:74). See also B.L. MS Add, 38,336, 
fol. 348, regarding activity in the House of Lords: "It was ordered that the Lord St. John 
have leave to bring in a bill for declaring the fining and imprisoning of jurors illegal. This bill 
was brought in but did not pass." 
88. Journals of the House of Commons, 9:74, 84. 
89. Kelyng died in May, 1671. He was still on the bench in 1670, but it appears from the 
printed Reports that he was not present after Trinity Term of that year. See E. Foss, The 
Judges of England, with sketches of their lives and notices connected with the Courts at 
Westminster, 1066-1864, 9 vols. (London, 1848-64), vol. 7 (1864), p. 139. 
222 Transformations 
ened.9o On August 14, 1670, Penn addressed an especially large crowd in 
Gracechurch Street. Shortly after he began to speak, constables 
forearmed with warrants signed by the Lord Mayor, Sir Samuel Starling, 
moved to arrest both him and his copreacher, Mead. According to the 
document addressed formally to the keeper of Newgate, Penn was 
arrested for ''preaching seditiously and causing a great tumult of people 
... to be gathered together riotously and routously. "91 Despite the form 
of this warrant both men were charged under the recently renewed 
Conventicles Actn and might have obtained release sine die through 
payment of fines. But they refused and instead demandedjury trial, as the 
Act allowed. They thus remained in custody until the close of their 
five-day trial, which began September 1 at the quarter sessions held at the 
Old Bailey.93 
Neither Penn nor Mead was indicted for attendance at a meeting in 
breach of the Conventicles Act. Rather, the government charged them 
with causing an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the peace, 
charges that came close to an indictment for insurrection. The indictment 
alleged that the two men agreed that Penn would preach and that Penn 
"by abetment of ... Mead ... did preach and speak"; it also alleged that 
"by reason" of the defendants' actions "a great concourse and tumult of 
people in the street ... a long time did remain and continue, in contempt 
of ... the King, and of his law, to the great disturbance of his peace. "94 
At their trial the prisoners were brought forward, a jury was sworn and 
the indictment read. Asked to plead, the defendants requested a copy of 
the indictment, but the bench informed them of standard practice: they 
must plead to the indictment before receiving a copy of it. After extracting 
promises that "no advantage may be taken against" them, both pleaded 
''not guilty in manner and form.' '95 
The court recessed until September 3, when the Crown produced three 
witnesses against the defendants. The first, James Cook, stated that he 
had been sent for to disperse the meeting. He saw Penn speaking to the 
people but "could not hear what [Penn] said because of the noise." He 
could not approach Penn "for the crowd of people; upon which Capt. 
90. Catherine Owens Peare, William Penn (Ann Arbor, 1956), pp. 107-8. 
91. Arrest warrant, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, quoted in Peare, William Penn, p. 
110. 
92. Stat. 22 Chas. 2, c. 1 (1670). 
93. Peare, William Penn, pp. 110-13. 
94. State Trials, 6:954-55. This account was published originally by Penn and Mead as 
The People's Antient and Just Liberties (London, 1670). It contains several appendixes 
dealing with, inter alia, Magna Carta and the proceedings in Parliament against Chief Justice 
Kelyng. 
95. Ibid., p. 955. 
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Mead came to me ... and desired me to let [Penn] go on, for when he had 
done, he would bring Mr. Penn to me." A constable, Richard Read, 
corroborated Cook's testimony. Read "found a great crowd of people," 
"heard Mr. Penn preach to them, " 96 and "endeavored with my watchmen 
to get at Mr. Penn to pull him down, but ... could not, the people kicking 
my watchmen and myself on the shins. "97 Read could hear neither Penn's 
nor Mead's conversation with Cook because of the "great noise." A 
witness named Whiting saw Penn but not Mead; he supposed Penn was 
speaking but could not hear him.98 
Penn and Mead occasionally challenged the witnesses, but clearly they 
believed that any factual errors in the witnesses' testimony should prove 
irrelevant, for both defendants admitted with pride that they had as-
sembled to preach and to pray.99 Neither defendant believed that the 
Crown's evidence, even if true, amounted to the breaking of any law. To 
their demand that they be shown the law upon which the indictment was 
based, the Recorder (Rowel) replied that the indictment was based ''upon 
the common law" and that he could not "run up so many years, and over 
so many adjudged cases, which we call common law. "Joo This drew 
Penn's famous retort: "[I]f[the law] be common, it should not be so hard 
to produce." Once again he returned to the indictment: 
Shall I plead to an indictment that has no foundation in law? If it 
contain that law you say I have broken, why should you decline to 
produce that law, since it will be impossible for the jury to determine, 
or agree to bring in their verdict, who have not the law produced, by 
which they should measure the truth of the indictment, and the guilt, or 
contrary of my fact? ... The question is not, whether I am guilty of this 
indictment, but whether this indictment be legal. 10 1 
96. Ibid., p. 957. 
97. Sir Samuel Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, entitled, 
The Trial ofW. Penn and W. Mead (London, 1671), p. 15. This account, written by the Lord 
Mayor of London, who presided at the trial, contains this testimony. The "official" account, 
by Penn, does not. On this point, Starling's account seems credible. 
98. State Trials, 6:957. The official account does not contain the name of this witness. 
Starling's account does (p. 16). 
99. Ibid., p. 958. Penn: "We confess ourselves to be so far from recanting, or declining 
to vindicate the assembling of ourselves to preach, pray, or worship the Eternal, Holy, Just 
God, that we declare to all the world, that we do believe it to be our indispensable duty." 
Starling (An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 17) asserted that the 
witnesses' testimony and defendants' "confessions" sufficed for conviction. 
100. State Trials, 6:958. 
101. Ibid., 6:958-59. Starling's account (p. 19) contains a paraphrase of this speech, 
referring to it as though it had been added post hoc and never spoken in court. Starling also 
records a comment of his own that he evidently made at about this point in the trial: "Now 
the Common Law is Common Right, or Lex Rationis, imprinted in every man's understand-
ing" (p. 17). 
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Irritated by Penn's continued demands, the Recorder insisted that the 
defendants "speak to the indictment," i.e., that they speak to the 
evidence presented against them. 
[Y]ou are now upon matter of fact, which fact you have heard proved 
against you; you are to answer it: If the fact be found against you, you 
may then speak to the matter of law, in arrest of judgment, and you 
shall be heard. 102 
Penn would have none of this. To make his "best defense" before the jury 
he must have the Crown's statement of the law. At this point the 
Recorder, supported by the mayor, ordered that Penn be removed to the 
bale dock; it was in response to that order that Penn appealed to his jury 
("my sole judges") to consider whether he was being tried in accordance 
with the fundamentallaws.103 Mead soon followed Penn to the bale dock, 
having stated to the jury ("who are my judges") that his indictment was 
"a bundle of stuff, full of lies and falsehoods. "104 The Recorder then 
charged the jury that the indictment was for "preaching ... and drawing 
a tumultuous company." 10s From the distant bale dock, the full court 
heard Penn's parting shot: 
I appeal to the jury who are my judges, and this great assembly, 
whether the proceedings of the court are not most arbitrary, and void 
of all law, in offering to give the jury their charge in the absence of the 
prisoners .... [A]nd you of the jury, take notice, that I have not been 
heard, neither can you legally depart the court before I have been fully 
heard, having at last ten or twelve material points to offer, in order to 
invalidate their indictment.J06 
In considering their verdict, the jurors agreed that Penn had preached 
to an assembly of persons, but could agree to no more. They reported to 
the Court that eight jurors were prepared to return a "guilty" verdict; 
four were not. Displeased, the bench berated the four and sent the jury 
102. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 18. 
103. State Trials, 6:959. 
104. Ibid., p. 960. According to Penn and Mead's account, Mead also told the jury that 
a "riot" involved three or more meeting together "to beat a man, or to enter forcibly into 
another man's land, to cut down his grass, his wood, or break down his poles." Starling (p. 
20) also records this speech and adds that the recorder replied: "[Y]es, and to do any other 
unlawful act." This has reference to the Conventicles Act, breach of which under these 
circumstances the Lord Mayor deemed constituted the holding of an unlawful assembly. 
105. State Trials, 6:690. 
106. Ibid., p. 961; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, p. 21. 
The first half of this speech is in both Penn and Mead's account and Starling's account; the 
second half is in only Penn and Mead's account. 
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away to reconsider its decision. 107 When the jury returned, the foreman 
reported that they had found Penn "guilty of speaking in Gracechurch 
Street,'' to which the Recorder replied that they ''had as good say 
nothing." The mayor questioned the jury: "Was it not an unlawful 
assembly? You mean [Penn] was speaking to a tumult there?" But further 
questioning availed the bench nothing; the jury was not prepared to 
answer to the core of the indictment. Penn was guilty only of "speaking 
or preaching to an assembly''; Mead was not guilty. Bushel and the others 
who would not bring in a guilty verdict stood upon their ''conscience,'' as 
Penn had exhorted them to do. It was, or so Penn contended, the 
juryman's "right."JOs 
In the end the jury abandoned the device of a truncated verdict and 
rendered a definitive "not guilty. " 109 The trial was over, and the indict-
ment was overturned. The bench was left to assess fines: Penn and Mead 
for contempt, Bushel and the other jurors for their disobedient verdict. 
The bench, because it viewed the evidence as manifest, came down 
harshly on the jurors, fining them for finding contrary both to the evidence 
("in matter of fact") and to the instructions ("in matter of law"). 110 
Precisely how the jurors perceived the case against Penn is beyond 
reconstruction. Penn had insisted that the court produce the law on which 
the indictment was grounded so that jurors ''might measure the truth of 
the indictment, and the guilt of the fact.'' The recalcitrant jurors may have 
acceded to the court's view of the law, that preaching to a large and 
tumultuous assembly in a manner that continued a disturbance of the 
peace was a high misdemeanor, but doubted whether there was sufficient 
evidence of a tumult and disturbance of the peace. More likely, however, 
they both doubted the tumult and believed that the Crown had, in any 
event, to prove an unlawful intent, especially where the law of criminal 
trespass was being applied to a man of God preaching His Word to those 
gathered to hear him. 
For Penn the message of his acquittal was unmistakable: the jurors had 
made their own assessment of the law, or at least had rejected that put 
forth by the court. What was now awaited-and would surely come-was 
exoneration of the jurors, who, by assessing the law themselves, had 
rebuffed the tyranny of the judiciary and vindicated their own true 
107. State Trials, 6:961; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, 
p. 22. 
108. State Trials, 6:961-65; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous 
Pamphlet, pp. 22-30. 
109. State Trials. 6:966; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, 
p. 30. 
110. State Trials, 6:969; Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, 
pp. 30-31. 
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historical and moral purpose. In the meantime, Penn would spend much 
of his stay in prison publicizing his case in a series of tracts. These tracts, 
written by Penn and the Quaker Thomas Rudyard, who was convicted of 
obstructingjustice by ajury sworn in to replace Penn'sjury, 111 dealt both 
with the duties of jurors and with the (alleged) right ofthe bench to punish 
them. These tracts appeared between October, 1670 and March, 1671, the 
period that saw as well the early stages of the legal contest over the fining 
and imprisonment of Bushel and his cojurors. To what extent the legal 
and rhetorical campaigns influenced each other we shall probably never 
know-perhaps they proceeded independently of each other, drawing 
primarily on a common pool of ideas. As we shall see, the central thrust 
of Vaughan's opinion, handed down in the fall of 1671,112 differed 
significantly both from earlier legal arguments and from those in the 
contemporary jury-tract literature. 
In An Appendix by way of Defense, a tract he attached to his account 
of the trial, Penn articulated his defense more clearly than he had at the 
Old Bailey .113 His position was analogous to the familiar Quaker argu-
ment that the jury must look behind the indictment to the law upon which 
it was based lest the bench and the officials who framed indictments 
significantly misinterpret the Conventicles Act. But Penn varied the 
argument slightly. The crucial point of reference for his jury was not 
statute but the common law regarding the requisites for unlawful as-
sembly and disturbance of the peace. An unlawful assembly required at 
most either assembling to commit an act that would, if committed, 
constitute a riot, or refusing to disperse when part of the assembly was 
threatening to commit such an act; it might also be charged where a large 
number of persons met under circumstances that created fear of great 
harm by either those who met or those who witnessed the meeting. 114 It 
111. See below, n. 126. 
112. The exact date upon which Vaughan issued his opinion is not known. Bushel had 
sued out his writ in November, 1670. The arguments at bar ensued during the following 
months. See Clark, The Later Stuarts, p. 108 (giving 1671 as the year of the decision). 
Rudyard, in his "Appendix" to Penn's Truth Rescued, which was written in Feb.-March, 
1671 (see below, n. 122), referred to the case as pending in Common Pleas. 
113. State Trials, 6:970-1000. 
114. William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols. (London, 1716), vol. 
I, p. 158: "An unlawful Assembly, according to the common opinion, is a disturbance of the 
peace by persons barely assembling together, with an intention to do a thing, which if it were 
executed would make them rioters, but neither actually executing it, nor making a motion 
toward the execution of it; but this seems to be much too narrow a definition; for any 
meeting whatsoever of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror, as cannot 
but endanger the public peace, and raise fears and jealousies among the King's subjects, 
seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly; as where great numbers, complaining of 
a common grievance, meet together, armed in a warlike manner, in order to consult together 
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is unclear whether London authorities counted any assembly in breach of 
the Conventicles Act as an unlawful assembly. Apparently, authorities 
believed that a tumult had resulted, or at least had been highly likely to 
occur. Such a tumult clearly constituted a disturbance of the peace and 
made the assembly unlawful. 
According to Penn, the government had to prove that the defendants 
had met with an intent to do-or to plan-physical harm to person or 
property, the traditional sphere in which common law crimes were 
located. The intent to worship God in a manner and form contrary to 
statute was clearly not such a design: "[T]hat dissenters meet with no such 
intention, is manifest to the whole world, therefore their assemblies are 
not unlawful. " 115 The authorities, Penn argued, had resorted to an evil 
stratagem. The prosecution had "forged" a "romance-indictment" that 
cited circumstances which did not, in law, amount to an unlawful 
assembly or disturbance of the peace, but which included those phrases. 
The hoped-for verdict would then attach to the entire indictment, so that 
on the basis of evidence of religious assembly only, the jury would have, 
in legal effect, found an unlawful assembly and disturbance of the peace. 
Moreover, according to Penn, the indictment had been framed in such a 
way as to induce a verdict of guilty. It was "swelled with malicious 
scaring phrases'' to give the impression that the defendants were ''the 
most dangerous persons." Precisely because there was so little evidence 
against them the government had introduced fictitious testimony into the 
indictment. In short, the indictment was intended to be self-proving. 116 
The jury, applauded the Appendix, had not been fooled. It refused to do 
more than to find those facts proven at trial and had stated its verdict 
accordingly, thus comprehending its role as judge not only of fact, but of 
the law upon which the indictment was based. The jury had responded to 
the defendants' exhortation not to return a verdict of guilty unless it 
believed that the facts proved amounted in law to the crime of unlawful 
assembly. Nor could the jury have done otherwise: "For as well the jury 
as prisoners, were denied to have any law produced, by which they might 
concerning the most proper means for recovery of their interests; for no one can foresee 
what may be the event of such an assembly." 
115. State Trials, 6:971-72. Although Penn denied there had been a "tumult," except, 
perhaps, in response to the "unlawful" acts of the officials who disrupted the lawful 
assembly, Penn apparently did not believe that the mere fact of a tumult sufficed to make the 
assembly (which met without the intent to cause such a tumult) unlawful. "In short, because 
to worship God can never be a crime, no meeting or assembly, designing to worship God, 
can be unlawful" (p. 971). 
116. Ibid., pp. 973-74. Penn made good use of the historical lore concerning Empson and 
Dudley in his denunciation of the authorities' approach to the indictment process (pp. 989 et 
seq.). 
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measure the truth of the indictment, and guilt of the fact. " 117 Thus, had 
the bench "produced" the law, as the defendants had demanded, the jury 
would then have been duty-bound to determine whether the indictment 
and judicial charge conformed to the law regarding the facts required for 
the alleged offense. Presumably this determination would have been 
informed not only by their own understanding of the law but also by their 
consideration of the defendants' arguments against the bench's inter-
pretation of law. 
This, then, was Penn's conception of due process in trials by jury-so 
far as one can now reconstruct it. Penn's claim that his jurors were his 
"sole judges" was not a claim that the bench played no role at all; the 
bench was to "produce" the law and to charge juries upon it, and even to 
monitor indictments for just the sort of abuses of which Penn and Mead 
believed they had been made victims. The jury, one might suppose, would 
give the bench's charge due weight. It operated as a shield where 
necessary, and, for the Quakers, unusual events had created present 
necessities. 
Penn and Mead's views, and their behavior at their trial, were fiercely 
attacked by Sir Samuel Starling, the Lord Mayor of London, in a tract 
written in part as a reply to the defendants' trial account and the 
Appendix. us Starling, who had presided at the trial, produced an account 
of the proceedings that differed little in detail from that of the defendants 
but one that-perhaps sincerely-misconceived the nature of the cam-
paign on behalf of the jury. Starling characterized the defendants' 
behavior as insulting attempts to undermine the law, and the jury's 
"special" verdict as a nonverdict, an abuse of their duty. Starling never 
doubted that the jurors merited the fines imposed upon them for their 
outright nullification of the law: the Crown, he believed, had lawfully 
charged and definitively proved an unlawful assembly. 
Addressing the Westminster bench, Starling devoted much of his tract 
to a denunciation of Penn's notion "[t]hat the jury were the proper judges 
both of law and fact."119 Not surprisingly, he thought that Penn's 
historical "precedents," reproduced in the Appendix, falsely demon-
strated the jury's right to find the law. However, he wrongly interpreted 
Penn's appeal to the jury as his "sole judges" as an entire renunciation of 
117. Ibid., p. 974. 
118. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet. 
119. Ibid., p. 2: "Now Gentlemen of the long robe look to your selves, and your 
Westminster Hall: If these learned reformers of religion shall likewise reform your laws and 
methods of proceedings (as doubtless they design it) and make twelve jurymen, eleven of 
which it's possible can neither write nor read, to be the sole judges both of law and fact; 
farewell then to your great acquisitions, your Year Books then will be out of date, and an 
ouster will be put to your Books of Entries." 
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the powers of the bench, a "claim" he rebutted as absurd and dangerous. 
The Quakers, Starling asserted, would reduce the justices to "ciphers," 
a term he may have taken from Lilburne's well known 1649 appeal to his 
jury.I2o The defendants, he continued, misinterpreted Magna Carta's 
most famous chapter. "By lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of 
the land" did not guarantee trial by peers who acted as judges. As it was 
in the "disjunctive," the Crown might employ the "law of the land," 
which must mean trial by both judge and jury ("peers"). Magna Carta 
was entirely consistent with that well known legal maxim: "[T]he judges 
respond to questions of law." In claiming trial solely by jurors, Starling 
concluded, the Quakers aimed at a special sort of jury, not that employed 
by the common law; they intended ultimately to "turn the judges and 
juries also out of Westminster Hall and set up a High Court of Justice of 
Saints.'' 121 
Starling's tract provoked a retort from Penn. Truth Rescued from 
Imposture was written during February and March of 1671, in Newgate, 
where London authorities had imprisoned Penn anew, this time for 
breach of the Five Mile Act. 122 Now forced to state more precisely his 
pro-jury position, Penn defended his view that jurors are judges oflaw as 
well as fact, pointing to the form ofthe traditional charge to the petty jury: 
"to deliver their verdict or opinion, whether [the defendant] be guilty in 
manner and form." Since the indictment "comprehends both law and 
fact," the jury is judge of both, to determine "whether the fact proved be 
obnoxious to the law. " 123 But how does the jury achieve its understanding 
of the law? This question Penn now answered for the first time. The jurors 
need not take the law solely from the bench; otherwise, the bench might 
require a verdict of guilty for "the most lawful act imaginable, it being 
such as he cannot deny, and which is proved by evidences." While 
acknowledging that a jury might be so ignorant that ''there may be a 
necessity to inform them of the law, by the better skill of the justices,'' 
Penn argued that even in such a case the law stood only as it is 
understood, digested, and judiciously made the jury's, by their own 
free will and acceptance, upon their conviction of the truth of things 
reported by the bench: As a man may be educated in any religion; but 
to make it his proper religion, it is requisite that he believe and embrace 
120. Ibid., p. 3. 
121. Idem. 
122. Penn, Truth Rescued (see above, n. 52). For Penn's activities between September, 
1670, and March, 1671, see Peare, William Penn. pp. 127-34. Truth Rescued appears to have 
been written in February, 1671; Thomas Rudyard added an "Appendix" in that month and 
Penn added a "Postscript" in March, 1671. 
123. Penn, Truth Rescued, pp. 500, 504-5. 
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it judiciously, not implicitly ,124 
Penn thus conceded an important role to the bench, while marking out the 
limits of its power and articulating his conception of the process by which 
the jury "finds the law." 
Penn's views found support in Thomas Rudyard's Dialogue, in a Plain 
and Friendly Discourse between Student and Citizen. 125 The tract re-
ferred to Penn and Mead's trial, the Appendix, and to the trial of Rudyard, 
Francis Moor, and several others, all of whom were convicted by a jury 
that replaced the jury that had tried Penn and Mead. 126 In Dialogue, a 
self-styled student of the common law explains the importance of jury 
duty, the nature of the juror's role, and the unlawfulness of the punish-
ment of jurors for finding according to their conscience. Echoing Penn 
(and well-settled Quaker strategy), the Student advises the Citizen as 
juror to observe the indictment closely so as to determine whether the 
evidence offered proves the defendant guilty not only of the acts alleged 
in the indictment but also of the "manner" ("which they call law"), for 
''though a person be proved to be guilty of some fact or misdemeanor, yet 
if it be not also proved to be done in such manner and form as the party 
stands indicted, he is not guilty, and ought to be acquitted by you. " 127 To 
the Citizen's query, "But is not there both law and fact in an indictment, 
as those against W.P. and W.M. and the rest of the Quakers last sessions? 
And how shall a jury deal in such cases?"tzs the Student replies that the 
jury may return a special verdict, finding the fact and asking the Court to 
apply the law. 
Citizen: What's the reason then, that the Court will not accept of such 
124. Ibid., p. 502. 
125. Thomas Rudyard, An Appendix, by way of Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly 
Discourse between a Student in the Laws and Liberties of England, and a true Citizen of 
London (London, 1670). This tract was appended to The Second Part of the Peoples Antient 
and Just Liberties (London, 1670) that was itself part of an expanded edition of Penn's 
account of his trial. The Second Part recounted the trial of Thomas Rudyard. 
126. The Second Part of the Peoples Antient and Just Liberties Asserted. This account 
was probably written by Penn and Rudyard. It states that after Penn's jury had been 
incarcerated, a new jury was called to try Rudyard (who had taken part with Penn and Mead 
in convoking the assembly in Gracechurch Street) and about a dozen others for obstructing 
the prosecution for sedition of Samuel Allinbridge. To obtain the new jury, the account 
alleges, the clerk "picked here and there such persons that were judged the most likely to 
answer the malicious ends and horrid designs of [the] Bench, calling not the jury-men in 
order and direct course, as is usual in all courts of justice, where right is impartially 
administered; and withal, bidding the prisoners to look upon the jurors, and before they 
were sworn to make their challenges" (p. 364). 
127. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, p. 396. 
128. Ibid., p. 397. 
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special verdicts, but frequently turn the jury back, till they bring in 
general? 
Student: Because then they have your oaths as well for law as fact; 
and if the judgments be severe, it shall lie at your door. 129 
This was, of course, a far riskier tactic than that of a simple statement of 
the facts that had been found unaccompanied by a request to apply the 
law .130 Because it left the bench the legal right to enter a verdict of guilty, 
however, it could prove much more embarrassing. 
The Student goes on to charge, along the lines of Penn and Mead's 
Appendix, that the authorities systematically loaded down indictments 
with incriminating terms: verdicts of "guilty" on insufficient facts might 
then be applied to the entire indictment. Moreover, the "City Magis-
trates" had a "further artifice." They indict persons "by the common 
law, and waive intermeddling with any of the statutes in force against 
such misdemeanors, as they pretend the persons indicted are guilty 
of." 131 Thus, stated the author, in an obvious reference to Penn and 
Mead's case, the bench, when asked to produce the law on which the 
indictment is based, answers that it is "Lex non scripta." 
By this means the prisoner is incapacitated to make his defence, and 
the jury kept ignorant, whether the offence charged to be done by the 
prisoner be innocency or guilt. . . . [T]hey might have framed an 
indictment against a man for (viet armis) eating meat at his own table. 
. . . Therefore it concerns you to have great care and regard to the 
charge you undertake; which is, well and truly to try, and true 
deliverance make, according to what is evidenced to your con-
science.132 
Conscience, then, required that jurors do one of two things: Either they 
ought to return a special verdict and thereby force the bench openly to 
wrench the law to its own ends, or taking it upon themselves to find the 
law, they ought to find the defendant "not guilty." 
Of course there were cases-Penn's Case was one-where the bench 
would not tolerate either course of action, where the bench believed that 
such jury behavior seriously threatened the social order. For what 
officials took to be an outright and illegal nullification of the law, the jury 
129. Idem. 
130. In many Quaker cases, including Penn and Mead's trial, the jury merely stated the 
facts it had found, omitting any finding whatsoever on what it knew to be the crucial facts. 
Moreover, it did not request the bench to apply the law. For cases involving Quakers in 
which jurors rendered such verdicts see e.g. Besse, A Collection of the Sufferings of . .. 
Quakers, I: 48 (1663, Bristol), 634 (1683, Somersetshire), 730 (1684, Sussex). It is not clear 
how the bench ought in law to have treated such truncated verdicts. 
131. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, p. 399. 
132. Ibid., pp. 399-400. 
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would be fined and imprisoned until the fines were paid. Inevitably, the 
question of the legality of the fining and imprisonment of jurors for 
acquitting in criminal cases "against manifest evidence" was central to 
the tracts occasioned by the trial of Penn and Mead. In the Appendix and 
the Dialogue, Penn and Rudyard dealt at length with this question. The 
defendants had protested at their trial against the bench's treatment of 
their jury, particularly against the court's refusal to accept the jury's first 
several verdicts. Penn had asserted that judicial fining of jurors offended 
the principle, set forth in Magna Carta, that no free man should be 
amerced "but by the lawful judgment of his peers." Indeed, Penn had 
made judicial behavior toward the jury a principal basis of his final appeal 
to the jury that it should consider the entire course of the proceedings 
against him illegal.133 
In the Appendix, Penn developed more fully the question of jury 
control, recounting both ancient and recent precedents relating to trial by 
jury. He claimed that jury fining was an innovation, that the Court did 
"most illegally, tyranically fine and imprison [the defendants] . . . 
notwithstanding the late just resentment of the House of Commons, in 
Judge Kelyng's Case, where they resolved, 'That the precedent and 
practice of fining, and imprisoning of juries for their verdicts, were 
illegal."' 134 Rudyard's Dialogue likewise recounted recent events in its 
argument against the legality of fining jurors. It made effective use of the 
Kelyng incident and, after summarizing Penn's Case, described the 
"packing and enforcement" of the jury that convicted Rudyard, Moor, 
and the others tried before it. The imprisonment of Penn and Mead's jury, 
the Dialogue asserted, had been directly responsible for the new jury's 
obsequious behavior .t3s 
Not all of the arguments in the Dialogue were historically based or 
reduced to mere aphorisms. Some of them went to the nature of the 
criminal trial, arguing-as Vaughan was to argue-from the logic of the 
trial to the unlawfulness of fining jurors. Rudyard devoted the opening 
passages of the Dialogue to the jury's duty to find the fact-and to the 
proposition that they were better equipped to do so than was the bench. 
The jury, the Student explained, is drawn from the vicinage ''where the 
fact is supposed to be done or acted" because "it's always presumed that 
the neighborhood are best acquainted with the persons inhabiting, or the 
actions and facts .... They may know the witness on the one side, or the 
133. State Trials, 6:961-69. Penn argued that the proceedings were "most arbitrary and 
void of all law" because the bench gave "the jury their charge in the absence of the 
prisoners" (p. 961). Subsequently, he protested against the threatening of the jury by the 
recorder (p. 965) and then the fining of the jurors for their verdict (pp. 968-69). 
134. Ibid., p. 984. 
135. Dialogue, in a Plain and Friendly Discourse, pp. 400-2. 
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other, to be persons of no credit, or ... they may know the party accused 
to be a man otherwise qualified or principled, than to do such an act. " 136 
The Citizen was quick to see the point: it would be "very hard" if the jury 
were fined, since it may be taking into account things it knows of its own. 
Moreover, continued the Student, one ought to prefer the "knowledge of 
twelve men, agreeing together" to the "single apprehension of any one 
person whatsoever.'' 137 
The Dialogue also confronted-as would Vaughan-the logic of con-
cluding, in a particular case, that the jury had found "against the law." 
The Student, quoting Coke, explained that since "the law grows out of 
the root of the fact," if the jury does not find the fact, then the jury 
"cannot be said to find against the law, which is no other than a 
superstructure of fact.'' The Student conceded that if the jury openly find 
the fact and then find against the law, ''the Court ought to give judgment 
according to law."J3s Finally, the Dialogue produced an unusual argu-
ment regarding the problem of appellate review. Because no writ of error 
lay in such a case, jurors would be "remediless of relief' if judges could 
fine them, and thus they would be "in worse condition than the criminals 
that are tried by them." If the bench moved by way of attaint, the first 
jury would have some safeguard, as "the truth or falsehood of a juror's 
verdict, in matters of fact, may be tried." But in a criminal case, "the 
jurors are concluded, by reason that whether they have found with or 
against their evidence, can never be tried." The Dialogue thus appears to 
assume that attaint lay only in civil cases, and it employed this assump-
tion in its argument against the fining of jurors .139 
Starling's reply to the Appendix had included a lengthy discourse on the 
subject of fining. First Starling cited a string of cases, only one earlier than 
1660, in which juries had been fined for verdicts unacceptable to the 
courts. These cases, Wagstaffe's Case and Leech's Case among them, 
were the backbone of the pro-fining argument, and Starling concluded 
from them that "[t]he fining of jurors that find contrary to their evidence 
is no innovation, but always practised.'' 140 Like Rudyard, Starling 
concluded that attaint did not lie in criminal cases, but he drew from this 
fact a very different conclusion. Not surprisingly he couched his argument 
against attaint in legal rather than theoretical terms, for any philosophical 
argument against attaint of juries could also cut against their being fined. 
136. Ibid .• pp. 391-92. 
137. Ibid., pp. 392, 394. 
138. Ibid., p. 394. 
139. Ibid., p. 393. 
140. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, pp. 32-33. 
Starling's statement that the jury in Leech's Case was fined (p. 33) was rebutted by Rudyard 
in his "Appendix" to Truth Rescued at p. 514. 
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Starling cited Coke and Fitzherbert for the proposition that "attaint lies 
[for] ... false verdict ... against the Plaintiff or Defendant ... in a plea, 
real or personal, sued out by writ or bill," but not in a criminal case. "It 
is agreed by all sides, that an attaint lieth not in an indictment of treason, 
murder or felony; much less in an indictment of trespass, which ... is far 
lesser offence than them aforementioned.'' He relied on Brooke for the 
maxim that "where the King is the sole party, attaint doth not lie." 
Finally, he cited statutes establishing the remedy of attaint in certain 
cases and argued from this that its nonexistence at common law must be 
inferred. The strength of the government's case lay in the fact that, 
without the power to fine, there would be no remedy for an acquittal 
against manifest evidence; instead there would be, pure and simple, a 
"failure of justice. " 141 Thus Starling, like counsel for the Crown who 
were busily attempting to justify the imprisonment of Bushel, echoed 
Chief Justice Hyde's admonition in 1665 that "jurors ought to be fined if 
they ... take bit in mouth and go headstrong against the court ... seeing 
the attaint is now fruitless. "142 
Truth Rescued from Imposture, Penn's answer to Starling's tract, 
contains an appendix by Thomas Rudyard which takes issue with the 
claim implicit in the title of Starling's section on fining, "The Fining of 
That Jury, that Gave Two Different Verdicts Justified."143 Although 
Starling abandoned the charge in the body of the work, the implication of 
peJjury is important, for such behavior might have justified the fines 
imposed on Bushel and the other jurors. Rudyard sought to show that the 
verdict rejected by the court, ''Guilty of speaking in Gracechurch 
Street," and the general verdict of "not guilty" were not contradictory. 
The jury had been forced to resolve its verdict one way or another; 
Starling, Rudyard charged, has "a very treacherous memory, which is an 
ill companion for a Liar." 144 
Rudyard agreed with Starling on the technical aspects of the attaint 
issue, but went on to make a broader claim that implicated fining as well. 
"[We] not only grant to him that no attaint lies against such jurors, but 
that it is horrid injustice and oppression to punish them by that, or any 
other way. " 145 In a gloss on Starling's bald statement that where the king 
141. Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, pp. 31, 33-38. "As 
nature abhors a vacuum in the universe, so it is the honour of our law, that it will not suffer 
a failure of justice" (p. 31). 
142. I Keble 864, 83 Eng. Rep. 1288 (1665). 
143. Thomas Rudyard, "Appendix" (see above, nn. 52, 122). 
144. Ibid., p. 512. 
145. Rudyard cited Horn's Mirror on judicial abuses of juries, and the parliamentary 
statutes on attaint, saying that if attaint lay in such a case, it would be clear from the 
statutes. Ibid., p. 519 (emphasis added). 
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is the sole party, there is no remedy of attaint, Rudyard asserted that an 
element of corruption must be present before a verdict is punishable, 
because although the indictment is prosecuted in the name of the King, he 
is acting in the interests of the public. Cannot the public, Rudyard asked, 
be entrusted with their own protection and safety?146 Thus did Rudyard 
attempt to avoid Starling's (and the Crown lawyers') conclusion regarding 
a "failure of Justice." 
Continuing (more cogently) his attack on fining, Rudyard denied that 
there was any, except recent, precedent for fining, and cited the censure 
of Justice Kelyng as invalidating the post-Restoration cases cited by 
Starling. Following the line of argument he had established in the 
Dialogue, Rudyard asserted that the procedure used in fining denied 
jurors the "due process of the common law," in that the jurors were 
condemned without trial, with no possibility of review or appeal, and 
without the lawful judgment of their peers. Rudyard cited Coke on the 
common law of England, particularly on the maxim that Lex intendit 
vicinum vicini facta scire, and claimed that, according to Coke's "ratio 
legis," the law would have "left all controversies to [the judges'] sole 
arbitrary determination" had judges been better equipped to hand down 
verdicts.147 Two interests, Rudyard asserted, were represented by those 
who argued against fining: the freedom of jurors, and the freedom of the 
people of England. In the interests of these freedoms, all Englishmen on 
trial should be judged by ''twelve honest men of the neighborhood,'' who 
are presumed to be more fit to hand down a verdict than a judge, both by 
their numbers, "since ... twelve men may neither be so easily corrupted 
as one single person, nor their judgment of such fact ... so likely to be 
erroneous" and because, being of the "neighborhood where the offence 
was committed," they may be expected to have a fuller understanding of 
the crime than the judge. In this way, "lives and liberties can be secured 
against the lusts of ... petty prerogatives." 148 
Rudyard's arguments against the practice of jury fining seem less an 
extension of either the Quaker "law-finding" theory or the older notion of 
the merciful verdict than elaborations upon the much more modest theory 
that he set forth in the Dialogue .149 This theory was more difficult for the 
bench to refute, for it emphasized the inscrutability of fact that resulted 
from the possibility that the jurors possessed personal knowledge. If 
Rudyard's true claim was that, because the jury was judge of both law and 
fact, it could not in any way be coerced or punished for its verdict, the 
146. Idem. 
147. Ibid., pp. 513-17. 
148. Ibid., p. 516. 
149. See above, n. 136 and accompanying text. 
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claim was well hidden by the arguments that focused mainly on the 
fact-finding aspect of the jury's role, its claims to superior knowledge. 
Rudyard constructed a defense behind which the jury might effectively 
act as independently of the bench as if they were judges both of fact and 
law, but his view was bound to be much more acceptable to the bench, for 
it largely avoided the overtones of insurrection which made the ''law-
finding" theory so unpalatable. In this respect, Rudyard's argument 
against fining suggested the strategy that Vaughan was to follow, but 
Rudyard's central argument, based on the proposition that jurors were 
still self-informed, was to become only one-and perhaps the less 
significant-element of the Chief Justice's famous opinion. 
IV 
Two and a half months after the final, tense day of Penn and Mead's 
trial at the Old Bailey, Edward Bushel, who had been imprisoned in 
Newgate for refusing to pay his fine of forty marks, sued a writ of habeas 
corpus out of the Court of Common Pleas. He claimed that the fine had no 
basis in law and that he was, therefore, being held without lawful cause. 
Bushel's suit, in which three of his fellow jurors joined, brought to a head 
the recent political and legal ferment over the issue of fining jurors. 150 
Five years had passed since Wagstaffe's Case, when most of the bench 
150. T. Jones 14, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1670). The three who joined Bushel were John 
Hammond, Charles Milson, and John Bailey, all "merchants and tradesmen" and citizens 
and freemen of London. The other eight jurors ''paid their fines and were soon discharged.'' 
See The Case of Edward Bushel [ et al.] ... stated and humbly presented to the Honourable 
House of Commons assembled in Parliament (London, 1671 ?). This petition is in Lincoln's 
Inn Library, Miscellaneous Pamphlets, vol. 104 at p. 37. The petition refers to the 
successful resolution of the case, which occurred in late 1671, and states that the jurors were 
discouraged by counsel "to seek [further] remedy or satisfaction in the courts of 
Westminster." Hence the petition to Commons. Subsequently, Bushel and Hammond did 
attempt to sue the mayor and recorder who had presided at Penn and Mead's trial, but their 
suits were rejected. For Bushel v. Starling see 3 Keble 322, 84 Eng. Rep. 744 (1674): suit for 
false imprisonment fails because "no writ of error lies . . . but he must be delivered by 
certiorari or habeas corpus and no other ways." For Bushel v. Howell see 3 Keble 358, 84 
Eng. Rep. 765 (1674): action upon the case fails because "this action will not lie against a 
judge." See also Bushel's Case, 1 Mod. 119, 86 Eng. Rep. 777 (1674). For Hamond (sic) v. 
Howell see 2 Mod. 218, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1677): suit for false imprisonment fails because 
"it was an error in [the judges']judgments for which no action will lie" (ibid., p. 1037). The 
defendant may bring a certiorari; "the Barons of the Exchequer might refuse to issue 
process upon" an erroneous judgment (idem). "[T]he whole court were of opinion, that the 
bringing of this action was a greater offense than the fining of the plaintiff, and committing 
of him for non-payment; and that it was a bold attempt both against the Government and 
justice in general ... though the defendant here acted erroneously, yet the contrary opinion 
carried great colour with it, because it might be supposed very inconvenient for the jury to 
have such liberty as to give what verdicts they please" (ibid., pp. 1036-37). 
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had concluded that such fining was indeed legal. Now, in a more 
prominent case, the matter came again before the royal justices, this time 
before the Court of Common Pleas. In a decision that definitively 
overturned the ruling in Wagstaffe's Case, Chief Justice Vaughan finally 
laid the problem to rest. 
It is not entirely clear why Bushel's counsel turned to Common Pleas 
rather than to the more appropriate forum, King's Bench. They may well 
have believed that he would receive a friendlier hearing from the court 
presided over by Vaughan, who had played a prominent (though ambigu-
ous) role in the parliamentary proceedings involving Kelyng, than he 
would from Kelyng's former associates on King's Bench. 15 1 Ironically, 
Vaughan was opposed on jurisdictional grounds to granting the habeas 
corpus but was outvoted by his fellow justices. 152 In the event, it would be 
Vaughan who, in consultation with all the justices of the king's courts, 
wrote the opinion that addressed the merits of the case. 
With a few significant exceptions, Vaughan's opinion followed the 
contours of the arguments made by Bushel's counsel and by Seijeants 
Ellis and Baldwin. Those arguments largely rehearsed the case earlier 
put, without success, on behalf of Wagstaffe: the return was too general; 
it failed to state the legal standards laid down by the bench and rejected 
by the jury as well as the facts that the jury had allegedly found against; 
even if one conceded the sufficiency of the return, one need not concede 
that it was demonstrable that the jurors had gone against the court. Some 
of the arguments that went beyond those made in Wagstaffe's Case 
paralleled those in the tract literature-just then appearing-that Penn 
and Mead's trial had generated: e.g., the juror might have knowledge of 
the "falsity" of evidence presented in court, and as a consequence, 
because law arises from fact ("ex facto jus oritur" ), one could not 
conclude that the jurors went against the law .153 
There were, however, several new arguments. Judges as well as jurors, 
it was observed, might mistake the law; it would, therefore, be unreason-
able to penalize the jury while the judges themselves were not subject to 
!51. Kelyng was still Chief Justice of King's Bench, but his illness kept him from taking 
part in judicial matters; technically, the other judges of King's Bench were current, not 
former, associates. Possibly counsel for Bushel believed that Kelyng still exerted influence 
over the bench; they might even have feared that the Chief Justice would feel his health 
returning when presented with the opportunity to rule personally on the habeas! 
152. T. Jones 14, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1670). According to Vaughan: "This court has no 
cognizance of crimes .... [The court may hear cases] between subject and subject, but in 
a criminal case the plea is between the King and his prisoner." See also Vaughan's view that 
Common Pleas was not the appropriate forum in a case a year later: Anonymous, Carter 222, 
124 Eng. Rep. 928 (1671). 
153. I Freeman 4-5, 89 Eng. Rep. 3-4 (1670); T. Jones 14-15, 84 Eng. Rep. 1124-25. 
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penalty for error. In any case, one ought to assume the good faith of 
jurors, as one did judges, for jurors were "judges" of the fact. Jurors, it 
was urged, have "divisum imperium" with the judge. One of Bushel's 
counsel addressed this issue with a phrase that anticipated the most 
original part of Vaughan's opinion: jurors, Broome asserted, "are to 
satisfy their own consciences. " 154 
These last arguments, which went to the heart of the question of the 
jury's duty, left open the problem of the possible "failure of justice" that 
had seemingly determined the outcome of Wagstaffe's Case and that 
counsel for the Crown relied upon heavily in the present case. Bushel's 
counsel seemed by and large to accept the possibility with equanimity; it 
was a part of the system, perhaps no greater a threat than that of judicial 
error. Serjeants Ellis and Baldwin, in favor of Bushel, argued that there 
was a remedy: an attaint would lie, they said, a view ultimately rejected 
by Vaughan. Because attaint lay in this kind of case, if Bushel and his 
fellow jurors might also be fined they would be subject to a double 
penalty. In making this point Ellis distinguished between capital cases, 
where, in favorem vitae, attaint did not lie, and the case at hand, one of 
mere misdemeanor. Iss 
Nudigate and Baldwin argued, as Vaughan later would, that according 
to the precedents fining was appropriate only for true jury misdemeanor 
(in the sense of outright corruption). Baldwin's handling of the two major 
precedents put by counsel for the Crown may not have been entirely 
honest. Wharton's Case, he asserted, was never cited as precedent but 
had been passed sub silentio. As for Wagstaffe's Case, it had probably 
involved "some [true] misdemeanors," for the jurors, Baldwin wrongly 
claimed, were fined in unequal amounts: ten were held to pay 100 marks; 
two were fined only five marks. It is possible that Baldwin (and subse-
quently Vaughan) was confused by the report of the case (very similar to 
Wagstaffe's) that had been charged against Kelyng in the House of 
Commons. In that case, the report of which Vaughan's committee (and 
now Baldwin) may have had in hand, Kelyng had indeed fined the jurors 
different amounts. Kelyng's report, however, makes clear that those fines 
were assessed simply for finding against the direction of the court. Only 
a very hurried and careless review of the report would have left a reader 
in doubt on that score. More than likely, Baldwin (and perhaps Vaughan) 
honestly mistook the case for that of Wagstaffe and wittingly misread it to 
suit his own end.l56 
154. 1 Freeman 3, 89 Eng. Rep. 3 (1670). 
155. Ibid., p. 4, 89 Eng. Rep. 5; T. Jones 15, 84 Eng. Rep. 1124. 
156. 1 Freeman 2, 4-5, 89 Eng. Rep. 2, 4 (1670). For reference to, and discussion of, 
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For the Crown, Scroggs, Maynard, and Powis relied heavily upon 
Wagstaffe's Case, hardly going beyond it to meet those arguments for 
Bushel that might be deemed novel. Powis seems to have stressed the 
possibility of a "failure of justice," the point that had so exercised Kelyng 
and Twisden (and before them, Hyde). Maynard, presumably to the same 
end, insisted that an attaint did not lie on an indictment. But for the most 
part, the Crown's argument rested upon a defense of the generality of the 
return, the assertion that Bushel's appropriate remedy was a writ of error 
and the fact that the jury might have escaped their dilemma by returning 
a special verdict. Scroggs came closest to meeting the opposition's stress 
on the importance of maintaining some degree of jury independence. 
There was, he said, a danger both ways: the jury might be overawed, but 
then, too, the defendant might ''lose all he has by the wilfulness of the 
jury and have no remedy.'' 157 This argument, which overlooked the 
possibility of a judicial reprieve, apparently was in reply to Broome's 
assertion that the power to fine would destroy the jury's independence of 
mind. 158 It was this issue that Vaughan was to make central in his opinion 
and for which he was to supply an as-yet-unstated rationale. In doing so, 
he would sidestep the main argument of the Crown and, without condon-
ing law-finding-either true nullification or merciful discretion-take the 
case on behalf of the jurors a long step beyond the arguments both of 
counsel and of the tract writers. 
Vaughan's opinion, holding for the Court of Common Pleas (and indeed 
for all the justices of England but one) that jurors may not be fined or 
imprisoned for their verdicts, is remarkable for how little it addressed the 
most volatile issues of the day. Vaughan's absolute conviction that jurors 
were judges only of fact and not of law, was left largely implicit, despite 
the fact that Penn and Mead had emphasized the issue of law-finding. The 
opinion contains no hint of the struggle between bench and jury that 
typified many Quaker prosecutions. It is an oddly and confusingly 
organized opinion whose central theme is· difficult to discern. 159 
Vaughan's contemporaries seem to have concluded that the decision 
turned on the argument that jurors might in any given case have 
knowledge of their own and thus could not be charged with finding either 
against evidence or against law .160 A close reading of the case suggests 
Kelyng's report of the case actually charged against him in Parliament, see above, nn. 63-64, 
66, and accompanying text. 
157. Ibid., pp. 3, 5, 89 Eng. Rep. 3-5 (1670). 
158. Ibid., p. 3. 
159. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006. 
160. See below, text at nn. 213-32, for a discussion of tracts by John Hawles and Henry 
Care, who claimed that Vaughan endorsed jury law-finding, but who seem also to have 
240 Transformations 
that there was more to it than that. 
Vaughan divided his opinion into four principal sections: the sufficiency 
of the return to the writ of habeas corpus; reasons against fining; 
consideration of precedents regarding fining; and consideration of prec-
edents regarding the power of Common Pleas to discharge, upon habeas, 
persons imprisoned by other courts. This last matter need not detain us 
beyond recitation of the argument that, Vaughan implied, convinced the 
Court of its power to discharge the imprisoned jurors: 
[W]hen a man is brought by habeas corpus to the Court, and upon 
return of it, it appears to the Court, that he was against the law 
imprisoned and detained, though there be no cause of privilege for him 
in this Court, he shall never be by the act of the Court remanded to his 
unlawful imprisonment, for then the Court should do an act of injustice 
in imprisoning him, de novo, against the law, whereas the great charter 
is, quod nullus tibet homo imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae.161 
Vaughan had opposed issuing the writ of habeas corpus, but having been 
outvoted by his brethren he was determined to see the case through to its 
conclusion. 
Vaughan's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the return of the writ 
of habeas corpus dealt first with the allegation that the jury had found 
"contra plenum et manifestam evidentiam" and then with the allegation 
that the jury had found "contra directionam curiae in materia legis." On 
the question of finding against the evidence, Vaughan observed: ''The 
Court hath no knowledge by this return, whether the evidence given were 
full and manifest, or doubtful, lame and dark, or indeed evidence at all 
material to the issue .... " 162 How far, then, ought one to credit the bare 
assertion of a court that the evidence given to the jury was full and 
manifest? Laying an important foundation stone for the arguments that 
were to follow, Vaughan firmly denied that the judgment of the bench was 
beyond inquiry. Though ajudge's "ability, parts, fitness for his place, are 
not to be reflected on," a judge is not to be presumed "unerring in [his] 
place." No one with any interest by virtue of "the judgment, action, or 
authority exercised upon his person or fortunes ... must submit ... to 
the implied discretion and unerringness of his judge, without seeking such 
redress as the law allows him." 163 Vaughan referred to the frequent 
review and reversal of judicial judgments, whether of "inferior" or 
"superior" courts, and concluded, perhaps gratuitously, that "corrupt 
based their views of Vaughan's fact-finding argument mainly on Vaughan's references to the 
jurors' possession of out-of-court evidence. 
161. Vaughan 155, 124 Eng. Rep. 1016. 
162. Ibid., p. 137, 124 Eng. Rep. 1007. 
163. Ibid., p. 139, 124 Eng. Rep. 1008. 
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and dishonest judgments ... have in all ages been complained of to the 
King in Star Chamber, or to the Parliament.'' He made reference to such 
instances down to the impeachment of the judges who ruled for the Crown 
in the Case of Ship Money. 164 Kelyng was not mentioned, perhaps 
because he was neither "corrupt" nor "dishonest." Perhaps (but not 
likely) he had not even come to Vaughan's mind. 
Vaughan's opening sally overrode the distinction between "superior" 
and "inferior" courts, a distinction even Hale had conceded in his 
grudging admission that King's Bench might not be reviewed by a 
common-law court. In logic, Vaughan had established only that King's 
Bench was reviewable by Parliament; in effect, however, given his refusal 
to remand a person imprisoned "against the law," Vaughan had an-
nounced that once a habeas had issued, the power of review extended 
even to the Court of Common Pleas. Vaughan's second argument on the 
sufficiency of the return set forth a critical rule of law regarding ''fineable 
fault" in jurors. Jurors, he asserted, may be fined only for finding against 
their own view of the evidence. That amounted to perjury, in effect to a 
true misdemeanoL The return was deficient for failing to state that the 
jury had so found. Vaughan found support for this proposition in Bracton 
and Fleta, but his own rationale is of greatest interest. People commonly 
disagreed, he observed, about evidence in many contexts. Barristers and 
judges deduced "contrary and opposite conclusions out of the same case. 
And is there any difference that two men should infer distinct conclusions 
from the same testimony?" By what logic, then, must "one ofthese merit 
fine and imprisonment, because he doth that which he cannot otherwise 
do, preserving his oath and integrity? And this often is the case of the 
judge and jury." 165 Vaughan had gone well beyond claiming that the 
return was insufficient. He had asserted that the bench could not fine a 
jury unless it could prove bad faith out of the mouths of the jurors 
themselves. 
Vaughan made short work of the question of sufficiency of return 
regarding acquittal "against the direction of the court in matter of law." 
The allegation is meaningless, said Vaughan, unless it means that the 
judge, having taken upon himself knowledge of the fact, directed the jury 
on the law. But if the judge is to find the fact, why use ajury? Vaughan's 
premise was: 
Without a fact agreed, it is impossible for a judge, or any other, to 
know the law relating to that fact or direct concerning it, as to know an 
accident that hath no subject. 
164. Idem. 
165. Ibid., pp.141-42, 124 Eng. Rep. 1009. 
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Hence it follows, that the judge in logic can never direct what the law 
is in any matter controverted, without first knowing the fact; and then 
it follows, that without his previous knowledge of the fact, the jury 
cannot in logic go against his direction in law, for he could not direct. 166 
Vaughan conceded that ajudge might nearly know how the jury has found 
the fact before he directs them. In some "special trial," the judge might 
ask the jurors how they found a certain fact or ''whether they find the 
matter of fact to be as such a witness, or witnesses have deposed." But 
even here the judge's direction ought to be "hypothetical, and upon 
supposition, and not positive, and upon coercion," for "until a jury have 
consummated their verdict . . . they have time still of deliberation." 
Regardless of their previous reply to the judge on matters of fact, "they 
may lawfully vary from it if they find cause. " 167 
This last assertion, that the jury may "vary from" its answer if "they 
find cause," was the weakest link in Vaughan's chain of reasoning. He 
must have realized that in some cases the jury had revealed enough of its 
findings on fact for the bench to conclude that the jury knowingly was 
going against the evidence. Indeed, in what is clearly an earlier, tentative 
draft of his opinion, Vaughan had conceded that where the verdict 
contradicted the jury's announced findings, and the jury failed to correct 
itself, the verdict was to be "set aside and a new trial ... directed."J6s 
Presumably, where in such a case the jury refused to "correct itself," it 
could be punished for perjury. Only subsequently-in the final (published) 
version of his opinion-did Vaughan alter his views crucially and further 
limit the scope of the judge's power to conclude that the jurors had 
committed peJjury, asserting that, after they gave their in-court answers, 
but before they pronounced their verdict, the jurors (or any one of them) 
might have (honestly) changed their minds regarding the evidence.169 
If Vaughan meant to suggest that jurors in such cases typically did 
change their minds on the evidence, he was being insincere. His opinion 
carries force only to the extent that it argues that a jury might have 
honestly reassessed the evidence and that the judge could never be 
certain it had not done so. Vaughan's opinion is least convincing 
regarding prosecutions under the Conventicles Act where the defendants 
admitted attending the meeting but failed to show that religious worship 
166. Ibid., p. 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012. 
167. Ibid., pp. 144-45, 124 Eng. Rep. 1010-11. 
168. B.L. MS Lansd. 648.9, fol. 315v. 
169. The new-trial remedy seems to have been a substitute for proceedings by way of 
attaint, the remedy Vaughan had assumed existed in such cases only three years earlier. See 
above, text preceding n. 84. If so, what Vaughan had meant by "corrupt" in his speech in 
the Commons in 1668 was not limited to verdicts resulting from bribes but included those in 
which the jury simply did not believe. 
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(against Anglican form) was not involved. Acquittals in such cases (as in 
later prosecutions for seditious libel) were clearly based on rejections of 
the bench's view of the law. In other cases, including several of the 
homicide cases that Kelyng addressed in Parliament and prosecutions for 
unlawful assembly (the offense charged in Penn and Mead's case), the 
possibility of honest reassessment was not automatically excludable. As 
we shall see, Vaughan's failure to distinguish between those kinds of 
cases made it possible for later writers to employ his language in their 
justification of acquittals in cases of seditious libel. 
Vaughan's listing of reasons against fining includes significant additions 
to those he gave in his discussion of sufficiency of return. He began with 
a reference to the argument for which the opinion is famous, that the 
judge could not direct because ''he can never know what evidence the 
jury have." 170 But before stating the reasons why the judge was in this 
position, Vaughan returned to the most original premise of his opinion: 
even were the jury to have no evidence other than that deposed in Court, 
"even then the Judge and jury might honestly differ in the result from the 
evidence, as well as two Judges may, which often happens." 171 
The more famous arguments, concerning out-of-court evidence, head a 
catchall list of points that appear to have been culled from arguments 
made at bar. On the whole, they were unoriginal and routinely made. 
Vaughan stated that jurors were supposed to have "sufficient knowledge" 
to try a case in which no evidence on either side was produced in court. 
Moreover, they might have "personal knowledge" that conflicted with 
what was deposed in court. Finally, the "jury may know the witnesses to 
be stigmatized and infamous." These curt observations were followed by 
reference to jurors having the view of premises (''to this evidence 
likewise the Judge is a stranger"), which affected civil but rarely criminal 
cases; mention of the dilemma posed by the possibility of attaint (though 
Vaughan no longer believed that attaint lay in criminal cases); 172 re-
capitulation of rules presupposing that juries were self-informed and 
impartial (the vicinage rule, rules of challenge, the freehold requirement, 
the view).m To what end, he summarized, once again moving back to the 
true basis for his opinion, 
must [juries] undergo the heavy punishment of the villanous judgment, 
if after all this they implicitly must give a verdict by the dictates and 
170. Vaughan 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012. 
171. Idem. 
172. This argument, which does not appear in the manuscript draft of Vaughan's opinion, 
appears to have been added either carelessly or insincerely (as a makeweight). 
173. Idem. 
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authority of another man, under pain of fines and imprisonment, when 
sworn to do it according to the best of their own knowledge: 
A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear by another's ear, no 
more can a man conclude or infer the thing to be resolved by another's 
understanding or reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury 
give, yet they being not assured it is so from their own understanding, 
are foresworn, at least in foro conscientiae .174 
Vaughan thus turned away from standard arguments derived from jury 
practices, some of which practices were becoming outmoded or pertained 
mainly to civil cases, to restate the fundamental, and original,m element 
of his discussion of the sufficiency of the return. Even if the judge had all 
of the evidence before him, judge and jury might disagree, and jury trial 
was premised on a preference for the jury's assessment of that evidence. 
The remainder of this section of Vaughan's opinion reveals the extent 
of his reliance on civil cases. It is not surprising that Vaughan drew his 
examples from his own domain in Common Pleas. Most significantly, he 
insisted that jury independence in criminal cases should be as great as in 
civil cases, where judges could not fine. Nowhere in his opinion did 
Vaughan give space to Kelyng's and Twisden's concern about a "failure 
of justice.'' If in criminal cases there was liability neither to attaint nor to 
fine, presumably it was because the defendant, not the Crown, had more 
at stake. 176 
Vaughan's discussion of precedents follows, in the main, that of 
counsel at bar. He was fully prepared to sanction fining of a jury for 
accepting a bribe or for committing any other true ministerial breach-
including, of course, giving a verdict provably against oath. Most of the 
precedents that others had cited, he asserted, either certainly or at least 
apparently fell into the class of legitimate impositions of fines. The two 
most prominent criminal cases commonly thought to be precedents for 
fining jurors who gave verdicts against the evidence were Wharton's Case 
and Wagstaffe's Case. Vaughan stated that even those cases might have 
involved true jury misdemeanor. Probably he allowed his reading of main 
trends to influence his view of particular cases.m In any event, at several 
174. Ibid., p. 148, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012-13. 
175. The last twenty-seven words ("and though" ... conscientiae") do not even appear 
in Vaughan's tentative manuscript draft. 
176. Vaughan 146, 124 Eng. Rep. 1011: "If [the judge] could not [fine the jury] in civil 
causes ... he could not in criminal causes upon indictments ... for the fault in both was 
the same, namely, finding against the evidence and direction of the Court, and by the 
common law; the reason being the same in both, the law is the same." 
177. Vaughan appears to have followed Baldwin on these two precedents. See above, 
text at n. 156. Vaughan evidently preferred to think that the best report of Wharton's Case 
was Noy's, which suggested that the fine was imposed because "the judges conceived the 
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points he commented on the absence of clear evidence that courts had 
fined in accordance with the allegations in the return in Bushel's Case. 
There was, he said, no evidence that the common-law bench or Star 
Chamber had ever fined "only for (i.e., as the judge inferred) finding 
against the evidence"; in civil cases, there was no evidence of fining at 
common law before statutes of attaint, or thereafter, "until Popham's 
time," when the fines were not clearly other than for jury misde-
meanor.178 
Taken at face value, Vaughan's opinion rested ultimately on two 
propositions: the common law required trial by jury; in such trials, 
without the confession of the jurors themselves, it could never be shown 
that the jurors had gone against fact or, hence, that in applying the law the 
jurors had rejected judicial instructions on how the law ought to be 
applied. Further than this he did not go. Although jurors might "resolve 
both law and fact complicately," presumably they were supposed to 
follow instructions on the law. He cited no exception to the rule that 
jurors were to adhere to the facts they had found. The word "mercy" 
does not appear in his opinion. 
Some of Vaughan's arguments based on the self-informing role of the 
jury ring false, for they hark back to much earlier times; but others do not. 
Jurors' knowledge of reputation was still sometimes an important evi-
dentiary guide, both in criminal cases and in the civil trials from which 
Vaughan took his lead. The rule that jurors must go only by evidence 
produced in court had not yet been firmly settled in criminal cases, and 
certainly it was not considered wrong for a jury to acquit on outside 
evidence. But it remains unclear just how significant these arguments 
were for Vaughan. As he stated, even if the judge did know all the 
evidence, judge and jury might nevertheless disagree. The judge could not 
assume peljury; the jury was bound to swear to what it believed, however 
an outsider might have viewed the case, however wrong the jury might 
be. Moreover, objective truth was not easily obtained in such matters: 
Vaughan compared the assessment of witness testimony to the interpreta-
jury had been unlawfully dealt with" (Vaughan 153, 124 Eng. Rep. 1015); he said of 
Wagstaffe's Case that "by the record it is reasonable to think the jurors committed some 
fault besides going against their evidence, for they were unequally fined" (idem). Vaughan 
struck from his published opinion the view expressed in his manuscript draft (B.L. MS 
Lansd. 648.9, fol. 315v) that "[Bushel's] case has been grounded upon many particular cases 
which I think have been grossly mistaken, therefore it's fit to give it a plenary resolution at 
this time." Vaughan did not deal with Leech's Case. Braithwaite ("Early Friends' 
Experience with Juries," p. 223) conjectures that Vaughan's omission of Leech's Case 
confirms Rudyard's assertion (''Appendix'' to Truth Rescued, p. 514) that the jurors in that 
case were not in fact fined (see above, nn. 35, 140). 
178. Vaughan 152, 124 Eng. Rep. 1014; ibid., p. 146, 124 Eng. Rep. 1012. 
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tion of religious texts .1 79 Finally, no matter how wrong the jurors were in 
their sincere belief, the law guaranteed resolution of guilt or innocence 
according to their "understanding." Although the king might pardon a 
defendant convicted against the fact, as it appeared to the judge, acquittal 
by the jury was final. 
It is useful to compare Vaughan's opinio,n with an anonymous (and 
hitherto unnoticed) contemporary manuscript tract, or draft argument, 
"Reasons against the Fine and Commitment of the Jurors."Jso "Rea-
sons," which appears to pre-date Bushel's Case, almost certainly was 
occasioned by the fining of jurors in a case involving the Quakers. It is 
unlikely that the case was Wagstaffe or the very similar one charged 
against Kelyng in the House of Commons, for here the jurors were 
imprisoned until all of the 100 mark per juror fines (''imposed jointly and 
severally") had been paid.1s1 The arguments in "Reasons" bear close 
relationship to those made by SeJjeant Ellis in Wagstaffe's Case: great 
emphasis is placed on the notion of a "divisum imperium" between judge 
and jury and on the fact that judges are not punished for their errors. But 
"Reasons" contains a religious motif all its own.tsz Though it takes the 
form of a lawyer's brief, it might have been a lay tract designed to make 
the strongest case for juror independence and for verdicts reached 
according to conscience without the barest suggestion that jurors ought to 
engage in law-finding.ts3 
"Reasons" contained most of the arguments that Vaughan made in 
support of the jury's right to be free from coercion. Like Vaughan, the 
author of "Reasons" confines fineable wrongdoing to peJjury and other 
true misdemeanors. "Reasons" implies that the precedents for fining 
were actually cases involving some jury misdemeanor, but it relies 
ultimately on the view that precedent ought not to be followed if it is 
179. Ibid., p. 141, 124 Eng. Rep. 1009. 
180. B.L. MS Sloane 827, fols. 35-42v. To my knowledge, this manuscript has never 
before been discussed in print. 
181. Ibid., fol. 42. 
182. Ibid., fol. 36: "If not according to their consciences then they offend God and incur 
punishments both temporal and eternal"; fol. 38v: "[N]either is it superfluous to consider 
that this trial by a jury in criminal cases is said to be a trial by God and the country which 
seems to imply the absoluteness of it, so that the acquittal by the country is an acquittal by 
God and finding guilty by the country a finding guilty by God." 
183. "Reasons" refers to the reign of Henry VIII as "perhaps ... not beyond the 
memory of some men living" (fol. 40v). It also refers to the Petition of Right (1628) (fol. 35); 
a person born in the last year of Henry VIII's reign would have been eighty-one in 1628. The 
author probably means that some living persons have heard or read about the time of Henry 
VIII. Clearly, "Reasons" bears all the marks of the mid-to-late-1660sjury-right debates. In 
my view, it was the work of Ellis or of someone influenced by his arguments in Wagstaffe's 
Case. 
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"against reason and the principles of justice." The tract makes the 
increasingly commonplace arguments that jurors have knowledge of their 
own and that, as law arises from fact, the judge cannot direct on the law 
until the jurors have pronounced their verdict.184 
"Reasons," like Vaughan's opinion, holds that attaint does not lie, but 
it confronts the possibility of a failure of justice, as Vaughan did not do. 
First, the author concedes that "the administration of the law must be 
entrusted somewhere and there must be a ne plus ultra in all controver-
sies." This trust had been distributed between judge and jury, both of 
whom are on oath to do justice. There is little reason to think, the author 
continues, that acquittals will cause a great deal of harm. That "one or 
two juries in an age are mistaken" does not suggest that many more will 
be, for "persons of their conditions" have more at risk than "persons of 
greater rank" who "are perhaps better guarded." 185 Moreover, trial by 
jury assumes jury independence. Here the author compares civil (i.e., 
Roman and canon) law with common law. In the latter system, evidence 
is given viva voce and is not made part of a sworn record that remains for 
later examination. Testimony given at common law, "upon a sudden 
altogether," cannot be sifted in the same way, nor "so well observed or 
remembered, for vox audita perit.'' It would be unreasonable ''that men's 
lives, liberties and estates should be bound up in so narrow and dangerous 
a compass as the direction of a judge against evidence seeming so to 
him." 186 The author of "Reasons" thus supplied a more powerful version 
than did Vaughan of the argument for relying upon twelve men's 
memories. And it was not only a matter of accurate observation and 
recall. The reason for using a form of trial to which jury independence was 
integral was that ''no man if he be condemned can blame the King or the 
nobles or the judges or men of power, the frequent objects of envy, but his 
own peers and so every man rests content and his government se-
cured." 187 
Vaughan was content to take the jury as a given; it required no 
justification beyond the comment that one man's memory is less accurate 
than that of twelve men. It was enough to observe that the jury was on 
oath to give a verdict according to its understanding. The problem for 
Vaughan resided more in the realm of science than in the realm of politics. 
Because people drew different conclusions from the same evidence, one 
could not presume insincerity. It was a point that Ellis and his fellows had 
not seen and that escaped the author of "Reasons." But it was also a 
184. Ibid., fols. 40v, 38v, 40. 
185. Ibid., fol. 41. 
186. Ibid., fols. 38v-39. 
187. Ibid., fol. 39. 
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point that begged the question, Why depend so heavily upon laymen's 
"understanding"? Surely the answer could not be solely that they might 
have knowledge of their own, for they could (and often did) report that 
knowledge to the judge. As "Reasons" implied, the true answer to the 
question, Why a "divisum imperium?" -i.e., Why use a jury in the first 
place?-involved considerations of trust and politics which took account 
of the fact that the judiciary was in reality, or in common supposition, 
capable of exercising tyrannical powers. This was ground upon which 
Vaughan would not unnecessarily tread. 
Vaughan broke relatively little new ground in his opinion. Where he did 
adduce novel arguments, he did so in a modest way. He denied that 
attaint would lie in a criminal case, but he took his lead from the lack of 
precedent rather than from the rights of Englishmen. He suggested that if 
fines were not imposed in civil cases, a fortiori they ought not to be in 
criminal cases. His language was softer than that of Hale. 188 If judge and 
jury disagreed on questions of fact, the jury prevailed, according to 
Vaughan, both because otherwise the institution would be a waste of time 
and because it was unreasonable to make jurors swear to what they did 
not believe. Preference for the jury's view was implicit in institutional 
arrangements; for Vaughan, historical usage ipso facto suggested correct 
practice. 
Vaughan used extreme care to avoid any argument that smacked of the 
politics of the day. His legal precedents were similarly uncontroversial, 
drawn almost without exception from before the Interregnum and not 
tainted by any recent political maneuvering or misuse of power; indeed, 
he ignored the series of contemporary cases on which proponents of jury 
fining relied as precedent, save for the most important one, Wagstaffe's 
Case. Perhaps for this reason Vaughan did not rely on the proceedings 
relating to the censure of Justice Kelyng, although as a party to the 
proceedings he was certainly aware that many in Commons supported his 
stand on fining. Nor, in his discussion of attaint, did he seek support from 
Hyde, who had called attaint a "fruitless remedy." 189 Instead, without 
endorsing either side in the Quakers' struggle with authorities, or even 
acknowledging the turmoil, Vaughan attempted to settle this controver-
sial question simply on the basis of "reason" and his own (perhaps 
idealized) view of the old common law. 
188. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2:311-12: "[I]t were impossible almost for 
any judge or jury to convict a jury upon such an account, because [it is] impossible that all 
the circumstances of the case, that might move the jury to acquit a prisoner, could be 
brought in evidence; this therefore seems to me to be but in terrorem." 
189. See above, nn. 31-32. 
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It is difficult to tell from Vaughan's opinion the influence he expected it 
would have on the jury law-finding debate. The opinion seemingly took 
little notice of the real world: it was grounded in legal theory, and what 
followed from that theory was not his concern. If Vaughan had any 
thoughts about law-finding or the jury's right to apply law mercifully, he 
kept them to himself. Penn's entreaties, as well as those of the Quakers 
for nearly a decade, seem, in the light of Vaughan's opinion, 
wrongheaded and irrelevant, and to have had little or no effect on the 
outcome of Bushel's Case. And yet it is difficult to believe that Vaughan 
failed to realize that the fact-finding role as he depicted it would be used 
by the pro-jury elements to forward their cause. To Vaughan's mind, legal 
reasoning and precedent followed the Quaker pro-jury arguments up to 
but not including the point where they advocated jurors' control over the 
law. Pro-jury interpreters of Bushel's Case, however, did not stop where 
Vaughan did; instead, they glossed his opinion, employing it in their 
forthright arguments for jurors as judges of law. 
v 
The ruling in Bushel's Case probably had little impact on proceedings 
in most routine felony trials. In the great majority of such cases bench and 
jury continued to function as before, in tandem and without open 
conflict.19o In those few cases where the bench found itself impatient with 
a too merciful-or simply dishonest-jury, the judge employed mecha-
nisms short of outright coercion that typically afforded the bench effective 
control.J91 True jury intransigence, though now protected by law, was 
probably very rare. 
Political trials, such as those for treason, the unlicensed printing of 
news, and seditious libel, presented a different situation. Since authorities 
were more likely to take a strong interest, the risk of disagreement with a 
resolute jury was substantially greater. In these and similar cases the 
transition from the principle to the practice of noncoercion was probably 
slow .192 The nearly two decades between Bushel's Case and the Glorious 
190. See below, Chapter 7, sections I and II, for discussion of the typical felony trial in 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
191. See below, Chapter 7, text at nn. 36-39. 
192. Joseph Besse (A Collection of the Sufferings of . .. Quakers, I) claimed that the 
bench sometimes refused to accept acquittals in trials of Quakers [pp. 106 (1675, Cheshire), 
110 (1683, Cheshire)]. When a jury that acquitted was ordered to go out again to reconsider, 
one juryman objected, whereupon Peniston Whaley, one of the justices, was enraged and 
said he hoped that the king would get rid of juries. He allegedly told another jury that "[i]f 
they did not agree, they should be kept there till they died" and they complied [p. 560 (1676, 
N ottinghamshire) ]. 
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Revolution were testing years for the bench and criminal juries, grand and 
petty. The complicated and oft-described political trials of the most 
tumultuous years, 1678-83 (the period of the Popish Plot and its after-
math) need not be retold in detail here. 193 Our immediate interest lies 
mainly in one aspect of the legacy of those years, the fate of Vaughan's 
opinion in the hands of a few publicists writing in 1680. For our purposes 
a brief background of the political trials of the period will suffice. 
The Popish Plot was the invention of Titus Oates, who convinced a 
gullible court and a more gullible populace of Jesuit plans to kill the king, 
massacre Protestants, and engineer the succession of Charles's Catholic 
brother, James. As a result of ensuing arrests and prosecutions, between 
1678 and 1681 some twenty people were either executed or died in 
prison. 194 In the first two years of the crisis, the virulently anti-Papist 
Chief Justice (King's Bench) Scroggs worked his relentless will on 
defendants and took a strong lead with juries, who were for the most part 
ready to follow. But as doubts about Oates (if not the Plot itself) set in, 
Scroggs scrupulously and skillfully exposed false accusations, incurring 
the wrath of anti-Papist mobs. 195 The Court, which had been thrown off 
balance by Oates's accusations and the resultant move in Parliament for 
exclusion of James from the order of succession, gradually recovered 
maneuvering room. Already in 1680, there were prosecutions of Prot-
estant publicists whose anti-Papist attacks were alleged to blame the crisis 
on the Court's encouragement of Catholic hopes. 196 The following year 
only the resistance of Protestant London grand juries frustrated royal 
efforts to destroy Shaftesbury, the leader of the nascent Whig party .197 
The pendulum soon swung fully against the most outspoken of the 
pro-Exclusion Protestant Whig leaders. Stephen Colledge was convicted 
by an Oxford shire jury on charges oftreason in 1681; Edward Fitz-Harris 
was convicted and executed for treason later that year. The purge reached 
its height two years later in the wake of the discovery of the Rye House 
193. On the Popish Plot and the prosecutions it inspired see e.g. John Miller, Popery and 
Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973); John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London, 
1972); J. R. Jones, The First Whigs. The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678-1683 (London, 
1970), esp. ch. 2; John Pollock, The Popish Plot: A Study in the History of the Reign of 
Charles II (London, 1903). For the ensuing attack on the Whigs see e.g. Michael Landon, 
The Triumph of the Lawyers. Their Role in English Politics, 1678-1689 (University, Ala., 
1970), esp. ch. 5; G. W. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause (London, 
1965), esp. ch. 10. See generally Clark, Later Stuarts, ch. 5. 
194. Kenyon, Popish Plot, p. 205. 
195. Ibid., pp. 175-78; Clark, Later Stuarts, p. 94. See also the detailed study of Scrogg's 
behavior at the Wakeman trial, J.P. Kenyon, "The Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman: 18 
July 1679," Historical Journal, vol. 14 (1971), pp. 693-708. 
196. See below, text at nn. 207-8. 
197. See below, n. 225 for recent discussions of the proceedings against Shaftesbury. 
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Plot to seize the king. Among the victims were Lord Russell and Algernon 
Sydney, though neither had in fact been part of the plot. Jeffreys's role in 
the anti-Whig prosecutions as an implacable foe of opposition to authori-
ties, first as Crown counsel and then as Lord Chief Justice, is now 
famous. 198 
The bullying tactics of the Stuart bench during this period should not 
blind one to the fact that in many instances the prosecutions were 
popular. Local officials returned juries sympathetic to the Crown as often 
as they returned juries likely to engage in some resistance. Jury packing 
was common and practiced on all sides. 199 The changing winds of local or 
national politics determined whether such pretrial manipulation would 
favor or disadvantage the defendant. Defendants in such cases were not 
themselves strangers to tactics that might lawfully be employed in court 
to secure favorable or at least open-minded jurors: in some cases 
challenges were frequent. The bench played both ways the rule that jurors 
must be freeholders, sometimes challenging jurors as nonfreeholders, 
sometimes denying that the rule grounded a challenge for cause. zoo Some 
juries were harangued and berated by the prosecution or bench; others-
where the bench was confident that the jurors could be trusted to convict 
the "guilty"-were told that they must determine the truth according to 
their own consciences. 2o1 Conscience might thus be invoked in the 
apparently magnanimous spirit of encouraging jury independence of 
mind. Yet <>,gain, invocation to "conscience" might reflect judicial doubts 
about the evidence for the Crown. In late 1679 Scroggs, standing against 
the tide of anti-Jesuit feeling, urged Wakeman's jury to regard the 
evidence, not public feelings: "Never care what the world says, follow 
your consciences. "zoz The courageous jury found Wakeman not guilty. 
For Scroggs, of course, the claim to conscience was a claim upon the 
jurors' honest assessment of fact. No hint of law-finding was intended. 
And like Vaughan, Scroggs recognized that factual assessment was not an 
198. F. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys, chs. 9-10. 
199. Ibid., p. 97; Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 2:520. See Kenyon's comments 
on the composition of juries in the Popish Plot trials. "Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman," 
p. 702. 
200. See Sir John Rawles, "Remarks on FitzHarris's Trial," in State Trials, 8:435. 
201. E.g. Rex v. Green, Berry and Hill, State Trials, 7:220. Scroggs made it clear that he 
believed the defendants were guilty and then told the jury: "So I leave it to your 
consideration upon the whole matter, whether the evidence of the fact does not satisfy your 
consciences, that these men are guilty. And I know you will do like honest men on both 
sides." 
202. State Trials, 7:686. See also Rex v. Langham, State Trials, 7:484, where a doubtful 
Scroggs told the jury: "Follow your own consciences; do wisely; do honestly; and consider 
what is to be done." See Kenyon, "Acquittal of Sir George Wakeman," pp. 701-2. 
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infallible science. 203 The juror was sworn to say what he believed was 
true, not to achieve objective truth. Scroggs made this point in his charge 
to Henry Care's jury in 1680 in an effort to forestall a verdict of not guilty 
on grounds the evidence did not yield an absolute certainty of guilt. 
You must take evidence in this case, as you do all year long, that is, in 
other cases, where you know so: for human frailty must be allowed; 
that is, you may be mistaken. For you do not swear, nor are you bound 
to swear here, that [Care] was the publisher of this book; but if you find 
him guilty, you only swear you believe it so. God help juries, if so be 
in matter of fact they should promise otherwise. They cannot swear to 
it. 204 
The uses to which the claim upon conscience might be put were many. 
Vaughan's language seems to reverberate in the Reports of Restoration 
political trials. It clearly reverberates-but to very different effect-in the 
jury tract literature of the day. John Rawles, whose Englishman's Right 
was published in 1680 and enjoyed wide readership, many successive 
reprints, and unending quotation, drew so heavily upon Vaughan's 
arguments as virtually to be a gloss upon the opinion.205 Rawles set the 
tone for many pro-jury writers down to Fox's Libel Act. His characteriza-
tion of Vaughan's opinion also became the accepted pro-jury view in 
America, though the influence of his tract there was insubstantial until 
Zenger's Case in 1735.206 
Rawles's tract, as well as large portions of a book by Henry Care,207 
were occasioned by the spate of prosecutions for unlicensed printing of 
news, seditious libel, and treason during the first years of the Popish Plot. 
Although neither tract mentions the prosecutions in 1680 of Benjamin 
Harris and of Care himself, it seems likely that those trials, and what 
Rawles and Care took to be judicial rulings on the law of seditious libel 
203. This is not to deny, however, that the Restoration bench approached fact-finding in 
a more "scientific" manner than had earlier jurists. It is only to say that the political cases 
(and the problem of coercion) of the period resulted in emphasis on the juror's "conscience" 
and understanding, and in assertions that the juror's sworn "belief" be respected whether 
or not it accorded with objective truth. Perhaps increasing confidence in the (relatively) 
"scientific" aspect of jury fact-finding made it easier to adopt such a stance. For an 
important discussion of contemporary notions about the science of fact-finding see Barbara 
J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1983). 
And see below, Chapter 7, text at nn. 15-17. 
204. State Trials, 7:1128. (Alternatively spelled: Carr.) 
205. John Rawles, The Englishman's Right (London, 1680). 
206. Stanley N. Katz, ed., A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, 
by James Alexander (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 15-16. 
207. Henry Care, English Liberties: or, the Free-Born Subject's Inheritance (London, 
1680). 
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(rather than the treason trials of alleged Catholic plotters), revived the 
claim to the jury's right to decide law.zos 
The law of seditious libel was still taking shape during the first two 
decades of the Restoration. Its roots lay in Star Chamber practice,209 and 
certain rules of law-e.g., that truth was no defense-might be expected 
to have been inherited and reaffirmed by the common law bench. But 
questions regarding the allocation of duties between judge and jury, 
concerning, i.e., what was law and what was fact, were less clearly 
questions to be answered by reference to Star Chamber practice. Whether 
a writing was seditious might fairly be claimed a matter of fact for the jury 
to decide; it might also be insisted that criminal intent should not be 
implied by the bench but should be determined instead by the jury. The 
settlement of the Stuart doctrine of seditious libel was not in any simple 
way a result of the ruling in Bushel's Case. It may be that the principal 
basis for the practice in seditious libel cases-that the jury was to find 
only whether the defendant "published" (wrote, printed, or published) 
the words in question whereas seditiousness and intent were matters of 
law for the bench-was the fact that a record of the allegedly offensive 
words existed, so that those words were, unlike all other criminal "acts," 
available for judicial inspection. 210 Nonetheless, it seems likely that the 
208. Rex v. Harris, State Trials, 7:926-32; Rex v. Care, Ibid., 1111-30. See Philip 
Hamburger, "The Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel" (ms. pp. 32-37), Stanford Law 
Review (forthcoming). All Hamburger pp. herein referred to are from ms. When published, 
Hamburger's study will importantly modify all earlier work on the pre-1730 law of seditious 
libel. Hamburger argues, inter alia, that Harris's prosecution was for "a strange combina-
tion of seditious libel and Scandalum Magnatum" (p. 32) and that Care's prosecution was, 
strictly speaking, for unlicensed printing (pp. 34-37). The defendants, states Hamburger, 
were charged with, among other things, publication of "seditious libels"; Hawles "pro-
fessed to think" that such cases "were but poorly conducted common law seditious libel 
prosecutions." He complained, "with uncertain ingenuousness, that traditional powers of 
juries in libel trials were being abused" (p. 36, n. 73). Whether or not Hawles was 
"ingenuous," I believe his writings were taken seriously, especially as prosecutions that 
were clearly for seditious libel became common. 
209. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:336--42, esp. 339. But note that Hamburger 
("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," Part III) provides an important reassessment of 
the early development of seditious libel. Hamburger argues that Star Chamber was 
concerned not with seditious libel broadly defined but with that form of seditious libel that 
involved defamation of public officials. 
210. See Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:343; see also Thomas A. Green, "The 
Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law," in Green and Richard H. Helmholz, Juries, 
Libel, and Justice: The Role of English Juries in 17th-18th Century Trials for Libel and 
Slander (Los Angeles, 1984). Hamburger ("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel") has 
reassessed the applications of these doctrines in the period 1660-95. His work rests on only 
a few cases, partly because he has excluded those cases that he believes were in fact 
prosecutions for unlicensed printing. As to the issue of "libelous ness," Hamburger 
concludes: "In the seventeenth century, the bench determined in practice whether a 
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tensions between judge and jury that the Quaker trials occasioned and 
that culminated in Bushel's Case affected the development of the law of 
seditious libel. 
The Quakers' opposition to the Conventicles Act of 1664, and es-
pecially their assertion that jurors ought to determine the meaning of the 
Act, pushed the bench to declare that jurors were to determine only the 
question of whether the defendant had attended the alleged meeting. The 
bench would decide whether such attendance at the alleged meeting 
implied unlawful religious worship. (This was so, at least, if the defend-
ants did not show that the purpose of the meeting was not religious or, if 
religious, not contrary to Anglican forms.) We have also seen that Chief 
Justice Kelyng attempted to reduce the jury's scope of fact-finding in 
homicide. Where murder was alleged, and no provocation was shown, the 
jury was to find whether the defendant intentionally slew the deceased; if 
so, the court would determine whether the act implied malice.zu Thus 
judge-jury conflicts in the early 1660s led the bench to reserve to itself as 
questions of law matters that had traditionally been left to the jury as 
questions of fact. 
Bushel's Case increased the importance of placing limitations upon the 
scope of fact-finding. It may have encouraged the bench to reserve to 
itself-where it could-the kinds of determinations within which jury 
law-finding or merciful verdicts might otherwise be concealed. As we 
shall see, only in seditious libel did the bench succeed in restricting the 
jury to largely stipulated facts and thus force a jury that did not want to 
convict to return a verdict that was flagrantly contrary to the evidence. 
Although some juries adopted a ruse analogous to that employed in 
Quaker prosecutions, and returned a verdict of "guilty of publishing 
writing's content was defamatory or libelous." He implies that juries could have (though 
they rarely dared to do so) disagreed with the bench (pp. 53-54). As to intent, Hamburger 
states (pp. 55-60) that the bench followed the law of homicide, wherein murder was 
presumed unless the defendant produced evidence of provocation, accident, etc., in which 
case intent became a matter for the jury. In seditious libel, the defendant might similarly 
produce evidence that he lacked knowledge or malice. Hamburger concedes that the 
defendant's task was not easy: "In the 1680s, judges and Crown lawyers disparagingly 
referred to questions of knowledge and malice as mere formalities, in order to remove such 
issues from the control of the jury" (p. 59). Apparently,judicial treatment of the defendant's 
exculpatory evidence depended upon the judge's view of the publication-whether it was 
sufficiently or "insufficiently defamatory to imply malice." Even on Hamburger's analysis, 
then, in practice, in most seditious libel cases, libelousness and intent were implied or not 
by the bench, not by the jury. In homicide, it should be pointed out, defendants might claim 
provocation almost as a matter of course. They (or their witnesses) were not embarrassed 
by an act that lived on for judicial inspection. They might be countered by witnesses for the 
Crown, but the testimony of witnesses was always open to attack, and the question of 
credibility of all witnesses was conceded to be a jury question. 
211. See above, n. 80 and accompanying text. 
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only," given the establishment of the principle of noncoercion, the Stuart 
doctrine of seditious libel was particularly advantageous to the Crown. 
The application of that doctrine in the prominent trials of 1680 thus 
provoked Hawles and others to come to the defense of the jury and, 
specifically, to "find" in the principle of noncoercion support for very 
far-reaching propositions about the right to find law as well as fact. 
Rawles's Englishman's Right is cast as a dialogue between a barrister 
and a juryman. The barrister stresses the importance of the duty to serve 
on juries and instructs the juryman regarding his proper function. The 
juryman, for his part, asks all the "right questions." Whether Hawles was 
concerned with the increasing use of packed juries, the rate at which 
Englishmen avoided jury service, or the ignorance and timidity of jurors 
in the face of the Stuart bench, his message was the same: "[T]he office 
of a juryman is, conscientiously to judge his neighbour; and he needs no 
more law than is easily learnt to direct him therein.' '212 
Hawles adopted virtually all of Vaughan's language. All discourses by 
the judge to the jury on the law "ought to be hypothetical, not coercive." 
The judge should so charge juries because "ex facto jus oritur, all matter 
of law arises out of matter of fact, so that until the fact is settled there is 
no room for law." Hawles also endorsed Vaughan's view of the im-
penetrability of the fact-resolving role of the jury. He followed Vaughan 
closely in saying that since the jurors were drawn from the neighborhood, 
they might be supposed to have knowledge of their own touching the facts 
of the situation and the credibility of witnesses. The jury's verdict, 
formed in good conscience, was determinative. The judges, said Hawles, 
"do often recapitulate and sum up the heads of the evidence; but the 
jurors are still to consider whether it be done truly, fully and impartially 
(for one man's memory may sooner fail than twelve's)."2J3 In the end, 
Hawles repeated Vaughan's effective formulation, "A man cannot see by 
another's eye";Z14 if judges andjury disagreed, so be it. Trial by jury was 
trial by peers, not by judges. 
At a crucial point in the dialogue the juryman asks whether juries are 
restricted entirely to the finding of fact. Through the response of the 
barrister, Hawles developed the law-finding argument that was to be for 
more than a century the lodestar of many of the opponents of the seditious 
libel doctrine. Hawles implied that he had derived the argument from 
Vaughan, but in fact he simply attached it to one of Vaughan's most 
conventional statements. The jury, Hawles noted (quoting Vaughan), 
must deal with law "as it arises out of, or is complicated with, and 
212. Hawles, Englishman's Right, p. I. 
213. Ibid., p. 9. 
214. Ibid., p. 27. 
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influences the fact. " 215 Vaughan meant-but failed explicitly to state-
that the jury must take the law from the bench and must apply it in the 
manner that the bench has ruled it should. Rawles drew an opposite 
inference which deserves close study. Rawles's barrister begins by 
conceding that matters of fact constitute the jury's "proper province" 
and "chief business." But this, he states, does not determine the matter: 
For to say, [the jury] are not at all to meddle with, or have respect to 
law in giving their verdicts, is not only a false position, and contra-
dicted by every day's experience; but also a very dangerous and 
pernicious one, tending to defeat the principal end of the institution of 
juries, and so subtlety to undermine that which was too strong to be 
battered down.216 
The jury must "apply matter of fact and law together; and from their 
consideration of, and a right judgment upon both, bring forth their 
verdict." The barrister's examples, borrowed from Vaughan, are not 
startling: the general issue in trespass, breach of the peace, felony, and 
seditious libel. In homicide, e.g., the jury is free to return "murder, 
manslaughter, per infortunium, or se defendendo, as they see cause." Did 
this mean for Rawles, as it did for Vaughan, only that the jury must apply 
the law, as stated to them by the bench, or did "right judgment" mean 
something more?ZJ7 
Clearly Rawles meant more, but he could find no further support in 
Vaughan's opinion. Thus he turned to other sources. Apparently borrow-
ing from a tract on Penn and Mead's case, Rawles has the barrister ask, 
"[T]o what end is it, that when any person is prosecuted upon any statute, 
the statute itself is usually read to the jurors, but only that they may judge, 
whether or not the matter be within that statute?"218 This appears to go 
beyond Vaughan, but its full meaning remains ambiguous. Read in the 
light of Quaker prosecutions under the Conventicles Act, it seems to 
adopt a far-reaching position: the jury must not feel bound to "apply" the 
statute as interpreted by the bench. Then, perhaps taking his lead from an 
account of Lilburne's dispute with the bench in 1649, Rawles drew upon 
the passage from Littleton, stating "[t]hat if a jury will take upon them the 
knowledge of the law upon the matter, they may." 21 9 This, Rawles 
suggested, was conclusive. We have seen how weak a reed this passage 
was, and Rawles, a trained barrister, must also have known it proved less 
215. Ibid .. p. 10. 
216. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
217. Ibid., p. II. 
218. Idem. 
219. Idem. For Lilburne's use of Littleton see State Trials, 4:1381 and above, Chapter 5, 
text at nn. 70-76. 
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than he asserted for it. But the position of juries in seditious libel cases 
seemed to him untenable; juries, he said, might be turned into "engine[s] 
of oppression.' '220 Their right, and duty, to judge the law was self-evident. 
Thus, the heart of Rawles's argument dealt not with the problem of 
judicial directions on the law but with the problem of defective indict-
ments. Here it was that Rawles grafted the claims of Lilburne, Penn, and 
opponents of the seditious libel doctrine in his own day onto the opinion 
in Bushel's Case: 
And ... it is false to say that the jury hath not power, or does not use 
frequently to apply the fact to the law; and thence taking their 
measures, judge of, and determine the crime or issue by their verdict. 
As juries have ever been vested with such power by law, so to 
exclude them from, or disseize them of the same, were utterly to defeat 
the end of their institution. For then if a person should be indicted for 
doing any common innocent act, if it be but clothed and disguised in the 
indictment with the name of treason, or. some other high crime, and 
proved by witnesses to have been done by him, the jury, though 
satisfied in conscience, that the fact is not any such offence as it is 
called, yet because (according to this fond opinion) they have no power 
to judge of law and the fact charged is fully proved, they should at this 
rate be bound to find him guilty.22I 
Hence, the central point of the tract and the core of the juryman's right 
and duty was this: the jury, to render a guilty verdict, must be satisfied in 
conscience not only that the fact has been proved but also that the fact 
constitutes an offense under the law. There can be little doubt that Rawles 
held the same views regarding judicial charges. The argument was not 
new; Quaker writers had made it since the Restoration. Now, however, it 
was made with reference to indictments for treason and seditious libel, 
and it was clothed in and accorded the respectability of the words and 
(seemingly, though not really) the logic of the opinion in Bushel's Case. 
Rawles's law-finding argument comes in the middle of his tract. It is 
followed by lengthy borrowings from Vaughan's arguments against the 
fining and imprisonment of jurors and is thus made to seem an integral 
part of Vaughan's opinion. The barrister comments that the recent 
appearance of Vaughan's Reports is an important event; all prospective 
jurymen ought to read it, along with Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, 
and other fundamental statements of Englishmen's rights. Jury trial, as 
defended by Vaughan and defined by Rawles, was central to those rights. 
As the barrister concludes (in what were in fact Lilburne's words): 
220. Rawles, Englishman's Right, p. 12. 
221. Ibid., pp. ll-12. 
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[T]he law of England has not placed trials by juries to stand between 
men and death or destruction to so little purpose, as to pronounce men 
guilty without regard to the nature of the offence, or to what is to be 
inflicted thereupon.zzz 
Rawles's gloss upon Bushel's Case was adopted by Henry Care, who 
published English Liberties: or the Free Born Subject's Inheritance 
shortly after his trial in 1680 for printing unlicensed (and seditious) news. 
Care lifted whole passages from Hawles, including Rawles's commentary 
on indictments. Elaborating on Rawles's argument, Care asserted that if 
the indictment put words of law wrongly in apposition to the facts 
it is an apparent trap at once to perjure ignorant juries, and render them 
so far from being of good use, as to be only tools of oppression, to ruin 
and murder their innocent neighbors with the greater formality: for 
though it be true, that matter of fact is the most common and proper 
objective of a jury's determination, and matter of law that of the 
judges, yet as law arises out of, and is complicated with fact it cannot 
but fall under the jury's consideration. 223 
Once again, Vaughan's words appear: No allegation "contra materia 
legis" will be heard, for "ex facto jus oritur"; law is "complicated with 
fact." These phrases, which had become code words for the pro-jury 
writers, were harnessed to the arguments developed by Hawles. For 
many, the meaning that Hawles and Care read into those words would 
quickly come to stand for the essence ofthe Englishman's right to trial by 
jury.zz4 
The petty jury was only the final bastion of opposition to allegedly 
tyrannical prosecutions. Grand juries might (and sometimes did) refuse to 
return a true bill, whether the charge was homicide, theft, or a political 
crime.m In the years following Bushel's Case, the Crown fought a 
two-tiered struggle in some political cases, first to secure an indictment 
222. Ibid., pp. 38-39. See Lilburne, Jury-man's Judgement (1653), p. 6 (above, Chapter 
5, text at n. 141). 
223. Care, English Liberties, p. 259. 
224. See e.g. A Guide to Juries, setting forth their Antiquity, Power and Duty (London, 
1699; first published as A Guide to English Juries, London, 1682), pp. 17, 25; Lord John 
Somers, The Security of Englishmen's Lives, or the Trust, Power and Duty of the Grand 
Jurys of England (London, 1681), pp. 10-11. 
225. For the grand jury in routine cases see Zachary Babington, Advice to Grand Jurors 
in Cases of Blood (London, 1680; orig. published 1677). The problem of grand jury 
"recalcitrance" in political cases has received a great deal of attention, esp. regarding 
Shaftesbury's Case and Colledge's Case in 1681. See e.g. Havighurst, "Judiciary and 
Politics," pp. 241-43; Helene E. Schwartz, "Demythologizing the Historic Role of the 
Grand Jury," American Criminal Law Review, vol. 10 (1972), pp. 712-21. See also K. H. D. 
Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), ch. 28. 
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and then to obtain a trial jury conviction. At either stage, Crown officials 
might be hard pressed to convince jurymen that the official characteriza-
tion of an offense coincided with the law. Rawles's The Grand-Jury-
Man's Oath and Office Explained, which appeared in the same year as 
Englishman's Right, argued that grand juries ought to return an ignora-
mus if they believed that the offense alleged was not a crime. The grand 
jury, according to Hawles, must look to facts, not to words of form 
inserted by zealous prosecutors: 
Here lies the knot, the pinch of the business, which rightly understood, 
would silence this controversy for ever. You must note therefore, that 
sometimes these words are only of course, or matter of form, raised by 
a just and reasonable implication of law; but sometimes they may be 
thrust in to raise .a pretence or colour of crime, where there is really 
none. 226 
Hawles therefore asked the grand jury to distinguish two kinds of case. In 
one, the act charged is itself criminal, whether or not it is "malicious" or 
"seditious," etc. If the jury is satisfied that the act is criminal and that the 
person charged probably is guilty of the act, it must return a true bill. In 
the other case, however, the act is innocent or indifferent unless it is 
undertaken with a "malicious" or "seditious" intent. In this instance, the 
jury must be satisfied that the "words of form" are proved, or else it must 
reject the indictment. Since they judge fact, grand juries must find the 
facts which make an act criminal; they ought not to find noncriminal facts 
and then leave to the bench, under the rubric of law, the determination of 
criminality. If they do so, said Hawles, they might indict for treason one 
charged with "looking on the tombs at Westminster" or for high 
misdemeanor one charged with printing the Bible.227 
For a grand jury to reject a bill because the act charged was neither 
criminal nor committed with criminal intent it had, of course, "to take 
upon [itself] the knowledge of the law." 
[Grand] jurors are to consider both law and fact or else they will never 
deliver just and lawful verdicts. To what purpose does the law provide, 
that jurors should be so well qualified as to estate, understanding and 
sufficiency, and so strictly sworn, but only to detect offenders and 
preserve the innocent from needless vexation and trouble? How far 
juries are judges of law as well as of fact is pretty well set forth in a 
small treatise lately published, entitled, The Englishman's Right .228 
226. John Rawles, The Grand-Jury-Man's Oath and Office Explained: and the Rights of 
English-Men Asserted (London, 1680), pp. 16-17. 
227. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
228. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
260 Transformations 
With this allusion, Rawles united his argument for a true shield at the 
grand jury stage with his claim that the trial jury possessed the power to 
decide law as well as fact, a strategy that Care and the author of The 
Guide also subsequently adopted.229 
In the period we have reviewed, the pro-jury position became, in fact, 
several different positions. The tract writers moved easily from one 
argument to another, sometimes confusing them but always uniting all of 
them under the rubric of the Englishman's right to trial by jury. 230 At 
times the assertion that juries ought to decide law was inseparable from 
claims to control over fact. To understand the entire complex of pro-jury 
arguments, therefore, it is necessary to separate the various strands of 
jury theory and to view them in relation to earlier thinking. 
The basis of the jury's power was, of course, the right to resolve issues 
of fact. Following Vaughan's logic, this implied the right to apply the law 
to the facts. Because "law arose from fact," unless the jury rendered a 
special verdict, no one other than the jurors had an opportunity to play 
this role. This concept of "application oflaw" was the most limited of the 
contemporary theories of law-deciding. It presumed, for many (certainly 
for Vaughan), jury adherence to the judicial interpretation of the law. The 
judge could do no more than put hypotheticals, but that was because he 
could not be sure of the fact. Once the jury found the fact and determined 
to which hypothetical it corresponded, application of the law could follow 
automatically. 231 
229. Care, English Liberties, p. 261; A Guide to Juries, pp. 59-62, 68. See also 
Twenty-four Sober Queries Humbly Offered to be seriously considered by all juries in city 
and country (London, 1680, printed for Benjamin Harris). 
230. See e.g. John Somers, The Security of Englishmen's Lives, pp. 9-11. Somers's tract 
was occasioned by the proceedings against Shaftesbury. Somers drew upon Vaughan for the 
proposition that juries (grand and petty) "determine the law in all matters where issue is 
joined" (p. 10). For an analysis of the influence on Somers of Fortescue's De Laudibus 
Regum Angliae see Caroline A. J. Skeel, "The Influence of the Writings of Sir John 
Fortescue," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd ser., vol. 10 (1916), pp. 
77-114. 
231. Some tract writers who were not explicit about the jury's right to render merciful 
verdicts, or who even opposed such verdicts, nonetheless described the jury's role in terms 
that may have seemed to leave room for such discretion. See [Giles Duncombe] Tryals Per 
Pais: or the Law of.England Concerning Juries by Nisi Prius, etc., By S. E. (2nd ed., rev., 
London, 1682). The first edition of this tract, signed S. E. [Samson Euer] contains little 
commentary on the scope of the criminal trial jury's power. In Duncombe's 1682 edition 
there is a commentary on Bushel's Case at pp. 441 et seq.: "[A]nd that question which has 
made such a noise, viz. whether a jury is fineable for going against their evidence in court, 
or the direction of the judge? I look upon that question, as dead and buried, since Bushel's 
case, in my Lord Vaughan's reports" (p. 443). Duncombe then accurately deals with 
Vaughan's opinion (pp. 444-45). He subsequently notes that juries may take the law unto 
themselves where law and fact are joined, but concludes (unlike Vaughan) that if they 
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Some, perhaps most, would have agreed that the jury's method of 
applying the law was not always required to be absolutely mechanical. 
Indeed, judges had long encouraged jury leniency in many cases involving 
homicide or minor theft, a practice that continued, perhaps even in-
creased, after the Restoration. It became commonplace to assert that the 
jury ought to apply the law mercifully. Although in theory juries were to 
apply the law as it was stated for them, in practice they applied the law to 
conform to their own rough sense of justice. Only when, in a given case, 
the bench deemed jury leniency inappropriate was the issue of jury 
deviance raised. Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's Case, which Hawles and 
Care took to address Kelyng's behavior in homicide cases as well as the 
treatment of the jury in the case of Penn and Mead, thus strengthened the 
jury's hand. Among the tract writers this right of merciful application of 
the law became the most common "proof" of the jury's right to decide 
law and fact "complicately." 
At the other extreme was the most pronounced form of law deciding: 
the right of the jury to determine whether the act with which a person was 
charged constituted a crime. Here, according to some tract writers, the 
jury's power and right were definitive. Neither the language of the 
indictment nor the judge's direction should divert the jury's attention 
from this duty. To pronounce guilt when one believed in conscience that 
no true crime had been charged was to commit "murder." This argument 
was also extended to grand juries where, in the light of the proceedings 
against Shaftesbury, it was absorbed into the historical myth of the grand 
jury as a shield against, rather than a sword of, the Crown. It merged also 
with the older attack on the use of informations. Right to jury was right to 
judgment by two lay bodies, mainly to provide a double check on fact but 
also to prevent prosecutions for activity that was not truly criminal. 
As we have seen, the tract writers urged juries to assess the words used 
in indictments that made otherwise innocent acts criminal. Without 
evidence of criminal malice or seditiousness there should be neither 
indictment nor conviction. In the case of the petty jury, this argument is 
complex; the series of propositions (which were never spelled out as 
such) runs as follows. First, the jury was to decide law; i.e., it was to 
decide whether as a general matter the act charged was criminal. Second, 
the jury would decide fact; i.e., if the act was criminal, the jury would 
mistake the law they run the danger of an attaint. Finally, Duncombe states that juries 
"determine the law in all matters where issue is joined and tried, but [not] where the verdict 
is special. ... [l]n such cases, the judge cannot of himself answer, or determine one particle 
of the fact, but must leave it to the jury, with whom let it rest and continue forever, as the 
best kind of trial in the world for finding out the truth, and the greatest safety of the just 
prerogatives of the Crown, and the just liberties of the subject; and he who desires more for 
either of them is an enemy to both" (pp. 447-48). 
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determine whether the defendant had committed it. If (as the jury saw it) 
the act charged was criminal only when committed with a certain intent, 
the jury would determine whether the defendant had committed it with 
that intent. This second, fact-finding stage, of course, could involve a 
degree oflaw-finding. For, as stated above, in reaching its verdict the jury 
would apply to the facts it had found the law as stated by the bench, but 
in a manner dictated by considerations of mercy. So long as the bench 
approved of the (merciful) verdict, this last form of law-finding was 
assimilated to the mechanical application of the law as stated by the 
bench. 
The Stuart bench conceded, at least in theory, that it could not coerce 
convictions. As of 1671, it conceded both in theory and in practice jury 
finality concerning fact and concerning the application of the law to fact-
with one important proviso: that the jury apply the law as stipulated by 
the bench. It would not tolerate, as a general matter, jury determination 
of criminality; nor would the bench tolerate a "merciful" verdict if it 
thought that the verdict disguised a rejection of the law as stated by the 
bench. Instead, as we have seen, the bench retreated, where it could (and 
where it felt it imperative), to the device of reserving to itself certain 
"questions of law." And thus it was that in cases of seditious libel the 
bench hoped by severely restricting the scope and nature of the facts to be 
found to eliminate the jury's power to conceal law-finding within fact-
finding. 
It was at just this point, however, that the Stuart bench suffered a major 
setback, one that ensured that the Restoration legacy of the criminal trial 
jury would be complex, confusing, and even contradictory, and that the 
contest over the true meaning of Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's Case 
would continue into the eighteenth century. This setback occurred on the 
eve of the Glorious Revolution in the prosecution of the seven bishops 
who refused to read James II's second Declaration of Indulgence. 232 
When the bishops petitioned the Crown, stating their reasons for refusing 
to read the Declaration, they were indicted for publishing a seditious 
libel. Their trial focused the growing opposition-an opposition that 
reached far into the political establishment-to James II's policies and 
religion, and to the behavior of the Stuart bench during the preceding 
decade.233 At the trial the bench badly divided on the question of whether 
the bishops' petition was libelous and, hence, whether it implied mal-
232. Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 454-55; J. R. Jones, Country and Court: England, 
1658-1714 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 238-40; Clark, The Later Stuarts, p. 126; Hill, 
Century of Revolution, pp. 198-99, 238-39. 
233. State Trials, 12:183-434 (1688). 
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ice. 234 In the end the jury was left to decide the issues of intent and 
libelousness in the most highly charged political context possible. The 
subsequent acquittal of the bishops was greeted with great celebrations, 
and was taken to signal the victory of the jury as a bulwark of the 
constitution against executive and judicial tyranny. It perhaps rekindled 
memories of the appeals of the hapless Colledge and Fitz-Harris, seven 
years before, to their juries as judges ''of law and fact.' ' 235 Momentarily, 
at least, the Stuart regime had worked a fusion of the proponents of the< 
radical law-finding position and much of the Whig establishment. 
As we shall see, this final Restoration episode became a central event 
for eighteenth-century constitutional and legal theorists. But it was an 
event from which different persons could draw very different conclusions. 
It perhaps reinforced the almost universally held view that jury verdicts 
were final, but it in no way settled the question of the legitimacy of judicial 
steering of juries that might otherwise find against manifest evidence: 
most eighteenth-century observers believed that the jury had found the 
facts correctly. Nor did the Seven Bishops' Case settle the question of the 
doctrine of seditious libel. Virtually all commentators deemed that 
doctrine dangerous, even illegitimate, when exercised by a "dependent" 
bench, as, from the perspective afforded by the watershed of the Glorious 
Revolution and the Act of Settlement of 1701, the Stuart bench seemed to 
have been. But was the doctrine inherently wrong? Could not an 
independent judiciary be entrusted to apply it fairly?236 For many the jury 
had proved itself a vital element during one stage in the development of 
the constitution. Jury intervention, they concluded, had been a crucial 
defense against tyranny; true it was that the jury might again play that 
role, should England ever suffer at the hands of a tyrannical Crown and 
bench, but such a retrograde development was (so they thought) unlikely 
ever to recur. 
For others, however, the right to jury trial meant the right to a jury 
verdict on all the facts, including intent and seditiousness. A bench that 
withheld that right was per se tyrannical. If the post-1689 bench pro-
nounced the law of seditious libel in its original form, the jury ought to 
reject that judicial pronouncement, for in such circumstances-and 
possibly in some others-the jury had the right to decide law as well as 
234. For a discussion of the Seven Bishops' Case, see below, Chapter 8, text at nn. 8-10. 
235. Rex v. Colledge, State Trials, 8:694; Rex v. Fitzharris, State Trials, 8:377. 
236. Hamburger (''Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel,'' pp. 88 et seq<) has shown that 
the doctrine of seditious libel not only survived the Glorious Revolution but was thereafter 
substantially broadened (to include "seditious" criticism of the government, not merely of 
specific government officials; to include mere writing, whether or not publication was 
intended); moreover, the de facto control of the bench over the question of libelousness 
became de jure. 
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fact. The legacy of the Restoration was thus severalfold. Though, as we 
shall see, there emerged a settled division of authority between judge and 
jury in routine cases, that division remained unresolved and problematic 
in many political contests. Nor could these two kinds of cases remain 
entirely separate. The two traditions of jury law-finding that passed on 
into eighteenth-century thought and practice influenced each other in 
important ways. Most significantly, the merciful discretion that survived 
the Tudor transformation in criminal administration and that was safely 
left to juries in common-run felonies (though it clearly went beyond 
Vaughan's identification of "conscience" with a good-faith belief regard-
ing fact) was bound to affect views regarding the legitimacy of true 
nullification in prosecutions for seditious libel. 237 
237. See below, Chapter 8. 
Partm Resolutions 
7 Jury Trial and Its Critics in the Eighteenth Century 
Between Bushel's Case and the late eighteenth century the English 
criminal jury trial underwent little significant change. The first great 
watershed in the history of trial practice was the development in Tudor 
times of a formal prosecution; the second was the increasing recourse to 
counsel and the development of a true law of evidence in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Perhaps the modern trial took 
shape only in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the point at 
which our present story ends. But if one searches in vain for dramatic 
change in trial procedure, the eighteenth century does reveal develop-
ments both in the role of the criminal trial and the way in which 
contemporaries thought about the jury. These two developments were 
related, and it is mainly the history of that relationship that Part III 
addresses. There are many strands to the history of jury trial, 1689-1800, 
too many certainly to outline here. But the main ones can be set forth 
briefly. 
The eighteenth century saw a consolidation and rationalization of the 
age-old practices that characterized the administration of the criminal law 
generally and the role of the trial jury in particular. Building on develop-
ments of the preceding century, authorities brought jury practices further 
under control even as they conceded the principle of the inviolability of 
the general verdict. Although jury trial itself changed little, the context of 
the trial altered significantly as authorities elaborated on the practical 
approach to penology that had emerged almost accidentally in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The "selection" of offenders by 
Crown, bench, and jury for one or another level of punishment became a 
complex and, at times, an awe-inspiring ritual. Authorities were all the 
readier to share the power of mitigation with juries in a system in which 
most of the beneficiaries of mitigation suffered some substantial punish-
ment. 
As the jury's role in this evolving system of mitigation became 
formalized, and in a sense tamed, that role expanded accordingly; but the 
jury was now more than ever just one part of the system, and the scope 
of its role in practice depended increasingly upon surrounding institutions 
and procedures. So intrinsic was the jury to the officially sponsored 
process of mitigation that many contemporary observers were either 
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confused as to whether the judge or jury was in control or wrongly 
concluded that the latter was the dominant of the two. As we shall see, 
what contemporaries-especially those who wrote about the law or took 
an active part in political debate-thought about the jury was of great 
importance. We cannot always tell when they are exaggerating to make a 
point or are simply seeing what they want to see, but it would be wrong 
to dismiss their depiction of the jury as purely polemical. They provide 
evidence of the contemporary understanding of the role and power of the 
criminal trial jury. 
Largely as a result of the reception of the Enlightenment tradition of 
penology, some jurists and publicists began to criticize (albeit, often in 
terms long employed in England) the prevailing administration of the 
criminal law. Their writings reveal certain distinctively English habits of 
thought that may have blunted the force of the reformers' message: 
English reformers attempted to combine criticism of what they perceived 
as ad hoc jury-based mitigation with endorsement of the long-standing 
constitutional role of the jury as a bulwark against tyranny. 
Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 8, about the same time that doubts 
arose concemingjury mitigation in common felonies, the jury emerged as 
central in the debate over the law of seditious libel. In this important 
noncapital, political offense the jury's role had been limited by legal 
construction, and this limitation was attacked by pro-jury writers as 
contrary to the English constitution and to the purpose of jury trial as a 
protector of fundamental liberties. Authorities who had accepted and 
encouraged jury-based mitigation in common-run felonies were hard 
pressed to explain limitations upon the jury in political cases. In 1792, the 
limitations were removed by a statute guaranteeing the general verdict in 
seditious libel cases, but stating little in express terms about how juries 
ought to employ the powers the general verdict conferred. 
In the long run, the tradition of jury adherence to the letter of the law 
was a product of the mounting campaign for legal reform. That campaign, 
briefly surveyed by way of conclusion in Chapter 9, saw the repeal of 
many of the capital felony statutes and the development of notions oflegal 
certainty and of theories of deterrence that undermined the arguments for 
jury-based mitigation. Not that such jury behavior came to a sudden and 
complete termination. It remained (and still remains), but was practiced 
far less frequently. When legal reform through a (perceived) democratic 
process dismantled much of the capital law of felony that had been 
created seven centuries before, jury deference to the letter of the law in 
criminal cases became standard practice for the first time in English 
history. 
The eighteenth-century criminal trial has recently been described so 
thoroughly and so well that only a brisk and derivative summary will be 
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necessary in this chapter. 1 Of course there were, as there had always 
been, many different kinds of crimes and, hence, many different contexts 
for criminal trials in the eighteenth century. We shall pay most attention 
to theft, by far the most common offense tried at the eighteenth-century 
assizes. Not only was theft common, but mitigation of the capital sanction 
for theft was both commonplace and the subject of commentary in trial 
accounts, pardon records, and the professional and lay literature of the 
day. Mitigation of the law of homicide continued, though it was less often 
commented upon. As we shall see in the following chapter, much of the 
attention to jury behavior in the diminishing number of homicide trials 
arose from the political offense of seditious libel, not out of routine 
felonies. Suffice it to say that we are here mainly concerned with 
extremely common and open mitigation of the law, practices whichjuries 
by and large did not hide from themselves, the bench, or society at large. 
These instances of mitigation were easily separated from cases in which 
there was substantial doubt about the level of offense that had been 
proved in court, for they were quite evidently simple rejections of the 
prescribed sanction. 
We shall also leave aside such obvious instances of nullification (even 
where the facts were clear) as that practiced in prosecutions for rape and 
infanticide. These cases, though important, were relatively rare and had 
little visible impact upon widespread attitudes toward jury practices. 
However, the attitudes toward jury behavior that were shaped by trials 
for property crimes may have influenced social views toward such 
practices in other kinds of cases. In this sense, I am dealing very broadly 
with the phenomenon of jury intervention. But this suggestion remains 
tentative; the important differences among offenses, and among attitudes 
toward them, require much further study. 
1. See generally Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers" and "Shaping the 
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: The View from the Ryder Sources," Chicago Law 
Review, vol. 50 (1983), pp. 1-136. Langbein's studies provide the most comprehensive and 
trenchant analyses in print of the relationship between criminal procedure, the law of 
evidence, and jury control. See also Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure"; Beattie, 
"Crime and the Courts in Surrey," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 164-74; and see 
Beattie's forthcoming book on the administration of the criminal law in the eighteenth 
century, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton, 1985). My own account 
draws heavily on Langbein, Baker, and Beattie. I have cited them for statements regarding 
procedural details that my own research on eighteenth-century trial accounts have borne 
out. I am grateful to Professor Beattie for allowing me to read, cite, and comment upon his 
forthcoming book. Citations (to manuscript chapters only) appear in the footnotes to this 
study. In the main, I have cited Professor Beattie's published articles. For an account of 
Restoration London and Middlesex criminal-trial resolutions see Valerie C. Edwards, 
"Criminal Equity in Restoration London and Middlesex" (paper presented at the Sixth 
British Legal History Conference, University of East Anglia, Norwich, July, 1983). 
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The phenomenon of jury-based mitigation that I discuss was of particu-
lar importance because of its visibility, especially to those who com-
mented upon jury behavior. It framed the issue for later generations who 
depended upon the works of London reformers and polemicists. In the 
countryside there were, doubtless, other traditions. Jury repudiation of 
the law as it applied to poachers and the like was an important aspect of 
contemporary culture, as were attempts by the government to pack and 
influence juries before whom such offenders were brought to trial. Many 
common-run cases thus took on the form of "political" prosecutions, at 
least in the understanding of much of the population. The impact of these 
prosecutions on contemporary views regarding the jury is difficult to 
trace, though some historians have made important headway. Suffice it to 
say that the absence of these episodes from my account in part reflects the 
fact that the attitudes they engendered were infrequently assimilated into 
contemporary accounts of the jury and in part reflects the limitations of 
my study. 
Section I of this chapter summarizes the changes in criminal adminis-
tration that variously affected the continuing practice of jury-based 
intervention in felony cases. In section II, I elaborate upon the jury's role, 
but mainly upon the contemporary understanding of that role. Those 
topics are further discussed from a different angle in section III, which 
analyzes the criticism of selective enforcement by some reform-minded 
publicists in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Section IV puts the 
developments discussed in this essay in perspective and suggests the 
ways in which one might interpret both the acquiescence of authorities in 
the prevailing system of criminal administration and the mounting attack 
on that system. 
I 
Trial procedure in the eighteenth century still bore a close resemblance 
to the model sketched in the sixteenth century by Thomas Smith. The 
most distinctive aspects of trial were the defendant's self-representation 
in full sight of the jury and the presentation of witness testimony largely 
ungoverned by rules of admissibility. The most dramatic moments of trial 
were those of relatively unmediated confrontation between the accuser, 
who still bore the expense and responsibility of setting forth the case for 
the prosecution, and the accused, who, until late in the century only 
occasionally had the advantage of counsel.Z The judge remained in the 
2. As late as 1771, William Eden could still say of the trial: "[T]he whole examination is 
rather in the nature of a discussion between the parties, than of a prosecution against an 
undefended, oppressed individual." Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771), p. 219. For 
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foreground, putting his own questions; he had no reservations about 
revealing his point of view. As in the past, the judge's directions to the 
jury were brief, but pointed and leading, if not coercive.3 Also as in the 
past, the jurors, drawn mainly from the artisans, tradesmen, and small 
farmers who composed the lower-middling ranks of society, deliberated 
briefly and reached verdicts that largely accorded with the views of the 
bench.4 
There were of course some changes which, although mostly minor, may 
have influenced the outcome of some cases. Thus, it appears the Crown 
set out its entire case through the private prosecutor and his witnesses 
before the defendant spoke, so that any argument between accused and 
accusers came relatively late in the trial.5 Moreover, in the early eigh-
teenth century the judge played an even more active role than before in 
questioning the defendant on the basis of evidence presented in open 
court. The bench also gave increasingly more complex instructions, as 
rudiments of the law of evidence took shape and as the increasing use of 
witnesses produced more evidence upon which to comment. 6 Finally, 
development of rules of evidence see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. For discussion 
of the emergence of defense counsel in routine felony cases see idem; Langbein, "Criminal 
Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 307-14. 
3. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," p. 284. 
4. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 8) analyzed the social and economic status of jurors 
at the Surrey assizes. I have drawn here upon his study, which is the only analysis of 
eighteenth-century jury composition I have seen. ·Other studies of this sort are now being 
undertaken; they are, I believe, unlikely to alter Beattie's conclusions significantly. 
Beattie's findings suggest that jury composition-which is not to say jury attitudes or the 
judge-jury relationship-had not substantially changed since the late seventeenth century. 
Beattie also argues, however (idem), that the jury qualification statute of 1730 (Stat. 3 Geo. 
2, c. 25) was intended to insure a steadier flow of jurors from the lower-middling groups in · 
society. Jury service became a more respectable activity (a response, perhaps, to the 
upgrading of the grand jury); the Crown relied on fewer, hence more experienced persons, 
individuals drawn from the higher ranks of the very large class of persons that remained the 
target of summons for trial jury service. 
5. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," p. 38. Although the olderform of altercation 
continued in some instances, the characterization here represents the main trend. This is 
reflected in the trial accounts known as The Old Bailey Sessions Papers (O.B.S.P.). For 
most of the eighteenth century, these accounts were formally entitled, The Proceedings of 
the Sessions of the Peace, and Oyer and Terminer, for the City of London and the County 
of Middlesex. Nearly complete runs of the O.B.S.P. are in the British Library and the 
Library of the Guildhall, London. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 
267-72, describes these trial accounts. Similar patterns are evidenced in the records of 
Surrey assizes for this period. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. Practice in and near 
London may in some respects have differed from practice elsewhere, but it is likely that the 
changes I have noted fairly rapidly became general throughout England. 
6. I base this statement on a review of the O.B.S.P. for the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Langbein is now working on the rise of the law of evidence and its 
effects on trial procedure and on judge-jury relations. 
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juries in the late decades of the seventeenth century heard a large number 
of cases before retiring; thereafter, at least on some circuits, they 
deliberated after each case, and often they did not actually retire.? 
Some of these developments may have made the jurors' task more 
difficult. Although the production of evidence was more organized, the 
separation of accusation and denial meant that testimony that went 
unanswered may have been either forgotten or given too much weight. s 
Then, too, the open "altercation" of an earlier day, while putting some 
defendants so much on the defensive that their nervousness counted too 
heavily against them, may have at least revealed telling emotions that now 
remained hidden. And though the increasing diffuseness of testimony may 
have been mitigated by the judge's commentary,9 judges had for long 
commented upon the evidence; more witness testimony meant more 
commentary for the jury to digest. By the same token some jurors 
obviously had trouble keeping straight the complex array of defendants, 
evidence, rebuttals, and commentary put before them. 1o As a result the 
most experienced jurors, probably including the foreman, exercised 
significant influence over their fellow jurors in the brief discussion of each 
case. 11 But these differences in practice were subtle; there is no reason to 
believe that they initiated or reflected a new era in the history of trial by 
jury.Jz 
If the eighteenth-century felony trial differed from that of two centuries 
before, it was because changes external to trial procedure had a palpable 
7. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 174. Beattie concluded that in Surrey 
juries "do not appear to have found it necessary to withdraw very often." See Beattie, 
Crime and the Courts in England, ch. 8. 
8. For a description of standard trial practice see The Complete Juryman: or, A 
Compendium of the Laws relating to Jurors (London, 1752), p. 158. The prosecutors first 
examined the witnesses produced against the defendant, then the defendant cross-examined 
them; the defendant next examined his own witnesses and the prosecutors cross-examined 
them. 
9. See M. Grosley, A Tour to London; or, New Observations on England, and Its 
Inhabitants (London, trans. 1772; orig. published 1765), p. 145. Grosley attended a trial in 
King's Bench. His account, which must be used with caution, states that the judge 
"summed up to the jury the whole charge, and the result of the depositions"; see also 
Francois de Ia Rochefoucauld, A Frenchman in England, 1784 (1784; trans. and annot. by 
S. C. Roberts, London, 1933), p. 126. 
10. Beattie found that in Surrey although the same jury heard a half dozen (or so) cases, 
verdicts were rendered after each case. Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. 
11. Beattie (idem) states that typically one panel of about fifteen jurors handled all the 
cases at eighteenth century Surrey assizes. Several members of each dozen sworn to sit on 
a given case had served at a previous assize. One must consider, too, that jurors became 
"experienced" in the course of a single assize, after serving in many cases. 
12. This view must remain tentative until the extant trial reports have been fully 
analyzed. 
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impact on the ways in which that procedure was employed and on the 
patterns of resolution that emerged from it. It is necessary to identify 
these changes before asking, in the following section, how the criminal 
trial jury functioned (and was thought to function) in practice. 
Although the development of a formal law of evidence in criminal cases 
is difficult to discern before the late eighteenth century, judicial notions 
regarding both the nature of evidence and the appropriate standard for 
proof of guilt may have been changing in important ways over the course 
of the seventeenth century. It has been argued that seventeenth-century 
transformations in scientific theory affected juristic modes of thought, and 
these new conceptions are reflected not only in legal writings but also in 
judicial charges. 13 These developments paralleled or followed the decline 
of the self-informingjury. It was the practice of judicial summing up of the 
evidence proffered by witnesses that provided the opportunity for the 
bench to comment upon the degree of certainty or probability that jurors 
must accord certain elements of testimony before finding the defendant 
guilty. More often than not the bench mainly stressed the weight that it 
itself accorded testimony, but its reasoning in this regard often was 
revealed in judicial recommendations to the jury .14 
We have seen that the Restoration bench sometimes invoked the 
principle of verdict according to conscience. 15 This principle took a 
variety of forms. It is hard to discern in it reference to a specific standard 
of proof, but clearly it carried the implications that jurors must act upon 
their own beliefs and that they must be fully satisfied that their beliefs 
were supported by the great weight of the testimony. Scroggs invoked the 
principle when he himself doubted the evidence; Rawles invoked it in the 
course of exhorting jurors to assess all the evidence, not just those 
elements or facts that the bench ruled appropriate for determination by 
the jury. These were special circumstances, of course, but they contrib-
13. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, ch. 5; see also· 
Shapiro, "Theories of Knowledge and English Juries" (paper read at the American 
Historical Association Convention, Dec., 1984). I am grateful to Professor Shapiro for 
allowing me to cite her paper. Shapiro argues: "The traditional 'satisfied conscience' 
standard had initially been a rather vague notion employed because the jury was on oath. It 
became the vessel into which was poured the new learning about criteria for evaluating facts 
and testimony. 'Satisfied conscience' gradually became synonymous with rational belief" 
(p. 8). Shapiro identifies the new standard ("satisfied belief") with the "beyond reasonable 
doubt" standard (p. 12) that was frequently employed in the late eighteenth century; "[i]ts 
introduction caused no comment, precisely because it was consistent with notions of 
'belief,' 'satisfied conscience,' and 'moral certainty' as employed in and out of the 
courtroom" since the seventeenth century (p. 13). 
14. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 8. 
15. See above, Chapter 6, text at nn. 201-4. 
274 Resolutions 
uted to a perspective on fact-finding that eighteenth-century concern with 
rules of evidence-hearsay and the like-greatly enhanced. 
We cannot know the impact of these developments on jury fact-finding 
in routine cases. Probably they counted for something in important 
political cases, especially in the light of statutory reference to "credible" 
testimony in cases of treason. 16 But the concern among jurists with 
scientific assessment of evidence may have made itself felt more gener-
ally. Judges as well as juries had long been inclined to mitigate the law of 
sanctions in many capital cases. As we shall see, eighteenth-century 
legislation greatly increased the scope of offenses for which death was at 
least a potential sanction, thereby expanding the universe of cases subject 
to the process of selection of the worst offenders. Eighteenth-century 
commentators often remarked upon the tendency of the bench to advise 
jurors that conviction of capital felony required something close to 
absolute certainty of guilt. 17 An extremely high standard of proof (which 
was a very important source of the traditional presumption of innocence) 
was one-though only one-of the devices that were central to the regime 
of mitigation. 
There were, then, several sources for the increasing concern with the 
standard of proof, the last-mentioned being the oldest and the most 
significant. Restoration advances in scientific theory can't be discounted, 
but they should be seen as having provided a more modern intellectual 
approach to longstanding practice. Their impact upon the emerging law of 
evidence is palpable, but it was nonetheless indirect, making itself felt via 
the catalysts of politics and, most important, the administration of a 
criminal law based upon mercy as well as terror. 
From 1671, judges were precluded from actually coercing jurors to 
return a conviction. For a time some judges may have broken the spirit, 
if not the letter, of the ruling in Bushel's Case, but for the most part 
straightforward coercion disappeared from the English courts. 18 Strictly 
speaking, the ruling directly altered trial practice in only a negative 
sense-something only occasionally done, or even threatened, was no 
longer allowed. Indirectly, however, the constraints imposed by Bushel's 
Case may have altered practice by intensifying the bench's inclination to 
apply more subtle forms of influence at every point in the trial.J9 
Although the petty jury remained relatively uncontrolled, the grand 
jury did not. By the mid-eighteenth century it was finding true bills in 85 
16. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, p. 190. 
17. See below, nn. 58-59 and accompanying text. 
18. See above, Chapter 6, section IV. 
19. See Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," passim. 
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to 90 percent of all capital cases.2o These figures no doubt reflected the 
development of the prosecution and especially of pretrial examinations. 21 
The evidence that a case existed against the accused was usually too 
strong for the grand jury to return an ignoramus; the commotion over the 
packing of grand juries during the Restoration represented a momentary 
turnabout in highly charged political cases long after the grand jury had, 
from the Crown's point of view, come to be "reliable" in common-run 
felonies. 22 The benefit of the doubt went to the prosecution at the 
grand jury stage. Lay prosecutors possessed greater powers than before, 
once their complaints were moved before the justices. A sincere-
sounding accusation was bound to go a long way. False accusations, 
whether malicious or merely mistaken, were now less effectively fil-
tered.23 Although the grand jury might undervalue goods in order to indict 
a suspect for only petty larceny, in general it is fair to say that if the 
community was going to play a significant role, increasingly it would have 
to play it at a later stage. 
At the very moment that relatively pro forma grand jury proceedings 
were placing greater strain on postindictment institutions of mitigation, 
the scope of capital felony was expanding.24 Most of the new laws 
concerned the taking or destruction of property;z5 many of them did little 
more than remove the right to benefit of clergy for offenses that had long 
before been capital at common law. The genesis ofthis legislation is little 
understood, 26 but some of its effects are well known. The capital statutes 
empowered property owners, small as well as large, to put at risk the lives 
of ever greater numbers of Englishmen. These laws may have increased 
20. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 163; Baker, "Criminal Courts and 
Procedure," p. 20. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 7. Beattie found that Surrey grand 
juries (1660-1800) rejected 11.5 percent of capital property crime accusations and 15 percent 
of homicide accusations. 
21. For an important study of developments in mid-eighteenth-century pretrial policing 
and prosecutorial practices see Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth Century Criminal 
Trial." 
22. See above, Chapter 6, n. 225 and accompanying text. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, 
ch. 8) shows that this episode had the effect of upgrading the status of grand jurors. 
23. Accusations made under oath had to go forward from the magistrate for grand jury 
consideration; by the mid-eighteenth century, magistrates exercised discretion regarding 
accusations not made under oath. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 2. 
24. This development has its roots in the sixteenth-century statutes limiting eligibility for 
benefit of clergy. See above, Chapter 4, text at nn. 42-50. 
25. See e.g. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (New York, 1975), for a study of one 
such act, The Waltham Black Act [Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 22 (1723)). 
26. See John Styles, "Criminal Records," Historical Journal, vol. 20, (1977), p. 980; 
G. R. Elton, "Introduction: Crime and the Historian," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, 
pp. 4-5; John H. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," Past and Present, no. 98 (1983), pp. 
115-19. See also Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 5. 
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the problems of enforcement by further burdening already overbusy 
courts and swelling the numbers of those who were ultimately punished at 
less than the prescribed level of sanction. Also, in a more subtle way, the 
new statutes occasionally influenced the criminal trial: judges were 
required to interpret the statutes, and this was sometimes reflected in the 
length and technicality ofjudicial charges. Frequently the bench sought to 
confine the statutes, so that narrow construction of the criminal law 
became a common form of mitigation.27 
Even more pronounced was the rapid increase in the practice of 
undervaluation of stolen property. Medieval in origin, and common 
enough in Tudor-Stuart times, undervaluation became a major form of 
resolution during the eighteenth century.zs Its prominence resulted from 
the coincidence of the multiplication of capital statutes for property 
offenses, many of which precluded clergy except in cases of minor theft, 
and the creation of a new lesser sanction, transportation. Transportation 
had been in use episodically from around 1600, but not until the early 
eighteenth century was it statutorily prescribed for a wide range of 
offenses. 29 Very soon it became a catchall for most of those defendants 
who had committed capital theft but whom the Crown, bench, or jury 
desired to spare. In effect, transportation had come largely to replace 
clergy (in the form of branding and discharge), serving both as a 
prescribed sanction and as a safety valve where mercy was deemed 
appropriate. 30 
27. Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in D. Hay et al., eds., 
Albion's Fatal Tree (New York, 1975), p. 32; Leon Radzinowicz, A History of Criminal Law 
and Its Administration from 1750, 4 vols. (London, 1948-68), vol. 1, pp. 25-28, 83-91, 
97-103. 
28. See the figures in Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 175-79. "Partial 
verdicts," where a verdict of guilty on the indictment as framed would have meant death 
unless bench or Crown interceded, involved characterizing the value of the goods stolen as 
less than twelve pence (petty larceny) or as more than twelve pence but less than whatever 
amount the relevant statute prescribed as the threshold for capital felony. (It might also 
involve characterizing the circumstances of the offense in such a way as, e.g., to convert a 
burglary into clergyable larceny). See also Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2nd ed., 
New York, 1952), pp. 139-41; Radzinowicz, History of Criminal Law, 1:94-97. 
29. Stat. 4 Geo. 1. c. 11 (1718). The statute allowed the bench to sentence convicts to 
transportation for seven years in cases of clergyable felony and petty larceny. See Beattie, 
"Crime and the Courts," p. !58; Cockburn, History of English Assizes, p. 130; Langbein, 
Torture and the Law of Proof(Chicago, 1977), pp. 39-44, and works cited in accompanying 
notes. See also Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 10, for an excellent account of the 
pre-1718 experiments with transportation and the legislative history of the statute. Beattie's 
work on the history of punishment, 1660-1800, constitutes a major step forward in the 
history of the administration of the criminal law. 
30. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 10) points out that before transportation came into 
general use juries were urged to convict of petty larceny, for which the punishment was 
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By the middle decades of the eighteenth century the apparatus for 
sifting defendants tried on capital charges-a process that Beattie aptly 
characterizes as one of "selection"31-had become fairly complex. Some 
defendants were acquitted outright; others were convicted, condemned, 
and hanged because of the seriousness of their offenses and "as a terror 
to others. " 32 Many capital defendants were saved by undervaluation or a 
"finding" of simple larceny instead of burglary (either on the jury's own 
action or because of judicial advice to the jury), and thus were convicted 
of an offense for which transportation or whipping were the prescribed 
sanctions. Still others, having been convicted of a capital offense, looked 
to the bench for relief. Of these, a very few were saved by appeal and 
retrial, or by a legal ruling, the verdict notwithstanding, by King's Bench 
or by the trial court itself. 33 Many more were granted judicial reprieves, 
thus securing time to petition the king for mercy in the form either of 
pardon on condition of transportation or of outright pardon. The bench 
played an important role regarding these posttrial petitions. At the close 
of every session the judges sent to the Council or Home Office letters 
containing the names of those they thought ought to be spared.34 
whipping, rather than simple grand larceny, which was clergyable. Thus what appears to be 
greater mercy was in fact conviction of the lesser offense that carried the harsher 
punishment. After passage of the 1718 transportation statute, recourse to petty larceny 
declined and conviction for simple grand larceny became more common. 
31. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 171. 
32. See e.g. SP 37/5, fols. 98v-99 (1766), Mr. Justice Perrott's letter to the Council 
recommending a convict not be saved: "I beg leave to certify that the law upon which this 
man was indicted had for its object the protection and security of the industrious poor who 
are obliged to labour for their bread abroad and are therefore daily liable to be stripped of 
all their honest labour has furnished them with and once stripped of that are little able to 
replace it. An act founded upon such principles I thought should not become a dead letter 
but that an example should be made as a terror to others and to give a very valuable part of 
his majesty's subjects that protection and security intended by the law." See also Bernard 
de Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn (London, 
1725), p. 36: "[I]t is not the death of those poor souls that is chiefly aimed at in executions, 
but the terror we would have it strike in others of the same loose principles"; Henry 
Fielding, An Enquiry into the Causes of the late increase of Robbers, etc. (London, 1751), 
p. 264: "The terror of the example is the only thing proposed, and one man is sacrificed to 
the preservation of thousands .... If therefore the terror of this example is removed (as it 
certainly is by frequent pardons) the design of the law is rendered totally ineffectual"; Sir 
Samuel Romilly, below, n. 120 and accompanying text. 
33. Baker, "Criminal Courts and Procedure," pp. 45-48. 
34. This was a continuation, and expansion, of a procedure that dates from at least the 
sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century, judges are mentioned frequently in State 
Papers (e.g. SP 36/113, fols. 5, 15, 78). After the mid-1780s, these circuit letters are grouped 
in the Home Office records (e.g. HO 6, 2/23; 4/23; 7/15; 12/58). For discussion of judicial 
requests for pardons see below, nn. 48-53 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion 
of pardon procedure and practice see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9. 
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Frequently the judges received requests from the Council or Home Office 
for supporting data, both in the cases that the judges had moved and in 
others moved by the defendant or by his employer, friends, or kin. 35 In 
many of these latter cases, the trial judge recommended against clem-
ency, which presumably doomed the defendant. 
The jury was only one of several sources of mitigation, and even then 
many of its merciful verdicts were encouraged-practically com-
manded-by the bench. But it was more active in this regard than it had 
been since medieval times, and much of the mitigation it practiced had 
taken on a kind of legitimacy it had not possessed before. There was now 
more law and more prosecution, and thus greater reliance on jury or 
postverdict determination of whether someone who had committed a 
nominally capital offense actually ought to hang. The trend was not new, 
but frequency of practice conditioned concepts of legitimacy, and these 
concepts in turn shaped society's understanding of the eighteenth-century 
criminal trial. 
II 
Although there can be no doubt that the jury was one of many 
institutions of mitigation, it is difficult to determine the degree of 
independence jurors had, or believed they had, in reaching verdicts of a 
discretionary nature. Langbein has shown that long after Bushel's Case 
the bench retained a number of devices that assured it control over the 
jury. The bench commented on the evidence and embodied such com-
mentary in instructions that sometimes read like recommendations. 36 The 
bench could withdraw a case before it went to the jury in order to allow 
time for the gathering of more and better evidence;37 its sense of timing in 
this regard was relatively acute because there was now more frequent 
exchange between judge and jury, or between jury and trial participants, 
that revealed the jury's view of the case. 38 The jury might be made to 
disclose its reasons for finding for or against the defendant, and the judge 
could send the jury back for further discussion if he thought the reasons 
insufficiently grounded on the evidence presented.39 Thus the bench 
35. See e.g. SP 36/115, fol. 24; SP 36/116, fol. 105. 
36. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 284-87. See also H. Misson, 
Memoirs and Observations in his Travels over England (London, trans. 1719; written 1698), 
p. 328: "[O]ne of the judges makes a discourse upon all that has been said, recapitulates the 
discourses pro and con, weighs and considers all things, draws his conclusions, and declares 
to the jury, that conformably to the laws of the country they ought to bring it in so and so." 
37. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 287-89. 
38. See O.B.S.P., passim. 
39. Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 289-96. In a few early modem 
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possessed the means for achieving practical control of juries. Had judges 
employed those means frequently, the tradition of jury independence in 
common-run felonies would have diminished substantially. In fact, as 
Langbein would agree, only the first device-comment on the evidence, 
containing strong hints of the judge's view of the appropriate outcome-
was a common feature of eighteenth-century criminal trials. To a sig-
nificant degree, however, judicial comment allowed the bench to achieve 
the modest control it felt necessary and appropriate to exercise. For there 
was, in any case, little area of real disagreement between judge and jury 
over the outcome of most trials. 
In light of the power that the bench possessed to control the jury, it is 
striking to consider the actual fate of defendants. Acquittal and conviction 
rates varied from decade to decade and from place to place, but Beattie's 
figures for Surrey, 1736-53, would seem a typical set of jury verdicts. 4o 
Beattie found that defendants charged with capital property crimes were 
treated, in roughly equal numbers, in one of three ways. One third were 
found guilty of the capital charge; one third were acquitted; and one third 
were convicted on a lesser, or ''partial,'' charge, e.g., either petty larceny 
or simple (noncapital) grand larceny. Of those found guilty of the capital 
charge, only one half were hanged; the remainder were pardoned on 
condition of being transported. Of those granted partial verdicts, 85 
percent were transported. The remainder were whipped or imprisoned, or 
were discharged after successfully claiming benefit of clergy. Thus, of the 
total tried for capital property offenses, some 15-20 percent were hanged, 
at least 40 percent were ordered to be transported, and perhaps 40 percent 
were not punished at all beyond pretrial incarceration and any posttrial 
stigma that might have attached. 
If there was a trend across the entire period, it was toward fewer actual 
executions, fewer outright acquittals, and more transportations (followed 
later in the century by more terms of imprisonment at hard labor). The 
assumption that offenders ought to be punished and reformed became 
more general; the willingness to take life long remained constant, then 
trials the judges accepted the jury's verdict of acquittal and urged a surviving kinsman to 
appeal the suspect. See Ernst, "Moribund Appeal of Death," pp. 177-80. 
40. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 179-81. See also Beattie's Crime and 
the Courts, which contains far more complete statistical tables than those he has previously 
published. In his book, Beattie details the fluctuations and long-term changes in the patterns 
of resolutions. He links these to specific events, prevailing social perceptions of crime, and 
changes in attitudes toward treatment of human beings. Beattie also demonstrates that the 
figures varied substantially as between the "old" (more serious) capital offenses and the 
"new" (less serious ones). See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9 and table 9.4. 
Langbein's figures for mid-century Old Bailey cases are similar ("Albion's Fatal Flaws," p. 
106). 
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dramatically receded. Although in percentage terms no more individuals 
were executed in the early eighteenth century than in earlier times-the 
20 percent figure remains the typical figure across the half-dozen centuries 
we have studied-the alternative sanction, transportation, was consider-
ably more punishing than the alternative sanctions resorted to in the past, 
pardons and clergy. 
The new regime of mitigation must be distinguished in yet another way 
from its predecessors. In the medieval period, property crimes at the 
capital level might be reported as petty larceny by the grand jury, 
pardoned before trial, or mitigated through acquittal by the trialjury.41 It 
is difficult to determine what percentage of the many trial jury acquittals 
were in the nature of merciful verdicts. There is little indication that the 
medieval bench encouraged merciful acquittals; such verdicts remained 
hidden and, at most, tolerated. In the later Middle Ages, the grand jury 
was brought under greater control, but pretrial pardons were plentiful and 
benefit of clergy was extended to an ever larger number of persons, 
reducing the number of cases in which the jury's verdict was of great 
importance. The sixteenth-century statutes removing many property 
crimes from benefit of clergy brought the jury once again to the fore: the 
practice of undervaluing goods or of convicting the defendant of a form of 
theft that was still clergyable became far more common than it had been 
in the medieval period. The jury could preclude capital punishment 
without granting a full acquittal, though not entirely at will since the 
bench might still exercise its power to deny that the defendant was truly 
literate. As we have seen, the bench often encouraged jury undervalua-
tions (and other forms of ''partial'' verdicts) and thus helped to initiate the 
practice that came to dominate jury trials by the eighteenth century. 42 
Although this practice had increased in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, it was the statutory provision for transportation in 
many property offenses that made it standard form after 1718. The 
novelty, of course, lay in the creation of a largely jury-administered 
scheme of mitigation that was legitimated both by the complicity of the 
bench and by the reality of some substantial punishment for those who 
were its beneficiaries. 
Within this evolving scheme of mitigation numerous factors induced 
acquittals and partial verdicts. Judicial recommendations to the jury 
often, though by no means always, were based on the quantum of 
evidence against the accused. The bench demanded that proof be virtually 
absolute before the jury convicted at a capital level. 43 Where such proof 
41. See above, Chapter 2, section II. 
42. See above, Chapter 4, text at n. 176. 
43. See below, nn. 58-59 and accompanying text. Judges frequently reprieved defendants 
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was lacking the bench recommended a form of mitigation that was 
"principled," i.e., in accordance with the evidence that had been 
adduced, but its recommendations in this regard were virtually always 
also conditioned by prevailing notions regarding the seriousness of the 
offense or its assessment of the character of the defendant. 44 In many 
instances, neither judge nor jury was disposed to give full expression to a 
newly minted capitallaw.45 In others, the law itself was not nullified, but 
a defendant who had stolen only marginally more than the threshold 
amount was treated in the same way as one who had stolen just a little 
less. The circumstances surrounding the defendant's act were also taken 
into account. Although the earliest statutes precluding clergy singled out 
accompanying circumstances that society had long considered especially 
heinous, many later ones did not; some of these latter statutes merely 
lowered the capital amount in offenses that did not involve physical threat 
or assault. In prosecutions under such statutes evidence regarding sur-
rounding circumstances became critical-not for the purpose of exonerat-
ing the defendant entirely, but for treating him mercifully. 
Almost inevitably many partial verdicts were the result of a combina-
tion of circumstantial considerations and considerations touching the 
defendant's background and character~ Character witnesses played a 
complicated and significant role. At trial their purpose was to exonerate 
the defendant, to testify that he was of such good reputation that he could 
not be presumed to have committed the offense with which he was 
charged. 46 In their charges to juries, judges may have treated such 
testimony mainly in this regard, but witnesses served also to support the 
defendant's plea for mercy after conviction. Juries may have had dif-
ficulty keeping these different roles separate, and it is even possible that 
the behavior of the bench encouraged the jury to confuse them. Judges 
counseled partial verdicts on the basis of such testimony even when it was 
clear that the defendant had committed the act in question. Moreover, the 
bench did so not only where the offense was trivial but also in more 
serious cases where the witnesses testified that the defendant was of good 
they believed ought not to have been convicted on the evidence. And see e.g. SP 36/113, fol. 
121: because "the whole [case] depending upon one single witness," the judge recom-
mended commutation to transportation for fourteen years (1751); SP 36/115, fol. 34: 
"because the evidence was not sufficient in law to convict him of the offence," the judge 
recommended transportation for fourteen years (1751); see also HO 47/5, no. 5: because of 
the "great doubt thrown on this case ... perhaps [the defendants] should be transported to 
some place with a more favorable climate than their present destination of Africa" (1786). 
I am grateful to Elizabeth Clark for this last reference. 
44. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9; Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-
Century Criminal Trial," pp. 26--30. 
45. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," p. 172. 
46. See Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 42. 
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character or had been in straitened circumstances or misled by others.47 
Although juries sometimes convicted with a recommendation for mercy ,48 
the bench did not always attempt entirely to sever the question of guilt 
from the matter of appropriate sanction by first securing a conviction and 
then undertaking to exercise mercy judicially. In practice, the bench did 
not seek a monopoly over the practice of mitigation. Rather, it tolerated 
and implicitly legitimated the age-old jury practice of mitigation without 
always setting clear standards for the jury regarding the weight to be given 
to any of a number of considerations that paraded as evidence. 49 
Assessment of guilt by the jury, as well as consideration of postsentence 
reprieve by the bench, was frequently made into a test, in the most 
general sense, of the defendant's just deserts. 
The specific considerations upon which a given jury acted when it 
acquitted a defendant or rendered a partial verdict on other than strictly 
legally prescribed grounds are seldom revealed to the reader of extant 
trial accounts. Some conclusions about typical reasons for mitigation can 
of course be drawn. Mitigation was common, for instance, where the 
evidence was not "absolute," or where the defendant had stolen little 
more than the capital amount. (Some offenses were so systematically 
treated as though they were not capital that the interesting question is not, 
Why were most such offenders spared? but, Why were the very few 
unlucky ones singled out?) The details of mitigating circumstances and 
the constituents of "good character," however, often remain unclear. 
One is forced to extrapolate from letters and petitions in cases where the 
defendant had been condemned, but where judge, jury, or others urged 
47. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey," pp. 171-73. In his excellent synopsis 
Beattie does not focus on the jury's perspective and perhaps understates the degree to which 
jury acquittals and partial verdicts were impressionistic and based on a mixture of motives 
that not even the jurors themselves. were pressed to sort out. 
48. See e.g. SP 36/113, fol. 76 (1750): Mr. Justice Burnet's report to Council: "The jury 
found the prisoner guilty; but at the same time desired that I would represent him as an 
object of mercy upon condition of transportation"; SP 36/113, fol. 78: Michael Foster wrote: 
"The jury recommended [the convict] to mercy, and I reprieved him"; SP 36/116, fol. 150 
(1751): "The jury after the business of the day was over came in a body to the bar and 
recommended the prisoner to mercy, out of regard to his youth." 
49. The intermixing of different kinds of reasons for extending mercy at the postconvic-
tion stage is reflected in a letter to the Council from Mr. Newton Ikin, recommending mercy 
for a convict who foiled a conspiracy to murder his gaoler [evidently while waiting for a 
reprieve after being sentenced to hang]: "These facts may possibly have some weight if Mr. 
Perrott [Baron and Judge] which it is expected he will, should make an unfavorable report 
to his majesty, for he refused the sheriff the favor of a reprieve for [the defendant]. His 
sentence I find to be generally thought severe, as the burglary was not positively proved, and 
the felony he was convicted of was no more than a cotton handkerchief of a very small 
value." SP 37/5, fol. 88 (1766). (Perrott did recommend carrying out the sentence, 
apparently without knowing these additional details. See SP 37/5, fols. 98v-99). 
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commutation and/or pardon. It is necessary to proceed with caution, for 
matters thought relevant to postconviction clemency were not necessarily 
persuasive with juries charged with finding the truth (or the just resolu-
tion) in the first place. 
Although most of the extant petitions for pardons and commutations 
date from the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they were 
abundant enough by the 1550s to indicate that the range of reasons for 
which pardons were granted remained fairly constant from the mid-
sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century.50 Judges' letters in support of 
pardons often cite the petitions of the defendant's minister or substantial 
neighbors.si To have the support of respectable members of the com-
munity to which the convict would ultimately return must have counted 
for a great deal. It is not possible to determine how often the jurors had 
known the views of such persons at the time of their deliberation. Drawn 
from the county, though not necessarily from the hundred where the 
offense occurred, some jurors may have known of the defendant's 
reputation, and we must assume that juries took this kind of knowledge 
into account in at least some cases resulting in mitigated verdicts. 52 
From judges' letters it is apparent that in addition to the nature of the 
offense itself, good character and previous behavior, youthfulness, sub-
missiveness upon arrest, and evident remorsefulness weighed ·heavily 
both with them and with juries. 53 The sentence that most beneficiaries of 
50. See above, Chapter 4, n. 163 and accompanying text. This subject requires further 
study. Although the stated reasons for pardons remained relatively constant, social attitudes 
toward mercy must have changed over time. For a study of the Puritan ideas that informed 
much social thinking about the role of mercy see Herrup, "Common Peace," ch. 6. See also 
my comments below, Chapter 9. 
51. E.g. SP 36/ll3, fol. 5 (1750): Thomas Birch, J., requested a free pardon for one 
convicted of stealing a calf, because of "favorable circumstances" at the trial and because 
he received a petition from the "minister, church wardens, overseers and principal 
inhabitants of the parish wherein he resided"; SP 36/ll3, fol. 15 (1750): Mr. Baron Legge 
seeks a free pardon for a defendant on whose behalf he "received a petition for principal 
inhabitants of the parish wherein she resided"; SP 36/ll6, fol. 32 (1750): Mr. William Noel, 
Chief Justice of Chester, sought commutation for a defendant for whom the prosecutor and 
many of the defendant's neighbors spoke; SP 36/116, fol. 306: Sir Martin Wright (judge of 
King's Bench) received a petition from "diverse of the better sort of the inhabitants of 
Drayton, in Shropshire" that the defendant "may dwell amongst her neighbours again." 
52. See above, Chapter 6, section IV, for discussion of the role of out-of-court 
information. The argument for the jury's right to a noncoerced verdict was based in part on 
out-of-court knowledge of the defendant's reputation. Although those making the argument 
probably meant that this kind of knowledge was relevant to the question of guilt or 
innocence, we have seen that the trial process confused this question with the question of 
the appropriate punishment. 
53. E.g. SP 36/113, fol. 9 (1750): youth "and other favourable circumstances," including 
stealing goods "of no considerable value," making no resistance, confessing immediately; 
HO 47/6, nos. I (1787): youth, and because prosecutor had recovered his sheep; 2 (1787): 
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jury-based mitigation received was transportation for seven years (in lieu 
of execution or transportation for fourteen years); substantial evidence of 
good character and of likelihood of reform must have seemed sufficient 
justification for one of the standard lesser sanctions. Perhaps it was the 
moderate quality of mitigation that led the bench to accept what was in 
any case inevitable, and to share openly its power of commutation with 
the jury. Whatever the reasons, the acceptance of shared powers of 
mitigation was of the greatest importance. It demonstrates that the 
criminal trial jury was still a social morality play over which officials 
exercised only a partial control. It also revealed that judge and jury, 
though they may have represented different social strata and different 
attitudes toward criminal behavior, generally acted in tandem, not one 
against the other.54 In the administration of the law regarding common-
youth, inexperience, penitence; 3 (1787): good reason to believe the defendant was 
instigated to commit the offense by some of those persons admitted to testify against him; 
5 (1787): appeared "to us" (six "freeholder-neighbors") to be sober and industrious, no 
earlier offences "we know of," has wife and three children "whom he has hitherto 
supported by his industry"; 10 (1787): good behavior during confinement, first offence; 11 
(1787): good behavior, repentance; 20 (1787): first offence, employable; HO 47/15, no. 39 
(1792): of former good reputation, husband a bad man who misused her. Hay, "Property, 
Authority and the Criminal Law," pp. 42-46, argues that judicial recommendations for 
mercy reflect class-based attitudes wherein "respectability" played a leading role. Hay has 
understated the role of other considerations, e.g., the problem of unsafe verdicts, reputa-
tion, repentance, etc. [On this point see Peter King, "Decision-Makers and Decision-
Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1820," Historical Journal, vol. 27 (1984), pp. 
25-58. King's article provides an excellent analysis of prosecution and pardon. On the 
whole, we are in agreement.] It is possible that judicial attitudes regarding all of these 
factors were characterized by condescension and that, whatever the stated rationale, 
judicial mercy was proffered to obtain the deference of the lower classes. That remains 
unclear. It cannot be assumed, however, that jury attitudes were the same as those of the 
bench, even where juries extended mercy on the recommendation of the bench. From their 
own perspective, however, defendants may have been led by the apparent agreement 
between judge and jury to the conclusion that the jurors' attitudes and motives were the 
same as those of the bench. It does indeed seem plausible, as I believe Hay would argue, 
that merciful verdicts reinforced the view among all participants (defendants, jurors, 
observers) that the administration of law (and law itselt) was just. This almost certainly 
engendered a certain degree of deference to authorities, to one's social betters, and even to 
one's social equals where the latter had been part of the process that had resulted in merciful 
treatment. For further discussion of Hay's views as they pertain to the role of the jury see 
below, n. 156. 
54. This is evidenced also by jury verdicts in cases where no partial verdict was possible 
(e.g., sheep stealing). The jury had either to convict of the capital offense or acquit 
altogether. In such cases, juries convicted with great frequency, probably knowing in many 
such cases that the bench was going to reprieve the defendant and recommend a pardon on 
condition of transportation. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 9. In some cases, however, 
the jury ignored judicial recommendations for mercy. The judge felt bound to honor their 
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run felonies, everything conspired to the creation of an integrated 
fact-finding, law-applying, and sentencing process. 
Contemporary observers depicted the role of the criminal trial jury 
largely in the terms we have set forth. Professional and lay writers on the 
law and legal institutions well understood the importance of the element 
of mitigation in the administration of the criminal law. They were not, 
however, wholly in agreement either on the factors that most often led 
juries to mitigate or on the degree to which juries acted on their own 
rather than taking their lead from the bench. Moreover, some of them did 
not view the process of mitigation as a carefully managed "selection" but 
viewed it rather as an unruly flight from the horrors of the sentence to the 
gallows. For this reason, among others, many observers doubted that a 
system of jury-based mitigation was a virtue; indeed, as we shall see, 
beginning early in the eighteenth century there was increasing criticism of 
a system of criminal administration that depended heavily upon this 
aspect of the jury's role. 
In most eighteenth-century descriptions of the routine felony trial the 
judge looms large. Even foreign observers, who were mainly curious 
about the role of the English jury, were impressed by the care that the 
bench took in questioning witnesses and the defendant, in taking notes on 
all testimony, and in summing up the evidence for the jury .55 Contempo-
rary accounts confirm the impression left by the Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers that the bench dominated proceedings, but they do not suggest 
that judges frequently brought pressure to bear on the jury. Rather, the 
judge reviewed the evidence thoroughly in open court, leaving little doubt 
of his own conclusions and making recommendations to the jury. 56 
Observors thought that these recommendations carried great weight, 
partly because of the intrinsic authority of the bench and partly because 
of the reasonableness and thoroughness of judicial summations. Some 
contemporaries, especially foreign observers, who tended to idealize the 
English criminal trial, asserted that the jury remained free to reach its own 
conclusions, implying that the bench rarely questioned jurors closely or 
sent them back to reconsider their first verdict. But even they conceded 
that juries typically agreed with the bench. The routine felony trial in very 
nearly all accounts was characterized by a harmonious judge-jury rela-
verdict but reprieved the defendant and recommended him to the Crown for commutation. 
E.g. HO 47/6, no. 12 (1787). 
55. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 328; Grosley, A Tour to London, p. 145; de Ia 
Rochefoucauld, A Frenchman in England, pp. 124-26; J. H. Meister, Letters Written 
During a Residence in England (London, trans. 1799; orig. published 1789), pp. 36-37. 
56. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 328. See also above, n. 9 and accompanying 
text. For an important study of one (probably typical) judge's practice see Langbein, 
"Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial," pp. 26-30 and accompanying notes. 
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tionship. Neither the judge nor the jury was a nullity; both were active 
and central institutions despite the fact that the judge was the partner that 
led .57 
We have seen that most defendants were either acquitted or awarded a 
partial verdict. Judicial leadership, it appears, involved frequent recom-
mendations that the jury not convict the defendant of a capital offense. 
Although it is clear that judges and juries took the kind of offense 
committed into account, contemporary writers have surprisingly little to 
say about judicial treatment of different kinds of offenses. For lay writers 
especially, the most important factor in acquittals and partial verdicts was 
the very high threshold of proof that the court required for conviction of 
a capital offense.5s The bench, it was asserted, seized upon every possible 
weakness in the testimony against the accused, even mere technicalities, 
to save the defendant's life. 59 The jury was urged to take the greatest care 
in assessing testimony where life was at stake, and, according to 
contemporaries, this is precisely what juries did. All parties to the system 
of justice, often including the complainant, strained to find some pretext 
on which to avoid the ultimate sanction of capital punishment. 
It is ironic that many contemporaries counted close and impartial 
scrutiny by judge andjury as a hallmark ofEnglishjustice, for there were 
as yet few formal rules of evidence. In much the same way, the frequent 
recourse to judicial reprieves hid the absence of a formal system of 
appeal. 6o The death penalty drove the bench and jury to find informal 
substitutes for what the legal system lacked and perhaps thus delayed the 
57. Misson, Memoirs and Observations, p. 329: "[W)ithout being under the least restraint 
to keep to the conclusions of the judge that has harrangued them''; de Ia Rochefoucauld, A 
Frenchman in England, p. 126. But see Grosley, A Tour to London, p. 146, who concluded 
that the judge thinks he dominates and the jury thinks it does: "The juries, on the contrary, 
maintain that the whole procedure in all its branches is referred to them; that the judge 
assists merely that his presence may awe the witnesses and the prisoner with respect, and 
to assist the jury by his experience and knowledge of the law. This competition, and the 
rivalship which it occasions, rendering both judges and juries equally alert, put the law in the 
place of man." 
58. William Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (London, 1785), pp. 
550-51. See also B. L. Muralt, Letters describing the Characters and Customs of the 
English and French (London, trans. 1726; written 1694, published 1725), p. 71. Muralt noted 
that some people were "condemned for small matters, and others are easily acquitted at the 
same time that seem to be much more guilty" (i.e., are suspected of a more serious offense). 
This, he said, was because the English "don't determine anything but on the clearest proofs, 
without any regard to probability." 
59. F. Lacombe, Observations sur Londres et ses Environs (London, 1777), p. 69. 
60. See A Treatise on the Right of Juries (London, 1771), p. 42: "The good sense and 
liberal feeling of the law ... cannot be enough admired: It impowers juries to acquit 
absolutely, but reduces and softens their power to convict, by enabling the Crown in its 
mercy to withhold punishment." 
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development of formal institutions. As a result of the way things worked 
in practice, some observers underestimated the degree to which the 
framework of protections surrounding the defendant was manipulated in 
accordance with the defendant's offense, bearing, and background. 
English criminal justice was not mainly a matter of the application of 
abstract rules. The threshold of proof required for capital punishment was 
flexible, subject to being heightened in given instances. 
It is possible that in many instances where the defendant's character or 
offense was the real reason for the extension of mercy, judge and jury 
rationalized the verdict in terms of the ''weakness'' of evidence adduced 
against the defendant, of the possibility that the testimony against him 
was inspired by hope of reward, or of a real or alleged departure by 
authorities from the formal requirements of the law.61 Authorities may 
thus have hidden both from themselves as well as from some contempo-
raries the degree to which mercy resulted from abhorrence of the death 
penalty or from considerations of character or offense. 62 But these 
nonformal considerations were, in fact, both significant and noticed. 63 
Moreover, they were understood as requiring a substantial degree of 
discretion on the part of the jury. Judicial recommendations were not seen 
as "directions"; even when the jury was following the lead of the bench 
it was seen as assimilating the judicial inclination to mitigate the rigors of 
the law to its own independent process of deliberation. 
At one level this process of deliberation had been purged largely of 
out-of-court evidence: by the eighteenth century, if not earlier, it may 
have been deemed inappropriate for jurors to take such knowledge into 
account.64 At another level, however, consideration of the defendant's 
reputation and character involved an assessment that might be thought of 
as community based. At the very moment that the jury was losing its right 
to be self-informing, authorities were continuing to acquiesce in the jury's 
right to apply standards that could be characterized as not entirely 
accessible to the bench. As we shall see, the persistence even in this 
truncated form of the tradition of the self-informing jury strengthened the 
61. On the matter of technical defects in indictments see J. H. Baker, "The Refinement 
of English Criminal Jurisprudence, 1500-1848," in Knafla, ed., Crime and Criminal Justice 
in Europe and Canada, pp. 19-24.' 
62. Misson (Memoirs and Observations, p. 329) thought the judicial recommendations for 
commutation were based on whether the defendant was "more or less guilty." 
63. English law reform writers were especially attentive to the role of these factors in the 
mitigation of the law. See below, section III. 
64. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 8) notes that jurors at Surrey assizes sometimes 
had actual knowledge of events and were allowed to make use of it. See also Langbein, 
"Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," pp. 298-99, n. 105. 
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hand of jury proponents in the late-eighteenth-century debate over the 
law of seditious libel. 
Although contemporaries understood that trial juries frequently inter-
vened to save the defendant's life, their discussion of jury behavior 
reveals the complexity of the system of trial by jury and the varying 
conclusions that might be drawn regarding the way in which that system 
worked. Some writers viewed the jury as an -appendage of the bench, but 
most saw it as far more independent. Most writers thought that jury 
verdicts were influenced mainly by the evidence, but many understood 
the importance of the offense, and the defendant's character and reputa-
tion. All of these considerations were influential, given the general 
resistance to convict at a capital level all but the worst offenders. 
Although most contemporaries understood this, they did not always take 
care to separate these factors. Even when juries did convict, they often 
did so with (perhaps because of) the knowledge that the defendant's life 
would or might be spared. Many contemporaries may have missed this 
point and thus failed to consider whether the jury in such cases doubted 
that it had the right to intervene or simply preferred to leave the ultimate 
decision to the bench. 
The general impression that the lay and professional writings of the 
eighteenth century convey is that juries were willing to punish but not 
often to condemn men and women who came from walks of life that were 
different, but not totally removed from their own. Jurors may have 
identified with the perspective of authorities, but, as many contemporar-
ies saw it, they often also identified with the defendant. Observers did not 
see jurors as constantly drawn in one direction or the other, perhaps 
because the bench was similarly disinclined to enforce the law to its 
fullest and at least appeared to adopt standards close to those of persons 
from the ranks from which jurors were drawn. Judge and jury, it was 
widely believed, shared both point of view and the age-old right and duty 
to mitigate the law. 
III 
The practical approach to penology that we have described was the end 
product of a dialectical process set in motion centuries before. The trial 
jury's systematic nullification of the law of capital sanctions was gradually 
accommodated by authorities through doctrinal and institutional changes, 
some-though only some-of which were conscious responses to the 
relatively benign sort of jury-based intervention that we have been tracing 
in this chapter. As authorities tightened their control of juries in cases 
where they felt something substantial was at stake and developed a set of 
relatively severe noncapital sanctions for the general run of cases, they 
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not only acquiesced in, but even encouraged, jury participation in the 
selection of offenders for one or another level of punishment. 
The result of this historical development was a scheme of selective 
enforcement in which the jury played a significant role. Had juries, 
however, adhered from the outset to the rules of law, a system of 
selective enforcement might nonetheless have resulted. Given the needs 
of politics, the attack on capital punishment, and the recognition that the 
able-bodied could be put to good use, the English might have adopted a 
Crown-based Continental-style system of pardon and commutation. As it 
in fact evolved, the English system of penology, wherein the jury was an 
important participant, was more visible, more complex, and perhaps less 
consistent in its resolutions than its French or Italian counterparts. But it 
probably reflected the attitudes of a larger part of society and induced a 
more widespread belief that the entire system of criminal administration 
was just. 
Whatever degree of public support the English scheme of selective 
enforcement enjoyed, it nonetheless met with significant criticism over 
the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The criticism 
intensified in the last decades of the century due largely to the influence 
of Cesare Beccaria's work, On Crimes and Punishments, first published 
in English in 1767.65 The central principles of Beccaria's attack on 
Continental systems of criminal justice are too familiar to require detailed 
discussion. Popularizing the ideas of earlier and more original Continental 
writers, 66 Beccaria argued for moderate and proportional punishments 
that were both humane and capable of being systematically enforced. 
Certainty of punishment, he held, was the best deterrent to crime:67 
prospective offenders should not be encouraged to suppose they could 
escape punishment through the extension of mercy. Beccaria took an 
absolutist position, leaving virtually no room for the power of pardon.6s 
Punishment, he believed, ought to be prompt69 and ought to bear a 
rational relationship to the nature of the offense, 70 but in no case was it to 
be capital.71 Though on this last point some Continental reformers 
65. Cesare Beccaria, Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1767). References 
hereafter are to the J. A. Farrar translation (London, 1880). 
66. See e.g. Coleman Phillipson, Three Criminal Law Reformers: Beccaria, Bentham, 
Romilly (London, 1923), p. 84; Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, 1:268-80, 
esp. nn. 36 and 42. 
67. Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, p. 168. 
68. Ibid., pp. 190-91. 
69. Ibid., p. 186. 
70. Ibid., pp. 213-14. 
71. Ibid., p. 169. 
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disagreed with Beccaria, his tract, generally speaking, fairly captured and 
transmitted their views to English shores. 
Continental penological views of the late eighteenth century influenced 
but were not perfectly replicated in the emerging critique of the English 
system. For some English reformers, the Continental principles were 
especially attractive because of the open and seemingly ad hoc character 
of selective enforcement in their own country. At the same time, 
however, these reformers held a conception of justice to which some 
degree of jury discretion was integral. The English version of the new 
penology reveals just how complicated a role the jury had come to play in 
English legal and political culture. In what follows I shall examine the 
initial English reception of the new penology and suggest the ways in 
which longstanding English practices affected that reception. I shall also 
contrast the English reformers to the principal defenders of the status 
quo, who agreed with the reformers only in their criticism of prevailing 
jury practices, and in their view that whatever mitigation was to be 
practiced ought to be centered mainly in the Crown. 
The reformers to whose work we shall pay greatest attention were not 
necessarily typical in their criticism of the jury. Their understanding of 
jury practices, and of the impact of those practices on the administration 
of the criminal law, rested mainly on their familiarity with the trials at 
urban assizes of a seemingly endless parade of suspected thieves and 
slayers.72 They were influenced by their perception of a rising crime rate 
and a growing criminal class. Their view, in short, was a view from the 
center. The reformers' criticism was blunted, however, by their adher-
ence to two positions that enjoyed wide social agreement. First, many 
reformers believed that the severity of the law of sanctions was a principal 
source of the problems afflicting the administration of the criminal law. 
Jury mitigation, they perceived, was an inevitable response to that 
severity; until sanctions were reformed mitigation would be both common 
and in accord with humane principles. It proved difficult for reformers to 
write about the prevailing system without giving support, pro tern, to 
some of the practices to which they were in fact opposed. Second, for 
most reformers there was an important conflict between their belief that 
jury mitigation played havoc with a rational system of criminal law and 
their faith in residual powers of nullification as a safeguard against 
72. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," pp. 54-55) has pointed out that 
London "had a highly transient population, and a large body of disorderly and parasitic 
poor," and that "instruments of control there were weaker, in part because the class 
relationships that fostered deference were [weaker] .... Equally, judicial mercy in London 
was more often a bureaucratic lottery than a convincing expression of paternalism." This 
may help account for the reformers' criticism of what seemed to some of them a nearly 
random process of selection. 
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executive and judicial tyranny. (It is the exploration of these jury-related 
themes that distinguishes my treatment of the eighteenth-century reform 
tradition from that of earlier scholars, e.g., Sir Leon Radzinowicz.) As we 
shall see in this chapter and the one that follows, the contradictions 
inherent in both politics and the administration of criminal law in the 
eighteenth century were mirrored in the academic legal literature of the 
period. 
The major reform writings and the responses to them may be aligned as 
follows. In the years around 1770, William Blackstone, William Eden, and 
Henry Dagge produced pioneering works on penal reform. All of these 
writers were influenced by Beccaria, whose concern had been with the 
law regarding common-run felonies. Though all three reflected some 
understanding of the constitutional-safeguard role of the jury, only Dagge 
clearly (and favorably) responded to the uproar over the jury in seditious 
libel cases and to the agitation of the Wilkites in the late 1760s. A decade 
later Manasseh Dawes, influenced by both Blackstone and the philosophi-
cal writings of Joseph Priestley that appeared in the late 1770s, added a 
variation on the Beccarian themes. Dawes argued for reform of the law of 
sanctions, urging that death be replaced by imprisonment at useful labor. 
He dwelled on the causes of criminal behavior, striking at points a modern 
note. Interestingly, his work showed no attention to the seditious libel 
crisis and to the defense of the jury in that context that he was to make 
two years later (1784) in the wake of the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph. In 
the mid-1780s William Paley and Martin Madan published very different 
defenses of the law of sanctions that criticized jury-based mitigation of the 
law in common-run felonies. Taken together, these two works challenged 
the early penal reform movement. The voice of the future, however, was 
heard in the first work of Samuel Romilly, who replied in 1786 to Madan's 
discourse. Romilly called for reform of the kind for which the adherents 
of Beccaria had called. Like most of the other reform writers, Romilly 
devoted nearly all his attention to the traditional felonies, and little to the 
problem of the jury in political cases, this despite the fact that just two 
years earlier Romilly had written a powerful defense of the role of the jury 
in seditious libel cases. 
Although all of these writers-proponents and opponents of reform-
opposed jury mitigation, at least at its contemporary levels, they nonethe-
less reflected widely divergent perspectives on the system of criminal law 
in general. Because these commentators on jury practices built upon one 
another, we shall examine them separately and chronologically, even at 
the risk of repetition on points where they were in substantial accord. 
Before turning to these seven important late-eighteenth-century legal 
writers, however, we must take account of Henry Fielding's two mid-
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century tracts. Fielding foreshadowed the later writers, especially in his 
ambivalence about the role of the criminal trial jury. 
Fielding's 1751 Enquiry into the causes of what he perceived to be a 
recent increase in criminal activity attacked jury mitigation of "two 
excellent Acts of Parliament" regarding pilfering and like offenses.73 By 
valuing goods at less than a shilling, the jury leaves the thief "ordinarily 
to be whipped," so that he returns immediately to his trade. As a result, 
"the jury are perjured, the public highly injured ... that two miscreants 
[principal and accessory] may laugh at their prosecutors, and at the 
law. "74 Criminals thus "are ever lying in wait to destroy and ensnare the 
honest part of mankind, and to betray them by means of their own 
goodness." They take advantage of the "passion of love or benevo-
lence," the "only human passion that is in itself simply and absolutely 
good. " 75 Fielding preached against naivete, against what he took to be a 
misplaced generosity of spirit; he extolled the virtues of mercy in the 
abstract, but scorned the sudden accesses of compassion that blinded 
men to the real effects of merciful verdicts in criminal cases.76 
The tone of the Enquiry is harsh and angry. It has the feel of a complaint 
from the front lines, penned by a magistrate attempting to deal with what 
he took to be a national crime wave. In only the narrowest sense was it a 
penal reform tract. Far from criticizing capital sanctions, Fielding insisted 
upon adherence to the rules of the system. Though Fielding's endorse-
ment of the ''terror of examples' '77 to deter would-be offenders seems to 
sanction some degree of selective enforcement, the principal argument of 
the Enquiry is that failure to prosecute and refusal to convict were both 
unlawful and unwise. To the extent that the tract foreshadowed later 
commentary on the jury, it bore a closer resemblance to Madan's call for 
rigorous enforcement of existing laws than to the writings of Beccaria's 
73. Henry Fielding, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers 
(London, 1751), p. 73. For a recent study of the contribution of Henry Fielding and his 
brother John to pretrial investigation see Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial," pp. 49 et seq. See also Pat Rogers, Henry Fielding: A Biography (New 
York, 1979), ch. 6. 
74. Fielding, An Enquiry, p. 73. 
75. Ibid., pp. 106-8. Fielding refers here to too-merciful prosecutors, but he clearly 
means also to characterize too-merciful jurors. 
76. See also Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, no. 114 (London, April, 20, 1751): "[I]t may 
be observed, that all but murderers have, at their last hour, the common sensations of 
mankind pleading in their favour" (p. 4). "This scheme of invigorating the laws by 
relaxation, and exploiting wickedness by lenity, is so remote from common practice, that I 
might reasonably fear to expose it to the public, could it be supported only by my own 
observations" (p. 7). 
77. Ibid., p. 120. 
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disciples or to Paley's defense of the regime of selective enforcement of 
the criminal law. 
Fielding's 1753 Proposal was written in an altogether different vein. 78 It 
was an original reform tract, reminiscent of Interregnum reform writings, 
and a significant addition to the eady eighteenth-century English litera-
ture that counseled use of the workhouse for persons convicted of petty 
theft.79 Though limited in scope by its attention to petty theft, and to first 
offenders at that, Fielding's argument was informed by a series of insights 
that were shared by the later reformers. His central purpose was to argue 
for sentences to the workhouse, instead of gaol, for first offenders.80 In 
the main, his tract was frankly utilitarian. Like mid-seventeenth-century 
reform writers, Fielding saw little purpose in simple and brutal incarcera-
tion. He portrayed the prospective defendant as one who awaits trial in 
the worst of circumstances, unable to support himself and his family, prey 
to the wretches of society.s1 Sentencing the convict to gaol only made 
matters worse. Fielding believed that the existing system produced 
hardened criminals and induced juries to acquit defendants who deserved 
some punishment and who required-to use a modern term-rehabilita-
tion. 
The themes of mercy, fairness, deterrence, and social utility were 
woven into a logical and compelling argument. The accused, Fielding 
observed, must await trial in gaol no matter how "trifling" his offense or 
how much he is an "object of mercy." "If he be acquitted on his trial, as 
he often is by the mercy of the jury, against clear and positive evidence, 
he is again turned loose among the community with all the disadvantages 
I have mentioned above." If he is convicted, whipped, and gaoled, so 
much the worse: "What must be the situation of this wretch I need not 
mention; such in truth it is, that his second theft is in reality less criminal 
than the first. This was perhaps choice; but that will be necessity. "sz 
Transportation of pilferers, made possible by a recent Act, offered little 
improvement: 
78. Henry Fielding, A Proposal for Making an Effectual Provision for the Poor (London, 
1753). 
79. See above, Chapter 5, text at nn. 124-31, for a discussion of Interregnum law reform 
writing on penology. For early eighteenth century works that continued the seventeenth-
century tradition see e.g. Thomas Coke, Work-houses the best Charity, A Sermon, preached 
at the Cathedral Church of Worcester (London, 1702); Sollom Emlyn, "Preface" to A 
Complete Collection of State Trials, 6 vols. (2nd ed., London, 1730), vol. 1, p. ix. Emlyn 
recommended "hard labour at home." For an excellent discussion of early eighteenth-
century reform ideas regarding use of workhouses and the "reformation of manners," see 
Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 10. 
80. Fielding, A Proposal, p. 71. 
81. Idem. 
82. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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[T]his, though probably it may be real mercy, has such an appearance 
of extreme severity, that few judges are willing to inflict such a 
punishment on such an offense. But if it should be in the interest of a 
wretch in these circumstances, to be banished from a country where he 
must steal or starve, it is scarce the interest of the public to lose every 
year a great number of such able hands. By the means I have proposed, 
it seems to me, that the offender will receive a punishment proportion-
able to his offence; he and his family may be preserved from utter ruin, 
and an able member, instead of being entirely lost to the public, will be 
rendered more useful to it than he was before.s3 
Fielding's prescription for reform was clear enough, but what were his 
views regarding mitigation in the unreformed present? Were judges and 
juries to apply the letter of the law to the "wretches" and "objects of 
mercy" who came before them? One might suppose that the Fielding who 
in 1751 opposed merciful verdicts in capital cases opposed them in 
noncapital cases of petty larceny in 1753. This is not necessarily so. 
Fielding might have believed that perpetrators of more serious offenses 
deserved the strongest possible punishment but that those who committed 
"trifling" ones deserved very little punishment at all. All one can say is 
that the Proposal reflects recognition that such verdicts were inevitable in 
"trifling" cases and that Fielding found it difficult to deny that they were 
just. Fielding's tracts signaled a revival of English penal reform writing. 
They carried forward Interregnum ideas, adding to them the insights of an 
experienced London magistrate. But they also revealed the tensions that 
characterized the late-eighteenth-century English reform tracts. 
Blackstone's final volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of En-
gland, Of Public Wrongs, contained the first analysis of the administra-
tion of the criminal law written after the publication in England of 
Beccaria's influential work.s4 Blackstone admired the Continental reform 
tradition, and Of Public Wrongs attempts to assimilate that tradition to 
the common-law world, sometimes pretending that English institutions 
already conformed to the reformist ideal and sometimes justifying the 
obvious and seemingly important dissimilarities between them. 
Blackstone accepted Beccaria's principles of justice and deterrence based 
upon a law of sanctions that was humane and applied with certainty. 85 
Blackstone also understood the role that English juries played in common- · 
run felonies. He simultaneously acquiesced in a substantial amount of 
jury-based mitigation of the criminal law and counseled reforms that 
83. Ibid., p. 72. 
84. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (1765-69; 
reprinted, Chicago, 1979), vol. 4: Of Public Wrongs. 
85. Ibid., pp. 1&-17. 
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would greatly lessen the need for such practices.86 
The great bulk of jury mitigation practice involved the rendering of 
partial verdicts in offenses against property. Blackstone argued that 
undervaluation was largely a response to inflation, which had brought 
more and more goods within the scope of capital felony statutes. This was 
a kind of ''pious perjury'' that achieved justice by preventing unforeseen 
economic forces from condemning to death persons whom the legislature 
had not specifically said ought to be hanged.87 Blackstone knew, how-
ever, that juries went beyond this form of mitigation, that they were 
merciful in a far wider range of cases; he was more cautious in his 
condonation of these practices, but it is clear that he believed they 
accorded with natural justice. Much of the law of capital sanctions was 
wrong as a matter of justice and policy; reform-in the form of repeal-
was required, and until it came about one had both to understand and to 
accept the mitigating role of legal institutions. 88 
But as an advocate of reform Blackstone did not go so far as Beccaria, 
who argued that a rational law of sanctions would dissolve the necessity 
for a power of pardon. Blackstone believed that there would always be a 
need for that power; moreover, he inherited a view of monarchy from 
which the pardon power was inseparable. For Blackstone, the goal was 
partly to reduce the frequency with which pardons were granted, but 
mainly to centralize the pardon power in the Crown. Blackstone under-
stood Beccaria's argument regarding deterrence, but seems not to have 
accepted the notion that any decrease in certainty of punishment, 
whatever its source, had to be paid for in decreased deterrence. 
Blackstone focused on a distinctively English problem that Beccaria 
did not have to address: the dangers inherent in dispersed powers of 
mitigation.89 For Beccaria, the villain was mitigation itself, not a particu-
lar institution of mitigation. While necessarily more complicated than that 
of the Continental reformer, Blackstone's argument was also internally 
contradictory. He sought to justify the English system even as he called 
for its reform. Thus he sought at times to argue that all power of 
mitigation was in fact centered in the Crown.90 But he was well aware of 
the truth: political control, certainty of the law, consistency of treatment 
of offenders were all sacrificed under an English administration of law that 
86. Ibid., 18-19, 239, 354. 
87. Ibid., p. 239. 
88. Thomas A. Green, "Introduction" to ibid., pp. ix-xi. 
89. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
90. Ibid., p. 390. Blackstone asserted that "the exclusion of pardons must necessarily 
introduce a very dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law 
by the spirit instead of the letter." Blackstone knew that such practices were common 
despite the possibility of royal pardon. See above, n. 88. 
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corrected for its potential inhumanity through ad hoc and variously 
situated institutions of mitigation. 
Blackstone understood that the problems besetting English criminal 
justice could be resolved only through fundamental change in the manner 
in which all the institutions of the criminal law functioned. Change could 
not come piecemeal; it would have to begin with the law of sanctions, but 
the effects of that change would have to radiate throughout the entire 
system. Until sanctions were reformed the jury would remain an institu-
tion of mitigation, playing a role akin to the one it had historically played 
in the English constitution of accommodating the rules of law to the 
Englishman's sense of natural justice. The jury was a guardian against 
inhumanity as well as against tyranny. As a corollary, whatever reforms 
were undertaken regarding sanctions for common-run felonies, the jury 
would have to retain the ultimate power in order to guard against episodes 
of legal abuse in more overtly political cases. 91 There were, of course, 
costs involved in the use of juries, but these Blackstone characterized as 
''inconveniences.' '92 Better to educate Englishmen to serve as jurors in a 
system that required of them wisdom and some knowledge of the law, 
restraint but a sense of justice, than to eliminate the jury in order to avoid 
potential or even present abuses. 
Blackstone shared his contemporaries' view that much criminal activity 
resulted from social conditions,93 and he was prominent among the early 
proponents of prison reform who argued that current incarceration 
practices only made offenders more dangerous.94 Characteristically, 
however, he shied away from the conclusion that poverty or exposure to 
vice and to evil companions stripped one of a truly free will. That 
conclusion (for which he provided no logical rebuttal) he regarded as 
dangerous to the public order. Poverty, he asserted, ought not to ground 
a defense of involuntarism or of necessity, especially in cases of theft of 
food or clothing, for property would then be rendered insecure by the 
alleged wants of others, "of which wants no man can possibly be an 
adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads them. "95 Blackstone 
resolved the problem by invoking the power of the Crown ''to soften the 
91. Ibid., pp. 343-44: "[S]ince in times of difficulty and danger, more is to be ap-
prehended from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the Crown, in suits 
between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one individual and another. ... 
So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist, so long as this palladium remains sacred 
and inviolate." 
92. Ibid., p. 344. 
93. See Green, "Introduction" to Blackstone, Commentaries, 4: iv-v. 
94. For Blackstone's contribution to the movement for imprisonment at hard labor see 
Beattie, Crime and the Courts, ch. 11. 
95. Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:32. 
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law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hardship. "96 But as he 
doubtless realized, in practice juries daily served to help resolve this very 
dilemma. 
William Eden also recognized the complexity of the role of the criminal 
trial jury.97 Like Beccaria, he focused clearly on the problem of deter-
rence, echoing the Italian's message through his borrowings from 
Blackstone's terminology. Eden's analysis of the property-crime problem 
that afflicted late-eighteenth-century England is a classic formulation of 
the Continental reform theory. The source of the problem was, he said, 
"national prosperity." "Sensibility sleeps in the lap of luxury; and the 
legislator is contented to secure his own selfish enjoyments, by subjecting 
his fellow citizens to the miseries of a dungeon, and the horrors of an 
ignominious death. " 98 Increased wealth brought increased selfishness and 
increasingly harsh laws to protect that wealth; it magnified one aspect of 
human nature, but it did not transform human nature entirely: "Still 
however [the legislator] feels a tacit disapprobation of the laws, which he 
has enacted; and even, when injured, [he] hesitates to bring the offender 
to justice. He knows that the punishment is disproportionate to the 
offense. "99 Nor did it blind the propertied to reality: "[O]r at least, if 
humanity be obliterated by interest, [the legislator] foresees, that the 
punishment cannot be inflicted, without raising the indignation of society 
against the accuser." The result, then, follows Beccaria's diagnosis 
closely: 
The delinquent therefore is discharged without prosecution; he repeats 
the crime under the expectation of repeated mercy .... It is a property 
inseparable from harsh laws, that they are neither regular, nor expedi-
tious in their execution; consequently, that they flatter the hope of 
impunity, and, equally injurious to the society and the criminal, tend to 
the fatal multiplication both of crimes and of punishments.too 
Eden argued that the existing system of criminal law emerged fortui-
tously, for the anger that generated new capital legislation gave way to the 
natural instincts of compassion when it came time to apply the law to 
96. Idem. Blackstone was at his most internally inconsistent on this issue. After asserting 
that a defense of necessity would be unmanageable and dangerous, Blackstone stated: "In 
this country especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in admitting so dubious an 
excuse: for by our laws suth sufficient provision is made for the poor by the power of the 
civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced to 
the necessity of thieving to support nature." Subsequently, he pointed to the power of 
pardon, which he suggested gave relief in rare instances. 
97. William Eden, Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771). 
98. Ibid., p. 266. 
99. Ibid., pp. 266-67. 
100. Ibid., p. 267. 
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individual suspects. As a result, the system of penology actually en-
couraged criminal behavior. There are hints of this in Blackstone, but 
Eden made the point with force. Thereafter, virtually all reform writers 
charged that mitigation, though preferable to mass executions, was partly 
responsible for the crisis in criminal law. 
The role of the jury as a mitigator of the law raised a number of 
problems, and the more Eden pursued them the more he shifted his 
attention from the question of deterrence to other considerations of 
justice. First, he criticized the practice of basing capital felony on the 
monetary value of stolen goods. Since money was "in its nature ... of 
fluctuating value," to base punishment ofthe offender on such value is to 
make "adjudication of the law ... vague and uncertain. " 101 Turning to 
the jury's role, Eden observed that "the impulses of benevolence are 
opposed to the obligations of religion": jurors were "taught to trifle with 
their oaths, and to call such trifling 'a kind of pious peljury."' 
In fact, upon trials oflarcenies so limited, it is commonly found to be 
the chief anxiety both of judges and of jurors, to reduce the crime 
below its real predicament, by reducing the conviction below the value 
affixed by law. Such an anxiety is the natural consequences of laws, 
which, by an absurd distinction, make a trivial difference between two 
sums the criterion of capital crime.wz 
Unlike Blackstone, who placed the emphasis on "pious" rather than on 
''perjury,'' Eden criticized the practice of mitigation for the confusion it 
produced in the minds of the mitigators. He, too, was concerned with a 
kind of incoherence, but not so much a legal or political as a moral 
incoherence. 
Trifling with laws and lives: the business of sorting out those who 
deserved to hang from those who did not appeared very different to Eden 
than it did to many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, Eden took a 
liberal view of jury fact-finding in some kinds of cases. He defended the 
jury's 
indisputable, unquestionable right to acquit the person accused, if, in 
their private opinions, they disbelieve the accusers; or if in their 
consciences, they think, however erroneously, that the fact partakes 
not of that degree, or species of criminality, with which it is charged in 
the indictment.103 
The first instance mentioned-if the jurors "disbelieve the accusers "-is 
in line with all contemporary analysis and comes as no surprise. The 
101. Ibid., p. 268. 
102. Ibid., pp. 268-69. 
103. Ibid., p. 153. 
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second basis for acquittal is of greater interest. Eden's formulation is 
ambiguous. He might have meant: if the jurors find that the fact required 
by law was not committed; if so he stated no more than a commonplace. 
But more likely he meant: if the jurors decide that the fact the law 
considers criminal is not really criminal, for, he continued, jury trial is a 
nullity unless jurors may determine ''the criminality or innocence of the 
intention, the legality or illegality of the fact. " 104 
Eden was aware that the jury's power to go outside judicial instructions 
had long been the subject of debate, especially in the context of cases 
wherein the government had a political interest. He cited the relevant 
passages in Blackstone, Hale, and Foster, and concluded: "When wise 
and good men differ upon points of great constitutional importance,'' 
humbler folk like himself should await the outcome. But, he added 
(bringing the discussion back to his own central concern), it was 
a certain truth, that the political liberty of every individual bears a 
proportion to the security given by the laws to the innocency of his 
conduct; which security decreases, in proportion to the multiplication 
of penalties, the uncertainty of penal laws, and the irregularity of 
trials. 105 
Thus Eden remained ambiguous regarding the limits of fact-finding. He 
attempted to treat jury law-finding as appropriate only in exceptional 
cases and to minimize the conflict between traditional English jury 
law-finding theory and the overriding principles of the new penology. 
Certainty, he believed, was not only crucial to deterrence but was 
indispensable for justice. All members of society had a right to know what 
was criminal and to what degree it was so. To announce that certain 
crimes were capital but then to punish various commissions of them at 
different levels was to invite injustice. No one would be certain before-
hand what his punishment would be; arbitrary decisions would abound. 
Eden apparently believed that reform of the penal laws would so reduce 
the need for jury mitigation that one might approve of occasional 
instances of jury-based intervention without endorsing principles that 
interfered with human liberty. Eden thus bridged Beccaria and 
Blackstone in a particularly effective way. And it would be to his 
Principles of the Criminal Law perhaps more than to the Commentaries 
that early nineteenth-century reformers would look for guidance. 106 
Nearly forgotten, on the other hand, was Henry Dagge, whose Con-
siderations on Criminal Law was published in 1772, one year after Eden's 
104. Ibid., p. 154. 
105. Ibid., p. 158. 
106. See below, Chapter 9, section I. 
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work and three after Blackstone's.J07 Reflecting the growing concern over 
the political role of juries, Dagge's book does not directly confront the 
problem of jury mitigation in common-run felonies. But Dagge was not 
unaware of the issue: he began by lauding Eden, who dwelled upon it, and 
he supported Eden's reform ideas. His main contribution was his strong 
support for the establishment of penal institutions that would inculcate 
moral virtues. 1os Dagge repeated Eden's-and through Eden, 
Beccaria's-argument that men will shrink from enforcing a strict law and 
that the end result will be an increase in crime and criminals. Legislators, 
he asserted, ought not to forget that "criminals are their 
fellow-creatures," the products of social inequality and degradation. 1o9 
Laws ought to be aimed at improving man's lot, and so improving man, 
not at doing away with men led astray. But this social determinism theme, 
which had surfaced in Fielding's Proposal, remained largely buried in 
Dagge's work. Like Blackstone, Dagge entertained a vision of human 
behavior that differed perhaps from earlier more strictly moral ap-
proaches, but in the end he resisted the ideas that a later, more scientific 
age could not. Others, like Dawes, were to develop them further in the 
next few decades. For Dagge it was an important but subordinate 
argument: one ought to encourage compassion for the offender, who was 
often the product of his environment, and take account of that fact in the 
criminal law. 
Dagge' s work reveals the dilemma implicit in the work of other reform 
writers. Dagge did not criticize jury mitigation in common-run felonies, 
but his endorsement of Eden suggests that he saw the dangers in such 
practices. At the same time the thrust of Dagge's section on juries was a 
forceful statement favoring substantial jury law-finding powers. 11o 
Blackstone and Eden had recognized the virtues of the jury's power to 
nullify political prosecutions should there be a return to tyranny. Dagge 
made the point with far greater emphasis, drawing upon the history of 
civil society and English legal institutions to establish the advantages of 
the judgment of a jury of twelve common men over that of one man of the 
robe.lll For him, the threat of intentional or unintentional judicial 
misreading of the law was the overriding concern: juries, he argued, must 
supply constant vigilance. As the seditious libel controversy heightened, 
the problems of jury mitigation, law reform, and the constitutional and 
legal balance of powers drew closer together. Dagge perhaps saw the 
107. Henry Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law (London, 1772). 
108. Ibid., p. xix. 
109. Ibid., p. xxvi. 
110. Ibid., pp. 123-36. 
lll. See below, Chapter 8, text at nn. 72-74. 
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larger constitutional issues more clearly than Blackstone or Eden, but he 
failed to explain how the jury would play a more modest role in one area 
while remaining the dominant constitutional safeguard in the other. 
Dagge's concern with the social origins of criminal behavior reflected 
an insight that virtually all reformers shared. 112 At some level, the view 
that social conditions bred or at least encouraged criminal behavior was 
commonplace in the eighteenth century. Not a few of the petitions for 
pardons stressed the conditions that led the convict astray; if these 
notions were current among the secular and religious officials who drafted 
the petitions, they were no doubt current among those who, in their role 
as jurors, mitigated the severity of the law. Then as now, nearly all who 
held such views also believed that men freely willed their own actions. By 
and large the reformers shared this dualistic view of human behavior.m 
Manasseh Dawes was among the more single-minded and eloquent of 
the deterministic reformers. In An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, 
published in 1782, Dawes castigated lawyers for their failure to under-
stand the most basic principles of human behavior and heaped scorn upon 
the prevailing concepts of punishment.ll4 Lawyers, wrote Dawes, "talk 
of the necessity of punishment, while they know little of the cause of 
those actions for which they would have it inflicted." "Criminals do not 
offend so much from choice, as from misery and want of sentiment." 115 
Dawes adhered to "the principles of philosophical necessity," according 
to which: 
[A]ll actions are effects of some cause in the mind; and man being free, 
he has a self-determining power governed by consideration and judg-
ment, which precede his volition, and direct it; all actions necessarily 
follow their causes, or volitions; and as they cannot be otherwise than 
they are, when committed, it ought to be, and is the duty of society to 
form the minds of individuals, so that they may detest what is 
constituted bad by law.II6 
112. E.g. Fielding, A Proposal, pp. 71-72. See also Jonas Hanway, Distributive Justice 
and Mercy (London, 1781), p. xii. Hanway favored true reform of convicts and thought that 
merciful acquittals were not helpful in this regard. He preferred reform of the law of 
sanctions and prison reform. 
113. See Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial 
Revolution, 1750-1850 (New York, 1978), pp. 71-76. For further discussion of this matter 
see below, Chapter 9, section III. 
114. Manasseh Dawes, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1782). 
115. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
116. Ibid., p. 40. See also ibid., p. 155. "[The] principle of philosophical necessity ... 
admits, that although the actions of men, when committed, cannot be otherwise than they 
are, yet ... their future may.'' A possible effect of a certain act may be to punish the actor; 
this, in turn, may deter others who would otherwise have committed the same act. 
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Dawes contrasted the theory of "philosophical necessity" to "fatalism or 
predestination, which supposes all things come to pass in spite of 
man.'' 117 Man possesses a will, and his actions flow from that will, though 
that will is shaped by forces (ultimately by God) external to man. 
Although Dawes's theory of human freedom was murky, 11 8 his analysis of 
the cause of criminal behavior was clear enough: 
[C]riminals suffer eventually for the inevitable effects of certain causes 
which influence their moral conduct: let a gang of thieves, for example, 
teach an ignorant boy, that by certain methods of breaking a house, or 
personal robberies, he will succeed in his end, and be undiscovered, 
and he will listen to the instruction, and turn thief, in the hope of 
escaping detection, not being convicted if taken or tried; the mitigation 
of his sentence, the death of his prosecutor, a flaw in his indictment, or 
a pardon: the crime to him appears harmless; his study is to avoid the 
laws, which with him is the only iniquity .119 
Dawes's program of reform involved moral instruction. But by implica-
tion it also countenanced reform of the administration ofthe criminal law. 
Although mercy was an appropriate response owing to the ultimate 
blamelessness of criminal offenders, it was also one of the conditions that 
engendered criminal behavior. In his own way, Dawes associated himself 
with the critique of the administration of criminal law that Blackstone, 
Eden, and Dagge set forth and that derived, ultimately, from the reception 
of Beccaria's work. And like the English writers who preceded him, 
Dawes argued that, pending reform either of human nature or of the law 
of sanctions, mercy-whatever its contributory costs-was appropriate. 
117. Idem. 
118. Dawes seems to have adopted a view of free will similar to that defended by 
Jonathan Edwards thirty years before in A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern 
Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral 
Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame (Boston, 1754). But 
Dawes at times took a more sombre view: "[I]s it not a hardship to inflict a punishment for 
what must and will happen? or is it a justifiable effect of our living in society, that some of 
us should be cut off from it, because we cannot be otherwise than we are?" In his earlier 
work, Philosophical Considerations (London, 1780), Dawes asserted that "nature punishes 
us ... by conferring the power of punishment upon us, at the moment of our creation, in the 
faculty of reflection. Thus man may be a free agent respecting himself, but not so in respect 
to the great author of nature .... If [man is] ignorant and bad, the cause may be traced in 
the faults of his education, productive of moral actions, injurious to himself and others. The 
future actions of one moral agent, may be made wise and virtuous, from an abhorrence of 
the perils attendant on the past actions of another." Thus the purpose and virtues of 
punishment (pp. 38-39). And again, in his An Essay on Intellectual Liberty (London, 1780), 
Dawes spoke of "the sacrifice of moral criminals, who became victims to laws for the 
welfare of society" (p. 10). 
119. Dawes, Essay on Crimes and Punishments, p. 42. 
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Men of sense will compassionate all human and social offenders, 
lament their offences, and sigh over the unhappy cause ofthem;-they 
will look upon the wretched prisoner, perhaps half naked and starved, 
amputated or maimed, ill educated or destitute of taste, and grieve over 
his condition; regretting some hidden defect in the criminal constitution 
or civil government, and reluctantly give him up to a punishment, 
which vagrant liberty had prepared him for, against the inmost desire 
of his heart; they will not be contented that he has offended, but they 
will examine why; and tracing the cause, be disposed to forgive an 
effect, which it was impossible to avoid; and thus feeling the force and 
power of the mind, they will sparingly punish the man for what the 
mind only was deficient in producing. 12o 
Unlike his predecessors, however, Dawes did not dwell on the question of 
which institution was the most appropriate mitigator. More philosopher 
than lawyer, Dawes commented on human nature and the responses to it 
of ''men of sense,'' be they prosecutors, grand jurors, trial jurors, judges, 
or monarchs. His readers cannot have doubted that jurors, like the others 
who possessed the power to dispense mercy, were not only part of the 
problem but for the time being part of its solution. 
William Paley's famous defense of the English system of criminal 
justice was no more supportive of jury-based mitigation than were the 
reformers' tracts. 12 1 Indeed, the jury was virtually the only aspect of the 
status quo that Paley criticized. Paley argued in favor of both capital 
statutes and very selective enforcement, but he believed that enforcement 
ought to be exclusively in the Crown. 122 Like Blackstone, Paley saw the 
dangers of dispersed powers of mitigation. The two differed on the reform 
issue: for Blackstone, the need for mercy ought to be reduced to a 
minimum; for Paley, the need for mercy was an important aspect of a just 
and rational criminal law. 
Paley praised the English system as one that "assigns capital punish-
ment to many kinds of offenses, but inflicts it only upon a few examples 
of each kind. " 123 He rejected, however, the view of Eden that this system 
of penology was unpremeditated. The laws, Paley believed, were de-
signed to be enforced selectively; the ends of deterrence and rational 
decision making dictated the form of penology that actually prevailed. 
120. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
121. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). The substance of this 
work was drawn from lectures given at Cambridge at least as early as 1770. Paley may have 
been responding in part to Beccaria and Blackstone. See Radzinowicz, History of English 
Criminal Law, 1:248, n. 63. Beattie (Crime and the Courts, ch. 12) argues persuasively that 
Paley's work represents a response to the critics of the late 1760s and early 1770s rather than 
a response to the post-American Revolution crime wave of the mid-1780s. 
122. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 535. 
123. Ibid., p. 531. 
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The pardoning system saved nine of every ten who had been convicted. 
This was as it should be, for 
the selection of proper objects for capital punishment principally 
depends upon circumstances, which, however easy to perceive in each 
particular case, after the crime is committed, it is impossible to 
enumerate or define beforehand.J24 
Paley challenged every claim of the new penology. He agreed that English 
law "sweeps into the net every crime," and that, of those swept in, "a 
small proportion of each class are singled out." The law makes "exam-
ples," he said: "By this expedient few actually suffer death, whilst the 
dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of many. " 125 Everything that 
Beccaria and his followers asserted was wrong with the English system 
Paley asserted was right. Everything, that is, save for jury discretion. 
Juries, Paley asserted, were too cautious, gave too many too much 
benefit of the doubt: 
I apprehend much harm to have been done to the community, by the 
over-strained scrupulousness, or weak timidity of juries, which de-
mands often such proof of a prisoner's guilt as the nature and secrecy 
of his crime scarce possibly admit of; and which holds it part of a safe 
conscience not to condemn any man, whilst there exists the minutest 
possibility of his innocence. Any story they may happen to have heard 
or read ... is enough, in their minds, to found an acquittal upon .... 
[T]o reject such proof, from an insinuation of uncertainty that belongs 
to all human affairs ... counteracts the case, and damps the activity of 
government: it holds out public encouragement to villany, by confess-
ing the impossibility of bringing villains to justice; and that species of 
encouragement, which, as has been just now observed, the minds of 
such men are most apt to entertain and dwell upon. 126 
Paley understated the degree to which jurors were actually motivated by 
the character of the defendant or the nature of his act. In fact, jurors took 
into account the very considerations that Paley thought the Crown ought 
to take into account. Paley's real complaint was that jury-based mitigation 
resulted from consideration at the verdict stage of matters relevant to the 
question of the appropriate sentence. The jury, he believed, created the 
problem of inconsistent treatment of offenders: not only assessment of 
guilt but also degree of punishment depended in each case on the 
sympathies and inclinations of a new jury. 
124. Ibid., p. 532. 
125. Ibid., p. 533. 
126. Ibid., pp. 550-51. 
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Paley, however, agreed with the reformers on the end of punishment-
the prevention of crime. Indeed, he considered himself a reformer who 
sought to make a good system work even more efficiently. Paley's stress 
on prevention led him to conclude that severity of punishment ought to be 
determined by difficulty of discovery and conviction, not by elusive 
notions of the defendant's guilt. Crimes that were common, hard to 
prevent, and equally difficult to prosecute ought to be very severely 
punished-that the offender had taken a small amount surreptitiously, 
rather than openly robbed his victim of a large sum, suggested he ought to 
be punished more, not less, severely. Paley left questions of conscience 
and guilt to God's judgment: man lacked the omniscience required to see 
into the defendant's mind. 127 Small wonder that Paley had little patience 
with jury discretion and instead took great pains to found his discretion-
ary system on a regularized, formal, and consistent procedure of Crown-
based mitigation. 
If Paley shared with the anti-discretion reformers reservations about 
the jury in common-run felony cases, he also shared with them strong 
approbation of the jury's ultimate constitutional independence. Like 
Dagge, Paley viewed the judge and jury as checks upon one another; the 
judge instructs the jury, but the jury applies law to fact according to its 
understanding. 
In proportion to the acknowledged excellency of this mode of trial, 
every deviation from it ought to be watched with vigilance, and 
adopted by the legislature with caution. Summary convictions before 
justices of the peace, especially for offenses against the game laws; 
courts of conscience; extending the jurisdiction of courts of equity; 
urging too far the distinction between questions of law and questions of 
fact, are all so many infringements upon this great charter of public 
safety. 128 
Paley appears to have seen the contradictions inherent in the different 
roles that he thought the jury ought to be called upon to play. He may 
even have understood that a jury with secured powers of nullification of 
tyrannous laws was a jury that could not be controlled easily in common-
run cases. There were, however, some risks he believed worth running, 
for in his view definitions of institutional roles could never be precise in 
a just political system. 
The second major defense of the English law of crimes was embodied 
in Martin Madan's Thoughts on Executive Justice, a tract that reflected 
concern with the increase of crime in the mid-1780s and impatience with 
127. Ibid., pp. 527-31. 
128. Ibid., pp. 504-5. 
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the penal reform writers of the preceding decade. 129 Madan openly 
criticized the ethic of merciful verdicts, judgments, and sentences, and 
exhorted judges and juries to apply the law as it stood. It was "fashion-
able with many, to find great fault with the number or severity of'' the 
criminal laws; for his part, however, he deemed that the country had been 
served well by them: 
I may say, that the legislature has from time to time been assiduous in 
meeting crimes, as they have arisen, with wholesome laws; but those, 
whose duty and office it is to administer the laws, have now, for many 
years, been preferring their own feelings as men, to the duty which 
they owe the public as magistrates. J3o 
Madan likened judicial reprieves to the hated and abandoned suspending 
power exercised by the later Stuarts. The pardon power was in the Crown 
and was intended to be used judiciously, not wantonly. There were cases 
wherein the bench could reprieve: where it thought the jury was mali-
cious, or the evidence insufficient, or where postconviction testimony 
warranted a reversal.131 In most cases, however, the judge should invoke, 
not vitiate, the rigors of the law. 
Madan's famous description ofthejudge doing his awesome duty bears 
repeating: 
[The judge] then, in the most pathetic terms, exhorts the unhappy 
convicts, to consider well how best to employ the little space that yet 
remains between that moment and the grave-he acquaints them with 
the certainty of speedy death, and consequently with the necessity of 
speedy repentance-and on this theme he may so deliver himself, as 
not only to melt the wretches at the bar into contrition, but the whole 
auditory into the deepest concern. Tears express their feelings-and 
many of the most thoughtless among them may, for the rest of their 
lives, be preserved from thinking lightly of the first steps to vice .... 
The dreadful sentence is now pronounced-every heart shakes with 
terror. The almost fainting criminals are taken from the bar-the crowd 
retires-each to his several home ... the day of execution arrives-the 
wretches are led forth to suffer, and exhibit a spectacle ... the whole 
country feels a lasting benefit. 132 
129. Martin Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice (2nd ed., London, 1785; orig. 
published 1784). Madan's work was published a year before Paley's, but Paley's was 
probably conceived substantially earlier than it was published. See above, n. 121. For a 
pathbreaking analysis of the relationship between the reform tradition and the fluctuations 
in real (and perceived) rates of crime, 1750-1800, see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs. 
11-12. 
130. Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice, p. 13. 
131. Ibid., p. 48. 
132. Ibid., pp. 28-30. For a remarkable insight into the "day of execution" and some 
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Equally imposing is Madan's description of what typically happens at 
trial, and how in his view the ends of justice are frustrated by misplaced 
sentiment: 
But perhaps [the defendant] happens to be young-it appears to be his 
first offense-he has, before the fact which is proved against him, had 
a good character-he was drawn in by others-was in liquor-or some 
other circumstances of the like kind strikes the minds of the jury; they 
forget their oath ... and take upon themselves to acquit the prisoner, 
against all fact and truth. This I have so often seen, that I cannot 
forbear the mention of it. The judge, on this occasion, usually takes 
little further notice of the matter, than to congratulate the prisoner on 
his "narrow escape" and to tell him that "he has had a very merciful 
jury. ''133 
Such juries, Madan concluded, found "according to their feelings, but 
against their oath. " 134 And if they could falsely acquit they might also 
falsely convict-Madan did not repeat at this point that the bench might 
in the latter case reprieve the defendant and recommend that he receive 
a royal pardon. 
Madan was not entirely opposed to reform of the law. He recognized 
that laws that were too severe-i.e., undermined the principle of deter-
rence-required revision. 135 The problem, of course, was to design an 
appropriate test of enforceability. Madan refused to accept the practices 
current among bench and jurors in his own day as the proper test. He 
sought instead to convince those who served in these institutions of their 
duty, but "duty" was an ambiguous concept. At what point did unwilling-
ness to convict of a capital offense or carry out the sentence not conflict 
with duty? Why were not all statutes that were seldom enforced ipso facto 
in need of reform? Madan sought to avoid this problem by vesting mercy 
in the Crown. Judge and jury, he believed, were too close to the 
condemned, whose pitiful condition overwhelmed the imagination and 
left no room for the rational administration of justice. The novelty and 
power of Madan's approach lay in its royalism and its indifference to the 
balance of power between judge and jury, either in common-run or in 
political cases. Having disregarded the need for safeguards against a 
tyrannical bench, Madan was virtually the only writer of his time who did 
not advert to the dilemma posed by the jury's duty to preserve the 
fundamental liberties. 
aspects of the "lasting benefit" that it confers see Peter Linebaugh, "The Ordinary of 
Newgate and His Account," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 246-69. 
133. Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice, pp. 137-38. 
134. Ibid., p. 138. 
135. Ibid., pp. 132-33. 
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Madan's tract provoked Samuel Romilly to write his first work on 
reform of sanctions, Observations on ... Thoughts on Executive Justice, 
a tract that brought the reformist position back into clear focus. 136 
According to Romilly, Madan's theory failed on a number of grounds, 
beginning with its avoidance of reality: prevention of crime could not 
"possibly be attained by the mere terror of punishment"; 137 more 
executions would lead to fewer convictions. One might call for enforce-
ment, but it could not be had, "for jurors would easily quiet their 
consciences upon a perjury which was the means of preventing mur-
der." 138 Moreover, Madan's assumption that the legislature intended 
fuller enforcement was unproven and intuitively wrong: 
And indeed it is hardly possible to doubt, that the parliament had the 
clemency of the crown in its contemplation, when it passed all those 
modern statutes, by which new felonies are created; for that the 
legislators of an enlightened age, and of a nation boastful of its 
humanity, should punish the slightest offences with death, is not to be 
accounted for, but upon the supposition, that those punishments are 
only held out as a terror, and never intended to be inflicted but in the 
most aggravated cases.J39 
Romilly was far from an admirer of this legislative policy, which perhaps 
thanks to Paley's defense of existing penology140 he saw more clearly than 
had Blackstone or Eden. The law, he said, was supposed to be reasonable 
in order that it could be known. Clearly those most likely to commit 
offenses were among those least likely to know the laws for which they 
might lose their lives. Unless law accorded with justice and morality, one 
could not hold all men to know it: "[N]o authority, however great, will 
136. Observations on a Late Publication [by Martin Madan], intituled Thoughts on 
Executive Justice [by Sir Samuel Romilly, but published anonymously] (London, 1786). 
Romilly stated in his memoirs that Lord Lansdowne, who was among those "dazzled" by 
Madan's book, recommended that he "write something on the same subject. This, of 
course, induced me to look into the book; but I was so much shocked by the folly and 
inhumanity of it, that instead of enforcing the same arguments, I sat down to refute them." 
Lansdowne, Romilly stated, "highly approved" the result, but the tract "had so little 
success with the public, that not more than a hundred copies were sold." Sir Samuel 
Romilly, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romil/y, 3 vols. (London, 1840), vol. I, pp. 
89-90. 
137. Ibid., p. 2. 
138. Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
139. Ibid., p. 82. See also Romilly, Memoirs, 1:370. Romilly asserted, in a letter toM. 
Dumont, that the Riot Act "was certainly never meant to be executed against all who should 
expose themselves to it; the only object was to hold out a terror; although it ought to have 
been foreseen that the circumstance of the law not being executed would prevent its 
inspiring terror." (Oct. 23, 1789). 
140. Observations on a Late Publication, pp. 73-78. 
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ever be able to persuade mankind, that penal laws ought to constitute a 
science merely of memory, and not of reason.'' 141 Thus Romilly bitterly 
attacked Madan's attempt to dress his theory of enforcement in the garb 
of certainty to which Beccaria and his English adherents had appealed.142 
Romilly suggested that tpe rich, or society at large, bore some respon-
sibility for the crimes of the poor. Perhaps punishment ought to fall on the 
better endowed in society; they, after all, were the "natural fathers and 
guardians" of the poor.143 Not surprisingly, then, Romilly's condemna-
tion of the law of sanctions was coupled with a plea for an expanded and 
enlightened use of incarceration to reform criminal offenders. He noted 
that Blackstone and Eden had drafted a ''plan for the punishment of 
criminals" that was "wholly unobjectionable," characterizing it as "a 
kind of asylum to that very large description of offenders, who are 
rendered such by the defects of education, by pernicious connections, by 
indigence, or by despair. " 144 Romilly also carried forward Fielding's 
utilitarian argument for such an institution: 
[W]hat it is that retards the execution of this excellent plan, it is not 
easy to conjecture; for, though the expense of erecting the penitentiary 
houses would be considerable, yet that is surely but a trifling object, 
compared with the benefit which, as it should seem, must necessarily 
result to the country from such an institution. And according to the 
calculations which have been made upon the subject, when the houses 
were once erected, the annual expense of maintaining them would be 
more than defrayed by the earnings of the convicts. 145 
Although it left little of Madan's tract unscathed, Romilly's argument 
held little support for the tradition of merciful jury verdicts. Such verdicts 
were inevitable, Romilly conceded, so long as the law of sanctions 
remained unreformed.146 But with reform, jury mitigation would be 
largely unnecessary and generally unwise. Conviction would lead to a 
form of punishment that was both rational and humane. That was, 
141. Ibid., p. 38. 
142. Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
143. Ibid., p. 95. 
144. Ibid .• pp. 59-60. 
145. Ibid., p. 61. 
146. Ibid., p. 90. Romilly's remarks were addressed to Madan's argument concerning full 
execution of the law. That, said Romilly, would lead juries to "take upon themselves to 
judge the policy and justice of the law." It would multiply the "evils which [Madan] so well 
discusses." I infer from this that Romilly agreed with Madan that, under existing circum-
stances, judges and juries mitigated the law. Romilly sought the opposite remedy from that 
for which Madan campaigned, and it seems a fair inference that Romilly believed jury 
mitigation was inevitable and just until reform came about. He characterized such mitigation 
as "peJjury which was the means of preventing murder" (idem). 
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however, the argument of the future. For the time being the problem of 
the jury's role as a constitutional safeguard remained to be worked out. A 
systematic solution to the problem of the jury in common-run felonies 
might have received the attention it deserved had the problem of such 
cases not been entangled with the larger constitutional crises in which, 
even in the eyes of its severest critics, the jury also played an important 
and controversial role. This is clear in the writings of Romilly who, two 
years before publication of the critique of Madan, had himself contributed 
to the debate over seditious libel: 
Rigid, however, and I will add, tyrannical, as the law of libels is, 
nothing is to be dreaded from it while it is administered by the paternal 
hand of juries, who though they will never suffer it to be relaxed to the 
encourage111ent of defamation and licentiousness, will refrain and 
temper its harshness by their discretion and humanity .1 47 
IV 
We are still far from understanding how the criminal trial jury operated 
in the eighteenth century. The process by which juries reached agree-
ment, the degree to which jurors followed the lead of the bench, and the 
extent to which jurors actually believed they were acting autonomously, 
all remain beyond our ken. But the history of jury trial is in part the 
history of contemporaries' perceptions of the institution. We do know 
that many learned contemporaries believed that the jury was a powerful 
and at least semi-autonomous institution of mitigation. And more signifi-
cantly, we can reasonably infer that most laymen believed that jury-based 
mitigation was a legitimate part of the administration of the criminal law. 
Authorities themselves seem to have encouraged this view of the jury. 
Even those jurists and lay publicists who questioned the wisdom of 
existing jury practices endorsed those practices so long as the prevailing 
law of sanctions remained intact. It remains, by way of conclusion, to 
reconsider how this view of the jury had come to be accepted and 
assimilated in a fashion that made it resistant to change. 
From one perspective, the administration of the English criminal law, 
of which the jury was but one element, appears to have been a calculated 
and manipulated expression of the authority of what might be called the 
ruling classes. 148 This view helps one to understand what has seemed a 
147. Sir Samuel Romilly, A Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries 
upon Trials for Libels (London, 1784), p. 3. Romilly comments upon the tract in his 
Memoirs, 1:86-87. I have used the copy of Fragment that is in Houghton Library, Harvard 
University. 
148. See Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law." Hay does not argue that the 
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paradox in the criminal law of the eighteenth century: the multiplication 
of capital statutes alongside their fairly general nonenforcement. The 
argument holds that these statutes expressed the interests of the proper-
tied classes and provided them with tools for protection of those interests. 
But it also recognizes the political and social difficulties that would have 
ensued from strict enforcement of the statutes and argues that the ruling 
elites had more to gain from only selective enforcement. These groups 
administered a program that combined terror with mercy. N onenforce-
ment was thus made to seem an aspect of justice and majesty, and it 
therefore also created a debt: England's rulers continued to reap a harvest 
of deference from those they ruled. In those cases in which the law was 
applied to the fullest, the thesis runs, there was attention to justification: 
enforcement was characterized by "circumspection" and "delicacy." 149 
How accurate a view of the administration of the criminal law does this 
perspective afford? Certainly some contemporaries analyzed the admin-
istration of the law in these terms; 15° for them this selective-enforcement 
theme became a rationalization for maintaining the status quo in the face 
of growing pressures for legal, and especially penal, reform. But their 
perspective was limited by their own social position; they perhaps failed 
to appreciate fully the point of view of those below them. No doubt the 
administration of the criminal law, and especially the practice of selective 
enforcement, emphasized the majesty of the law and engendered defer-
ence toward those who administered it. But these were incidents of a 
system that involved far more complex processes than solely the machi-
nation of a ruling class or classes. 
As we have seen, the selective enforcement of the law of felony 
resulted from the circumstances of the origins of that law. The Crown had 
always had to struggle to make its legal mandate effective. It had 
frequently complained about nonenforcement, announcing its own weak-
ness while pleading for obedience. lSI At the same time, English rulers had 
attempted to convert this weakness into strength through the use of 
pardons, benefit of clergy, and the pragmatic acceptance and even 
encouragement of merciful jury verdicts. If these devices underscored the 
beneficence and majesty of the law, they did not conceal from contem-
law was devised with these ends in mind or that all aspects of law enforcement were 
designed to take advantage of the class power inherent in the law. He is mainly concerned 
with the reasons for the reluctance of some of the ruling groups to reform the law. 
149. Idem. 
150. E.g. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, above, nn. 103 et seq. and 
accompanying text. See also above, n. 32 and contemporary writings cited therein. Some 
observers (e.g. Fielding) opposed pardons but favored the use of executions to strike terror. 
They were not clearly endorsing selective enforcement. 
151. See above, Chapter 3. 
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poraries the fact that literal enforcement of capital felony laws lay beyond 
the power of the Crown. In practice, enforcement was a matter of an 
accommodation in which, at one stage or another, many parties played 
important roles .152 
If some property owners failed to prosecute their thieving tenants in 
hopes of strengthening the bonds of affection that flowed upward, others 
looked the other way knowing that prosecution, if it succeeded, would 
destroy those bonds and increase the numbers of the unemployed and of 
professional thieves.t 53 Still others may have doubted the success of 
prosecution altogether, for even propertied jurors could not be counted 
on to hang, or even to punish with severity, perpetrators of relatively 
minor offenses. We cannot be certain that grand juries would have 
followed the lead of prosecutors had capital punishment been resorted to 
with substantially greater frequency. For one thing, the testimony of 
witnesses might have been far harder to come by. Indeed, those sus-
pected and captured in the first place were only a fraction of the total 
number who had broken a capital law, and that fraction might have been 
smaller still in a world of strict enforcement against all those taken and 
indicted. 154 
Mainly, of course, it was a matter of jury behavior that the Crown and 
bench had to accommodate. We have considered the circumstances that 
152. This theme runs through much of the recent literature on the social history of the 
English criminal law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I have elsewhere 
suggested the importance of this approach to law enforcement-one often manifested in 
practices regarding enforcement at the county or more local level-for jury behavior (and 
officials' reactions toward that behavior) at the assizes. See my review of Cockburn, ed., 
Crime in England, in American Journal of Legal History, vol. 23 (1979), pp. 357-62. For 
relevant studies of criminal law enforcement see e.g. Samaha, "Hanging for Felony"; 
Herrup, "Common Peace"; J. A. Sharpe, "Crime and Delinquency in an Essex Parish 
1600--1640," in Cockburn, ed., Crime in England, pp. 90--109; M. J. Ingram, "Communities 
and Courts: Law and Disorder in Early-Seventeenth-Century Wiltshire," in ibid., pp. 
110--34; Keith Wrightson, "Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables, and Jurymen in 
Seventeenth-Century England," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People, pp. 
21-46; T. C. Curtis, "Quarter Sessions Appearances and their Background: A Seventeenth-
Century Regional Study," in ibid., pp. 135-54; P. B. Munsche, "The Game Laws in 
Wiltshire 1750--1800," in ibid., pp. 210--28; Cal Winslow, "Sussex Smugglers," in Hay et al., 
eds,, Albion's Fatal Tree, pp. 119-66; John G. Rule, "Wrecking and Coastal Plunder," in 
ibid., pp. 167-88; Douglas Hay, "Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock Chase," in 
ibid., pp. 189-253; Thompson, Whigs and Hunters; Timothy Curtis, "Explaining Crime in 
Early Modern England," in Criminal Justice History, vol. 1 (1980), pp. 117-37; Lenman and 
Parker, "The State, the Community and the Criminal Law in Early Modern Europe," in 
Gatrell et al., eds., Crime and the Law, pp. 11-48; Sharpe, "Enforcing the Law in the 
Seventeenth-Century English Village," in ibid., pp. 97-119. 
153. See Munsche, "The Game Laws in Wiltshire," pp. 222-23. 
154. See generally Beattie, Crime and the Courts. Beattie's findings contain at least 
implicit support for the overall argument I am making. 
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made accommodation-with both loss of face and enhanced majesty-
more attractive than literal enforcement through coercion of juries. There 
had always been a significant number of false accusations. Before the 
sixteenth century, authorities lacked the means to separate these from the 
cases involving trumped up verdicts. As the means of monitoring jury 
behavior developed, the bench employed its powers-usually, if not 
always, with success-to ensure the outcome of what it considered 
egregious cases. But pressures of time, the development of an enforce-
able, yet relatively severe lesser sanction (transportation), and the 
by-then powerful social expectations regarding both the role of the jury 
and the appropriate use of the gallows dissuaded legal officials from 
inducing capital verdicts much more often than they had in the past. 
Although by the eighteenth century the increase in property crimes and 
the sense of insecurity felt by the urban rich and rural propertied may 
have contributed to passage of legislation making more offenses capital, 
or making common-law mandates more explicit, there is little reason to 
believe that legislators imagined they were any more capable than their 
predecessors of strictly enforcing the law. 
More than any other institution within the administration of criminal 
law, the trial jury reflected the limits of the power that authorities could 
bring to bear on those they ruled. Some juries could be effectively 
manipulated, or depended upon to deal harshly with property violations, 
but most jurors in most cases could be relied upon only insofar as 
authorities expected them to apply the law strictly in the cases that most 
of society itself thought especially serious. Authorities might derive 
benefit (in the form of respect for the law as well as outright deference) 
from jury-based intervention, perhaps the most prevalent form of selec-
tive enforcement, but the standards governing that process of selection 
were not theirs to set at will. 
The choices were obvious. Law could be administered in summary 
fashion by a magistrate or according to the traditional mode of trial by 
judge and jury. Although Parliament increased the scope of offenses 
summarily triable by justices of the peace sitting without a jury, 155 jury 
trial was maintained in all felonies, as much for widely shared notions of 
justice as for narrowly conceived reasons of politics. Of those brought to 
trial only some-by virtue of background, reputation, attitude toward 
authority, or the nature of the offense itself-deserved to die. That 
decision did not have to be made-and perhaps ought not to be made-
unilaterally by a judge. The judge might steer the process when it reached 
the trial stage, leading the jurors, who, given the standards the bench 
155. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 59; Baker, "Criminal Courts 
and Procedure," pp. 22, 24. 
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itself adopted, typically desired judicial leadership. The judge might 
comment upon the virtues of mercy and even, in some instances, go 
significantly beyond the jury in extending it. So far did the ruling elites 
adopt the posture of merciful law givers; so effectively did they make 
what may have been the best of a system in which enforcement was not 
commanded by the simple fiat of those elites, but depended upon and 
suited the views and interests of society generally. 
From one perspective, the propertied classes created a network of laws 
they had no intention of fully enforcing; nonenforcement was itself a tool 
worth forging. From another, the law, at least at the capital level, was in 
fact "enforced," for the process of enforcement involved a multistage 
examination of the character and behavior of persons suspected of acts 
denominated felonies by common law or legislation. To state the law 
regarding capital offenses one had really to talk in terms of processes and 
resolutions. Not all felons deserved to be executed, but all (save for petty 
larcenists) were subject to a determination of whether they numbered 
among those who did. From this perspective, the law was not really 
mitigated, it was simply applied in the appropriate fashion. It was as 
though capital legislation read: persons who act in such a way are subject 
to death, transportation, imprisonment, or whipping, by determination of 
Crown, judge, and jury. The legal system as it was in fact devised, with 
its superabundant claims upon the lives of men, would have been 
intolerable had it not in practice accommodated the realities of contem-
porary social life, had it not reflected how far England's rulers, both in 
their brutality and their leniency, had adopted the standards and ap-
proaches to law enforcement of those they ruled.I56 
156. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," p. 61) asserts that "when we ask 
who controlled the criminal law, we see a familiar constellation: monarchy, aristocracy, 
gentry and, to a lesser extent, the great merchants. In numbers they were no more than 3 
percent of the population.'' Hay says relatively little about juries. His argument is more 
plausible with respect to the summary powers of justices of the peace, the attitudes of 
members of Parliament, the disposition of those who administered the granting of royal 
pardons, and the language employed by judges when sentencing convicts to the gallows than 
it is with regard to either the behavior of trial jurors or the attitudes of the bench and the 
aristocracy generally toward that behavior. What Hay does say indicates he has mainly in 
mind juries in cases involving poaching and related offenses, where often landed jurors faced 
unpropertied defendants (See Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," pp. 107-08), though his 
remarks in "Poaching and the Game Laws in Cannock Chase" suggest that even in those 
cases jurors were not truly aligned with the propertied classes (pp. 189, 211). Hay might 
believe that those who "controlled the criminal law" controlled juries, or that juries 
typically sought to please (or at any rate not to displease) their social betters on the bench 
or in Parliament. [For an emphatic statement of this view see Peter Linebaugh, "(Marxist) 
Social History and (Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to Professor Langbein," 
unpublished paper (1984). I am grateful to Professor Linebaugh for allowing me to see his 
essay.] I have argued that while this was doubtless true in many cases, the standards that the 
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Maintaining the form of mitigation-of suspension of a blanket capital 
law-no doubt enhanced the authority and prestige of the ruling classes. 
It was a solution produced by history, both forced upon those classes and 
turned by them to their best advantage. But it was not without its costs. 
Sharing powers of mitigation meant defining jury trial in a certain way. 
Authorities first inherited and then enhanced an ethic of jury application 
of the law that they would not always find it easy to contain. The 
perpetuation of that ethic reflected the acquiescence of authorities in 
general social standards in common-run felony cases-so long, i.e., as 
those standards wore the stamp and ritual of official decision making-but 
it did not reflect a concurrence of opinion in other, more "political" 
cases. This, as we shall see, was to prove a critical problem in English 
governance. Moreover, there were other signs of unhappiness with the 
administration of a criminal law based upon dispersed powers of mitiga-
tion. There were some contemporaries who had begun to ask whether, 
after all, such an administration of law accorded with the best interests of 
society generally and of the propertied classes in particular. 
The reform literature of the eighteenth century provides an important 
commentary upon the system. Read in conjunction with the trial descrip-
tions of the more casual observers of the day, this literature suggests that 
many contemporaries viewed the criminal trial jury as relatively autono-
mous but not engaged in a struggle with the bench. But it also suggests 
that learned Englishmen exaggerated the degree of jury latitude that 
characterized everyday practice and underestimated the degree to which 
verdicts must have fit fairly settled and predictable patterns, patterns that 
mirrored not only the attitudes of the bench and of the common 
Englishmen who served as jurors but the expectations of most offenders. 
small ruling elite adopted were themselves in part a reflection of the attitudes of a very large 
part of society. This was true both with regard to substantive standards and with regard to 
the matter of who was permitted to apply those standards. One of the most powerful 
techniques of rulership was to allow even relatively lower-class juries to sort out (within 
limits) cases according to their own sense of justice. With regard to the administration of the 
criminal law in the eighteenth century, the concept of "control" (as I believe Hay would 
agree) must allow for this dialectical interplay of attitudes. At some point, certainly with 
regard to the use of the criminal trial jury, one might want to replace the word "control" 
with the word "management'' -the management of the administration of criminal justice in 
a fashion that redounded to the benefit of both managers and managed. Very possibly, the 
managers enhanced their control over the managed as a by-product of the managers' 
acquiescence in such a system of criminal law. I elaborate upon this point in Chapter 9. See 
"Introduction," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People, p. 19. The editors 
make the related point that society at large had access to use or to challenge many aspects 
of the legal system; this fact helped to convince society of the existence of the rule of law 
and "helped humbler men to reach a grudging accommodation with the more egregious 
aspects of the criminal process." I have stressed direct access to the system of criminal law 
itself. 
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Both the reformers and their critics failed to appreciate the extent to 
which judge and jury conditioned each other's perspective and behavior 
within a legal culture that developed and applied its own informal rules of 
law in a relatively consistent fashion. 
The reform literature also reveals several important contradictions 
inherent in prevailing attitudes toward crime, criminals, and the admin-
istration of the criminal law. First, as we have seen, contemporaries who 
favored reform of the law of capital sanctions and a concomitant 
reduction of the need for jury intervention tended to regard such 
intervention as both inevitable and just in the unreformed present. Their 
writings thus offered support to those seeking to justify jury-based 
intervention. 
Moreover (and, ultimately, perhaps more important), many of the 
reform writers viewed criminal behavior as a product of social conditions, 
including among those conditions the existing administration of the 
criminal law. They coupled their support for reform of the law of 
sanctions with a call for rehabilitation. Reformers thus accepted one of 
the ideas implicit in contemporary social thought and in the prevailing 
system of commutation-the notion that much crime was socially 
caused-and, carrying that idea part way to its logical conclusion, they 
rejected both the manner in which the sentencing procedure was im-
plemented and the principal form of treatment (transportation) of those 
offenders who were spared. But these writers also clung to a notion of free 
will and suggested by implication that it was for existing institutions to 
sort out the truly guilty from the great mass of relatively unfree offenders. 
Once again, in the decades preceding reform, the reformers provided a 
justification for age-old jury practices. 
Finally, few reformers supposed that reform of sanctions would en-
tirely remove the need for an ultimate right of jury intervention. Romilly 
had already written in defense of the jury in seditious libel cases when he 
turned his attention to the problem of sanctions in common-run felo-
nies;I57 Dawes produced a similar tract on seditious libel two years after 
the publication of his Essay on Crimes and Punishments. 158 We shall see 
that Blackstone and others also-though in more moderate language-
glorified the historical role of juries in political cases and suggested that 
the jury might again someday have to play a similar role. Though most of 
these later writers believed that the settlement of 1689 rendered unlikely 
a return to executive and judicial tyranny, they too offered a powerful 
argument for true nullification of the law to those contemporaries who 
thought such a turn of events had already come to pass. Perhaps as a 
157. See above, n. 147 and accompanying text. 
158. See below, Chapter 8, text at n. 58. 
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result, reform would come only after a political and legal crisis in which 
the virtues of an ultimate (though rarely resorted to) right of true jury law-
finding were openly debated and widely accepted. 
8 The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law 
The seditious libel trials of the eighteenth century constitute an important 
chapter in the history of freedom of the press and the growth of 
democratic government. While much has been written about them and 
about the administration of the criminal law in eighteenth-century En-
gland, little has been said about the relationship between the libel 
prosecutions and the more pervasive and longstanding problems of the 
criminal law. 1 We have perhaps gone too far in positing-or simply 
assuming-a separation between political high misdemeanors and 
common-run felony cases such as homicide and theft. There were, 
however, points of contact between the two; most notably, the trial jury 
was employed in both. This conjunction raises the question of whether 
the use of the jury in the one kind of case influenced thinking about how 
it ought to be used in the other. I shall explore this subject in light of the 
tract literature of the seditious libel crisis. I hope thereby to elucidate the 
oft-repeated arguments concerning the jury's right to decide law as well as 
fact, and to characterize the kinds of knowledge that pro-jury writers 
thought jurors were to bring to their task. Finally, I shall set forth some 
tentative conclusions concerning the place of the seditious libel episode 
and its resolution in the history of the jury and the administration of 
criminal law. 
At the time of the seditious libel crisis the two strands of jury 
law-finding theory that we have traced remained intact, one still active, 
the other largely historical. The tradition of merciful acquittals and partial 
1. E.g. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:672-96. (Much of Holdsworth's account 
of the seditious libel law, its interpretation by Mansfield and others in the major trials, and 
Fox's Libel Act and its aftermath remains adequate. I sketch in the necessary details but do 
not replicate Holdsworth's lengthy account. I stress those details essential for my own 
purpose, which is to assess the manner in which those contemporaries who commented on 
the matter thought about the problem of the jury's role in seditious libel cases.) See also e.g. 
Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 88-175; Frederick 
Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1447-1776 (Urbana, Ill., 1965), pp. 
269-75, 380-92; H. M. Lubasz, "Public Opinion Comes of Age: Reform of the Libel Law in 
the Eighteenth Century," History Today, vol. 8 (1958), pp. 453-61; Robert Rea, The English 
Press and Politics: 1760-1774 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1963); John Brewer, "The Wilkites and the 
Law, 1763-1774," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People (New Brunswick, 
N.J., 1980), pp. 128-71; Patrick Devlin, The Judge (Oxford, 1981), pp. 119-26. 
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verdicts in common-run cases continued apace with something close to 
official acquiescence. Although true nullification of judicial instructions 
was not officially approved, some very respectable jurists not only lauded 
the nullifying behavior of juries in certain pre-1689 political cases, but, 
more significantly, could be read as suggesting that there might be 
occasions on which juries would once again be duty-bound to play that 
role. 
The seditious libel tracts reflect the influence of these strands of thought 
in a variety of ways. Especially, they reveal both the extent to which the 
radical jury proponents were able to build upon the views of the more 
conventional, establishment writers and the importance of the interplay 
between notions of true nullification in political prosecutions and the 
tradition of merciful verdicts in common-run cases. After briefly describ-
ing the seditious libel controversy (section I) I shall examine these and 
other themes in the course of considering varying views of the constitu-
tional role of the criminal trial jury (section II) and the tract writers' 
approach to finding law (section III), finding fact (section IV), and 
applying law to fact (section V). My conclusion (section VI) puts the 
seditious libel controversy into historical perspective regarding social, 
political, and constitutional aspects of the institution of trial by jury. 
I 
The common law crime of seditious libel can be broadly characterized 
as the intentional publication of a writing that ''scandalized'' the govern-
ment, i.e., tended to bring it into disesteem. Although indictments for 
seditious libel generally alleged that the accused had acted ''falsely, 
seditiously, maliciously and factiously," the jury was to render what 
amounted to a special verdict in the form of a general verdict of "guilty" 
if it found that the accused intentionally published the writing and if it 
found that the writing bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution. The 
origins of the seditious libel doctrine lay in Star Chamber practice, but the 
doctrine was given final form early in the eighteenth century by Chief 
Justice Holt.2 Significantly, the law did not recognize truth as a defense.3 
Moreover, as we have seen, it assigned to the court as matters oflaw two 
questions that had the appearance of questions of fact: whether the act 
was done with criminal intent, and whether the writing was seditious or 
defamatory. It was perhaps plausible to consider the latter question one of 
2. Hamburger, "Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," passim. See above, Chapter 6, 
nn. 208-10 and accompanying text, for discussion of seditious libel in the seventeenth 
century. On Holt's modification of that doctrine see Hamburger, ibid., pp. 85-115. 
3. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 8:336-42, esp., 339. 
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law because the nature of the crime typically meant that the entire record 
of the allegedly criminal act was embodied in a physical specimen that 
survived for judicial inspection. It was less plausible to cast the question 
of criminal intent as one oflaw to be inferred by the court. On both counts 
the doctrine was strongly resisted, from the Restoration trials of Care4 and 
/ 
Harris5 in 1680 and the great case of the Seven Bishops6 on the eve of the 
Glorious Revolution down to the reform of the doctrine by means of 
Fox's Libel Act in 1792.7 
We may note briefly the major phases of the seditious libel debate in the 
eighteenth century. From the perspective of nearly all the participants in 
that debate, the Seven Bishops' Case had taken on the garb of hallowed 
precedent. Most writers saw that great courtroom drama as an act by 
which the people paved the way for the constitutional settlement that 
followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, wherein Englishmen con-
signed the law to its rightful place-the protective arms of an independent 
judiciary.s The case, which was tried in a highly charged political 
atmosphere, involved the prosecution of seven bishops who refused to 
read James II's Declaration of Indulgence in their churches. Because the 
bench divided on the question of whether the petition constituted a libel, 
that question was left, de facto, to the jury.9 The acquittal of the bishops 
was taken to be both a rejection of James's pro-Catholic policies and a 
vindication, against the views of the bench, of the jury's right to 
determine the questions of intent and libelousness. The case became a 
precedent for opposition to tyranny, an act of last resort: jury nullification 
of the official doctrine of seditious libel, on which the bench had not una 
voce insisted, had saved the constitution. Yet for some, this did not 
require rejection of the Stuart doctrine of seditious libel. An independent 
and impartial bench could be trusted (or so the theory ran) to assign and 
4. State Trials, 7:1111-30 (1680). (Alternatively spelled: Carr.) 
5. Ibid., pp. 926-32 (1680). 
6. Ibid., 12:183-434 (1688). 
7. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792). Technically, criminal intent was not at issue in seditious libel. 
If the court found that the writing was seditious, it held that the defendant constructively 
intended the consequences of the act of publication. Fox's Act left the jury in a position 
where it could apply the judge's instructions on seditiousness; in the course of doing so, the 
jury was supposed to imply the requisite intent if it found the publication seditious. The jury 
was thus in a position to consider whether in fact there had been actual defaming intent-
only in that sense had the issue been "left" to the jury-though to do so was to go against 
the instructions and, hence, against the Act. See below, text at nn. 62-64. 
8. Act of Settlement (1701), in E. N. Williams, comp. and trans., The Eighteenth Century 
Constitution (Cambridge, 1965), p. 59: "[J]udges commissions be made quamdiu se bene 
gesserint and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both houses 
of parliament it may be lawful to remove them." 
9. See above, Chapter 6, text at nn. 232-34. 
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determine all questions of law. Thus, in the century after the Glorious 
Revolution, much of the legal establishment both accepted the constitu-
tional settlement and adhered to the essential elements of the Stuart law 
oflibel. 10 For many others, however, the Seven Bishops' Case stood for 
more. It was a vindication of the integrity of the general verdict. For some 
this meant only that the traditional role ofthe trial jury, the finding of fact 
and the application to fact of the law as given by the bench, was 
preserved. Others, as we shall see, envisioned the general verdict as 
including not merely application of the law but also true law-finding. 
From the outset the eighteenth-century debate concerning the seditious 
libel doctrine was couched largely in Restoration terms. 11 Chief Justice 
Raymond succinctly restated Holt's formulation of the Stuart doctrine in 
Rex v. Franklin in 1731, setting forth a division of judge-jury responsibili-
ties that the courts would attempt to enforce until the passage of Fox's 
Libel Act. 12 His opinion, in turn, revived the Restoration defense of the 
criminal trial jury. Late in 1732, John Rawles's 1680 tract, The 
Englishman's Right, was reprinted for the first time. The new preface, 
signed by one J. K., warned of developments that threatened to destroy 
all that had been won in the Glorious Revolution and commended the 
tract "in which the original design, duty and power of jurors are so clearly 
10. Mansfield, in St. Asaph's Case (State Trials, 21:1040) espoused the commonly held 
point of view as follows: "Jealousy of leaving the law to the Court, as in other cases, so in 
the case of libels, is now, in the present state of things, puerile rant and declamation. The 
judges are totally independent of the ministers that may happen to be, and of the King 
himself." (Emphasis added.) Mansfield took the view that the opponents of the official 
doctrine sought to make an exception of the law of libel: in that case alone the jury would 
find law as well as fact. A similar view can be found in an unpublished manuscript, "Sketch 
of an answer to a Pamphlet, entitled 'Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and Seizures of 
Papers,' "(B.L. MS Add. 35, 887, fols. 171 et seq.), probably written in 1765 in reply to the 
second edition of "Father of Candor's" famous work (see below, n. 117). As the present 
study makes clear, most pro-jury writers took the view that the jury was to find law as well 
as fact in libel, as in other cases. From their perspective, libel was currently an exception 
under the official doctrine, and ought not to be so. 
II. Hamburger ("Origins of the Law of Seditious Libel," see above, Chapter 6, nn. 210, 
238) argues that the doctrine was still loosely formulated at the time of the Harris and Care 
prosecutions (1680) and that it received its crystallization between 1696 and 1706, mainly at 
the hands of Chief Justice Holt. What I refer to as the "Stuart law of libel" is the set of 
doctrines that I believe were emerging in the period before the Seven Bishops' Case and that 
some Restoration tract writers understood (perhaps wrongly) to be the settled official 
doctrine. As Hamburger demonstrates, Holt's modification of these doctrines toward the 
end of the Stuart period was of great importance, but these changes concerned the definition 
of libel, not the allocation-of-powers question. Holt did not place greater restrictions on the 
jury's fact-finding responsibilities than the major Restoration critics of seditious libel 
assumed were already part of the law. The response to the Seven Bishops' Case must be 
understood, at least in part, in the light of the assumptions made by earlier critics. 
12. State Trials, 17:625-76 (1731). 
322 Resolutions 
explained, that it will be sufficient to instruct all those, who shall, on these 
occasions, have the lives and properties of their fellow subjects in their 
hands."l3 In the tract itself Rawles argued that in all cases, including 
libel, juries were the true judges of law as well as of fact, not simply that 
in libel cases seditiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury .14 
The reprinting of Rawles was closely followed by the publication in 
England of the report of Zenger's Case (1735). Defense counsel for the 
New York printer, Zenger, had drawn upon Rawles, and in England the 
combination of the tract and the trial (Zenger had been acquitted) now 
helped to launch a half-century-long attack on the law of libel and the 
abuse of trial by jury it allegedly involved. 
After Franklin's trial the contest over the doctrine of seditious libel falls 
into three principal stages. In 1752, the Crown tried by special jury 
(frequently the practice in seditious libel cases) a bookseller named 
William Owen for the sale of a tract critical of the House of Commons.Is 
Chief Justice Lee, on the urging of the solicitor general, William Murray 
(the future Lord Mansfield), charged the jury in accordance with 
Raymond's statement of the law. The jury, after hearing testimony 
regarding Owen's character and loyalty to the Crown and Camden's 
argument that the right to criticize Parliament was fundamental, acquitted 
the defendant. Underlying Camden's argument for the defense was the 
principle that, notwithstanding the bench's view of the law of seditious 
libel, the jury, unless it was convinced that the allegations of falsity and 
13. Rawles, Englishman's Right (London, 1732), pp. iv-vii. 
14. Ibid., pp. 10-18. 
15. State Trials, 18:1203-30 (1752). The special jury was employed in a wide range of civil 
and criminal cases, though not in felonies. Typically, in seditious libel prosecutions, special 
juries were drawn from a panel of persons of higher social and economic status than those 
on panels for ordinary juries. Their rank was by no means exalted. The jurors who tried 
Owen were described as follows: merchant, sugar-baker, linen-draper, draper, draper, 
grocer, hosier, grocer, oilman, merchant, merchant, grocer. No doubt authorities attempted 
to secure a jury that would defer to the bench on rulings oflaw, but authorities met with little 
success in seditious libel. Owen's jury was hardly alone in resisting strict application of the 
seditious libel doctrine. Contemporaries occasionally criticized the use of special juries in 
seditious libel cases, but surprisingly little attention was paid to the matter, perhaps because 
many defendants fared well at the hands of the middling sort who sat on special juries. 
Indeed, at least one defendant complained that summons for special jurors had not issued 
sufficiently early to ensure a full complement, with the result that talesmen had to be used 
to fill out nearly half of the jury. [John Miller, the publisher, tried in 1770. See The 
Freeholder's Magazine (London), vol. 2 (July, 1770), pp. 252 et seq.]. The Freeholder's 
Magazine (ibid., p. 195) ended its report of Woodfall's trial with the comment that the jury 
(which found the defendant "guilty of printing and publishing only") was composed of seven 
special jurors and five "tales or common jurymen." For the background to the special jury 
see generally the excellent account in Oldham, "Origins of the Special Jury." 
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scandalous intent in the indictment had been proved, must acquit.t6 
Two anonymously authored, strongly pro-jury tracts followed im-
mediately upon the prosecution of Owen. The tracts reflect the two quite 
different approaches that opponents of the seditious libel doctrine 
adopted over the course of the eighteenth century. An Address to the 
Jurymen of London17 drew heavily upon Rawles, arguing that the jury 
must acquit if it is convinced that the facts charged in the indictment do 
not amount to a crime. Attached to the tract was a "Letter to be read to 
all Jurymen," signed: "Britannicus," which also drew upon the Restora-
tion tracts and Zenger's Case and which asserted that the jury must be 
convinced of the "crime of the fact. " 18 On the other hand, The Doctrine 
of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly Statedt9 at once conceded that 
juries were judges of fact only and insisted that the jury must consider all 
the "circumstances," (e.g., truth, intent) involved.2o The author thus 
seems to have adopted Camden's strategy, and, like Camden, made much 
of the analogy to the jury's fact-finding role in cases of homicide. 
Inflammatory rhetoric about "law-finding" had no place in this style of 
argument. 
The second stage in the English government's use of seditious libel laws 
to silence criticism of its policies began in 1763 with the prosecution of 
John Wilkes for his famous No. 45 of The North Briton,21 and climaxed in 
1770 with the prosecution, on informations ex officio, of those who 
published and sold the "Junius" letter protesting the official policy on the 
American colonies. Mansfield, as Chief Justice of King's Bench, enunci-
ated what had become the established law of seditious libel in the trials of 
the bookseller John Almon,22 and the publishers Henry Woodfall23 and 
16. State Trials, 18:1227-28. "Then, gentlemen, to show you how necessary it is to prove 
the intention; if there is an indictment preferred against a man for an assault, with an 
intention to ravish; the intention must be proved, or else the jury cannot find him guilty. The 
same of an assault with an intention to kill, if the intention is not proved, he must be 
. acquitted. If he kills, and the intention is not proved, that is, if it is not proved that he killed 
premeditatedly and of forethought, it is but manslaughter. Therefore in the case before us, 
if that part of the information is not proved, that he published maliciously, etc., you must 
acquit him." 
17. An Address to the Jurymen of London. By a Citizen (2nd ed., London, 1755, orig. 
published 1752). 
18. Ibid., p. 22. 
19. The Doctrine of Libels and the Duties of Juries fairly Stated (London, 1752). 
20. Ibid., pp. 14-15, 29-30. 
21. State Trials, 19:982-1002, 1075-1138 (1763-70). 
22. Ibid., 20:803-68 (1770). 
23. Ibid., pp. 895-922 (1770). See also the account in The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 
(June, 1770), pp. 192 et seq., esp. p. 195 . 
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John Miller.24 Glynn, who defended all three, followed Camden's argu-
ments in Rex v. Owen, at times verbatim. The Crown obtained a 
conviction in the case of Almon. The Woodfalljury, however, returned a 
verdict of "Guilty of printing and publishing only," which resulted in a 
judicial order for a new trial that was never held, and at the close of 
Miller's trial the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" despite clear 
evidence of publication. These widely publicized "Junius" trials, to-
gether with Mansfield's consistent refusal to charge the jury that it should 
consider the question of criminal intent, provoked debate in Parliament 
over the seditious libel law. Glynn introduced the question of reform in 
the Commons;zs Camden and Chatham supported him in the Lords.26 
They could not, however, agree on a new formulation. On the other side, 
opponents of an enquiry into the matter voiced their complete trust in the 
judges, including Mansfield. Solicitor General Thurlow may have spoken 
for many when he raised the specter of jury control over the law and of 
the dissolution of judicial authority .27 Some twenty years would elapse 
before sufficient support could be mustered to pass a bill giving the jury 
the right to return a true general verdict in cases of seditious libel. 
The period 1764-70 produced a spate of major seditious libel tracts. 
These tracts fall into two groups: the first in the wake of Wilkes's arrest 
and prosecution in the mid-1760s; the second around 1770, when the 
Wilkites and proponents of Almon furiously attacked Mansfield. The first 
series of tracts was composed of attacks on the official doctrine and 
replies to those attacks; it is not always possible to determine to which 
pro-jury tract a defender of the prevailing doctrine meant to reply. 
Possibly the earliest of the dissident tracts was Joseph Towers's Enquiry 
into the Question, Whether Juries are, or not, Judges of Law as Well as 
of Fact. 2s Like the writings of the preceding decade, Enquiry seems very 
dependent upon Rawles and recites as well from the Guide to Juries of 
1682 "that all that the judges do is but advice. " 29 Towers analogized to 
homicide, but he chose to characterize his description of the jury's role in 
such cases as determining law as well as fact. Perhaps the most important 
24. State Trials, 20:869-96 (1770). See also The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 (July, 
1770), pp. 252 et seq. 
25. The Parliamentary History of England (hereafter cited as Parliamentary History), 
ed. W. Cobbett (vols.l-12) and T. C. Hansard (vols. 13-36) (London, 1806-20), vol. 16, cols. 
1212-15. The ensuing debate in the Commons runs from col. 1215 to col. 1301. The issue had 
already arisen in the course of the debate over informations ex officio. See cols. 1124-90. 
26. Ibid., cols. 1302-6, 1312 et seq. 
27. For Thurlow's speeches see ibid., cols. 1146, 1290-93. 
28. Joseph Towers, An Enquiry into the Question, Whether Juries are, or not, Judges of 
Law as Well as of Fact; With a particular Reference to the Case of Libels (London, 1764). 
29. Ibid., p. 54. 
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early pro-Administration tract was the Letter from Candor to the Public 
Advertiser (1764).30 According to "Candor," there was nothing new about 
the prevailing doctrine: Mansfield applied the law largely as it had been 
applied by Jeffreys, a point that most critics of Mansfield were willing 
(even anxious) to concede.3I In defending the law against the claims of the 
pro-jury writers, "Candor" recognized that there might be mitigating 
circumstances. But these, he said, were for consideration by the judge 
after the jury convicted, as it must do if it found that the defendant had 
published the alleged libel.32 "Candor" understood how defendants were 
relieved from overly harsh sanctions in criminal cases generally, but he 
strongly denied that it was appropriate for the jury to undertake such 
mercy. 
In reply to "Candor" came An Enquiry into the Doctrine . . . 
concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers by "Father of 
Candor,"33 and in counterpoint to "Father of Candor," the famous 
Considerations on the Legality of General Warrants, to which was added 
"A Postscript on a late pamphlet concerningjuries, libels, etc. " 34 "Father 
of Candor" characterized intent and seditiousness as questions of fact, 
thus matters for the jury, and proceeded to discuss how ajury ought to go 
about deciding whether a writing was libelous. "Father of Candor" 
suggested that, simply put, "plain truth and fact, and common sense" 
were at issue. 35 He thus opened up discussion of what was required of 
jurors and of the competence of the average jury, issues that loomed large 
in the debate over the next several decades. The "Postscript" to 
Considerations contained a particularly trenchant attack on the pro-jury 
position, one that referred to jurors as "illiterate" and "unused to legal 
ideas. " 36 While conceding that jurors played a full role in homicide, the 
"Postscript" insisted that they merely found the facts and were bound to 
follow the judge's direction upon the law. If the jurors had any doubt 
about the law, they were to return a special verdict summarizing the facts 
they had found and to leave pronouncement of the general verdict to the 
30. A Letter from Candor to the Public Advertiser (3rd. ed., London, 1770, orig. 
published 1764). 
31. Ibid., p. 5. 
32. Ibid., p. 18. 
33. An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, concerning Libels, Warrants, and 
the Seizure of Papers ... in a Letter to Mr. Almon from the Father of Candor (London, 
1764). 
34. Considerations on the Legality of General Warrants, and the propriety of a 
Parliamentary regulation of the same. To which is added "A Postscript on a late pamphlet 
concerning juries, libels, etc." (2nd ed., London, 1765, orig. published 1765). 
35. Enquiry into the Doctrine, p. ll. 
36. "Postscript" to Considerations, pp. 42-43. 
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judge.37 (This, according to the author of "Postscript," is what the jury 
ought to have done in the Seven Bishops' Case.)38 In libel more than in 
other cases, the jury was likely "to be under the influence of popular 
passions, "39 and thus ought to hold closely to finding fact. 
"Postscript" to Considerations drew its own reply, Postscript to the 
Letter, on Libels . .. In Answer to a Postscript in Defence of the Majority, 
and ... Considerations ... ,40 which asserted that in libels it was 
particularly important that the jury play its historic role, for the Court in 
such cases was not likely to be impartial.4I That role, the tract stated, was 
set forth by Lilburne at the end of his 1649 trial.42 Thus, the tract 
suggested a far-reaching interpretation of law-finding, though it is not 
entirely clear that the author understood what Lilburne had been getting 
at. Postscript ... In Answer charged that the author of the "Postscript" 
to Considerations took a view of the jury that was "much too lowly and 
contemptuous, owing I presume to his education on the Northern side of 
the Tweed, where very little use is made of them. " 43 
The positions rehearsed in these and other tracts were repeated by 
proponents and critics of the prevailing doctrine in the heated political 
atmosphere of 1770.44 Virtually all of the London papers carried news 
stories, editorial comments, book reviews, and letters to the editor 
dealing with the trials of Almon, Miller, and Woodfall, with important 
jury tracts and with the progress of the jury debate in the Commons.45 
Among the most interesting of the second series of tracts were those 
produced in 1770 by the Wilkites Robert Morris and George Rous. 
Morris's Letter to Sir Robert Aston46 and Rous's Letter to the Jurors of 
37. Ibid., pp. 41, 44. 
38. Ibid., p. 45. 
39. Ibid., p. 47. 
40. A Postscript to the Letter, on Libels, Warrants, etc. In Answer to a Postscript in the 
Defence of the Majority, and another Pamphlet, entitled Considerations on the Legality of 
General Warrants (2nd ed., London, 1765, orig. published 1765). 
41. Ibid., p. 24. 
42. Ibid., p. 19. 
43. Idem. 
44. For an excellent discussion of the political strife of this period and of the sources of 
the "radicalism" that forms a background to the major seditious libel trials see the works by 
John Brewer cited below, n. 50. 
45. On the 1770 debates see e.g. The Political Register (London), vol. 8, no. 47 (Jan., 
1771), pp. 31-36. 
46. Robert Morris, A Letter to Sir Richard Aston, . . . Containing a reply to his 
scandalous abuse [of R.M.]; and some thoughts on the modern doctrine of Libels (London, 
1770). This work was reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 47 (Jan., 1771), p. 56. 
See the anonymous reply to Morris's tract, A Letter to Robert Morris, Esq. (London, 1771), 
reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 49 (March, 1771), pp. 184-90. 
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Great Britain47 dwelled at length upon the place of trial by jury in the 
English constitution. By now Rawles, though still quoted, played a less 
significant role, and Wilkite arguments concerning the susceptibility of 
the bench-especially of Mansfield-to bias in cases involving allegations 
of seditiousness came to the fore. 
The agitation over the jury was, of course, only a small part of the 
political turmoil of the day. Wilkes's followers, middling men of some 
property who came largely from merchant communities of the country, 
focused on the criminal trial jury only fleetingly. Their main efforts 
concerned issues of more general significance: criticism of the 
government's foreign and domestic financial policies; impurities of the 
political process; private law, with its inequities for the small business-
man; and the movement for speech and press, to which the jury debate 
was significantly but rather loosely attached. Nonetheless, the Wilkites 
were acutely aware of the importance of the jury as an element in the 
constitution48 (especially as a necessary surrogate for what they viewed as 
a corrupt and unrepresentative parliament) and as an investigative as well 
as a protective body. 49 In this last capacity the jury, whose members were 
frequently drawn from their own social groups, was particularly crucial to 
their embattled movement, and they made certain that jurors in important 
political cases were apprised of their "rights." This campaign caused the 
administration to view the jury as all the more likely to act out of political 
bias. 50 
47. George Rous, A Letter to the Jurors of Great Britain (London, 1771), p. 50. This work 
was reviewed in The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 48 (Feb., 1771), p. 105. 
48. See below, text at nn. 76 et seq. 
49. See e.g. The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 50 (Sept., 1771), pp. 128-29. "Whatever 
twelve good men and true do in their consciences think to be against the peace ... they are 
bound by their oath to present and to bring to justice .... [A] jury is sworn to do this, not 
only on information, but of their own knowledge" (editorial, p. 129). 
50. On the Wilkite movement see Brewer, "The Wilkites and the Law," esp. pp. 153-64; 
John Brewer, "English Radicalism in the Age of George III," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three 
British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, 1980), pp. 323-67, esp. 342-54; John 
Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," in Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. 
Plumb, eds., The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-
Century England (London, 1980), pp. 197-262. For a particularly trenchant attack on 
judicial browbeating of jurors see The North Briton (London), no. 64 (Sept. 3, 1768), p. 184. 
On jurors "true" duty see e.g. The North Briton, no. 168 (June 16, 1770), p. 426. Prospective 
jurors no doubt took note of the fact that London newspapers of Wilkite persuasion 
frequently printed the names of jurors. They could not expect to convict a defendant in a 
seditious libel case and remain anonymous. See e.g. The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 
(July, 1770), pp. 252-53. See Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," p. 236. For a 
balanced letter (from "A Whig"), critical both of the government and of the tone and 
substance of Wilkite criticism (including the subversion of the judicial process by "jurors, 
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Throughout the entire period 1763-70 the jury debate remained several 
different debates. Some jury proponents opposed what was now called 
Mansfield's law/fact distinction in seditious libel, insisting instead that 
seditiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury. In this, they 
drew support from the arguments of Glynn and Camden at the major 
trials. The more interesting debate, however, still concerned the jury's 
right to "find law," especially since the law-finding argument involved the 
confusing concession by jury proponents that the questions of intent and 
seditiousness were indeed "matter oflaw." Having accepted the bench's 
characterization, these publicists concluded that because these questions 
were of a sort that were traditionally in all other cases questions for the 
jury, the jury must therefore be a law-finding body.51 This, in turn, 
intensified the squabble over the competence of jurors, who now had to 
be defended as law finders, a proposition that authorities, thrown on the 
defensive by the size and force of the Wilkite movement, regarded as both 
preposterous and dangerous. 52 
The third stage of the seditious libel controversy commenced with the 
trial in 1783 of William Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph.s3 Unquestionably, 
Shipley's case was the most important seditious libel prosecution since· 
the Seven Bishops' Case. Shipley had published a tract by his brother-
in-law, Sir William Jones, that allegedly incited to rebellion;54 after the 
trial judge entered a conviction upon a verdict of "guilty of publishing 
only," a new trial was refused despite Thomas Erskine's ringing defense 
on Shipley's behalf. Yet after carrying the day on the law of libel, the 
bench set the conviction aside for a defect in the indictment.55 
The tracts that followed upon St. Asaph's Case made use of Erskine's 
defense, some taking a narrow line and others going beyond Erskine's 
men of rank, character and fortune"), see The Political Register, vol. 8, no. 49 (March, 
1771), pp. 169-70. 
51. E.g. Thomas Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel. Suggested by Mr. Fox's 
Notice in Parliament of an intended motion on that subject (London, 1791). See also the 
speeches by Mr. Cornwall and Mr. Dunning in the Commons in 1770. Hansard, ed., 
Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1135, 1160. 
52. See the speeches of attorney general De Grey and solicitor general Thurlow in the 
Commons in 1770. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1146, 1185-86. 
53. State Trials, 21:874-1046 (1883-84). See Devlin, The Judge, pp. 119-31 for an 
interesting summary and commentary on this case. 
54. William Jones, Dialogue between a Scholar and a Peasant (London, 1782), re-
published by William Shipley as A Dialogue between a Gentleman and a Farmer (London, 
1783). 
55. State Trials, 21:1041-44. "The Court ... [said] there were no averments to point the 
application of the paper as a libel on the king and his government." Willes, J., thought that 
"if the indictment had been properly drawn, it might have been supported." Mansfield, C. 
J., and Buller, J., did not give an opinion on that hypothetical (ibid., p. 1044). 
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relatively controlled arguments to reiterate the vaguer law-finding claims 
that had now become a part of the tradition.s6 Joseph Towers's Observa-
tions on the rights and duty of Juries in trials for Libels revived Rawles's 
strong claims and based its endorsement of broad jury powers in part on 
the view that the bench could not be trusted to determine the proper limits 
of judicial power.57 Perhaps the most ringing defense of the jury was 
Manasseh Dawes's England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine of 
Libels, which appeared in 1785. Dawes retreated to a historical perspec-
tive in making the case that juries had for so long been entrusted with 
plenary power to determine cases that it was no longer appropriate to 
claim they were incompetent to vindicate that duty. 58 Six years later 
Thomas Leach, who was himself trained in law, produced a still different 
defense of the jury, Considerations on the Matter of Libel. 59 Through 
juxtaposing the issues for determination in homicide and libel, Leach 
made the case for the jury and against the official doctrine in a way that 
must have put the proponents of Mansfield's position on the defensive. 
Despite the outpouring of pro-jury writings, the debate was by no 
means entirely one-sided. Authorities drew the conclusion from years of 
jury resistance to the law of seditious libel that juries could not be trusted 
in such cases to return verdicts that accorded even loosely with the 
government's interpretation of facts. Juries, they believed with some 
justice, were open to political pressures; verdicts could, and sometimes 
did, depend upon the heat of the political passions of the day. The 
anonymously authored An Examination into the rights and duties of 
Jurors (1785), which was a response to Joseph Towers's law-finding tract, 
drove home the point against a position that had, to be sure, been 
carelessly overstated: 
When we see this position, that juries are to judge all the criminality of 
a libel, as well as the truth of the fact of publication, supported, not by 
arguments drawn from the peculiarity of the case, which may require 
an exception to the general rule, but by general assertions, that jurors 
are complete and uncontrollable judges of the law in every instance, it 
56. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp. 249 et seq.; Holdsworth, History of English Law, 
10:688-96. See also Rex v. Stockdale, State Trials, 22:237-308, to which some tracts 
referred. 
57. Joseph Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, in trials for Libels 
(London, 1784), pp. 5, 15-20, 29. 
58. Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine of Libels as laid 
down by the Earl of Mansfield (London, 1785), pp. 8 et seq. For discussion of Dawes's 
writings urging reform of the law of sanctions in common-run cases see above, Chapter 7, 
text at nn. 114-20. 
59. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel. 
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is time for every honest man to oppose an innovation of the most 
dangerous tendency. 6o 
Some of Mansfield's defenders responded to the law-finding argument in 
a more legalistic manner. For them, the argument for a narrow scope of 
fact proceeded along the lines of an argument for certainty of the law. 
John Bowles's tracts, written on the eve of passage of Fox's Libel Act, 
pressed that point effectively, at least at the level of debate. 61 They were 
among the most cogent writings of the half-century of debate, and they 
lent great rhetorical (if no practical political) force to Mansfield's opinion 
in St. Asaph's Case. 
Mansfield had won the battle but he soon lost the war. The campaign 
against the seditious libel law culminated in 1792 with the passage of 
Fox's Libel Act. The Act did not explicitly convert the questions of intent 
or seditiousness into questions of fact but did state that in trials for 
seditious libel 
[the] jury sworn to try the issues may give a general verdict of guilty or 
not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue . . . and shall not be 
required or directed . . . to find the defendant or defendants guilty, 
merely of the proof of the publication ... and of the sense ascribed to 
the same.62 
The ''whole matter'' included the question of criminal intent, which might 
or might not have to depend solely upon inferences drawn from the 
publication itself, and the question of whether the writing was seditious. 
The statute affirmed the jury's right to return a general verdict. It was 
clear that in doing so the jury would necessarily have the right-and 
duty-to apply the law regarding criminal intent and seditiousness as 
stated by the bench. 63 But in the Commons at least it was neither stated 
nor implied that the jury possessed any more right in libel than in other 
60. An Examination into the rights and duties of Jurors; with some strictures on the Law 
of Libels. By a gentleman of the Inner Temple (London, 1785), p. 8. 
61. E.g. John Bowles, Considerations on the Respective Rights of Judge and Jury: 
particularly upon Trials for Libel, occasioned by an expected motion of the Right Hon. 
Charles James Fox (London, 1791). 
62. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792). For the debates on the form that the Act ought to take, see 
Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 551-602 (Commons), 726--42 (Lords), 
1036-47 (Lords), 1293-1300 (Lords), 1361-71 (Opinions of the Judges), 1404-31 (Lords), 
1534-38 (Lords). The Act began: "Whereas doubts have arisen whether ... it be competent 
to the jury ... ; be it therefore declared and enacted ... '' Holdsworth (History of English 
Law, 10:690) accepts the view that the Act was couched in declaratory form in order to 
suggest that the courts had been mistaken in their view of the law. 
63. The second section of the Act states that the judge shall "according to his discretion 
give ... his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue ... in like manner as 
in other cases." 
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cases to reject the law as stated by the bench. 64 That the jury might do so 
in a concealed fashion was undoubtedly understood-and feared. 
II 
The post-1750 discussion of the constitutional role of the criminal trial 
jury was pervaded by arguments that drew upon history. Virtually all 
commentators were convinced of the pre-Conquest origins of the jury. A 
few writers searched for its prototype in the classical world;65 some traced 
the jury to the Goths ;66 most posited a Saxon origin, identifying the early 
64. Erskine openly addressed the jury's right to reject the judge's instructions in the 
debate in 1791 in the Commons, stating that "[I]fajury, in despite oflaw and evidence, were 
to acquit a felon, he was immediately discharged; such was the wisdom of the constitution 
in the interposition and augmentation of the powers of a jury, lest the Crown should bear too 
hard on the life of a subject; nor could a jury be amerced or imprisoned for their verdict." 
This was true in felony and, Erskine argued, ought to be true in libel. Hansard, ed., 
Parliamentary History, 29: col. 598. His remarks were not adverted to by others. Fox had 
spoken more ambiguously. He asserted that in all trials the judge could give his ''opinion and 
advice." The bill, he said, would not prevent the judge from doing so in libel; it only "put 
the case oflibels on a footing with all other cases." Ibid., cols. 597-98. Pitt stated that juries 
were bound in libel (under the bill) as much as in other cases. Ibid., cols. 601-2. In the 
Lords, Camden in 1791 came close to stating that the jury ought to have more leeway to 
decide the law in seditious libel than in other cases. His remarks can be read as in agreement 
with those of Erskine. Ibid., cols. 728-32. Lansdowne thought libel was an anomaly: in libel 
"law and fact were but one thing .... [W]here, in God's name, could it be so safely entrusted 
as to twelve men, and how much better was it for the judge to be freed from such a critical 
duty, in all cases of libel, whether it were a public or a private libel." Nonetheless, the 
reporter recorded his next remarks as: "When judges confined themselves to their own 
province, to aid the jury by their advice, experience, and authority, without attempting to 
influence their decision, they should then have his best wishes." Ibid., cols. 738-39. See also 
his remarks in 1792. Ibid., cols. 1417-23. Presumably, in libel cases juries were to have more 
leeway than in other cases; i.e., they were not bound to follow the bench in any case, but 
the bench might exert greater influence in other cases. Stanhope took the strongest 
law-finding position, but he viewed the jury's power as unlimited in all criminal cases. Ibid., 
col. 1409 (1792). Loughborough is reported to have said that "[e]xperience had convinced 
him, if the judge did his duty by explaining the law with care, juries would decide with 
perfect justice." Ibid., col. 1296 (1792). The bill was silent on the matter. In the House of 
Lords, six opponents of the Act signed a protest against its passage, predicting "confusion 
and destruction." Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 1537-38. As it happened, 
juries proved relatively inclined to convict in seditious libel cases in the years following 
passage of the Libel Act. See below, n. 150 and accompanying text. 
65. E.g. John Pettingal, Enquiry into the use and practice of Juries among the Greeks and 
Romans; from whence the origin of the English jury may probably be deduced (London, 
1769), pp. iv-ix. See also Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm! On the Prevailing Doctrine 
of Libels, p. 12. 
66. E.g. Historical sketches of civil liberty From Henry VII to the accession of the house 
of Stuart, with an account of the antiquity, use, and duty of juries (London, 1788), pp. 
96-97. 
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laggamanni as combining the roles of judge andjury. 67 For the most part, 
however, this fascination with the origins of the jury remained an 
antiquarian exercise.6s It is true that eighteenth-century jury proponents 
thought that the jury's antiquity bolstered its place in the constitution, but 
no one disputed that the jury deserved some place. Exactly what place the 
jury ought to have was the question on which contemporaries disagreed. 
Here the eighteenth-century theorists had little in common with their mid-
seventeenth-century forerunners. Few of the later writers contended, as 
had some Levellers, that historically the jury had preceded the judiciary 
or that the law flowed forth from the community through the jury. 
Whatever their perspective on the law-finding power of the jury, the 
eighteenth-century writers implicitly accepted the Lockeian view of the 
origins of civil society. They took for granted the quasi-balance of powers 
created by the settlement of 1689 and the dominant role of Parliament in 
the making of law. The jury, even in the view of most of those who 
favored jury law-finding, was supposed to guarantee that English law, 
whether common law or statutory law, was fairly stated and fairly 
applied. 
For some eighteenth-century jury proponents the jury was not so much 
a part of the constitution as a symbol of the source of power that created 
civil government and the constitution itself. Henry Burtenshaw main-
tained that juries are not 
the creatures, even of the constitution, but coeval with it-with the 
constitution which declares all power to be in the people, and which 
has survived and remained unviolated through many revolutions of 
state government: they are themselves a government in miniature, and 
a symbol of that general democracy in which resides, and through 
which, under various modifications, is dispersed, all the functions of 
power, of justice and of policy. 69 
But even Burtenshaw recognized that laws were made in Parliament or 
"abroad, by [the people's] habits of life and usages," so that the jury, in 
his view, was to "interpret those laws when made. " 70 Most commenta-
tors took an even more frankly instrumental view of the jury: the jury was 
67. E.g. James Astry, A General Charge to all Grand Juries ... to which is prefixed a 
Discourse of the antiquity, power and duty of juries (London, 1703), p. 4; John Fortescue-
Aland, ed., The Difference between an absolute and limited monarchy, by John Fortescue 
(London, 1719), p. 56. See also Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:349-50. 
68. But see The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 51 (Oct., 1771), pp. 191-92 ("On the 
Perversions of Law from its Constitutional Course") for a tract strongly reminiscent of 
Leveller historico-legal writings. 
69. Henry Burtenshaw, Letters to the Right Hon. The Earl of Mansfield (London, 1781), 
p. viii. 
70. Ibid., p. 79. 
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a part of the constitution, established in order to fill a gap or to balance lay 
against official influence. Blackstone lent important support to this 
watchdog theory of the criminal trial jury. He cautioned against creation 
of more "convenient" procedures; the "delays, and little inconveniences 
in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their 
liberty in more substantial matters. " 71 Despite ambiguity in its charac-
terization of the jury's role, Blackstone's theory strongly implied that the 
jury remained a safeguard against some future recurrence of executive or 
judicial tyranny. 
Blackstone's contemporary Henry Dagge traced the origins of civil 
society in terms familiar to eighteenth-century political theorists. He 
began with a discussion of man in his natural state and with a depiction of 
his resolution of disputes by private revenge; this period of continual 
strife, he asserted, gave way to government and, eventually, to the 
creation of distinctive elements of government: legislative, executive, and 
judicial. Even at this stage, "after the three powers were divided," 
difficulties remained: 
The judicial power being entrusted with the exposition of the law, and 
as it depended on their judgment whether the case or fact sub lite, was 
or was not within the description of the law, there was evidently a great 
latitude still left for the exercise of partiality or oppression. 72 
The "remedy," he concluded, was "the invention of juries. " 73 Dagge 
assured his readers that it seldom happened that juries rejected the 
judge's instructions: "The opinion of the bench has generally its due 
weight. " 74 For the most part, the jury was to find fact and no more, and 
the better the primary institutions of government worked the less the jury 
would be needed as a safeguard of the liberti~s those institutions were 
designed to protect. This view of the jury was adumbrated even by 
William Paley, who exhibited tolerance for a complex, sometimes un-
predictable, legal process. In his view, there would and ought to be 
countervailing pressures, from which an equitable solution would 
emerge. The jury's role could not be given clearly defined limits; thus 
Paley cautioned against ''urging too far the distinction between ques-
71. Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:344. 
72. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, pp. 123-24. 
73. Ibid., p. 125. See also "A Sketch of the British Constitution" in The Court 
Miscellany, or Gentleman and Lady's New Magazine (London)(June, 1768), pp. 315-18 and 
361-63. This unsigned article, which gives the jury a prominent role in the constitution, 
seems to reflect Wilkite views, but it is careful to employ standard propositions in its 
creation of a powerful place for the jury. 
74. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, p. 135. 
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tions of law and questions of fact. " 75 
None of these prominent academic legal writers directed his attention 
specifically to the debate resulting from trials for seditious libel. Indeed, 
none set out to write mainly about the jury. Rather each developed a 
distinctive approach to the legal system generally, fitting the jury into the 
larger scheme of things. None subscribed to a far-reaching theory of 
endemic jury law-deciding, but all believed-or strongly implied-that for 
the legal system to operate fairly, recourse to the jury-monitoring of 
judicial instructions on the law would sometimes be necessary. This 
conception of the jury was of course shared-and fruitfully used-by 
most writers who wrote in response to the government's doctrine of 
seditious libel. For these latter writers, however, the jury was not 
incidentally, but rather in the main, a safeguard against oppression. 
Robert Morris, the Wilkite barrister and secretary of the Society for 
Supporters of the Bill of Rights, sounded a theme to which many of 
Mansfield's opponents rallied when he wrote: "The great province of a 
jury in criminal matters is to make true deliverance of the subject from 
false accusation, and especially from oppressive prosecutions of the 
Crown.' '76 The jury, Glynn was quoted as stating at the trial in 1770 of the 
publisher John Miller, are "in times of danger the asylum of the 
people. "77 It was to protect "every subject of the state, from the abuse of 
executive power," wrote Thomas Leach, that the English constitution 
required "the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals. " 78 Judges, who 
were still dependent upon the Crown for "pensions" and "places, which 
they hold at the mere pleasure of their minister, " 79 were not above 
"crafty distinctions and ensnaring eloquence"; they "throw dust in the 
eyes, and confound the sense of a well-meaning jury. "so Such invective 
became a commonplace in the years between the Wilkes affair and the 
Dean of St. Asaph's trial.s1 
The encomiums of the more radical supporters of the jury typically 
began with generalities from Hale or Blackstone and went on to the limits 
75. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 505. 
76. Robert Morris, A Letter to Sir Richard Aston, ... Containing a reply to his 
scandalous abuse [of R. M.]; and some thoughts on the modern doctrine of Libels (London, 
1770), p. 40. 
77. Paraphrase of Glynn's speech in Bingley's Journal (London) (July 21, 1770), p. 3, col. 
3. Glynn appears actually to have said (State Trials, 20:880): "For we all know, that in all 
times, the honest, intrepid, upright conduct of a jury must be the refuge of the people of this 
kingdom .... They must and will, in the natural course and evolution of things, flee again 
to the same asylum." 
78. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 9. 
79. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 56. 
80. Bingley's Journal (June 30, 1770), p. I, col. 2. 
81. See Brewer, "Wilkites and the Law," pp. 153-59. 
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of their authors' imaginations. Jury trial was, e.g., central to "the grand 
or principal law of this land, on which the justice of all the rest depend.' '82 
It was through the jury that subjects judged ''when the fundamental laws 
are violated; when an attempt is made to subvert the constitution. " 83 
Even the charges that jurors lacked legal training, were just plain 
ignorant, or were subject to popular passions became occasions for 
praise, albeit at times with a defensive tone. Jurors, it was frequently said, 
did not lack the natural capacity for the role they were being asked to 
play. They have, wrote Manasseh Dawes, "generally ajust sense of right 
or wrong. ''84 ''Juries have not a knowledge of the technical niceties of the 
law, as a profession," Capel Lofft conceded, "but the Constitution 
presumes them to understand it as a rule of civil rights in a general 
sense. "85 "Thanks be to God!" Anthony Highmore exclaimed, "there 
lives in mankind a sense of right and wrong that compels them to form the 
most impartial judgment they can. " 86 All three of these writers were 
trained in law; all opposed one or another Crown policy; and all resented 
use of the libel laws to silence criticism. 
To find law a general sense of civil rights and a sense of right and wrong 
were required, but not deep grounding in Scripture, custom, or the 
common law. For some, this was the irreducible core which law-finding 
theory had reached by the late eighteenth century ,87 So long as law-
deciding was linked to "pious perjury" or to egregious cases where the 
jury was required to stand as a bulwark against judicial overreach, even 
the moderate, bench-oriented Blackstone could be put to some use. 
George Rous, yet another Wilkite barrister, quoted Blackstone's admoni-
tion to subjects that they learn the law; their lack of such learning, 
Blackstone had written, ''has unavoidably thrown more power into the 
hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts, 
than perhaps the constitution intended. "88 
Some who supported the law-finding jury conceded that juries might 
make too much of their powers or misunderstand how they ought to be 
employed. Rous, e.g., wrote: "Jurors, like judges, may err through 
82. "Letter to be Read by all Jurymen" (Signed: "Brittanicus"), printed with An Address 
to the Jurymen of London, p. 19. 
83. Rous, A Letter to the Jurors of Great Britain, p. 50. 
84. Manasseh Dawes, England's Alarm!, p. 8. 
85. Capel Lofft, An Essay on the Law of Libels (London, 1785), p. 96. 
86. Anthony Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted in Criminal 
Prosecutions for Libel (London, 1791), p. 33. 
87. An editorial in The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 50 (Sept., 1771), p. 129, commented: 
"The wise institution of juries has contrived to make the conscience of every man a minister 
of the law to the utmost extent." 
88. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 10. See Blackstone, Commentaries, 1:8. 
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ignorance, or be misled by passion. "89 But the constitution wisely 
contained a remedy-where, i.e., a jury wrongly convicted the defendant. 
Drawing, as did many other tract writers, upon practice in common-run 
felonies, Rous asserted that "grace is always extended to the prisoner 
upon a proper representation from the judge. A refusal would be contrary 
to the duty of a sovereign, who swears, at his coronation, to execute 
justice in mercy. "90 In the case of seditious libel, however-at least 
before 1792-the government feared what it viewed as unwarranted 
acquittals, not unwarranted convictions. Those radical jury writers will-
ing to face this problem manipulated the language of the moderates Dagge 
and Blackstone, characterizing truly unwarranted acquittals as a "lesser 
inconvenience"91 and retreating to the well-worn maxim that it was better 
that many guilty went free than that one innocent man was convicted. 
However tolerable this maxim may have been in cases of manslaughter or 
petty theft, it was unlikely that authorities would be content to apply it to 
cases involving government critics. 
HI 
Only a minority of pro-jury writers who addressed the problem of 
seditious libel dealt openly and at length with true law-finding: the jury's 
right to reject an indictment, regardless of the judge's instructions, on the 
grounds that it failed to charge the defendant with a crime. Those who 
advanced this theory drew directly upon the late-seventeenth-century 
tracts by Rawles and Care, and the anonymous author of A Guide to 
Juries, all ofwhom had, in turn, drawn upon claims made by Lilburne and 
Penn. Perhaps the strongest version of this argument was the statement of 
the printer and bookseller Joseph Towers: 
It cannot be supposed ... that any jury should be arbitrarily directed 
to bring any man in guilty, when they are not convinced in their own 
minds, whether the action the accused person is charged with be a 
crime or not . . . not only whether he has been guilty of the action 
alleged against him, but whether he has been guilty of a crime.92 
89. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 60. 
90. Ibid., p. 61. 
91. Dagge, Considerations on Criminal Law, p. 135. See Blackstone, Commentaries, 
4:344: [T]he "delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all 
free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters." 
92. Joseph Towers, An Enquiry into the Question, Whether Juries are, or are not, Judges 
of Law, as well as of Fact; With a particular Reference to the case of Libels (London, 1764), 
p. 52. 
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The most offensive aspect of the seditious libel doctrine-so far as 
pro-jury writers were concerned-was that truth was not a defense; 
moreover, the prosecution did not have to convince a jury that a libel in 
fact brought the government into disrepute or created a threat to public 
order, even though indictments for seditious libel alleged that the defend-
ant had published certain statements "seditiously" and "factiously." 
Thus one writer, who reproduced some ten pages of Rawles's famous 
tract, concluded in his own terms: 
From all which it is evident, that however heinous a fact may be 
represented by hard work and artful innuendoes in an indictment or 
information, the jury may with impunity, and ought in conscience to 
bring in the general verdict, not guilty, not only when they think the 
fact has not been proved by sufficient witnesses, but also when they 
think the fact is not such a heinous fact as is charged in the indictment 
or information.93 
Another writer made the point in his comments upon the Penn-Mead trial 
of a century earlier: 
[A]s the jury were not convinced, that the fact, with which Penn and 
Mead were charged was in itself a crime, they were unwilling to 
condemn them; though, attending to the matter offact only, they could 
not avoid it, because the fact was fully proved .... [I]t is plain, the jury 
had respect, in their last verdict, entirely to the matter of law. For as 
they were convinced, that Penn and Mead had not been guilty of any 
criminal or illegal action, they could not honestly and conscientiously 
do any thing but acquit them.94 
In their arguments for true law-finding powers, jury proponents looked 
for support to the rules of criminal procedure and to the nature of the 
substantive criminal law. Most of the arguments devolving from proce-
dure touched upon the supposed theoretical liability of the jury to an 
attaint. Although this ancient procedure had probably never been applied 
in criminal cases,95 most eighteenth-century jury proponents referred only 
to its "disuse," drawing the conclusion (perhaps from Restoration tracts) 
93. Address to the Jurymen of London, p. 16. See also The North Briton, no. 168 (June 
16, 1770), p. 426 (Letter from "Cato"); The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. I (Jan., 1770), p. 
236 (anonymous tract, asserting that the jury, which applies law to fact, acquits where 
someone is indicted for "fact that is no crime"); The Political Register, vol. 9, no. 51 (Oct., 
1771), p. 189 ("On the Perversions of Law from its Constitutional Course," asserting, "The 
judges may advise, and if their arguments convince a jury, the jury is conscience bound to 
find as they advise; but it is the finding of the jury which is the determination and 
intepretation of the law"). 
94. Bingley's Journal (June 23, 1770), p. 2, col. I. 
95. See above, Chapter 6, section IV. 
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that attaint, like the fining of jurors, had once been but was no longer 
permitted by English law. The original law of attaint, they asserted, must 
have assumed the right of juries to decide law as well as fact, for attaint 
had applied only in those cases where the jury had found "bad" law.96 A 
Treatise on the Right of Juries (1771) carried this analysis one step 
further: the fact that since Bushel's Case the law had supplied no certain 
means of controlling jury verdicts in the case of an acquittal proved not 
only that the jury had the power but also that it had the right to find law .97 
Even Justice Willes, who voted with the majority in St. Asaph' s Case, 
found this argument persuasive.9s His views were rephrased on the eve of 
Parliament's consideration of the Libel Act by Thomas Leach, a barrister 
and police magistrate, who wrote: 
In the institutions of civil government, power and right, are, and 
must be, convertible terms. Civil power, and civil right, are the mere 
creatures of the law and know no other limits, than the law imposes 
upon them. The law speaks the language of prohibition, not of 
admonition. What it permits to be done, uncensured, and confirms, 
when it is done, it has delegated the power to do, and the exercise of 
that power, is of right.99 
Similarly, jury writers argued that the theory of the special verdict 
presumed that juries had a valid law-finding role. A jury could render a 
special verdict in a case if it doubted the validity of a certain application 
of the law to the facts. 10o If the jury had no such doubts, it was therefore 
said, the jury might find law as well as fact.IOI This argument, however, 
established nothing more than that juries applied law to fact. The law 
might still be said to have been taken from the bench, a point that many 
tract writers well understood. 102 Finally, many writers cited the practice 
of defense counsel in seditious libel cases for the proposition that juries 
96. A Treatise on the Right of Juries (London, 1771), pp. 16, 25, 39. 
97. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
98. 4 Douglas 171, 99 Eng. Rep. 824-25: "Where a civil power of this sort has been 
exercised without control, it presumes, nay, by continual usage, it gives the right." 
99. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 8. See also Charles, Earl Stanhope, 
The Rights of Juries defended, and the objections to Mr. Fox's Libel Bill refuted (London, 
1792), pp. 98-99. Fox himself made this argument in introducing his bill in 1791. See 
Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 564-65. 
100. Blackstone, Cummentaries, 4:354. 
101. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 48: "[W]here they are certain [of the "operation of 
law"], they may and ought to take the determination upon themselves. The power juries 
most undoubtedly have, of determining, upon the general issue, both the fact and the law 
which arises out of that fact." Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 9; Dagge, Considerations on 
Criminal Law, p. 131. 
102. See e.g. Romilly, Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries upon 
Trials for Libels, p. 8. 
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had the right to consider questions of law. The bench frequently allowed 
counsel to argue points of law to the jury, or even to question the validity 
of the official doctrine of seditious libel in their summations.J03 
Yet arguments that relied upon the nature of criminal procedure and 
trial practice were entirely too fragile to support a far-reaching claim to 
jury law-finding. The attaint issue was dead (indeed, it had never been a 
live consideration in criminal cases); the existence of special verdicts, it 
could be countered, proved only that in some cases the jury had doubts 
concerning a very restricted "law-applying" role. As for the leeway 
allowed counsel in their summations, such judicial leniency was hardly a 
sound foundation for the construction of a matter of jury right. Few 
laymen sufficiently understood criminal procedure to appreciate what 
were, in any case, tepid rejoinders to Mansfield's dissertations on the ever 
growing body of precedent. 
Of greater importance, though equally limited in logic, were arguments 
based upon the nature of the substantive criminal law, not only in political 
cases but in common-run cases as well. The criminal law, it was stated, 
was "within reach of the plainest understanding. "I04 Such claims, it is 
true, were only a pale reminder of mid-seventeenth-century assertions 
concerning the relationship between criminal law and the Scriptures; nor 
was it the point that the common man could know the law merely by 
examining his heart. But the criminal law was knowable. The entire 
system of criminal justice assumed as much: 
To say the truth, one could hardly imagine a more extravagant 
absurdity, than to hold, that a criminal shall not remove the imputation 
of guilt by pleading ignorance of the law; and yet, that a jury who try 
him have no capacities to judge of that law .105 
The logical conclusion of the argument that only the bench and bar 
possessed the ability to understand the law, it was said, was that "we may 
daily transgress without being wilfully guilty. " 106 The robber, the sneak 
thief, the slayer: they knew the law as it applied to them. The point was 
frequently repeated, always with a certain tone of astonishment: if the 
jury was not to decide law because men of their station lacked the 
necessary understanding, then the rationale for the official doctrine of 
seditious libel was inconsistent with the common understanding of mens 
103. London Evening Post (London) (June 21, 1770), p. 3, col. 3; Stanhope, Rights of 
Juries defended, pp. 128 et seq. 
104. Treatise on the Right of Juries, p. 15. 
105. Idem. See also Loughborough's remarks to the same effect in the Lords. Hansard, 
ed., Parliamentary History, 29: cols. 1297 (1792). 
106. The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London) (Dec. 6, 1784), p. 2, col. 2. 
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rea. 107 The analogy to common-run cases-to the common suspect, the 
"daily transgressor"-lent force to the point, but at the same time the line 
of argument here involved did not ground a true law-finding theory. To 
say that the jury possessed the ability to apply the law was not to say that 
the law they were to apply was to be "found" by them rather than to be 
set forth by the bench. 
IV 
For many commentators the issues of freedom of the press and, more 
generally, of the subject's right to criticize the government were more 
important than the jury question. The jury was significant not as an end in 
itself but as a safeguard against what were seen as the government's 
self-interested and abusive prosecutions. 
Arguments asserting that the jury was the protector of liberty were 
made both by those who conceived of the jury primarily as a fact-finder 
and by those who adhered to one or another variant oflaw-finding theory. 
Distrust of the government did not commit one to any particular concep-
tion of the jury. Yet the doctrine of seditious libel posed a special sort of 
problem. By drastically reducing the scope for factual determinations, the 
doctrine placed the defendant's fate almost wholly in official hands. 108 To 
assert the jury's right to play its traditional fact-finding role required an 
attack on the libel doctrine itself. Hence, all appeals to the jury neces-
sarily contained an express or implied demand that the jury reject the 
bench's instructions regarding the allocation of duties between judge and 
jury. Only a few writers bothered to focus on the problem-it seemed to 
go without saying. Of the pro-jury writers, Joseph Towers most ef-
fectively .united the themes of distrust of government and the jury's right 
to decide the allocation-of-duties question raised by the seditious libel 
doctrine: 
It would, perhaps, be as unreasonable, that kings should be suffered 
themselves to determine the bounds of their own prerogative, as that 
judges should be permitted finally to decide, when the point in contest 
107. Joseph Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, in trials for Libels 
(London, 1784), p. 42. But see the anonymously authored reply to Towers, An Examination 
into the rights and duties of Jurors; with some strictures on the Law of Libels. (By a 
Gentleman of the Inner Temple) (London, 1785). The author admitted that the promulgation 
of comprehensible laws was a necessary reform project. But in the meantime: "The end of 
the laws is obedience: but who will obey them farther than it shall please himself, if every 
man be allowed to plead an ignorance, almost impossible to be disproved?" (p. 61). 
108. A Second Postscript to a Late Pamphlet, entitled A Letter to Mr. Almon, in Matter 
of Libel. By the Author of that letter (London, 1770), p. 15. 
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is, what is the extent of their own jurisdiction, and what is the extent 
of that of juries.Jo9 
Thus, much, if not most, of the literature proclaiming the jury's right to 
find law as well as fact was concerned with the problem of the allocation 
of duties between judge and jury. Though many tract writers seem not to 
have realized it, this conceptualization of the problem hid important 
disagreements on the law itself. For many writers assigned as facts for the 
jury matters that the bench did not consider at all relevant. Nonetheless, 
for many opponents of the official doctrine the claim regarding jury 
law-finding was simply an exhortation to jurors that they insist that 
certain questions were matters of fact rather than matters of law. Once 
the jury had claimed the questions for its own it would merely find the 
fact, in seditious libel as in other cases. 
In the years following Rex v. Frankfinuo the assertion that seditious-
ness was purely a question of fact became quite common. Pro-jury writers 
argued that, at one level, the question of the seditiousness of the writing 
could be reduced to the question, Had the writing "scandalized" the 
government? But what test should the jury apply when making this 
assessment? The proponents of free speech and press and of the trialjury 
insisted that mere evidence of negative criticism was not sufficient, that a 
writing was not criminal unless, at the very least, measurable harm was its 
probable result.ll 1 Some characterized the test as more complex still. 
Robert Morris thought it should be "[t]he purport of expressions, the 
tendency to sedition, the infamy, the reproach oflanguage"; that, he said, 
"can never so well be decided as by the common class of mortals to 
whom the publication is made. Who [is] more interested than juries (for 
juries are composed of the people) to preserve the peace and order of the 
state? ... Juries are a tribunal ever changing as the times; they judge of 
men's writings and actions by what they see and feel. "m The decider of 
fact, George Rous asserted, sounding a theme dear to the hearts of all 
Wilkites, "must enter into common life ... must attend to the politics of 
the day ... must imbibe the sentiments of the people .... Juries taken by 
lot . . . are peculiarly the proper judges in cases of libel. " 113 The 
109. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, p. 29. In his reply to Towers, 
the author of An Examination into the rights and duties of Jurors asserted: "Where else 
shall we seek the boundaries, by which authority of different courts is restrained, but in the 
solemn adjudication of the superior courts of justice?" (p. 69). 
110. See above, n. 12. 
111. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, pp. 8 et seq. See also the 
letter from "B. L." in The Freeholder's Magazine, vol. 2 (June, 1770), p. 203: "tendency to 
subvert ... liberty." 
112. Morris, A Letter to ... Aston, pp. 42-43. 
113. Rous, Letter to the Jurors, p. 51. 
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determination that must be made, wrote Joseph Towers, required practi-
cally no knowledge of the law; the allegedly seditious publications were 
"generally addressed to men of all professions, and such of them as can 
be understood only by lawyers, are not very likely to produce tumults or 
insurrections. " 114 Highmore developed the same theme: if one argues that 
a libel is dangerous because it might arouse the common people, then one 
assumes that the people understand the writing and therefore must be 
qualified to be jurors, to determine whether a writing is, in fact, likely to 
arouse. "No man ever wrote, or read, sedition, but he knew that it was 
so: and this, without a little more knowledge of the law than is amply 
sufficient to answer all the purposes of his civil capacity as a citizen." m 
Here, where pro-jury writers referred specifically to the kind of fact-
finding they believed relevant to the matter of seditious libel, they 
frequently drew attention to the jury's traditional assessment of the 
element of provocation in cases of homicide.116 It is possible that some 
pro-jury tract writers, in their attempts to portray seditiousness as a 
question of fact (as in other cases), were induced to concede more than 
they otherwise might have. They were led to define seditiousness in terms 
of a writing's tendency to arouse people, especially that class of common 
people from which jurors were typically drawn. Some writers seem at 
times to have turned their attention from the question of the truth or of the 
intrinsic value of the criticism, matters that were less easily portrayed as 
facts within the competence of the average jury .117 
At yet a second level, most writers insisted that proof of scandal did not 
suffice to establish true seditiousness. There had also to be a finding of 
intent to scandalize-true criminal intent-indeed, true malice. us This, 
114. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, p. 33. 
115. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, p. 35. 
116. See below, text at n. 126. 
117. It is possible that most writers thought that three separate tests ought to be applied: 
the writing must be false; it must have a tendency to "arouse"; the defendant must have 
intended that the writing ''arouse.'' Indeed, a fourth test may be implied: the defendant must 
have known that the writing was false. Few authors approached these questions systemati-
cally; the highly polemical characters of the tracts leaves the impression that their authors 
would have required any or all of these tests, although they sometimes addressed one of 
them as though it were the "true" test. For an excellent discussion of "Father of Candor's" 
near rejection of the "bad tendency" test see Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp. 149-54. 
"Father of Candor" [An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, concerning Libels, 
Warrants and the Seizure of Papers . .. in a Letter to Mr. Almon from the Father of Candor 
(London, 1764)] implied that true harm or injury ought to be required. This position went 
beyond that taken by other writers, but it seems that (to the extent "Father of Candor" 
actually espoused it) it did not include statements that were "wilfully false" (pp. 48, 160). 
This tract has been reprinted (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970). 
118. E.g. Another Letter to Mr. Almon, in matter of Libel (London, 1770), p. 31. The 
author states that the jury ought to acquit if the defendant acted "without any wicked 
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too, was at times portrayed as a matter of pure fact-finding in terms with 
which we are now familiar. What words were intended to mean, said 
Morris, was a factual, hence a jury question. 119 Though establishing that 
meaning, as Francis Maseres argued, required the jury to draw inferences 
from facts, those inferences were "secondary" facts, which required 
"common sense, not technical learning. " 120 Juries were especially quali-
fied in cases of libel since they knew "street talk"121 and could draw the 
proper inferences. As another writer put it: a "jury of common coffee-
house politicians in London" was best qualified to determine the fact of 
whether words were meant to be scandalous. 122 
In most tracts, however, the discussion of criminal intent moved well 
beyond the immediate issue of seditious libel. Here, more than at any 
other point, writers looked to the role of juries in common-run felonies. 
Traditionally, juries assessed guilt or innocence largely on the basis of the 
intent with which an act had been committed. It was within this 
assessment that the jury, consciously or otherwise, had always applied its 
own standards of justice, weighing intent and conduct (and perhaps 
reputation) against the prescribed sanction. By ruling that criminal intent 
would be inferred by the bench from the writing itself, the bench 
threatened the more modest but ancient law-finding tradition and, hence, 
the values that the right to jury trial had long epitomized. 
The pro-jury writers' failure to maintain consistently the idea-ought 
one say, the tactical stance?-that the question of intent could be reduced 
to a purely factual matter is reflected in their constant analogizing to the 
jury's role in homicide cases. In homicide cases, as many tract writers 
pointed out, the bench drew the jury's attention to the differences among 
malice aforethought, sudden deliberateness, unintentional homicide, and 
intentional but justifiable homicide, and thereupon left the matter to the 
jury .123 The homicide analogy was in fact cited to prove that juries had the 
intent.'' He analogizes this to a finding that a defendant in homicide slew ''without malice,'' 
and then continues: "[I)f the jury are convinced, that although [the defendant] wrote or 
printed and published it, he did so without any traitorous, seditious, scandalous, or 
malicious intent, they ought to find him ... not guilty.'' (idem). See also A Dialogue between 
a. Country Farmer and a Juryman (London, 1770), p. 8. 
119. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 42. 
120. Francis Maseres, An Enquiry into the extent of the power of juries on trials of 
indictments or informations (2nd ed., London, 1785; orig. published 1776), pp. 30-31. 
121. Idem. 
122. Another Letter to Mr. Almon, p. 48. 
123. E.g. The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly stated (London, 1752), pp. 
14-15; Another Letter to Mr. Almon, p. 31; Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of 
Juries, p. 21. Standard treatment of the jury's role in homicide encouraged this understand-
ing. See e.g. Readings upon the Statute Law, by a Gentleman of the Middle Temple 
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right to apply law to the facts. It was this traditional law-applying role that 
the bench was attempting to remove in seditious libel cases, or so many 
pro-jury writers charged. 124 Thomas Leach, extrapolating from homicide 
to "all other cases of crime"-by which he meant seditious libel-
declared: 
On indictment for murder, the jury decide, not only that the person, 
charged to have been murdered, did die, in consequence of the act of 
the defendant, and that such act resulted from a design to kill; which 
are matters of fact: But they also decide, whether from the particular 
circumstances, attending the homicide, it is to be ranked in that class, 
which the law justifies or excuses; or whether from the degree of 
criminal intention in the defendant it comes within the legal definition 
of the crime of manslaughter; or amounts to murder, which, if the 
intention of the libeller be matter of law, are evidently also matters of 
law.Jzs 
For Leach, as for so many others across the half-century of active 
debate, the homicide analogy provided the basic model. Did the defend-
ant strike (did he publish); did the blow cause death (did the writing 
scandalize); were the blow and death (or the scandal) intended and, if so, 
was there true malice or was the act justified or excusable? There was 
bound to be occasional disagreement between judge and jury on what 
constituted one or another degree of malice, on the limits of justification 
and excuse, or on their application to a given case. That was often true in 
homicide and it was certain to be true in seditious libel. The centuries-
long tradition of allowing the jury leeway in its application of the law of 
homicide appears to have colored assumptions about the appropriate 
judge-jury role in seditious libel. And just as disagreements between judge 
and jury on the law of homicide were conceptualized as disagreements 
merely about application of law to fact, so were such disagreements 
conceptualized by many opponents of the official doctrine of seditious 
libel. 
It is not surprising pro-jury writers drew primarily upon common 
practices in cases of homicide, a shrinking category, 126 rather than upon 
such practices in prosecutions for theft, which accounted for most of the 
business of the assize courts. In the case of theft, mitigation operated 
(London, 1725), pp. 97, 102; Giles Jacob, The Student's Companion: or, The Reason of the 
Law of England (London, 1725), p. 106. 
124. E.g. Doctrine of Libels, pp. 14-15; Romilly, Fragment on the Constitutional Power 
and Duty of Juries, pp. 6 et seq. 
125. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, p. 7. 
126. See Lawrence Stone, "Interpersonal Violence in English Society 1300-1980," Past 
and Present (1983), pp. 22-33; Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial," 
pp. 44-46. 
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typically as an open means of commuting the death sentence for many 
defendants who had clearly committed the act with which they had been 
charged. Although it was also employed where the evidence was doubt-
ful, we have seen that in this context the concept of "safe" evidence was 
itself a function of the desire to use execution only sparingly. The thief's 
behavior was viewed as premeditated and insidious, virtually always as 
reprehensible, rarely as excusable. It is true that in most cases, especially 
where there had not been physical violence, the act itself was deemed by 
many as not meriting capital punishment. Moreover the thief's behavior 
was often seen as in part the product of social conditions; it was hoped 
that the thief might be reformed. But the thief's behavior was viewed 
nonetheless as intrinsically evil. 
Homicide presented a more complex problem. The taking of a life had 
always been viewed as a particularly serious matter. But the defendant's 
intent could be very evil or fully justified, or something in between. It 
might be (and often was) excusable under the law. In many cases, verdicts 
of self defense, accident, or manslaughter served to mitigate the law of 
sanctions in favor of defendants whose acts (like those perpetrated by 
thieves) were nonetheless viewed socially as evil. But in other cases, such 
verdicts reflected a very different social response. The behavior of the 
true self-defender was fully accepted. And like the true self-defender, the 
true ''public defender'' deserved at least vindication, if not approbation. 
The homicide analogy was also attractive because the process of the 
jury's resolution was often hidden from view, perhaps from the conscious 
understanding of the jurors themselves. It was a process around which 
myths might grow. Eighteenth-century commentators could suppose that 
jurors in homicide trials were engaged mainly in a subtle assessment of 
the defendant's intent at the time he committed the homicide in question. 
To the observor, the jurors' consideration of the defendant's reputation 
and character might be assimilated to their determination of the 
defendant's intent. This consideration need not be understood as the 
largely separate matter that all contemporaries knew it was in theft cases, 
where more often than not it influenced the jury only in its "sentencing" 
role. 
Finally, opponents of the official doctrine of seditious libel were greatly 
influenced by Rawles, who had cited the jury's right to decide among the 
various kinds of homicide verdicts as evidence of their right to decide law 
as well as fact. Through Rawles eighteenth-century writers-perhaps 
without realizing it-reached back to the parliamentary censure of Chief 
Justice Kelyng and, ultimately, to de facto practices of medieval juries. 
The daily practice in cases involving theft conditioned attitudes regarding 
the role of mercy and the right of the jury to share assessment of just 
deserts. But it was the jury's role in homicide cases that allowed the 
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strongest, most attractive, and best documented argument for the jury's 
right to "apply" the law within the "factual" assessment of whether the 
defendant had acted with a truly criminal intent. 
v 
The claim that the jury's inalienable role was that which it played daily 
in routine felonies-the application of the law that had been set forth by 
the bench-lay close to the core of the attack on the law of seditious libel. 
The true law-finding issues of the debate-the jury's capacity to compre-
hend the law sufficiently to determine whether the judge had chosen apt 
precedents or had interpreted the r~levant common law or statutes 
correctly-would continue to attract great attention, but the more routine 
discussion of whether the jury had the right merely to apply the law in 
seditious libel "as in other cases" was perhaps an equally important 
aspect of the debate. When the jury writers addressed this most basic 
level of law-finding they revealed something of their conception of the 
nature and purpose of the jury trial in all criminal cases. 
We have seen that in practice the criminal trial had always been 
person-as well as act-oriented. Assessment of the defendant's charac-
ter had traditionally affected the jury's view of his just deserts. 127 
Character and credibility of course bore on the question of whether the 
defendant had committed the act alleged in the indictment, and in that 
sense the jury found the fact that it was charged to find. This observation 
was contained in The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of Juries fairly 
stated, published in 1752: 
[I]f from the character of the person libelled they think they have 
reason to believe, that he has been guilty of those facts, and that from 
the character of the person accused of libelling they have reason to 
believe [the defendant] would not have charged any man with such 
facts unless he had known him to be guilty, they ought to bring their 
verdict Not Guilty. . . . This is a latitude which every jury ought to 
take, and a latitude which will be of great importance for every man to 
endeavor to preserve a good character in his neighborhood.12s 
127. See Beattie, "Crime and the Courts," pp. 173-74, 179, for a discussion of the impact 
of reputation and character on verdicts in the eighteenth century. These considerations were 
influential also at the reprieve and pardoning stages. See above, Chapter 7, nn. 50-54 and 
accompanying text. It is likely that judicial and royal attitudes influenced those of trial 
jurors, and vice versa. Indeed, this dialectical pattern of influence was probably present 
from the beginning of trial by jury. 
128. Doctrine of Libels, p. 10. 
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This "latitude" was implicit in every jury trial. Thus George Stanhope 
in his sermon entitled The Duty of Juries, which was delivered in 1701 at 
the Lent Assizes, conceded that in close cases 
[w]e may allow some abatements for a criminal action alleged against 
a person unblameable for the main, and impute it to ignorance, or 
sudden transport or passion, or misadventure, rather than to malice 
and wicked design; which abatements cannot fairly be allowed to those 
abandoned wretches, who are scandalous for mischievious dispositions 
and a profligate conversation.I29 
The problem was how to delineate between appropriate and inappropri-
ate "abatements." That depended upon the sufficiency of the proof 
offered at trial, of which juries were without dispute the final judges. The 
official doctrine of seditious libel avoided this assessment entirely. The 
only facts left to the jury were so fully proved as to be virtually 
undeniable, and there was in any case nothing to balance against them, 
since intent was "implied" as a matter of law. What the opponents of the 
official law were demanding was the return to the jury, as a question of 
fact, or of application of law to fact, of the complicated, intensely social 
question of criminal intent. 
The seditious libel literature often assigned to the jury an even more 
open-ended role than the above discussion of criminal intent suggests. 
Fundamentally, according to jury writers, whether in prosecutions for 
seditious libel, homicide, theft, or any other criminal offense, the defense 
of the general verdict amounted to the defense of the defendant's right to 
a "merciful" judgment by peers. And "mercy" might be appropriate 
even in cases where the defendant was guilty under the law. The core of 
the power to decide "law as well as fact" was the jury's right to nullify the 
law in particular cases without rejecting it as a general matter. 
That the English criminal law was a "merciful" law was a cliche in the 
eighteenth-century literature.Bo The identification of the jury with mercy 
operated on two levels. Most writers, referring to the fact-finding process, 
asserted that, as Towers put it: "Where the matter is doubtful, in criminal 
prosecutions, an acquittal is always most consonant to the spirit of the 
129. George Stanhope, The Duty of Juries (London, 1701), p. 12. Stanhope added: "But 
still ... these are but probabilities and presumptions and must come in their proper place. 
For where they are admitted to overbalance credible and full peremptory proof, there we 
offend against the Text (i.e., Levit. XIX, 15) and have respect of persons in judgment" 
(idem). 
130. E.g. An Inquiry into the Doctrine Lately Propagated, concerning Attachments of 
Contempt (London, 1769), pp. 40-41; Treatise on the Right of Juries, p. 42; Paley, Principles 
of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 522. 
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law of England. "131 Hinting at a yet broader role for the granting of 
mercy, Highmore observed: "[T]hejury know that by their verdict alone, 
and not by the knowledge oflaw in the judge, the prisoner at the Bar must 
be acquitted or suffer death." m As in the capital felonies of murder or 
theft, he implied, so in the noncapital high misdemeanor of seditious libel. 
Morris drew an analogy to the royal power of pardon: "Like the king in 
the extension of mercy [the jury] make so noble a use of their power when 
their consciences permit them to acquit. " 133 The anonymous author of A 
Treatise on the Right of Juries (1771) introduced his discussion of 
seditious libel with a conventional encomium of the merciful quality of the 
law in common felony cases: 
Mercy is the characteristic and leading feature of an English jury. They 
are apt now and then to err upon the favourable side: but let us consult 
the gentle spirit of our law, and we shall find it would rather dispense 
with the punishment of a hundred guilty persons, than permit a single 
innocent man to suffer. If on the other hand the jury should happen to 
be vindictive, the King's pardon interferes, to counteract them. The 
good sense and liberal feelings of the law in this well tempered 
regulation cannot be enough admired: It impowers juries to acquit 
absolutely, but reduces and softens their power to convict by enabling 
the Crown in its mercy to withhold punishment. 134 
In his Address to the People of Scotland, William Smellie described this 
commonplace but significant aspect of the jury's application of mercy. 
Commenting upon the statutory extension of jury trial to Scotland, and 
borrowing the terminology of the English seditious libel debate, he 
asserted: 
If, therefore, the power of judging of the law as well as the fact, were 
annihilated, the very intention of the legislature would be defeated; 
because the courts, and not the jury, would then be the sole judges. 
Intention is the essence of crimes. The facts [charged] may be 
distinctly proved. But, if from particular circumstances, the jury are 
convinced in their own minds, that the [defendant] either had no 
intention to commit a crime, or that the crime is not of so heinous a 
nature as to merit the punishment concluded for in the indictment, in all 
cases of this kind, the jury have not only a right, but they are bound, 
131. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty of Juries, pp. 109-10. See also Romilly, 
Fragment on the Constitutional Power and Duty of Juries, p. 3. 
132. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, p. 26. 
133. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, p. 40. Morris and other Wilkites opposed the 
widespread use of discretion in the courts, seeing it as a device by which authorities 
extended or withdrew the subjects' rights almost at will. They appear to have made an 
exception of the jury. See Brewer, "Wilkites and the Law," pp. 16()....61. 
134. Treatise on the Right of Juries, p. 42. 
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by the spirit of their oaths, and by the laws of God and man, to find the 
[defendant] Not Guilty of the crime .... They consider the nature of 
the crime, and the punishment that ought or ought not to be inflicted. 
In all such cases, the jury must necessarily determine both the law and 
the fact. m 
Finding law as well as fact, applying law to fact, or rendering a 
"merciful verdict," amounted to assessing the nature of both the 
defendant's intent and his act in the light of the punishment that would 
follow upon his conviction. The jury might approve of the defendant's 
behavior, as in some political cases, or might disapprove of it but deem 
the prescribed punishment too severe, as in some common-run felonies. 
Very different underlying motives, to be sure, but nonetheless, at least 
within the confines of some jury tracts, the fusion of jury theories was 
complete .136 
VI 
Fox's Libel Act marked a triumph for those whose concept of the 
English constitution was grounded in history. It vindicated the historic 
role of the jury as the last line of defense against executive tyranny. 
Although precedent could be found for treating seditious libel as an 
anomaly, the prior official doctrine nonetheless seemed to many a 
dangerous departure from deeply held assumptions about English govern-
ance. At one level Parliament's concern was with the law. Fox's Act was 
couched as a declaration of the common law, resting not on precedent but 
on general principles of that law .m Parliament looked first to the law 
regarding criminal trials generally. That law was assumed to govern; 
exceptions would be tolerated only where that law itself provided 
compelling reasons for them. Parliament's solution to the seditious libel 
problem was also the result both of politics and of the nearly irresistible 
force of broad constitutional principles. The pressures for the expansion 
135. William Smellie, An Address to the People of Scotland on the Nature, Powers and 
Privileges of Juries (Edinburgh, 1815; orig. published 1784), pp. 13-15. 
136. But see Maseres, An Enquiry into the extent of the power of juries. Maseres argued 
that consideration of the seriousness of an offense found by the jury was a matter for the 
court: "For if it shall be made to appear by just and legal reasonings at the bar, that the 
writing and publishing the paper in question, though it was done deliberately, and has the 
tendency ascribed to it in the information [as found by the jury], yet it is not an offense of 
such great and public consequence as to have been an object of legal punishment, it will be 
the duty of the court to forebear giving judgment. ... But this ... is a matter which judges 
only have a right to determine, either upon a motion made before them on behalf of the 
defendant in arrest of judgment, or of their own accord" (p. 34). 
137. See above, n. 62 and accompanying text. 
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of rights of speech and press were enormous. 138 Those rights might still be 
limited (few questioned punishing truly seditious writings), but they could 
not be reined in through what appeared to society at large to be a drastic 
revision of the historically vindicated balance of power between judge and 
jury. Retreat to the technical high ground of "questions of law" served 
only further to expose the government to attack by the opposition. In 
manipulating the balance of authority at trial, the government was seen to 
be manipulating one of the institutions through which it had historically 
ruled and on which it rested its claim to legitimacy. Having administered 
the law largely with the aid of the jury (one is tempted to conclude), the 
Crown and courts found they could not now govern mainly through the 
bench. 139 
To appreciate the way in which the government was captured by its 
own administrative history, we must recognize how little England's rulers 
controlled the circumstances that made law-finding, or discretionary 
fact-finding, a dominant element in the administration of the criminal law. 
For the most part, prosecution for felony proceeded in accordance with 
the attitudes of society at large. The alliance between authority and 
mercy-granting juries reflected a mixture of wise policy, acquiescence in 
the inevitable, and shared assumptions about justice.I4o We have seen 
that we must be cautious about extending the argument that authorities 
manipulated the selective enforcement of the criminal law in order to 
secure the deference of those they ruled to the problem of the use of the 
criminal trialjury. 141 If we focus too narrowly on the administration of the 
criminal law in the eighteenth century, we obscure the question of the 
roots of the system of mitigation. These practices were historically the 
138. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:672-74. Holdsworth took the view that the 
judges were right in their statement of the law, but that "it was clear that the law as laid 
down by the judges was quite out of harmony with the practical ideas and public opinion of 
the time" (p. 674). Levy (Legacy of Suppression, pp. 249-52) briefly discusses the tract 
campaign that preceded the passage of Fox'.s Libel Act. I discuss some aspects of the 
debates concerning the Act above, n. 64. Much remains to be said concerning those debates 
and the political views and interests of those in Parliament. Relatively few members of the 
Commons and the Lords spoke on the bill. Their views cannot be taken as the views of all, 
or even most, members. A true legislative history of the Act is badly needed; its results 
might lead to reconsideration of my analysis of the meanings of law- and fact-finding in the 
extraparliamentary debate concerning seditious libel in the period 1732-92. 
139. This conclusion is necessarily tentative. I have stated the point broadly, and mean 
it to say as much, but it may be that it applies mainly to the disparity between the treatment 
of routine cases on the one hand and seditious libel on the other and that contemporaries 
viewed that disparity as an isolated phenomenon. 
140. See above, Chapter 7, section IV. 
141. Hay ("Property, Authority and the Criminal Law") makes the argument with 
respect to Parliament's refusal to reform the law of sanctions. He makes little reference to 
the role of the jury. For discussion of Hay's views on the jury see above, Chapter 7, n. 156. 
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by-product of the criminal law in theft and homicide cases where 
complainant, defendant, and jury had frequently been (and often still 
were), relatively speaking, members of the same class. 142 The Crown and 
the bench and their attendant officials had an interest in overseeing the 
maintenance of order, but frequently they played the role of referees who 
lacked the resources, time, or stake in the outcome to prevent the jury 
from reaching a verdict according to its own sense of justice. Moreover, 
these practices, which long predated the eighteenth century, reflected 
social attitudes that were not easily managed or always willingly toler-
ated. This is not to say that authorities failed to capitalize on these 
sources of potential weakness, consciously or otherwise. It is to say that 
to the extent authorities reaped the benefits of governing through merciful 
justice, the interaction of rulers and ruled was complex and two-sided. In 
important ways, authorities prevailed at the behest of those they sought to 
rule. 
Our study of the seditious libel debate suggests that in yet another, 
related respect we must modify our understanding of the political and 
social implications of eighteenth-century law enforcement. The two 
strands of theory regarding the jury's rightful role could not forever 
remain separate. Jury law-finding in political cases could not be kept 
distinct from jury resolution in common-run felonies. In the popular mind 
at least, the strength and reach of the arguments against the seditious libel 
doctrine were almost certainly influenced by the nature of jury practice in 
common-run cases. Might it be that the same authorities who allowed 
juries to share the powers of mitigation in common-run cases found 
themselves by virtue of that policy on the defensive in prosecutions for 
seditious libel? If so, we must recognize that authorities sometimes 
reaped not deference but a bitter harvest largely of their own making. The 
irony is less striking than might at first appear: the policy of sharing 
powers of mitigation was, as we have seen, little more than acquiescence 
in practices authorities could not have eliminated easily. Having (over the 
142. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs. 5, 6; Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," p. 
107. But see Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth, and Theft in the Eighteenth Century," Past and 
Present, no. 95 (1982), p. 154, n. 100. There is need for more research on this matter. My 
essential point is that, whatever the status difference between suspects and their accusers 
(and jurors), the status difference between accusers (and jurors) and the bench was 
frequently far greater. Moreover, accusers and accused were sometimes from the same 
locale, nearly always from the same county; judges oversaw resolution of local disputes to 
which they were themselves outsiders, both geographically and socially. This was probably 
as much or even more the case in earlier centuries. So long as jurors typically took their lead 
from the bench, the bench countenanced substantial leeway in less serious cases. And even 
when jurors took their lead from the bench, they were responding to judicial attitudes that 
were themselves in part the reflection of long-held and widely shared community standards. 
352 Resolutions 
centuries) converted great weaknesses into moderate strength, England's 
rulers found that that strength had, after all, its naturallimits. 143 
It has been wisely observed that English authorities came to accept as 
binding certain concepts of due process in which they had cloaked their 
exercise of pure power .144 Something akin to this phenomenon seems to 
have been at work in Parliament's resolution of the seditious libel crisis. 
The Libel Act debates reflected a consensus on one principle only, that 
the criminal trial jury should have a right to return a general verdict on all 
facts in issue. That principle was recognized as having long constitutional 
standing. To deny it (or seem to deny it) in trials for seditious libel was not 
only to offend that principle but to risk political fire for offending it 
precisely in those circumstances that suggested the worst sort of mo-
tives.145 
Many in Parliament as of 1770 were persuaded by Mansfield's defense 
of the official doctrine of seditious libel. 146 Precedent and the uniqueness 
of seditious libel seemed to ground an exception to the general rule.147 
What, then, doomed the exception? Constitutionalism and politics are 
rarely separable. Parliament responded to both without being able to 
isolate either. The principle of a right to a general verdict in all cases had 
come to be identified socially with the prevailing theories regarding the 
purposes of the criminal trial jury. The principle was accepted by some 
143. I have made this argument in the present essay with regard to the administration of 
criminal law in the eighteenth century. I believe that it applies as well to earlier periods. 
Judges in the medieval period may have sensed that their relaxed treatment of juries in most 
cases made it difficult for them to control juries in those few cases in which they took a real 
interest. The early modern bench may have analyzed the resistance to fining jurors in similar 
terms. The phenomena I am describing were present from the outset of the jury-trial 
experience. The contest over the doctrine of seditious libel was of special importance 
because it involved widespread political debate and revealed the limits of authority during 
the very period in which authority was (ostensibly) corning to have relatively substantial 
control over the administration of criminal law. I shall return to this point in the conclusion 
to this book (Chapter 9). 
144. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 258-69. "And the rulers were, in serious senses, 
whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they played the games 
of power according to rules which suited them, but they could not break those rules or the 
whole game would be thrown away." See also Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law," pp. 32 et seq.; "Introduction," in Brewer and Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People, 
p. 20: "[T]he imprimatur of the law conferred only limited power on those who were its 
beneficiaries. Both the modus operandi of the law and the ideology that lay behind it served 
to constrain authority and to limit those who tried to manipulate the legal process." 
145. For references to the Libel Act debates see above, n. 64. 
146. See above, n. 25. 
147. But see the speech of Sir Thomas Townshend, who refused to make an exception in 
the case oflibel. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: cols. 1162-63. "He whom nature 
or education has not qualified for determining the guilt of a libel, is unqualified to sit as judge 
in cases of life and death" (col. 1162). 
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because they believed its rejection would appear (wrongly) to be a 
rejection of more general principles that all in fact accepted. It was 
accepted by others who would themselves have viewed a rejection in that 
way. At base in seditious libel was the historic role of the jury as a 
safeguard against tyranny. So long as that issue could be kept from being 
entangled with others, the sides might be clearly drawn; much would 
depend upon whether one viewed the settlement of 1689 as having 
rendered the safeguard unnecessary. But it could not be kept separate. So 
long as there were many in society who distrusted the role of authorities 
in seditious libel cases, the settlement would never be solely a matter of 
institutional framework as such. It would of course be a matter of the 
movement for free speech and of the liberties of subjects generally. No 
doubt that is how most members of Parliament saw the issue. But it would 
also be a matter of how society regarded the practice of institutions, of the 
very real importance of de facto powers, such as those of the jury in 
common-run felony cases. The idea that discretionary lay fact-finding was 
central to the administration of justice had taken on a life of its own, and 
no part of that administration could be shielded from it. Authorities could 
not, as it were, "bifurcate" the practice of trial by jury. The same judges 
who tolerated, or even encouraged, mitigated verdicts in homicide or 
theft could not easily explain why juries ought to play so limited a role in 
seditious libel. Notions of consistency and coherence were integral to the 
late eighteenth-century conception of justice. Nothing could gainsay 
them, not even the attendant risk of more subtle forms of inconsistency 
and incoherence-i.e., inconsistent jury verdicts-as the price of sedi-
tious libel law reform.I48 
148. Mansfield in St. Asaph's Case (State Trials, 21:1040) stressed the problem of 
inconsistent verdicts: "To be free, is to live under a government by law .... Miserable is 
the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the state, if there is no certain law, 
or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of the law to protect individuals, or to 
guard the state .... In opposition to this, what is contended for? That the law shall be in 
every particular cause what any twelve men . . . shall be inclined to think, liable to no 
review, and subject to no control. ... Under such an administration of law, no man could 
tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable." See also John 
Bowles, Considerations on the Respective Rights of Judge and Jury: particularly upon 
Trials for Libel, occasioned by an expected motion of the Right Hon. Charles-James Fox 
(London, 1791), p. 4: "It would be next to impossible that their [i.e., the jurors'] decision 
should accord with any uniform and fixed principles. The consequence would be, the 
prevalence of confusion and uncertainty in all legal proceedings where intervention of a jury 
takes place. A total loss of freedom must of course ensue; for the essence of freedom 
consists in the certainty of law." These considerations surfaced in Parliament both in 1770 
[e.g. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 16: col. 1146 (Thurlow); col. 1186 (De Grey)] and 
1792 [e.g. ibid., 29: col. 1297 (The Lord Chancellor)]. 
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The recognition of the right of the criminal trial jury to return a general 
verdict resolved one immediate political problem, but it contributed little 
to the resolution of some other longstanding problems of the criminal law. 
One of the important side effects of the seditious libel controversy was its 
intensification of the prevailing social conceptions of the criminal trial 
jury. The magnification of those conceptions and their translation to the 
sphere of political misdemeanors may have affected the administration of 
the law generally and delayed the movement for reform of the law of 
sanctions .t49 
It is possible, of course, that the seditious libel problem and its 
resolution only temporarily delayed and then ultimately accelerated the 
movement for reform of the law of sanctions. The penal reformers' 
argumeat against jury law-finding-i.e., against merciful fact-finding in 
common-run cases-lost some of its appeal when the integrity of the jury 
system seemed to be threatened in political misdemeanors. Resistance to 
the bench involved a glorification of jury independence; criticism of juries 
on all fronts may have become unfashionable. But in the years following 
passage of the Libel Act, juries, as is well known, convicted more often 
than they had before in cases of seditious libel. 150 The general verdict 
allowed the tenor of the times to take its toll, and perhaps reminded 
observers of the volatility of jury attitudes. In those years, the warnings 
of Mansfield, John Bowles, and others might have seemed well taken: 151 
the defendant's security was at risk; no one could be certain how juries 
would "apply" the law. One obvious solution to the problem of the jury 
that convicted against the law was a fuller right of appeal. 152 But for the 
149. This is, of course, a matter of speculation. Doubtless, many factors delayed the 
impact of the criticisms of the late-eighteenth-century reformers. See below, Chapter 9, 
section I. 
150. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:693. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, pp. 
252-54. Both Holdsworth and Levy rely heavily on Stephen's account of the aftermath of 
the Act. See Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 2:362-63. See also May, 
Constitutional History, 2:34 et seq. 
151. See above, n. 148. 
152. The Act itself (32 Geo. 3, c. 60, sect. IV) provided "[t)hat in case the jury shall find 
the defendant or defendants guilty, it shall or may be lawful for the said defendant or 
defendants to move in arrest of judgment, on such grounds and in such manner as by law he 
or they might have done before the passing of this act." See Holdsworth, History of English 
Law, 10:691-92. Holdsworth takes a view of the act that is perhaps too sanguine. He 
correctly stated that the question for the court was "whether the prosecution has satisfied 
the onus of proving that [the writing) is libellous." Whether "the settlement made by Fox's 
Act [was] very favourable to the accused" rests to some extent on one's view of the legal 
standards (including the relevance of truth) then existing that the court were always ready 
to apply and that juries might or might not apply depending upon the political climate. It 
rests also as a practical matter, on the way in which trial courts typically assessed the 
prosecution's case in seditious libel cases. Until a thorough study has been made of the 
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time being, the uncertainty of the law produced by the general verdict in 
seditious libel cases may have made it easier for penal reformers to 
resume criticizing jury discretion in common-run cases. The solution 
there was not to do away with the general verdict-that matter had been 
placed beyond reach-but rather to achieve certainty of law and punish-
ment through the unmitigated imposition of humane and moderate sanc-
tions. 
The constitutionalization of the general verdict perhaps raised the 
stakes for the penal reformers. Having reidentified the jury as the 
quintessential democratic institution in English society, Parliament would 
have to demonstrate definitively what eighteenth-century reform propo-
nents had only suggested: that the prevailing practice of jury-based 
mitigation in routine felonies had grown to such proportions that it was 
making a mockery of the law. Nothing less would suffice before Parlia-
ment could reduce the jury's role in common-run cases. Changes injury 
trial would follow, rather than precede, changes in English attitudes 
toward the entire problem of the administration of the criminallaw.l53 
treatment by the post-1792 bench of motions in arrest of judgment-in the light of the 
evidence proffered at trial by prosecution and defense in seditious libel cases-our own 
judgment must be reserved. 
153. See below, Chapter 9. 
9 Epilogue and Conclusion 
This concluding chapter falls into two principal parts, an epilogue and a 
summary, to each of which I have devoted two sections. In section I, I 
shall deal briefly and selectively with the background to the Victorian 
reform of the law of sanctions. I shall stress those developments that 
reveal the nature of the near impasse that confronted the English in the 
administration of criminal justice by the early nineteenth century. 
From the perspective I have chosen, the movement for reform of 
sanctions appears to have involved, inter alia, a widespread rejection of 
traditional assumptions about the virtues of jury-based intervention and, 
indeed, about the entire longstanding system of mitigation. Although the 
precise reasons for this transformation in contt::mporary thought remain 
elusive, the sea change it reflected seems, as I shall suggest in section II, 
a most natural denouement to the centuries-long process I have been 
describing. In section III, I discuss the themes of the book at length and 
identify some important questions that my work raises but which I am as 
yet unable to answer; I also allude to problems that fall within the subject 
of this book but which I do not treat in any of the essays that I have 
brought together. In the final section, I recapitulate my central arguments 
in a more direct fashion. 
I 
The movement for reform of the law of sanctions gained momentum in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century and bore fruit by the early 
years of Victoria's reign. Between 1830 and 1840, Parliament removed the 
capital sanction from many of the less serious offenses. Capital punish-
ment was retained for those offenses for which, as it happened, juries had 
from earliest times been relatively willing to convict offenders; it was no 
longer the nominal punishment for those offenses for which the jury had 
long served as one of the principal institutions of mitigation. Reform of 
sanctions thus brought to an end a long phase in the history of the English 
criminal trialjury. Jury-based mitigation of sanctions would continue, but 
at a greatly reduced level. In the popular mind, and in reality, the jury 
would usually adhere to the letter of the law. 
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The widely observed role of the jury as mitigator of the law of sanctions 
figured prominently in several aspects of the early-nineteenth-century 
movement for law reform. This is the final stage in the English debate 
over the trial jury that I shall discuss. My discussion will be brief, for the 
movement for reform has been thoroughly chronicled, and my own 
purposes are limited. 1 For the most part, my observations are retrospec-
tive, offered by way of conclusion. 
The movement for reform of sanctions had its roots in the mid-
seventeenth-century movement for law reform. 2 But it was the statutory 
manipulation of benefit of clergy in the early eighteenth century that 
represented the first important step in the direction of reform. We have 
seen that the resulting practical penology of the period both built upon 
longstanding mitigation practice and accommodated the notion that the 
threat of death was a necessary deterrenP Capital punishment would be 
imposed in only a handful of cases, but those cases would be identified as 
the residue of a winnowing process. The offender would be kept in doubt 
as to his fate for as long as it was deemed necessary and appropriate. 
Reform was shaped-and limited-by the perceived need for an element 
of terror in eighteenth-century penology. 
Contemporaries sometimes explained the need to maintain the death 
sanction as the price for not maintaining a large and professional police 
force. 4 Resistance to abandoning the legacy of a makeshift local and 
amateur constabulary prevailed not only among the county-based justices 
of the peace and their allies but also among the urban working class. Fears 
that a national police force would spawn both political centralization and 
oppression by the employer class intensified toward the end of the 
eighteenth century. 5 Proponents of a police system succeeded in 1792 in 
1. For a comprehensive statement of the reform movement see Beattie, Crime and the 
Courts, chs. 12-13. Beattie's masterful "Conclusion" (ch. 13) stresses the long-term 
preparation for the early nineteenth-century reforms and the speed with which reform was 
finally effected. I treat the developments involved sketchily and only in relation to the issue 
of the trial jury. See also Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, vol. I; W. R. 
Cornish, "Criminal Justice and Punishment," in Cornish eta!., eds., Crime and Law in 
Nineteenth Century Britain (Irish University Press, 1978), pp. 7-65; and Douglas Hay's 
astute summary essay, "Crime and Justice in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century En-
gland," in Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, eds., Crime and Justice: An Annual Review 
of Research, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1980), pp. 45-84. 
2. See above, Chapter 5, section V. 
3. See above, Chapter 7. 
4. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," pp. 115-16; David Philips, '"A New Engine of 
Power and Authority': The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England 
1780-1830," in Gatrell eta!., eds., Crime and the Law, pp. 155-89. See also Beattie, Crime 
and the Courts, ch. 2. 
5. Philips, '"A New Engine of Power and Authority,"' pp. 171-74. 
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passing an act for a stipendiary magistracy,6 but not until 1829 did they 
secure legislation establishing the basis for a truly professional force.7 In 
the intervening years the movements for reform of sanctions and for 
establishment of a professional police system dovetailed. The proponents 
of each reform fought against the common rationalization of the prevailing 
scheme of criminal administration: a police system would invite tyranny; 
in its absence, order depended upon the threat of the gallows; the decision 
regarding the gallows ought to be intrinsic to the prosecution of each 
individual offender. 
In theory, the selection of offenders for capital punishment on a 
case-by-case basis need not have involved the criminal trial jury more 
than for the initial determination of whether the suspect was guilty. Once 
the jury had found the defendant guilty the matter of sentencing could 
have been left to the bench and the Crown. We have seen that most 
eighteenth-century criminal law reformers, as well as apologists for the 
prevailing system of criminal law, favored centering the entire mitigation 
process (to the extent that it was to exist) in the Crown. We have also 
seen, however, that most reformers viewed such a resolution of existing 
problems as unrealistic. They recognized that, in practice, the jury would 
not always find the defendant guilty and leave his fate to higher authori-
ties. For the most part, reformers agreed that until the law of sanctions 
had been altered, juries would inevitably (and justifiably) play a substan-
tial role.s 
The system was even more complicated than most commentators 
indicated. In many cases the jury did in fact leave the decision on 
sentencing to the bench and Crown. But that was within the context of a 
system in which the jury possessed a great deal of power, should it wish 
to use it, and in which the jury's deference to the bench and the bench's 
deference to the jury were mutual. Moreover, in many cases involving 
jury-based mitigation the jury took its lead from the bench; again, the 
jury's willingness to do so must be understood in light of the fact that 
when the jury wanted to go its own way, it had the power to do so. 
Commentators may not have well understood the dynamics of the system, 
but their essential insight was correct: so long as the law of sanctions 
remained harsh, an entirely official system of mitigation of that law could 
not easily come into being. 
Law reformers in the early nineteenth century accepted the jury's role 
within the existing system as a given. Like the eighteenth-century 
reformers, their principal objective was certainty of the law. Thus they 
6. Stat. 32 Geo. 3, c. 53. 
7. Stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 44. 
8. See above, Chapter 7, section III. 
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argued for reform of the law of sanctions so that mitigation would not 
often be required. They did not, however, fall back on the argument that 
mitigation might continue so long as it was solely in the hands of the 
Crown. Romilly, in his famous speech in Parliament in 1810, framed the 
issue in terms that others were to follow. 9 The jury, Romilly argued, had 
been placed in the impossible position of having to choose in each case 
between imposing a sanction that it believed to be far too cruel in the hope 
that the Crown would mitigate it and committing an act ofperjury. 10 Not 
only did such perjury undermine the system of deterrence, but it also bred 
disrespect for the law. The reformers chose not to see the jury as part of 
a quasi-legitimate sentencing process, nor to view the oath as imposing 
responsibility to do justice in accordance with the terms in which juries 
had traditionally acted. Thus by the early nineteenth century the jury's 
longstanding tradition of merciful application of the law had come to be 
described as a kind of jury lawlessness. Far from blaming the jury for 
undertaking this lawless role, however, reformers sympathized with them 
in their plight, and portrayed themselves as friends of the jury who would 
save it from the "dilemma" that it faced daily. 11 
In his 1810 speech Romilly developed a theme that he had introduced 
decades before. Romilly had originally accepted Paley's description of the 
system of criminal law, asserting, in his reply to Madan, that Parliament 
had not intended that the law be enforced literally .12 He had both 
accepted the notion that Parliament intended the law to be enforced 
selectively and, true to the principles of the new penology, attacked such 
a system. By 1810 Romilly had come to believe that, even if Parliament 
had not intended that the law be enforced literally, there were no clear 
principles behind the process of selection. On the basis of statistical 
research, he concluded that patterns of enforcement were always chang-
ing and were determined by the mood and inclinations of jury, judge, and 
Crown. 13 Romilly now argued, moreover, that the system led in practice 
to decisions by the judge that ought to have been made, if at all, by the 
jury. He observed that in many cases where the jury convicted the 
9. Sir Samuel Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law of England (London, 1810) 
(this tract contains the substance of Romilly's speech in Parliament). 
10. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
11. See below, n. 22 and accompanying text. 
12. See above, Chapter 7, text at n. 139. 
13. Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law, pp. 16 et seq. At one point Romilly 
stated: "In this uncertain administration of justice, not only different judges act upon 
different principles, but the same judge, under the same circumstances, acts differently at 
different times" (p. 19). Several years earlier, Romilly had concluded that many capital 
felonies were the result of changes in the value of money, a severity that resulted from "no 
intention of the legislature, but altogether from accidental circumstances." Romilly, 
Memoirs, 2:230 (letter toM. Dumont, Aug. 25, 1807). 
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defendant, the bench subsequently reprieved him so that a pardon might 
be sought from the Crown. In these cases, Romilly argued, the bench 
based its decision upon facts which it itself had found. 14 Here again 
Romilly opened up a line of argument that others were to pursue. In the 
years that followed, the prevailing system of criminal administration was 
portrayed as totally unpredictable. 15 According to critics, the jury was left 
to guess what the bench might do in a given case, while the bench made 
its own assumptions about the grounds of the jury's decision. The result 
of the prevailing system of criminal justice, it was asserted, was that it 
actually produced crime. 16 In drawing this conclusion, reformers were 
perhaps fooled by the fact that there were more prosecutions in the early 
nineteenth century than in the recent past, an increase that probably 
reflected better enforcement rather than more crime. 
Romilly'sfollowers characterized the position of the jury in even more 
ironic terms. Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, argued that the jury 
was forced to adopt a kind of discretion that the jury was never intended 
to have. 17 Although this was true if one looks to the earliest period of the 
criminal trial jury, it hardly did justice to the long history of official 
acquiescence in jury mitigation of the law. Grant went on to criticize the 
exercise of discretion in a conventional manner. The law of sanctions, he 
argued, forced jurors to violate their consciences. 18 He played on the 
famous phrase, "pious peijury": like many of Blackstone's successors, 
Grant took the term "perjury" very seriously. He suggested that juries 
did not trust others to use discretion and so took it upon themselves; 
indeed, he noted, judges encouraged juries to do so. Grant seems not to 
have supposed that this kind of judicial steering of juries produced a fairly 
predictable scheme of resolutions. Rather he saw it only as contributing to 
the jury's dilemma.I9 
The dilemma of the criminal trial jury was often alluded to by early 
nineteenth-century law reformers in their argument for reform of the law 
14. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
15. See e.g. Lord Brougham's review of Romilly's published speech in The Edinburgh 
Review, vol. 19 (Edinburgh, 1811), pp. 396-97; John William Polidori, "On the Punishment 
of Death," in The Pamphleteer, vol. 8, no. 15 (London, 1816), p. 294. 
16. E.g. A Brief Address to the People of England on the Criminal Law (London, 1827), 
p. 10. 
17. Sir William Grant: speech in Parliament, 1811. Hansard, ed., Parliamentary History, 
vol. 19, App., cols. lxvi-lxvii. 
18. Ibid., p. 13. 
19. Idem: "Ought laws to be so framed that there must be a continual struggle in the 
minds of your jurymen? ... [Jurors] can not be unmindful of the lenity of the judges; but 
notwithstanding this, they are unwilling to risk anything: they will not trust to another the 
use of a discretion which they have the power and disposition to exercise themselves." See 
also Romilly, Memoirs, 2:230 (letter to Dumont, Aug. 25, 1807). 
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of sanctions. In 1819, and again in the 1830s and 1840s, parliamentary 
committees produced reports on the criminal law which portrayed pros-
ecutors and jurors in the most sympathetic fashion. They had been left, it 
was asserted, to implement a system that was essentially unworkable, 
unfair, and counterproductive.2o Parliamentary deliberations may have 
been influenced by the testimony of victims of crime, especially artisans 
and other men of small commerce, who had come to see the role of the 
jury in the same way that reformers saw it. Prospective victims petitioned 
Parliament for reform of the law of sanctions, asking that the death 
sentence be removed from offenses against their property so that of-
fenders would be more likely to suffer some substantial punishment and 
the law would be more likely to deter criminal behavior.21 Grand jurors 
and trial jurors also joined the clamor for reform. They too petitioned 
Parliament, urging reform that would save jurors from the dilemma that it 
now seemed nearly everyone agreed was their awful fate.22 
The movements for reform of the police system and for reform of the 
law of sanctions coincided with the movement for reform of prisons.23 
Transportation to the American colonies had ended abruptly with the 
movement for independence, and for a time the English had experimented 
with incarceration of convicts in the famous "hulks" on the Thames.24 
Transportation to New South Wales began in the late eighteenth century, 
but by then the movement for incarceration and rehabilitation of convicts 
in English penitentiaries was already well under way. Some of the 
literature of this movement, the roots of which reach back into the 
seventeenth century, featured descriptions of life in English prisons 
where, it was claimed, conditions were brutal and virtually calculated to 
produce a large and hardened criminal class.zs 
One of the themes of the prison reform literature dealt with the effect on 
the criminal class of the prevailing system of sanctions. Prisoners were 
portrayed as fully aware that participants at every stage in the criminal 
process sought to prevent imposition of the harsh sanctions provided for 
by law. In 1831, Edward Wakefield, who had spent time in Newgate, 
20. See e.g. "Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Laws," July 8, 1819, in 
Parliamentary Papers, (585), vol. 8 (1819), pp. 3 et seq.; "Second Report from His 
Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law,'' June 9, 1836, in Parliamentary Papers, vol. 36 
(1836), pp. 183 et seq. 
21. See e.g. "The Petition of the Master Calico Printers in the Vicinity of London" (Feb. 
27, 1811), reprinted in Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, 1: App. 4, p. 727. 
22. See "The London Jurors' Petition" (Sept. 6, 1831), reprinted in ibid., pp. 731-32. 
23. The literature on the subject of prison reform is vast. For excellent recent accounts 
see Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 
1750-1850 (London, 1978); Beattie, Crime and the Courts, chs. 10-12. 
24. Ignatieff, Just Measure of Pain, pp. 80-81. 
25. See e.g. Hanway, Distributive Justice and Mercy, pp. 28 et seq. 
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described a world in which there was remarkably little fear of the law.z6 
Suspects knew, Wakefield claimed, how to play on the sympathies of 
prosecutors; it was common knowledge, apparently, that a prosecutor 
who wanted neither to put a suspect's life in jeopardy nor to forfeit his 
own recognizance could be convinced to go through "the form of [his] 
part in the prosecution, taking care to shape [his] evidence in favor of the 
accused. " 27 Suspects also knew, Wakefield alleged, that judges and jurors 
constantly nullify the law, by saving from capital convictions, one 
whom they believe to be capitally guilty. This occurs so frequently, and 
is so fully brought to the knowledge of the public, in the reports of trials 
at every Old Bailey sessions, and at every country assize, that I am 
unwilling to dwell on it at any length. 28 
Wakefield described mock trials held by the prisoners in Newgate in 
which the prisoners took the parts of judge, jury, and witnesses, and the 
prisoner at the bar: "On these occasions the prisoners show a remarkable 
knowledge of the temper of judges and juries, being in the habit of 
acquitting many prisoners whom they knew to be guilty.' ' 29 
The parliamentary committees on reform of the criminal law had a 
virtual field day with this kind of material. At the very moment that the 
nation was establishing a professional police force, it was-or so it 
seemed-continuing to indulge a system of prosecution, trial, and sen-
tencing that bred disrespect for the law and the notion among the 
criminals themselves that, having been made the subject of mitigation, 
they could continue to breach the law with impunity. Doubtless the select 
committees that issued reports in 1819 and in 1836 interviewed persons 
who said what the committee members wanted to hear: the evidence that 
the committees compiled was remarkably one-sided. The testimony of 
suspects and convicts was nevertheless of some real importance. To the 
assertion that juries were faced with an awful dilemma was added the 
charge that juries were mocked by the very persons whose lives they 
spared. Apparently, capital sanctions failed to produce the terror they had 
been intended to produce, and the administration of the criminal law was 
undermining any real possibility of true rehabilitation. Far from inculcat-
ing religious values, the system was making a mockery of them. The jury 
was not, of course, the only participant in this ill-begotten system of 
criminal justice. But it was a participant whose behavior was difficult to 
modify. A developing police force could be depended upon to take over 
26. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Facts Relating to the Punishment of Death in the 
Metropolis (London, 1831). 
27. Ibid., p. 58. 
28. Ibid., p. 61. 
29. Ibid., p. 62. 
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the role of defaulting or half-hearted prosecutors, and the bench and other 
officers of the Crown might respond to Parliament's concerns. But the 
jury could be reached only through reform of the law of sanctions itself. 
Not all members of Parliament were in agreement that there ought to be 
reform. There were those who interpreted statistics showing more numer-
ous convictions for property crimes after the first, limited reduction of 
capital sanctions as indicating an increase in the number of those crimes 
rather than as a greater willingness on the part of jurors to comply with 
the letter of the law once the death penalty was no longer an issue. In the 
end, however, such doubters were unable to resist the tide of reform. By 
1840 Parliament had added large-scale reform of the law of sanctions to 
reform of policing and incarceration.30 
Reform of the law of sanctions had an immediate impact on jury 
behavior in many trials for felony. Parliament had largely removed the 
need for massive and daily jury-based intervention on behalf of criminal 
defendants. This development coincided also with the gradual trans-
formation of the trial itself from a kind of morality play in which the 
defendant spoke on his behalf in full sight of the jury to a more impersonal 
and more highly structured trial in which the defendant was represented 
by counsel and where rules of admissibility governed the presentation of 
the evidence to the jury. A new world of criminal justice was being 
ushered in; the old one had surely drawn to a close when, in the light of 
widely held views, it seemed plausible to say that, after all, the jury had 
never been intended to be a discretionary body. 
II 
Jury-based intervention did not end in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. It remains a pervasive and vital aspect of the (so-called) 
fact-finding process even in lesser felonies, where life is not at stake. In 
that setting, however, it has not always been noticed. Perhaps jurors 
themselves are, typically, unaware of the degree to which discretion 
creeps into the fact-finding process. It was the sanction of death that made 
jury law-finding in routine cases an important and recognized aspect of 
English culture. Jury mitigation of the law soon passed from public 
consciousness, save for episodic reappearances in what society has taken 
to be special circumstances. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
historians made relatively little of the fact that a tradition of jury 
intervention in common-run felonies had for centuries been central to the 
administration of the criminal law. Until recently, historians have por-
30. For a listing of capital statutes as of 1839 see Radzinowicz, History of English 
Criminal Law, 1:733-34. 
364 Resolutions 
trayed jury law-finding mainly as a matter of resistance to authorities in 
political cases, and they have viewed those cases in isolation from the 
general run of jury trials. They have viewed jury nullification the way they 
have viewed monarchical depositions: as sudden outbursts, undertaken in 
extreme circumstances, and seemingly lacking a basis in daily practices 
and attitudes. 
It seems fitting that the foundation for the abolition of open and massive 
jury intervention was laid in the course of the debate over reform of the 
English police system. In earliest times the jury had played an evidence-
gathering role, making up for the Crown's lack of policing and prosecuto-
rial capacity. Subsequently that role was played by justices of the peace, 
constables, and the other minor officials that composed England's 
protopolice force. The limits of that meager force were widely recog-
nized. Although authorities came to possess the capacity to gather 
evidence in cases that were scheduled for trial, they remained largely 
reactive, lacking the strength and numbers to prevent criminal activity. 
Partly for that reason, capital sanctions were maintained. The main-
tenance of those sanctions in turn made continuation of jury intervention 
inevitable. The development of the prosecution was a gradual process. 
Only very slowly did authorities achieve the capacity to control the jury, 
and even when they had done so there were reasons for allowing the jury 
to share the power of mitigation. The transformation of criminal proce-
dure in the early modern period thus eventuated in a system of trial 
wherein juries that no longer controlled the production of evidence 
nevertheless frequently and openly rendered verdicts against the evi-
dence produced in court. The struggle for control of the law was by that 
time very complex. The jury was coming to be a quasi-arm of the bench 
even as it remained an extension of society. At one level, procedural 
developments touching the jury reflected the fact that the criminal process 
was becoming increasingly formal; at another level, the jury remained a 
mediating institution that served multiple interests. 
It is difficult to determine precisely how this two-sided relationship 
between authority and the jury began. I have characterized the jury as 
possessing the greatest degree of power during the medieval period. But 
it must be remembered that in those times the Crown and bench were 
relatively weak, so that the advantage they stood to gain from an alliance 
with men of substance in the local community was correspondingly great. 
Moreover, even if before the sixteenth century the bench could not have 
prevented jurors from behaving as they did, authorities may nonetheless 
have benefited from that behavior and felt little inclination to prevent it. 
I have suggested that, in the main, legislative and judicial devices for 
controlling the jury were not created in order to deal with jury-based 
intervention that took the relatively benign form of merciful verdicts in 
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run-of-the-mill cases. Authorities did not seek to end that aspect of the 
jury's role; rather they sought to manage it, to set clear limits to its 
operation, and to create the means whereby they could monitor verdicts 
for what they considered true abuses. 
By the eighteenth century authorities had gained so much control over 
the practice of jury-based mitigation that it had become an integral aspect 
of the official sentencing procedure. In form, of course, the jury continued 
to determine only the question of guilt or innocence, and it was in part the 
fiction so frequently involved in this aspect of its role that was bringing 
jury-based intervention into disrepute. By then, too, it had become clear 
just how powerful the jury could be. Its place in the constitution had been 
marked out in the constitutional and political crises of the seventeenth 
century and again in the late eighteenth century during the debate over the 
law of seditious libel. The constitutional role of the jury combined with 
the long-standing ethic of jury-based intervention in routine cases to 
produce a formidable political and legal ideology. Yet at a deeper level, an 
increasingly widespread concern for clarity, certainty, and predictability 
of the law-a concern shared by both proponents and opponents of 
reform-was feeding into the stream of opposition to jury-based discre-
tion. 
Reform of the libel law took the wind out of the sails of the movement 
for the right of the jury to find law (though not out of the tradition of 
resistance to unpopular political prosecutions, as the acquittals of, inter 
alia, Hardy, Tooke, Thelwall, and Hone demonstrate). Although the 
claim to that right was reasserted during the next decade, by and large 
conferral of the power to render a general verdict altered the nature of 
discourse concerning the jury. Jury discretion in seditious libel could now 
be concealed within the fact-finding process, as it had long been con-
cealed in treason. Arguments might arise over the definition of the law, 
but they would be resolved by legislative decree or judicial elaboration of 
existing standards. True jury nullification (as distinct from discretionary, 
merciful verdicts) would continue episodically. But so long as such 
verdicts remained concealed or, if open, ad hoc and unaccompanied by a 
general claim to a right to find law, they could be-and down to our own 
day have been-accepted as anomalies and as one of the costs of the jury 
system. Ultimately, the reform of the law of sanctions had a similar 
impact on the tradition of merciful verdicts in routine felonies: by the later 
nineteenth century, jury discretion had largely been hidden from view. 
Moreover, the period of intense reform activity and criticism on all sides 
of the jury's supposed "dilemma" had conditioned much of society to 
think in terms of the jury's responsibility to adhere to the rule of law. 
It is impossible to ascribe the demise of discretionary fact-finding (or 
law-finding) to a single cause. Reform of the law of sanctions was, of 
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course, crucial, but that reform came about only after the assumptions 
that underlay the preexisting system were somehow no longer tenable. 
We have seen that the reform of the police system played a significant, 
albeit indirect and catalytic role, as did the movement for reform of 
English prisons. The emphases in the new penology on humanity and on 
the certainty of the law were also significant: what began as a claim that 
certainty was required for reasons of deterrence ended as a claim that 
certainty was necessary for fairness to the defendant. Rationality regard-
ing penology was closely related to rationality regarding the nature of the 
trial itself. The sequencing of the trial in the early eighteenth century may 
have resulted from developments in the law of evidence, including the 
rules regarding the burden of going forward and the burden of proof, But 
the law of evidence developed more rapidly in the nineteenth century 
when Englishmen were no longer satisfied with a cumbersome system of 
posttrial reprieve and royal pardon on grounds of an unsafe verdict. It is 
possible that the law of evidence developed only after changes had been 
effected in policing, in sanctions, and in the structure of jury trial, but 
jurisprudence probably led as much as it followed. One might speculate 
that the increasing recourse to counsel by defendants was crucial for the 
development of the law of evidence, a development that probably 
predated the acceptance of other reform demands. In the end, however, 
although we can roughly date the close of the centuries-long phase of jury 
trial history that we have traced, we can as yet do little more. We await 
an informed analysis of the manner in which the end of that phase came 
about; the much-needed history of the rise of the modern trial has yet to 
be written. 
III 
The movement for reform of the law of sanctions prepared the way for 
the modern view regarding the role of the criminal trial jury. The 
traditional view eroded suddenly, reflecting its fragility and inducing us to 
forget how long it had endured and how deeply it had been embedded in 
the English culture. We would do well, therefore, to end our study of the 
interplay of institutions, ideas, and behavior with a lengthy retrospective. 
I should state at the outset that I have sought in these chapters not only 
to answer some difficult questions but also to raise others for which I have 
found no satisfactory answer. I shall in the course of my summation 
review some of the unresolved problems that I have identified. This 
review will, I hope, make clear the limits of the present work, and thereby 
help to set a research agenda for those who share my particular interest 
and approach to the social and intellectual history of the criminal law and 
the criminal trial jury. 
Epilogue and Conclusion 367 
I have discussed the origin and early development of the criminal trial 
jury against the background of what I have called the Angevin transforma-
tion in the criminal law. That transformation-the gradual absorption into 
royal jurisdiction of virtually all felonies-prepared the way for a near-
universal capital sanction. Why did the Crown embark on such a harsh 
sanctions policy? To what extent did authorities expect compliance? 
From one point of view, the capital sanction merely represented a return 
to an older and more primitive approach to the criminal law. The 
Anglo-Saxon system of relatively moderate punishment (i.e., monetary 
composition) had developed as a result of the Crown's interest, and 
perhaps that of society generally, in stemming the more ancient practice 
of the feud. We must not forget that for those few most serious offenses 
over which the Crown even in Anglo-Saxon times exercised exclusive 
jurisdiction, punishment was typically capital. One might conjecture that 
so long as the Crown had a monopoly on punishment, that punishment 
would be very severe. 
On yet another view, the Angevins and their successors sought to make 
the strongest possible statement against criminal activity, but believed 
that enforcement ought to take account of both the circumstances in 
which offenses had been committed and the reputation of the offender. 
Roger Groot has shown that, at least in practice, the presentment jury 
undertook a good deal of selection among offenders. The presentment 
jury first named all those who were accused and then named those whom 
they truly suspected. The evidence does not allow for the conclusion that 
the presenters exercised discretion and stated that they did not suspect 
some persons whom they in fact suspected but chose mercifully (or on 
any other grounds) to exonerate. I have suggested, however, that we 
should not be surprised to discover that the presentment jury did operate 
on this basis. As I have tried to show, the trial jury did play such a role 
and played it in an expansive fashion. One must consider the adoption of 
the trial jury (and even the adoption of the harsh law of sanctions) in light 
of earlier experience with jury-like institutions. It is possible that, by the 
1220s, the Crown assumed that trial juries would behave just about as 
they did. Certainly it is possible that the tension between authorities and 
· juries that I have depicted in the medieval period reflected no more than 
disagreement about the degree of discretion that ought to be exercised. 
Those who view the eighteenth-century system of criminal administra-
tion as one in which authorities made active and calculated use of 
selective enforcement might see in the twelfth-century transformation of 
the criminal law an early form of this approach to governance. Such an 
argument, it seems to me, would be difficult-though perhaps not 
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impossible-to sustain. Except in homicide, royal pardons were fairly 
unusual before the end of the thirteenth century; most selective enforce-
ment was in the hands of the jury before that time. It is possible to argue 
that the jury was itself an extension of the Crown, at least in the earliest 
period, when the trial jury was often merely a subset of the presenting 
jury. On this view the Crown struck an alliance with the most established 
free men of the local communities, placing in their hands the power of life 
and death over the populace on the countryside. By the end of the 
thirteenth century (the argument might run) the Crown was attempting to 
play a more prominent role in the granting of mercy: hence the increasing 
flow of royal pardons of grace. It would stretch the point too far to say 
that royal complaints about jury-based nonenforcement of the law were 
really aimed at shoring up the royal purchase on the power to dispense 
merciful judgments. There remains, nonetheless, fertile ground for inves-
tigation. Surely the Crown engendered deference through its use of the 
pardon, whether or not one views royal policy as involving conscious 
manipulation of the law in order to engender it. 
My own view, as the essays in Part I of this volume suggest, is that the 
Crown's participation in the process of selective enforcement came abotJt 
largely by way of accident, and that that policy was only one of many 
contradictory policies authorities pursued. It is difficult to explain the rise 
of universal capital sanctions in terms of a desire to achieve the deference 
of society through merciful nonenforcement of the law. We still know too 
little about penological theory in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
especially about Continental practices and their influence within English 
ruling circles. There is need for research on the development of capital 
sanctions, on Continental influences, and on their melding with the 
administration of the criminal law in England. 
I have suggested that authorities were well aware that juries manipu-
lated the evidence in order to give effect to their views regarding just 
deserts and that the Crown and bench were unable to prevent juries from 
playing this role. But I have also suggested that authorities were not 
particularly ill-disposed toward this form of jury behavior. Other prob-
lems must have seemed more important, and there may not have been a 
great deal of distance between lay and official views regarding the 
appropriate sanction in most of the routine cases in which jurors exer-
cised discretion. It is even possible that from fairly early on the Crown 
actively encouraged juries to play the role that I have described. Although 
judicial encouragement of jury mitigation of sanctions does not become 
visible to us until the sixteenth century, there is no reason to believe that 
this tradition began so late. The development of the prosecution and of 
means to control the jury made judicial participation in merciful verdicts 
in "appropriate cases" more affordable, but the Crown and bench had 
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probably long before not only acquiesced in social standards but upon 
occasion encouraged them. It is true that one would expect to find some 
indication of this attitude in Bracton, Placita Carone, or in other law 
books of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But the fact that one 
does not is hardly conclusive. To say the least, the last word has not been 
written on the role of medieval institutions in the granting of mercy. It is 
no longer so fashionable as it once was to focus on the machinery of the 
criminal law or on theories of kingship and justice in the Middle Ages. 
Attention has shifted to the sociology of crime, surely an important 
subject. Somehow bridges must be created among all these fields. The 
bridge I have attempted to create through an analysis of the judges' 
shaping of the law of homicide is no more than a beginning. 
2 
Crucial to the developments I have traced is the origin of the investiga-
tive activities of the justices of the peace and the place of those activities 
in the transformation of criminal procedure in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Although the developments involved were not under-
taken in a conscious attempt to reduce trial jury discretion, they contrib-
uted indirectly to that end. Thus it was in this period that authorities 
largely brought the trial jury under their control. I have argued that the 
form of control that emerged allowed for a substantial degree of jury 
discretion. Although judges frequently steered juries not only to convict 
but also to acquit or to render a partial verdict, they did so in a way that 
preserved to some extent the reality and to a large extent the psychology 
of trial jury independence. This last proposition is, of course, the most 
difficult to prove. The leading authority on criminal procedure and jury 
trial in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries believes that juries 
exercised very little independence even in the assessment of questions of 
fact. In James Cockburn's view, juries knew what result the bench 
thought appropriate and gave their verdicts accordingly, so that, in effect, 
what appears to be jury independence was in reality fairly automatic jury 
ratification of judicially mandated mitigation. I have outlined the difficul-
ties involved in this reading of the evidence relating to criminal assizes. 
Beyond the realm of this study, there is also evidence, effectively 
marshaled by Cynthia Herrup, that in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries juries exercised very substantial discretion at 
quarter sessions, particularly in relatively minor cases, either on their 
own or by leave (but not solely on the order) of the bench. Although we 
must be cautious about generalizing from jury behavior where life was not 
at stake to jury behavior in capital offenses, it is difficult to imagine that 
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society did not develop expectations about jury practice on the basis of 
the very common use of the jury in relatively minor cases. 
I have dwelled at length on changes in substantive law and the law of 
sanctions that I believe reflected attempts to accommodate long-standing 
social attitudes. Although these changes reduced the need for jury 
discretion, they recognized the implicit or "silent" power of the Tudor-
Stuart jury; i.e., as the law (and especially its judicial application) was 
brought into closer conformity with deep-seated and long-manifested 
social attitudes about just deserts, and so long as the bench recognized the 
limits that those attitudes established, the new instruments of control 
could develop and be applied with relatively little tension. These changes 
in legal rules and sanctions recognized also the realities of pretrial stages 
where the community as well as royal officials played a role in sorting out 
potential defendants. Research (now underway) that embraces the admin-
istration of the criminal law at all levels, and that analyzes that adminis-
tration in terms of prevailing social and religious attitudes toward crime 
and criminals, will, I believe, support my view of a complex and 
two-sided judge-jury relationship. I suspect, however, that it will also lay 
bare, in a way I have not, the influence of local politics and the contest 
among central and local authorities for control over jury selection and 
over jury resolution of many kinds of cases. Jury independence from 
royal officials may often have reflected jury dependence upon local ones. 
It remains likely that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
criminal assize juries behaved largely as they did in the following century. 
That is, juries were frequently influenced by the bench, and usually 
resolved cases in a way the bench approved of, but in many cases were 
left by the bench to determine the matter on their own. And even where 
the bench revealed its view of how a case ought to be resolved, it left the 
jury in a position whereby it might resolve the case as though it were 
resolving it for itself. Juries both followed the bench-i.e., took their view 
oi the case largely from the bench-and believed they were making their 
own assessment both as to fact and as to the appropriate sentence. From 
the perspective of the jury, the judge's view was simply one very 
important consideration that ought to be taken into account. That, at 
least, is the way many contemporaries viewed the process in the 
eighteenth century, when the tools for steering the jury were just as 
strong, if not stro1ger. It is unlikely that in the earlier period jurors (and 
the denizens of England's local communities who observed them) thought 
juries played a less significant role. 
Mid-seventeenth-century writings on the jury are an important source 
of evidence about contemporary perceptions of the institution and its 
behavior. As we have seen, this evidence, too, is ambiguous. Some 
evidence for the existence of the most basic form of jury independence 
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resides in the tracts attacking the jury as composed of know-nothings and 
asserting that there were not enough qualified persons to serve. Had 
jurors simply ratified explicit judicial mandates, the deficiencies of jurors 
would have been less obvious and seemed less important. But this does 
not prove that jurors went beyond the finding of fact; it may prove no 
more than that some contemporaries doubted jurors' capacity to make 
accurate factual assessments independently. 
The Interregnum tracts that argued for greater jury power pose even 
more difficult problems. These radical jury tracts clearly reflect the view 
that, at least in political cases, the bench steered juries far too strongly. 
But what of trials in more routine felonies? For the most part, the tracts 
place the true law-finding jury deep in the historical past; it cannot be 
found-one infers from the tracts-at the contemporary assize or quarter-
session proceedings. But the tract writers equated true law-finding with a 
degree and form of jury power that we are certain did not exist in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The tracts simply do not speak 
directly to the question of whether juries in routine cases exercised some 
more modest degree of discretion. 
It is by no means clear why radical jury proponents were inattentive to 
the jury practices I have traced. Were they unfamiliar with the handling of 
criminal cases at assizes and quarter-sessions? Or should we conclude 
that juries did not exercise even the modest kind of discretion in routine 
cases that I have labored to show that they did exercise? My tentative 
view is that these writers probably were aware of contemporary practices 
but that, from their perspective, those practices were barely worth 
discussion. For what authorities saw as nearly too much jury autonomy, 
radical jury writers viewed as far too little. How had this come about? 
I have suggested that the early modern bench steered juries, that jury 
discretion was to a large degree undertaken with judicial leave or 
encouragement, and that the local community largely accepted this 
judicial role. For the most part, the community believed it was doing 
justice as much on its own terms as was appropriate. Those relatively few 
political dissidents who strenuously opposed the common-law bench-as 
the radical jury writers certainly did-perhaps viewed the modest degree 
of jury-based discretion that characterized routine felony trials as a mere 
remnant of what they supposed was a once fully manifested, God-given 
duty. In their view, that duty had become a peripheral, judicially 
manipulated power; no longer was it the very essence of the trial jury's 
right. The tract writers thus reflected the existence of an ongoing tradition 
in a curious way. Contemporary jury discretion gave them a clue to the 
jury's "true" role even while it appeared to them to have been nearly 
destroyed by the bench. 
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It is also significant that mid-seventeenth-century jury proponents 
sometimes failed to distinguish between civil and criminal trial juries. 
Like the Wilkites of the following century, the Levellers were concerned 
with private law as much-if not more-than with criminal law. Both 
groups sought a simpler, more accessible system of law to govern their 
acquisition, transfer, and protection of property. But the Levellers sought 
more than a reduction of both the mysterious forms of the common law 
and the discretionary powers of the common-law bench; they looked to 
the local community to judge cases, whether crimes, civil trespasses, or 
disputes over property rights or contracts. Lilburne's invocation of 
Littleton is of interest not only because the Leveller misread his chief 
source for the proposition that the jury possessed the right to find law. 
The jury that Lilburne (wrongly) claimed Littleton endowed with law-
finding power was a civil jury. Jurors in private-law disputes no doubt 
continued to exercise discretion in their fact-finding role, and this 
probably shaped their behavior when the same persons sat in criminal 
cases. But because of the formal separation oflaw and fact in civil cases, 
the civil jury had long before surrendered much of the power still retained 
by the criminal trial jury. How this separation had come about is beyond 
the scope of the present study. The influence of civil-jury practice upon 
criminal-trial-jury behavior, and the attitudes of contemporaries toward 
the civil jury, are, however, matters that do touch my own concerns, 
though I have left them for others to pursue. Lilburne, it seems to me, 
reflected an outmoded school of thought in his reference to the civiljury's 
law-finding power. By his day, the claim of the criminal trial jury's 
"right" to find the law mercifully, or to nullify judicial pronouncements 
upon the law, was based largely upon the fact that it was the Crown that 
brought (or stood behind) the prosecution. It was a tradition that gained 
its force from the threat of capital punishment, its justification from the 
defendant's "choice" to put himself upon the country, and its eventual 
spread to noncapital, high misdemeanors from the fact that the alleged 
"victim"-political authority-was, in one of its manifestations, the 
bench that presided over the trial and charged the jury to do justice. 
The background to Bushel's Case reveals, we have seen, the tension 
between judge and jury that sometimes accompanied the tradition of 
generally accepted de facto jury independence. In several homicide cases 
Chief Justice Kelyng challenged a kind of jury behavior that, from all one 
can determine, was not atypical. Although it is possible that the jurors 
whose verdicts he coerced had in fact been guilty of corruption, Kelyng's 
critics did not assume that was the case. Their response suggests that jury 
fact-finding was sancrosanct even when it appeared on the facts that the 
jurors had indulged in a substantial degree of discretionary decision 
making. Vaughan's opinion can best be understood against a background 
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of criminal proceedings in which judge and jury typically were in 
agreement not only on the facts but also on the merits of merciful 
discretion. The jury's right to an untrammeled general verdict could be 
vindicated precisely because there were few cases where judge and jury 
were likely to clash. I have suggested that the most important idea in 
Vaughan's opinion was not his statement that the jurors might have 
knowledge of their own but rather that the jury might see things in their 
own way. It is not clear what Vaughan meant by the term "conscience," 
but surely whether or not he was sincere Vaughan was pointing to some 
element in contemporary social thought. Vaughan's opinion suggests 
once more that the notion that the jury had an ultimate right to go its own 
way in its assessment of fact was not foreign to the period. 
But Vaughan's opinion raises as many questions as it answers. Why did 
Vaughan not allude to the most relevant aspect of the background to 
Bushel's Case? Why was he silent about the line of cases involving 
Quakers in which juries had, from the standpoint of authorities, threat-
ened the public order by making a mockery of the law and bringing 
courtroom proceedings to a virtual standstill? And why did not. Vaughan 
lay down a rule (as he might have) that placed some limits upon the jury's 
power to frustrate both the bench and the law? Vaughan's draft opinion 
leaves the impression that he had at first intended to set some limits to 
jury deviation from the facts adduced in court. Subsequently he altered 
his opinion, providing what must have seemed to contemporaries a lame 
excuse: a jury, after it had been questioned by a judge, might somehow 
have changed its mind (in the direction of innocence) in the intervening 
time. Vaughan might have ruled that a jury that rendered a verdict totally 
in the face of the evidence presented in court (as it seemed to the bench) 
but could not explain why it had done so had gone beyond legal limits. For 
reasons that are difficult to uncover, Vaughan seems ultimately to have 
responded almost viscerally to a deep-seated notion concerning the 
sanctity of the juror's conscience. It is probably true that Vaughan and his 
judicial brethren could afford to do so since there were relatively few 
cases in which jury discretion born of "conscience" might lead to real 
conflict with the bench. But that is only to affirm rather than to deny the 
existence of the concept of verdict according to conscience. 
3 
Thanks to recent research, we now know a great deal about crime and 
criminal prosecution in the eighteenth century. John Langbein has shown, 
for instance, how cut and dried the trial process could be. Because, 
however, that process was employed for "selection" of offenders for one 
or another level of punishment (as Langbein and John Beattie have 
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demonstrated), the trial inevitably took on several related but not always 
consistent social meanings. It is not surprising, for instance, that to many 
contemporaries the trial appeared to be open-ended and even arbitrary. 
Nor is it surprising that contemporaries disagreed about whether the 
judge or the jury was in control. There are, moreover, matters about 
which we cannot as yet be certain. How, e.g., did most of the populace 
view the trial? Did they identify the criminal trial jury as an extension of 
society or as an arm of authority? Did they regard jury verdicts as 
arbitrary, or did they possess a settled understanding of the kinds of 
offenders and offenses that were singled out for the various levels of 
available sanctions? Did they perceive the jury as a bulwark of liberty, or 
did they see jurors as pliant and venal (as some literary sources depicted 
them), as simply actors in a grand farce? 
I have suggested that we must be cautious about assimilating jury trial 
to those institutions and procedures by which eighteenth-century authori-
ties manipulated the affections of society at large. Although I am not 
certain that any institution or procedure ought to be viewed mainly in that 
way, some of them were handled in a manner that greatly strengthened 
the hand of authorities. However we characterize the intent of Crown and 
bench in these instances, we must distinguish the jury from other 
institutions on the basis of the effect its use had both on governance and 
on the relationship among the political and social orders of the eighteenth 
century. It is of course true that the criminal trial jury offered an 
important opportunity for cooptation of the middling and lower ranks of 
lay society. Authorities' use of the jury-and the apparent esteem in 
which the jury was held by the contemporary establishment-doubtless 
contributed to the stability of their rule. Through the jury, England's 
rulers extended the "beneficence" of the law to virtually all social orders. 
Judicial endorsement of jury verdicts was bound to enhance the position 
of authorities, whose mandates were implemented by an institution that 
many people probably viewed as reflecting the standards of society at 
large. 
It is also true, however, that the jury's usefulness to authority de-
pended upon the reality of the jury's independence both historically and 
in terms of contemporary decision making. The relationship between 
authorities and the institution of the jury was symbiotic. Authorities took 
their standards at least in part from juries; through the jury, authorities 
achieved more substantial enforcement of those standards than they 
might otherwise have achieved. Might one, then, postulate the existence 
of a ''ruling class'' that comprised the orders that served as judges, jurors, 
and prosecutors (many of whom were too poor to serve as jurors but 
sufficiently well-endowed to be the chief prey of thieves)? On such a view, 
upper, middling, and lower-middling orders created an alliance in order to 
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govern, according to their own shared standards, the lowest orders-
perhaps fully a third-of society. To a significant degree, this is an 
appropriate characterization of what actually occurred. But jurors com-
monly took their own standards from a variety of sources, and it seems 
likely that they saw the world through the eyes of frightened defendants 
even as they saw it through those of their own more insulated social 
betters with whom they presumptuously identified and whom they often 
sought to please. Jurors mediated by bringing rulers and ruled closer 
together. The standards that they accepted were for both practical and 
truly substantive reasons that much more acceptable to those above and 
below them. The power exercised by eighteenth-century authorities was 
very great, but the substance of the justice they provided, merciful as well 
as merciless, through their (unavoidable) use of juries reflected the 
interests of much of society. To put it slightly differently: authorities' 
power to determine the content of this substantive justice-to establish 
the terms upon which substantive rules would be applied-was severely 
limited, and no institution reflected this limitation more dramatically than 
the criminal trial jury. 
This limitation was reflected not only in institutional realities and in 
widespread social expectations regarding the administration of justice; it 
was reflected also in influential contemporary discourses on the English 
constitution and on the lessons of history. Although truly radical Inter-
regnum thought was never assimilated by later jury proponents, the 
nullification theory espoused by Lilburne (as of 1653), Penn, Hawles, and 
those who opposed the later Stuarts' manipulation of grand and petty 
juries achieved more than surface respectability. Having rested their 
legitimacy in part upon their defense of the historical constitution, the 
Whig government could not unilaterally determine the meaning of the 
post-1688 settlement. Eighteenth-century authorities might claim that, 
although the jury was still in use, it was no longer required as a bulwark 
against tyranny, but that claim was open to rebuttal by the political 
opposition. As I have argued, the longstanding ethic of jury discretion and 
the more episodic tradition of true jury nullification fused both in practice 
and in theory; they are not entirely separate even in the pages of so strong 
an ally of the prevailing political order as Blackstone. 
4 
I have devoted little space to the motives that underlay the mitigation 
of the law. This is of course an enormous subject, for motives varied from 
time to time and place to place. They varied, too, depending upon the 
background, character, age, and gender of the defendant (or the victim); 
upon the persons responsible in given cases for mitigating the law; and 
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upon the stage of the prosecution at which those persons undertook to do 
so. By and large, I have treated the subject only very generally. I have 
focused instead on the way the English thought about the practice of 
jury-based mitigation, and I have left to the many scholars now at work on 
the history of criminal law the tasks of analyzing and characterizing 
geographical, temporal, and other variations in the behavior of juries 
(including the important differences between the treatment of men and 
women) and of assessing that behavior in the light of the history of the 
many other stages in the enforcement of the criminal law. A truly 
comprehensive history of jury-based mitigation of the formal law awaits 
the results of these forthcoming studies. I should conclude this section, 
however, with some brief observations on the matter of motives-that is, 
the attitudes that led society to mitigate the law-and on the relationship 
between that important subject and my own study of the criminal trial 
jury. 
Students of Tudor and early Stuart England have pointed to the fit 
between, on the one hand, a system of criminal justice that announced 
legal imperatives in definitive terms but provided abundant opportunities 
for bestowing mercy and, on the other, a religious ethic that portrayed all 
men as sinners, as subject to temptation and transgression, but proffered 
opportunities for redemption to all but the worst of the fallen. Legal and 
religious systems of maintaining order and saving souls, they have 
asserted, in reality constituted a single system. Not only did society at 
large see the matter in this fashion, but authorities also explained it in 
these terms. Professor Herrup has developed this argument with particu-
lar force, characterizing Elizabethan and Jacobean enforcement of the 
criminal law as part of a religion-based process of rehabilitation, or moral 
regeneration. This seems to me, in fact, a plausible way of understanding 
the practical application oflegal rules across the entire period, 1200-1800. 
My own study of the history of the criminal trial jury points to some 
contours of the evolution of this worldview that, in some dimension, is 
with us still. The tendency to assimilate the law to prevailing religious 
notions is undoubtedly age-old. Religious and secular norms were not 
viewed as separate in the Middle Ages. Post-Reformation Puritanism 
intensified belief in the omnipresence of sin and the capacity for moral 
regeneration, but it did not mark a new departure in the identification of 
serious criminal offenses with breaches of divine command. The royal 
pardon had always carried with it-or was supposed to carry with it-the 
imprimatur of Godly Mercy; the refusal to forgive an offender, and the 
ritual of execution, were imbued with the notion that the offender was in 
the eyes of God beyond earthly redemption. 
It may be that from the outset of the common-law period it was 
assumed that a variety of institutions, the jury included, would apply the 
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law in a merciful fashion. We simply do not know how far authorities 
countenanced such behavior. At the very least, if authorities did believe 
that prosecutors, grand jurors, and trial jurors should conform to the 
formal rules of law, they also believed that the Crown should apply those 
rules in accordance with the standards of divine justice. I have suggested 
that society's reluctance to adhere to formal rules was far greater than 
authorities had at the outset assumed it would be. Indeed, society's 
disposition was apparently more merciful than that of the Crown, for 
early on the Crown left itself relatively few opportunities to intercede to 
prevent executions. Social (including religious) attitudes that were them-
selves in part-but only in part-engendered by secular and religious 
authorities combined with the relative lack of royal institutions of 
mitigation to produce a powerful degree of community intercession. 
We have seen that authorities reacted to widespread social intercession 
in a variety of ways. In some of its manifestations that reaction must be 
viewed as an attempt to monopolize and to limit the exercise of mitiga-
tion. To the extent that they were unable to do so, and especially with 
regard to those instances where they viewed the extension of mercy as 
both inevitable and just, authorities came to understand the system of 
criminal administration in terms that both accommodated the divine 
aspect of secular justice and accorded with the realities of practice. This 
is, then, how I would interpret the perspective of authorities by the Tudor 
period. Authorities had by that period made sense for themselves and for 
others of the practices over which they were coming to exert greater, 
though still far from total control. Their assimilation (to a substantial 
degree) of society's definition of the role and purpose of legal institutions 
had already taken place and so constituted one of the limiting factors that 
prevented them from willing, or attempting, a more complete form of 
control. Within the context of prevailing legal and religious norms, norms 
to which authorities gave significant degrees of definition and shape, 
authorities sought both to control and to share the power of mitigation. 
They were influenced in their views regarding both the appropriateness of 
mitigation and the institutions that ought to bestow it by the kinds of cases 
with which they were confronted and by the realities of the still-early 
stage in the evolution toward relatively greater royal control that the 
system of criminal administration had reached. 
The evolution toward royal control (I have suggested) is difficult to 
trace precisely because control came to involve manipulation of lay 
institutions, including the jury, even while the power of pronouncing the 
resolution of cases was left in lay hands. Thus it is difficult for us-as 
indeed it was for contemporaries-to determine whether the late 
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century criminal trial jury was a 
relatively independent mitigator or a relatively dependent one. Authori-
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ties and society at large probably viewed the institution differently in this 
regard; it is possible that when authorities and jury proponents clashed it 
was as much because of social assumptions about what juries did, and 
were supposed to do, as because of what, at least in most cases, juries in 
fact did. 
By the dawn of the modern era the understanding of the purpose of the 
institution of the jury may have altered in yet another significant way. 
New ways of thinking about human behavior had slowly emerged, mainly 
changing, but also weakening, the grip of religion upon society's under-
standing of the operation of the criminal law. As before, the law served to 
control and to rehabilitate, but the concept of rehabilitation was being 
transformed by the increasing emphasis upon the social origins of criminal 
behavior. Jurors sometimes took such notions into account in their 
decisions about the fate of offenders. For their part, authorities inter-
preted the jury's role as co-mitigator in terms of jurors' inclination to 
"use" the law to sort out the blameworthy at least partly in terms of the 
constraints under which offenders had acted and the likelihood that the 
new sanctions of transportation and hard labor would reform them. This 
more secular perspective on the causes of criminality and the prospects 
for reform was intimately joined with the more traditional religious 
conception of sin and redemption. Few contemporaries thought about 
them as truly separate interpretations of human behavior. But the 
implications of the new perspective should not be minimized, for that 
view contained a threat to the most crucial assumption that underlay the 
system of criminal law. 
By the eighteenth century, if not long before, some contemporaries had 
come to hold two potentially contradictory views concerning human 
behavior: offenders were the product of social circumstances; offenders 
acted freely and should be held criminally responsible for their acts. The 
prevailing system of administration of the criminal law highlighted this 
contradiction. The maintenance of the death penalty alongside an open 
search for reasons not to apply it focused attention on, among other 
things, the degree of constraint under which a given offender had acted. 
Authorities, and apparently much of English society, accepted the fact 
that such constraints were very powerful. The pardon process itself, and 
certainly the reasons for which many pardons were granted, testified to 
this understanding of the nature of much human behavior. 
Critics of the prevailing system made their own use of the same insight: 
the death penalty was unjust in many cases because the criminal was a 
mere product of his background-his upbringing, associates, and needs. 
At the same time, it was assumed that there was a realm within which 
people acted freely. Few writers attempted to draw a line between the act 
for which one was responsible and the act for which one was not. It was 
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as though most critics assumed that, with reform of the law of sanctions, 
the problem of constraint would melt away. They seem to have shared an 
almost universal view that the disparity between the nature of the offense 
and the level of the proposed punishment determined the relevance of 
evidence bearing on the defendant's freedom to have done otherwise than 
he did. But this was neither a new phenomenon nor one that died with the 
reforms of the nineteenth century. Perhaps we will come closer to 
understanding this aspect of eighteenth-century English mentality when 
we consider the way in which the same contradiction prevails in our own 
assumptions and language regarding criminal justice. 
It is conventional to say that we believe that nearly all offenders-
indeed nearly all persons-are mainly free, and thus mainly responsible 
for their acts, save for the few "insane" who, we agree, bear no 
responsibility at all. Some, we believe, are more free than others, and it 
is the degree of freedom or nonfreedom that we, like those before us, take 
into account. The sanction of death is reserved, on this view, for those 
whose acts are, as it seems to us, both extremely serious and at least 
substantially free. That is a modern view, but it is useful to keep it in mind 
as one studies the history of criminal law from medieval to modern times. 
IV 
The foregoing essays explore various aspects of the history of verdict 
"according to conscience," stressing the relationships among them. 
These relationships are often difficult to establish, for the various motives 
they reflect were not always separate in the minds of jurors, officials, or 
contemporary observors. 
I have given considerable attention to the idea of the jury as a bulwark 
against tyranny, an idea that, from the seventeenth century until recently, 
has loomed large in historical scholarship. But I have attempted to 
demonstrate that this traditional view does not capture what was behav-
iorally the most significant aspect of the jury's place in medieval and early 
modern English culture. Pride of place must be reserved for the jury's role 
as a mitigator of capital sanctions in felony trials. This aspect of jury 
history, which bears a complicated relationship to the political role of the 
jury, is itself a multifaceted phenomenon. 
We can best understand jury mitigation by focusing on jurors' attitudes 
regarding the appropriateness of punishment for specific defendants who 
had acted in particular ways. The most prevalent attitude was, in its most 
general form, a belief that the defendant did not deserve as harsh a 
punishment as the law provided. Such a belief is, of course, consistent 
with any number of specific attitudes toward the defendant or his 
behavior. For example, the defendant's peers may view his act as lawful, 
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or they may view it as unlawful but not so serious as to merit the 
prescribed sanction. The latter, by far the more common view, may 
reflect either the view that the defendant has suffered enough or the view 
that, although the defendant has not suffered enough, the prescribed 
sanction would make him suffer too much. Either stance may spring from 
the common feeling that defendants deserve mercy if they repent of their 
behavior and/or if their behavior was in some significant degree the 
product of forces beyond their control. 
In studying the effects of these aspects of jury behavior, I have 
developed several main themes. First, I have sought to show that the 
jury's role as mitigator was a by-product of institutional arrangements 
that were themselves (albeit indirectly) the result of the tensions between 
legal rules and social norms occasioned by the Angevin revolution. To a 
certain extent, the political implications of those tensions would in any 
case have made it difficult for authorities to develop an administration of 
the criminal law that was managed entirely by officials and so contributed 
to the need for a jury-like institution. But the existing weaknesses in 
English bureaucratic and policing capacities perhaps counted even more 
heavily: simply put, lay cooperation was required at every stage in the 
legal process. Once the institution of the jury came into being, both 
jury-based intervention and a struggle to limit its reach were virtually 
inevitable. 
Second, the history of legal doctrine was itself affected by the inter-
action of legal and social tensions with the institutional arrangements 
embedded in the administration of the criminal law. The law of homicide 
and the rules of forfeiture and of statutory benefit of clergy reflected 
responses to social realities. Tensions were muted not by head-on 
collisions between judge and jury but by the manipulation of categories, 
by the creation of alternative punishments, and by the powerful ethos 
inherent in the ritual and substance of the royal pardon. The evolution of 
the substantive criminal law cannot be understood apart from social 
processes; yet the relationship between the doctrine of the criminal law 
and other social processes was so complicated that we may never be able 
to sort out fully the strands of that relationship. 
Third, the ideology of jury mitigation (the more modest law-finding 
tradition) was relatively stable even though the specific motives that 
underlay mitigation were ever-changing. The community's attitudes 
toward criminal offenders were in part a product of transient notions 
regarding appropriate behavior, but they were also a product of more 
enduring relationships between individuals and society. Those attitudes 
were, moreover, in part a product of the very fact of jury participation. 
Institutional realities created or reinforced social norms and expectations. 
Man was not simply to be judged but, apparently, to be judged by his 
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fellowmen. He might be the subject of divine mercy, but divine mercy 
was to be granted not only through God's vicar, the king, but also through 
all of God's subjects, the community as represented by the jury. Secular 
and religious authorities might help define the concept of mercy in cases 
in which juries participated, but so, too, did both episodic movements and 
longstanding traditions within the community at large. Verdicts that were 
at one level routine, even cynical, repudiations of the capital law and that 
registered instead approval of a harsh, lesser sanction were conceptual-
ized (or at least rationalized) by participants and by both lay and learned 
observers in terms of the prevailing understanding of merciful verdicts 
according to conscience. 
Fourth, the more radical tradition of the jury as judges of law as well as 
fact underwent important changes between the time of Lilburne' s first 
trial and passage of Fox's Libel Act. It was a tradition born of, and 
influenced by, English constitutional and political conflict. The criminal 
trial jury came to represent the community in the face of (allegedly) 
tyrannical or otherwise illegitimate authority, and as concepts of political 
legitimacy changed, so too did the radical conception of the jury's 
law-finding role: from the true and sole judges to monitors of a legitimate 
but potentially abusive bench. Appeals to history played an especially 
important role in this tradition: the Levellers invoked an equalitarian 
Anglo-Saxon past; Rawles drew upon the ''persecutions'' of Lilburne and 
Penn; many Hanoverian critics of seditious libel doctrine took their stand 
upon the nullifyingjuries of the Restoration. The relationship between the 
radical tradition and the jury's role as mitigator in more routine cases was 
complex. We are still far from understanding the influence of jury-based 
mitigation on Leveller thought. Vaughan's defense of uncoerced fact-
finding was open to misappropriation by political dissidents who probably 
cared little about the fate of common-run thieves. Even among those who 
shared eighteenth-century reformers' opposition to what appeared to be 
an ad hoc system of justice, the daily role of the jury in helping to resolve 
routine cases could be turned to advantage. As the two traditions drew 
closer together, at least in some corners of contemporary political 
rhetoric, the more radical view was restated in terms that invoked the 
purposes and values implicit in the more commonplace and officially 
assimilated view-making control of the latter all the more significant to 
all concerned. 
Fifth, the struggle to define the terms on which mercy was to be 
granted, or to define the limits of appropriate jury behavior in common-
run cases, was integral to the entire administration of the criminal law. 
Authorities might manipulate some stages of that administration with 
what seems like almost a free hand. If we focus on the shaping of 
indictments by officials, on their handling of royal pardons or mitigatory 
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legislation, on the judge's role when passing sentence, or on the words 
and demeanor of royal officials at executions, we are likely to stress the 
degree to which the criminal law-and especially selective enforcement of 
that law-was an instrument of royal power. If we focus on the jury, the 
matter is more ambiguous. Although juries might be packed, harangued, 
threatened, and even, before 1670, coerced, there were always practical 
limits to the control authorities might exert. Moreover, acquiescence in 
jury intervention in some kinds of cases weakened attempts to control 
them in others. In the institution of the jury, one sees most clearly the 
dialectical aspect of the administration of the criminal law. Official 
attitudes, not only as they expressed themselves in judge-jury relations, 
but also as they were revealed in legislation, in judicial development of 
the law, and in the entire field of royal administration of both mercy and 
unforgivingness, reflected an assimilation of community attitudes. This 
fact does not vitiate the power of the concepts of class conflict and 
domination. It does suggest an approach-by no means a novel one-to 
the application of those concepts, one that might help us to understand a 
particular complex of forces at work in the English past. At least with 
respect to the use of the criminal trial jury, the phenomenon of domina-
tion might best be understood in terms of the widespread, community-
based attitudes that officialdom assimilated, in part reshaped, l:lnd then 
imposed as though they were largely of its own creation. 
Sixth, the English system of criminal administration that I have 
described involved substantial costs, only some of which were recognized 
by contemporaries. It involved a form of jury behavior that distorted and 
perhaps delayed development of the criminal law. By providing an 
opportunity for jurors to select from among those whom the law had 
doomed those whom the community would save, and those whom it 
would not, it gave vent to, and legitimated, not only merciful attitudes but 
also (we can be certain) the meanest sort of prejudices. As a result of the 
system, some judicial attempts to prevent juries from exercising mercy in 
common-run felonies were perhaps wrongly thought to reflect a taste for 
the gallows rather than principled opposition to jury law-finding and the 
belief that all mitigation ought to be left to Crown and bench. Though the 
problem of uncertainty of the law was ultimately recognized (and then 
perhaps even exaggerated by contemporaries), for long the perceived 
advantages of the approach to penology that the system accidentally 
produced delayed legal reform. Indeed, it delayed reform until jury trial 
had come to be viewed (in some quarters) as an open farce, risking the 
result that all jury discretion might come to be viewed as unlawful or 
unwise. 
Finally, the roots of mitigation are embedded not only in religious 
norms, intracommunity relationships, legal mandates, and political reali-
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ties; they are embedded also in the particular and enduring human 
response, in given cases, to excuse persons who have acted as those who 
sit in judgment of them might have acted, or with respect to whom 
(though the reason may not be clear) anger has subsided. The truly evil 
who deserve to die do so because-as it seems to jurors and other 
judges-the wrongs they have done are "unforgivable," which is to say, 
beyond earthly redemption. However, the perception of what is unforgiv-
able is colored by personal and status relationships to the accused and the 
degree to which those who judge him are able to get beneath his skin, or, 
if they stand back, how much they come to understand his apparently 
criminal act as the product of forces over which he had little, if any, 
control. 
It is difficult to trace the impact that notions of constraints on human 
behavior had on both official and lay participation in the administration of 
the criminal law. By the late eighteenth century, however, the trial had 
evolved to a large degree into a sentencing process in which the element 
of social determinism undoubtedly played a significant, if sub rosa, role. 
At the same time, determination of guilt or innocence had become so 
confused with the issue of the appropriate sentence that the entire 
proceeding was subjected to scorching criticism. The reform of the law of 
sanctions in the nineteenth century lessened the pressure on juries to find 
a basis for partial or entire exculpation in evidence suggesting that the 
defendant's behavior was to a significant degree beyond his control. 
Thus, the reforms, undertaken in order to produce certainty and, thereby, 
to deter criminal behavior, had the additional virtue of safeguarding the 
notion (ought one say: fiction?) that wrongdoers typically act with 
sufficient free will as to justify their conviction. As I plan to demonstrate 
in future studies on the jury, the concept of will, and the criminal law, one 
of the most significant characteristics of modern Anglo-American juris-
prudence has been its tendency to separate the two determinations that 
the centuries-long evolution of English criminal administration had forced 
together. First the post-1850jury would determine whether the defendant 
was guilty, in the sense of having "voluntarily" committed an unlawful 
act; then the defendant would be sentenced, often (by virtue of later 
reforms) in the light of a presentencing report in which he appeared as the 
plaything of social forces. This institutional solution to the ambivalence 
about the nature of human behavior that has increasingly afflicted modern 
culture has, for better or worse, served the purposes not only of those 
who rule us but of all of us as we rule each other and ourselves. 
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judge-jury relationship, 18 n.58, 48, 49, 
110-11, 119, 124-25, 129-30, 138-40, 
146, 147, 148-49, 150-52 n.179, 
168-69, 188, 241--42, 253-54, 254--55, 
271, 278-79, 282, 284, 284--85 n.54, 
351 n.142, 370, 380; in seditious libel 
cases, Chapter 8 passim. See also 
Criminal trial: observers of, in eight-
eenth century 
local magnates and gentry serving as, 21 
n.70 
mitigation of law by, 150--52 n.179, 277, 
280--81 n.43, 306 
monitoring bailment by justices of the 
peace, 109-10 
Penn's views on role of, 229 
perspective on jury behavior, 35, 66--67, 
76, 77, 85-86, 93, 96, 98-99, 110 
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n.l05, 115, 115 n.29, 126, 128, 150-52 
n.179, 307 
questioning of jury, 67-68, 67 n.5, 68 
n.8, 81 n.48, 140 
reasons for recommending mitigation of 
law, 282 n.49, 283-84, 283 n.51, 
283-84 n.53 
right to punish jurors (before 1660), 140, 
141 nn.150-51 
role in criminal trials, 16, 18, 18 n.58, 
270-71 
suspicion regarding alleged accidental 
slayers, 91-92 
suspicion regarding alleged property de-
fenders, 84 
suspicion regarding alleged 
self-defenders, 49, 79 
Vaughan's view regarding role of, 
240-42 
Wilkite criticism of, 334 
See also Commonwealth bench· 
Westminster bench Judgment': verdict 
nothwithstanding, 277 
Junius trials, 324 
Jurisdiction, private: and criminal law, 24 
n.86 
Juror. See Criminal trial jury 
Jury. See Civil trial jury; Criminal trial 
jury; Grand jury; Presentment jury; 
Special jury 
Jury bill. See Parliament: Commons com-
mittee on jury bill; Lords' considera-
tion of jury bill 
Jury packing. See Criminal trial jury: pack-
ing of 
Justices: local, 7 n.l7, 179 
Justices of assize, Chapter 4 passim; 
270-88 passim 
Justices in eyre, 3, 6, 7, 7 n.17, 14, 47, 
178-80, 182 
Justices of gaol delivery, Chapters 2 and 3 
passim 
Justices of oyer and terminer, 21, 130, 210 
Justices of the peace, 21 n.70, 24, 34 nn.16 
and 18, 58 n.115, 61, 66, 69, 74, 364, 
369; and bail statute, 109-10; origins 
of investigatorial role of, 111-13 
Justices of trailbaston, 178 
Keeper of the peace, 21 n.70, 24, 112, 112 
n.l9, 179 
Kin, 51, 58, 80 n.42, 86 n.62; defense of, 
. 77-78, 77-78 n.34; prosecutions by, 5 
Kmg. See Crown; Royal authority 
King's Bench, Court of, 130, 141 n.150, 
168, 178-81, 206 n.19, 209, 210, 211, 
212,237,237 n.51, 241, 272 n.9, 277, 
323 
Kingship, 163; theories of, 369 
King's peace, 6 n.13, 80 n.42 
Knights, 15-16 n.47, 52 n.92 
Labor, imprisonment at hard, 191 
Laggamanni, 332 
Land registration, 157 
Larceny, 5, 6, 10, 60; grand, 127-28 n.86, 
279; grand, conviction rate for 107· 
petty, 11, 20 n.63, 107, 127-28,n.86: 
275, 279 
Last resort. See Homicide: in self-defense 
rules of ' 
Latin, 49, 162 n.28 
Law: certainty of, 309; changes in, and 
effect on judge's perspective on trial 
jury behavior, 370; changes in, and 
effect on trial jury practice, 370; 
charge of obstruction of, 114; decen-
tralization, 178-80, 185-86, 187; funda-
mental, 183, 191, 197, 224; law and 
fact joined, 260-61 n.231; law and fact 
distinguished, 169, 169 n.49, 173-75, 
184, Chapter 8 passim; Leveller view 
of nature of, 184-86; principles of de-
velopment of, 93-94; "true," and 
Quakers, 207-8; whether knowable 
339-40. See also Anglo-Saxon; Co~­
munity; Crime; Criminal trial jury; 
Homicide; Judge; Private law; Sedi-
tious libel 
Law French, 165 
Law reform: Angevin, 6, 6 n.13; of 
Edward I, 23, 24, 86-87 n.64; 
eighteenth-century movement for, 
288-310, 354-55, 378-79; Interregnum 
movements for, 155-57, 160, 176, 180, 
186-92; nineteenth century movement 
for, 356-63. See also Hale Commis-
sion; Levellers 
Lechery, 78 n.36 
Leech's Case, 210, 210 n.35, 233, 233 
n.140, 244-45, n.177 
Leets. See Courts leet 
Legislation, 70-71; capital sanctions, 311; 
of Edward I, 23; exclusion of offenses 
from benefit of clergy, 117-18, 118 
n.49, 127 n.84, 275, 275 n.24, 280; 
qualifications for jury service, 114, 
132. See also Statutes 
Levellers, 153-59, 160, 162, 187, 332, 
371-72, 381; criticism of system of 
criminal law, 162, 162 n.28; natural 
rights theory, 164 n.32-33; opposition 
to discretion of authorities, 167 n.42; 
phases of debate over the jury, 
159-60; and Scripture, 164, n.33; un-
derstanding of history, 153 n.3, 164 
nn.32-33, 165-66; view of the bench, 
184; view of history of judiciary, 165 
n.36; view of the medieval jury, 
165-66, 198. See also Law reform: 
Interregnum movements for 
Leveller tracts. See Index of Persons and 
Places, passim 
Liberties, 7 
Literacy test: benefit of clergy, 118, 118 
n.50. See also Benefit of clergy 
Local politics, 370 
Lockeian, 332 
Magistrate, and exercise of discretion, 275 
n.23 
Magistrate, Godly, 186, 190 
Magna Carta, 13 n.39, 165, 178, 179, 180, 
181, 183, 189, 196, 219-20 n.81, 222 n. 
94, 229, 232, 257 
Malice, 12, 53, 54, 71, 93, 125, 219, 219 
n.80, 253-54 n.210, 254; aforethought, 
54, 55, 56, 74. See also De odio et 
atia 
Manifest felons. See Felons, manifest 
Manslaughter, 52, 107, 118, 118 n.49, 122, 
124, 214; as distinct from murder (six-
teenth century and after), 106-7; in-
voluntary, 124 n.78. See also Homi-
cide 
Mayor of London, Lord. See Starling, Sir 
Samuel 
Mens rea, 56, 57, 339-40 
Mercy, 5, 10 n.26, 86, 86 n.62, 99, 106, 
195, 198, 207, 245, 293-94, 307, 311, 
336, 382; characteristic of English law, 
347-48; exercised by presenting jury, 
13 n.38; and royal pardon, 24 n.88, 
Index 403 
376-77. See also Criminal trial jury: 
discretionary role; Judge: encourage-
ment of jury to mitigate 
Military service and pardon policy, 31, 70, 
72-73 n.21, 101, 146 
Misadventure. See Homicide: through ac-
cident; Infortunium 
Misdemeanor, 24, 241; high, 225, 372 
Mitigation: debate over who should exer-
cise power of, 288-310; inevitability 
of, under general capital sanction, 
308-10; system of, in eighteenth cen-
tury, 274, 280-88. See also Benefit of 
clergy; Criminal trial jury; Judge; Par-
don; Pregnancy, claim of; Reprieve; 
Royal authority; Transportation 
Moral certainty. See Evidence: standard of 
proof 
Moral regeneration, 376 
Murder, 5, 8 n.l9, 10, 35-36, 36 n.25, 45, 
50 n.80, 53-58, 53 n.95, 58 n.115, 
73-74 n.24, 214, 234, 253-54 n.210; in 
Anglo-Saxon law, 50, 53; definition of, 
in fourteenth century, 74-75, 74 n.25; 
definition of, in late fifteenth century, 
117 n.46; as distinct from manslaugh-
ter (sixteenth century and after), 
106-7; indictment for, 33, 34, 34 n.18; 
and pardon statute (1390), 33; societal 
distinction between murder and simple 
homicide, 32, 53-59 
Murdrum, 51, 53, 55, 74 n.25, 100 n.105 
Mutilation, 9, 10 
Natural justice, 295, 296 
Natural rights, 186 n.107 
Necessity: and criminal behavior, 293; as 
legal defense, 296, 297 n.96; theory of, 
in theft, 128, 128 n.87 
Negligence, 86, 87, 88 n.72, 89, 89 n.78, 
91, 124 
Neighbor, and theory of merciful jurors, 
195 
Newgate, 60 n.l27, 213 n.52, 222, 229, 
236, 362 
New Model Army, 155-56 
Norman Conquest, 4, 50, 163, 187, 189-90 
n.121 
Norman legal procedures, 164 n.32 
Norman Yoke, 162, 163, 165, 173, 189. See 
also Levellers 
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Novel disseisin, 174, 175 
Nullification, jury. See Criminal trial jury 
Oath, 7, 7 n.17, 8, 13, 19, 20 n.63, 27, 
66-67, 80 n.42, 82, 114, 189, 275 n.23, 
307, 327 n.49, 359 
Officials, local, 17 
Old Bailey, 194, 208, 213, 222, 226, 362 
Old Testament, 186, 195 
Ordeal. See Trial by ordeal 
Ordinances of !311, 70 n.14 
Outlawry, 16 n.48 
Outlaws, 30, 80, 80 nn.41-42 
Oyer and terminer, 24; commissions of, 
21, 113; trials on commissions of, 21 
n.70. See also Justices of oyer and 
terminer 
Pardon, 10 n.27, 12, 19, Chapter 2 passim, 
145, 289, 295 n.90, 304, 306, 311, 336, 
348, 366, 368, 380, 381; charters of, 
86; granted on condition (transporta-
tion), 279-80; for homicide, rules re-
garding, 30-31; and increase of crime, 
24-25 n.89; judge's request to Crown 
for pardon, 139-40, 277 n.34; of 
course (de cursu), 24 n.88, 30-31, 61 
n.l31, 70, 72-73, 75, Chapter 3 pas-
sim, 100 n.105, 117; of course, for de-
fense of kin, 77-78 n.34; of course, 
and development of law, 93; of 
course, and pardon policy, 72-73 n.21; 
of course, rules applicable to, 83, 84; 
of grace (de gratia), 24-25, 24 n.88, 
30-31' 46-47, 70-71, 73-74, 85, 99, 
116-17, 120, 280, 386; of grace, at-
tempts to restrain royal granting of, 
25, 70-76; of grace, and development 
of law, 119 n.54, 121 n.63; of grace, 
protests against, 33; of grace, and stat-
ute of 1390, 33-24, 75; reasons for 
granting, 145 n.163, 283, 283 n.50, 
301, 378; royal policy toward, and ef-
fect on jury, 59; statutory grants of, 
117 n.40, 121 n.63; terms of, 86 n.62. 
See also Military service; Statutes 
Pardonable homicide. See Homicide: 
through accident; through insanity; in 
self-defense 
Parliament, 63, 72-76, 155, 156-57, 163, 
164, 167, 167 n.43, 168, 169, 170, 171, 
172 n.63, 180, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
197, 204, 212-21 (text and notes pas-
sim), 236 n. 150, 241, 242 n.169 243 
250, 313, 322, 324, 326, 328 nn.SI-5Z, 
332, 349, 353, 356, 358, 359, 361, 363; 
attempts to limit pardons, 70 n.14, 
73-74, 73-74 n.24, 75-76; attention to 
crime, 25; bail and committal statutes, 
110-11 (see also Statutes); committee 
for reform of criminal law, 362-63; 
Commons committee on jury bill 
(1667), 221 nn.86 and 87, 238; concern 
with jury corruption, 26, 114 n.24; 
concern with serious crime, 73 n.23, 
73-74, 73-74 n.24; debate concerning 
seditious libel law, 324, 330, 330 n.62, 
331, 331 n.64, 349, 352, 352 n.147 (see 
also Statutes: Fox's Libel Act); 
Lords' consideration of jury bill 
(1667), 221 n.87; and pardon process, 
71-73, 72 n.20, 73 n.22; proceedings 
regarding Kelyng, 212-21, 232, 237, 
246, 248, 345; and qualification for 
jury service, 114, 132. See also Stat-
utes 
Parliament, and gradation of punishment. 
See Benefit of Clergy; Legislation; 
Statutes 
Partial verdict. See Verdict: partial 
Peine forte et dure, 15 
Penn and Mead's Case, 208, 243, 256. See 
also Trial: of William Penn and Wil-
liam Mead 
Penology, 190, 267, 268, 276, 368; English 
approach to, in eighteenth century, 
289; English reform movement (eight-
eenth century), special characteristics 
of, 290-91. See also Law Reform 
Peijury: by jurors, 114 n.24, 140, 242, 
359-63. See also Criminal trial jury: 
corruption of 
Petition of Right, 189, 257 
Petitions: to Parliament, protesting royal 
pardon policy, 73-74 n.24; for com-
mutation or pardon, 283, 283 n.51 
Petty assize, II, 20 n.63 
Petty larceny. See Larceny, petty 
Petty treason. See Treason, petty 
Philosophical necessity, 301-2, 301 n.l16, 
302 n.118. See also Dawes, Manasseh 
Pilfering, 292 
Pious peijury, 295, 298, 335, 360 
Piracy, 118 n.49 
Plague, 24, 69 
Plea bargains, 118 n.50, 131-32 n.lOO, 132, 
148, 150-52 n.l79 
Plea rolls. See Enrollments 
Plead, refusal to, 194. See also Peine forte 
et dure 
Pleas of the Crown. See Crown: pleas of 
Poachers, 270 
Poisoning, 50 n.80 
Police, 357-58; professional force, 362; 
system, reform of, 364 
Policing, 380 
Political offense. See Treason; Seditious 
libel 
Political prosecutions, 270 
Popish Plot, 250-51, 250 n.193, 252 
Pregnancy, claim of, 118 n.50, 186 
Premeditation, 45, 53-56, 121-22 
Presentment, 6 n.l4, 7, 7 n.17, 9, 10, 13 
n.39, 14, 17, 18-19 n.59, 21, 24, 25, 25 
n.91, 26, 51, 51 n.87, 51-52 n. 88, 52, 
98 
Presentment jury, 3-4, 7, 7 n.17, 8, 8 
nn.19-20, 9, 10, II, 11 n.30, 12 n.35, 
15, 16 n.48; and discretion, 10-11, 10 
n.26, 12, 13-14, 14 n.41, 98, 367; and 
fine for concealment of felony, 9; how 
informed, 16-17; relation to trial jury, 
13-14, 15-16. See also Grand jury 
Press, free, 341, 350 
Presumption of innocence, 274 
Printing: unlicensed, 253 n.209, 258 
Prison, 7 n.l5, 34, 52; breach of, 22-23 
n.79; at hard labor, 191; and Lilburne, 
197 n.163 
Prison reform, 160, 191 n.129, 296, 300, 
301 n.112, 309 n.52, 361, 366. See also 
Law reform; Penology 
Private law, 11, 18, 20 n.63, 188, 189, 327, 
372; complaints about, 187 
Probability. See Evidence: standard of 
proof 
Proof, method of, 7-8 n.l8. See also 
Compurgation; Criminal trial jury; 
Trial by ordeal; Trial by battle 
Property, 158, 187, 190 n.122, 227, 275, 
372; defense of, 79, 84 
Proportionality, 289 
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Prosecution, 5, 7; development of royal 
practices regarding, 108-9; malicious, 
25 n.91 
Prosecutor, private, 135, 270, 271, 275, 377 
Protectorate, 157 
Protestants, 250 
Provocation, 219, 219 n.80, 253-54 n.210; 
See also Homicide: in self-defense, 
rules of; Manslaughter; Murder 
Punishment: certainty of, 309, 383 
Punishment of jurors. See Bushel's Case; 
Coercion of jurors 
Puritan Revolution. See Civil War, English 
Puritanism, 186; and penology, 283 n.50 
Quakers, 160, 198-99, 199 n.170, 200-201, 
202-8, 209, 210-12, 215, 220, 221, 226, 
228, 229, 230, 235, 239, 248, 249 
n.192, 254, 256, 257, 373; prosecutions 
of, 209-12, 213, 215-16, 217, 220. See 
also Trial: of Quakers 
Quarter sessions, 24, Ill, 369, 371. See 
also Justices of the Peace 
Questions of fact. See Criminal trial jury: 
law-finding theory 
Questions of law. See Criminal trial jury: 
law-finding theory 
Rape, 26, 15-16 n.47, 269 
Reason and common law, 163, 171, 172 
n.63 
Reasonable doubt, beyond a. See 
Evidence: standard of proof 
Recorder of London, 213. See also Howe!, 
Sir John 
Reformation, English, 128, 185 
Rehabilitation, 191 n.129, 293, 361, 378 
Religion, and system of selective enforce-
ment of criminal law, 376-78 
Religious orders, 7 n.15 
Reprieve, 139, 145-46, 145 n.163, 239, 366. 
See also Judge 
Reputation, 7 n.l5, 8, 10, 17, 20 n.63, 26, 
58, 62, 73-74 n.24, 217, 245, 283, 283 
n.52, 287, 343, 367. See also Criminal 
trial jury: mitigation of law, motives 
for 
Respectability, 283-84 n.53 
Restitution, 191 n.l29 
Restoration, Stuart, 157, 253, 263-64, 274, 
275, 381 
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Restoration bench, 252 n.203 
Retreat, rule of, in law of self-defense, 38. 
See also Homicide: Self-defense, rules 
of 
Retrial, 277 
Rex v. Care, 253 n.208 
Rex v. Franklin, 321, 322, 341 
Rex v. Green [et al.], 251 n.20l 
Rex v. Harris, 253 n.208 
Rex v. Hood, 219 
Rex v. Langhorn, 251 n.202 
Rex v. Owen, 324 
Rex v. Selby, 210, 210 n.35 
Rex v. Stockdale, 329 n.56 
Rights, natural, 186 n.l07 
Riot, 224 n.l04, 226 
Riot Act, 308 n.l39 
Robbers, 8 n.l9, 10, 73-74 n.24, 80 n.44, 
81-82 n.49, 82-86, 94, 95 n.98; rules of 
law regarding, 30 
Robbery, 60, 75, 79, 81 n.48, 82, 84, 118 
n.49; conviction rates for homicide 
and, 62 n.l34 
Roman law, 247 
Royal authority: 
concern with serious crime, 63, 69, 70, 
102 
concern with state trials, 129, 132, 133 
control over law, special form of, in 
eighteenth century, 314-15 n.156 
and criminal law, 7 n.16 
divine right, 163 
enforcement of law, 7 
extension of mercy, 70-71 , 73, 99, 
376--78 
failure to introduce gradations in law, 
96, 99-100, 101-2 
jurisdiction of, 9, l 0, 51 
limits of power of, 4, 27, 68-69, 147, 352 
n.l4l, 350-51, 352 n.l44, 375, 377,382 
mitigation of Jaw, 267 
opposition to corruption, 28, 68 
original assumptions about role of crimi-
nal trial jury, 13, 367, 377 
and perspective on behavior of criminal 
trial jury, 26, 27,98-99, 105, 137, 140, 
147-48, 149, 368-69, 378 
and reach of legal rules, 80-81 
relationship to tradition of criminal trial 
jury discretion, 374-75 
remedies, 9 
use of criminal trial jury in administra-
tion of Jaw, 98, 364-65 
use of system of selective enforcement, 
101-2, 267, 310-15, 374, 381-82 
See also Crown; Judge 
Royal Court, 250 
Royal prerogative, 24 n.88, 30, 163 
Rump Parliament, 156--57, 192 
Rye House Plot, 250-51 
St. Asaph's Case, 328, 330, 338, 353 n.l48 
Salisbury's Case, 121-22, 121 n.62 
Sanctions, Jaw of: scope of capital, 275-76; 
movements for reform of, 160, 187, 
190, 356-63, 378-79, 383 (see also 
Law reform; Penology). See also Ex-
ecution; Imprisonment; Mutilation; 
Transportation 
Sanctuary, 80, 80 n.42, 116 n.38 
Satisfied conscience. See Evidence: stand-
ard of proof 
Saxon, 331 
Scandalum magnatum, 253 n.208 
Science, 247, 252 n.203, 274 
Scientific, 252 n.203; assessment, 274; the-
ory, 273 
Scripture, 159, 164, 164 n.33, 182-83 
n.103, 186, 190, 191-92, 191 n.130, 
191-92 n.132, 204, 207, 246, 335, 339; 
Leveller identification of, with law, 
185, 186 
Seditious activity, 222; of Quakers, 
alleged, 203, 203 n.lO, 206 
Seditious libel, 243, 249, 254, 257, 262, 262 
n.232, 263, 269, 316, Chapter 8 pas-
sim; debate over Jaw of, Chapter 8 
passim; Jaw of, 252, 253 nn.208-9, 
253-54 n.210, 255, 319-20, 321 n.11, 
342 n.117, 350 n.l38, 381; Mansfield's 
views on, 32 n.10; reform of law of, 
365; stages of the eighteenth-century 
debate concerning, 321-31; tracts con-
cerning, Chapter 8 passim (see also 
Index of Person and Places) 
Selective enforcement: criticism of, 
359-63; contemporaries' mistaken as-
sumptions about, 382; endorsement of, 
303-4; opposition to, in eighteenth 
century, 290; system of, in eighteenth 
century, 314-15 n.l56, 289-90, 374; 
use of, by royal authorities, 310-15, 
310-11 n.148. See also Criminal trial 
jury; Judge; Royal authority 
Self-defense. See Homicide: in 
self-defense; Pardon 
Sentences, in cases ending in partial ver-
dicts, 279 
Sentencing, judicial behavior at moment 
of, 306-7 
Servant: defense of master, 40, 78 n.36; 
slaying of master, 57-58 
Settlement, out of court, 9, 9 nn.24-25, 11 
n.30, 58 
Seven Bishops' Case, 263, 320, 321 n.11, 
326, 328 
Sheriff, 6, 7 nn.15 and 17, 16, 21, 52 n.92, 
61, 66, 178; tourn of, 181 
Ship Money, Case of, 241 
Simple homicide, 46, Chapters 2 and 5 pas-
sim. See also Homicide 
Social conditions. See Causes of crime 
Society for Supporters of the Bill of 
Rights, 334 
Special inquisitions, 22-23 n.79, 47-48. See 
also Inquest 
Special jury, 321 n.11, 322 
Special verdict. See Verdict, special 
Standard of proof. See Evidence: standard 
of proof 
Star Chamber, Court of, 106, 113-14, 132, 
155, 241, 245, 253, 253 n.209, 319; ex-
amination oftrialjury by, 137, 140-43, 
140-41 n.l49, 141-43 nn.l52-57, 
150-52 n.179 
State trials, 106, 120, 130, 132-33, 137, 
138, 140 
Statutes: 
52 Hen. 3, c.26 (1267): Marlborough, 100 
n.105 
6 Edw. l, c.9 (1278): Gloucester, 100 
n.105 
13 Edw. l, c.1 (1285): Winchester, 23 
n.82 
28 Edw. l, (1300): Articuli Super Cartas, 
178, 279 
2 Edw. 3, c.2 (1328): Northampton, 70 
n.14 
10 Edw. 3, c.2 (1336): limiting pardons, 
70 n.14, 73-74 n.24 
14 Edw. 3, stat. l, c.4 (1340): abolishing 
Murdrum fine, 74 n.25 
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14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c.15 (1340): limiting 
pardons, 73-74 n.24 
25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c.3 (1352): challenge 
of jurors, 22 n.75 
13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. I (1390): limiting 
pardons, 33, 56, 58 n.115, 71, 75, 75 
nn.29-30, 85 
2 Hen. 5, stat. 2, c.3 (1414): juror qualifi-
cations, 114 n.25 
11 Hen. 7, c.3 (1495): dispensing with 
grandjury, 115 
23 Hen. 8, c.13 (1531): juror qualifica-
tions, 114 n.25 
24 Hen. 8, c.15 (1532): slaying of felons, 
30 
26 Hen. 8, c.4 (1534): Welsh Marches, 
114 n.24 
1, 2 Phil. and Mary, c.13 (1554-55): bail, 
109-10, 113 
2, 3 Phil. and Mary, c.10 (1555): commit-
tal, 109-11, 113, 131 
4, 5 Phil. and Mary, c.7 (1557-58): tales, 
114 n.27 
14 Eliz., c.9 (1572): tales, 114 n.27 
14 Chas. 2, c.1 (1662): Quaker Act, 202 
16 Chas. 2, c.4 (1664): Conventicles Act, 
202-8, 216, 216 n.69, 222, 224 n.104, 
226, 227, 242, 254, 256 
4 Geo. 1, c.ll (1718): transportation, 276 
n.29, 276-77 n.30 
3 Geo. 2, c.25 (1730): juror qualifica-
tions, 271 n.4 
32 Geo. 3, c.53 (1792): act for stipendi-
ary magistracy, 358 
32 Geo. 3, c.60 (1792): Fox's Libel Act, 
252, 320, 320 n.7, 321, 330, 330 n.62, 
331, n.64, 349-50, 350 n.138, 352, 354, 
354-55 n.l52 
10 Geo. 4, c.44 (1829): police system, 
358 
Strangers, 59, 81-82 n.49 
Stuart bench, 251, 262-63 
Stuart monarchy, 153, 167, 320-21, 375 
Suicide, 92 n.92 
Suspects, 8 n.20, 10, 11, 13, 13 nn.37-38, 
14, 15, 16 n.48, 17, 22, 23, 32, 51-52 
n.88, 60 
Tales de circumstantibus, 114, 132, 133, 
322 n.l45 
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Target shooting, 88, 88 n.72, 88-89 n.76, 
89-90, 94, 123-24 
Terror and criminal law, 274, 277, 277 
n.32, 292, 308, 308 n.139, 311, 311 
n.150, 357, 362 
Testimony, 66, 119, 253-54 n.210, 270, 
272, 274, 281, 286; at coroner's in-
quest, 17; before presentment jury, 
18-19 n.59 
Theft, 9, 10 n.27, 21 n.70, 26, 59-60, 60 
n.127, 61, 62, 73 n.23, 85 n.61, 106-7, 
120, 126-27, 190, 191,269,344-45, 
363; acquittal rates, 59; conviction 
rates, 22, 22-23 n.79, 61-62, 279-80; 
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